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Germany is turning nationalistic in its approach to the debt crisis in Greece. This comes as Germans consider economic successes as Germany's, and failures in Europe, as the problems not of a united Europe but of these individual countries. The largest circulation German newspaper, Bild, suggested Greece sell the Acropolis to payoff creditors in the bond markets, and putting a estimate of $140 billion for this monument. A senior member of Merkel's party suggesting Greece sell off some of the Aegean islands. And a Bild poll showing a majority of Germans favor expelling Greece from the euro. There is not sufficient acknowledgement by German public opinion of the value to Germany of the export markets in Europe and the part they played in Germany's economic success.

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Von Mark Schieritz of Germany's Zeit Online describes the changes underway following the election campaigns in the U.S., and France, and the Brexit vote in Britain, all signalling the discontent of people left behind by the tech, capitalism, trade and globalization changes of the last two decades. The appeal of one time fringe politicians using racist slogans and divisive rhetoric to appeal to those left behind, appealing to people lacking intergenerational mobility, and without much hope for a better future, is a serious concern. People who are gullible enough, lack college education, or racially isolated so that they are not likely to look carefully at what is being offered in terms of programs and change of competing parties, and likely to overlook the hard and difficult road for corrective course of action, because of anger and pentup fears. Schieritz cites as part of this change the unanimously approved conclusion in its final declaration at the G-20 meeting in Chengdu, China- "The benefits of growth need to be shared more broadly within and among countries to promote inclusiveness." Yet this can be a sort of "too little, too late."  Bankers who are cited in an email going around Wall Street lack credibility with groups on Main Street, to people adversely affected by tech, trade and globalization changes that have been persistently ignored for over a decade, close to two decades. More convincing is the tone of Theresa May, the British prime minister's first statement outside 10 Downing Street- who spoke of the "burning injustices" and her determination to make this a top priority of her government. Still more convincing are the programs to invest $275 billion over 10 years in infrastructure put forward by the leading candidate in the U.S. presidential election of 2016, to provide easier access to public universities and colleges to those left behind, as a sure way to create new jobs and address intergenerational mobility. In fact every leading candidate had made the loss of upward mobility their central plank already in 2015, long before Trump and Sanders started their campaign. The real hope lies in western leaders Merkel, May, and Clinton, all keenly aware students of changes, all women by the way who have sensed the injustice and have the ability to come up with something new and promising for the future, after learning the lessons of the past. ...

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An internal IMF document that estimates Europe's banks are short of capital by $273 billion. IMF managing director, Christine Lagarde, tries to downplay the report by saying this is not from a stress test that the IMF conducts. In August, Lagarde, called for an "urgent recapitalization" of European banks. As France's finance minister, Lagarde, steadfastly insisted French banks were well capitalized. France worked hard to prevent requirements for significant capital reserves under the Basel III rules. The higher capital requirements were supported by the U.S.. Simon Johnson said in his blog, that as long as European banks had inadequate capital to act as a buffer against losses, European countries had no safe route for restructuring their debts.

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Laurence Peter of the BBC News describes a meeting of EU leaders in December 2016. The new Europa building with its space egg shape will be the location of the next summit in 2016, adding to a sense of history that the EU idea has witnessed since the 1950's, even optimism about far it has come at a time of a few setbacks.  He points out that Theresa May was not without persons to talk to at the meeting, though some video clips showed her looking lonely. EU president Martin Schulz said he was emotional seeing students crying after the Brexit vote, but that it was time to find solutions and not be emotional today. Lunch was offered at the meeting by Spain and Portugal, to mark the 30 years since they joined. People forget how much the European Community meant to the two countries after decades of suffering under fascist dictatorships- it meant new hope and an opportunity to set things right. Problems facing the EU today include, the frustration at the carnage in Aleppo, Syria, how to deal with Britain and Brexit, setting up an asylum system that will work, dealing with Ukraine and Russia without making the situation worse, and remaining concerns about the Greece debt crisis. ...

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The CDU convention in Leipzig, Germany passed a compromise resolution that lays the ground for a EU country to voluntarily leave the euro zone and still maintain membership in the European Union. The resolution called for changes to the Lisbon Treaty to allow a euro zone member that is "unable or unwilling to permanently obey the rules connected to the common currency... to voluntarily... leave the euro zone without leaving the European Union." Merkel told delegates that Europe must change the EU treaty to allow for strong automatic sanctions for violations of the monetary union treaty. "We need to send a clear signal. We don't whine; we don't complain. We know instead that we have a job to do." On the issue of voluntary withdrawal from the eurozone, the earlier decision by Merkel and President Sarkozy of France- when prime minister Papandreou of Greece decided to put the issue of membership to a referendum- was to tell Greece that leaving the eurozone would mean leaving the European Union. This CDU resolution provides a basis for Greece to resolve its debt problems outside the euro currency, as experts suggest....

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An account by Journal reporters based on over 25 interviews with eurozone policymakers shows how the central players in the eurozone drama acted to defend their national interests during the period April to July 2011. On one side France's president Sarkozy, Frenchman Claude Trichet at the European Central Bank, arguing in favor of the banks not to take bondholder losses or haircuts on loans made to Greece. On the other side the Bundesbanks Axel Weber, and Jens Weidman, Jurgen Stark and German Finance Minister Schauble. The Germans argued strongly for bondholder losses to take responsibility for bad loan decisions by French and German banks. French banks had committed more loans to Greece than German banks and had more at stake. German public opinion was strongly against German taxpayers paying for the losses, making German politicians insistent that European banks take losses on their bad loan decisions, or Germany would not support additional loans to Greece. Throughout April to July the two sides were locked in an impasse. The French feared losses for their banks and a Lehman Brothers bankruptcy style situation. The Germans at the Bundesbank and the Finance Ministry were equally insistent. A July 2011 summit meeting did not settle the issue. The events not covered here from the July to the December summit of eurozone leaders resulted in bondholders taking 50% haircut on loans to Greece, reducing the debt burden in Greece after austerity measures led to popular protests. The French pushed hard for the ECB or the EFSF to be allowed to make large purchases of bonds of troubled eurozone countries in an effort to protect Spain and Italy from contagion through higher bond yields. The Netherlands and Finland supported Germany's position. German bankers Weber, Weidman at the Bundesbank and Finance Minister Schauble opposed large scale buying by the ECB of Italy's and Spain's bonds and Chancellor Merkel said about a common eurobond that "this is not going to happen." Governments changed in Greece, Italy, and Spain by Dec. 2011, which committed to austerity programs and spending cuts. Italian Mario Draghi was appointed with German support as new head of the ECB. In late December 2011 Draghi launched the Long Term Financing Operation for lending unlimited amounts at 1% for three year loans to European banks and relaxing the terms to accept government bonds and other debt as collateral for loans. The effect of this was to provide a large infusion of liquidity into the banking system in Europe and drastically bring down the yields on bonds issued by Italy and Spain....

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At the height of the Eurozone crisis in December 2011, David Brooks points out that it is important not to forget what the Germans are saying in this crisis. They are arguing for truth in accounting, which the government in Greece failed to do, and which may have more to do with negative opinion in the media and with the public in Germany about Greece than any other factor. They are arguing against speculative excesses that enabled Greece to borrow recklessly. And they are making the argument that the only way to put the finances of the eurozone on a sound basis is to have the financial discipline that is necessary for a sound currency. Anthony Faiola pointed out recently that one estimate for tax evasion in Italy is $340 billion a year- Washington Post, 11/25/2011. Greece has a similiar problem, which needs to be addressed. This view has credibility and the backing of every principle of sound financial practices, irrespective of country or region. For ordinary Germans who have gone through years of wage restraint during the period of high unemployment, their attitude is captured in one German workers response to Greece's situation - when she said there are "poor children in Germany also." Years after reunification were a difficult experience for Germany, and left parts of the country still affected by the experience. The period of high unemployment is still a fresh memory, as the economic recovery is fairly recent. There is a feeling that the situation is precarious, depending on exports, as the 2009 downturn showed. These facts remain even when one considers the criticism levelled at Germany. Germany benefitted from the bubble in the economies of Southern Europe through surging exports- from a currency that was undervalued in relation to neighbors- because of the common currency. German banks lent heavily to Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, along with French and British banks, and bear responsibility for reckless lending and not doing due diligence for loans to Greece and other countries. Germany also carries the burden of memories of hyperinflation in the 1920's, and the sense along with France that partnership is necessary for peace in Europe. Germany's position on austerity measures also has one underlying weakness - if this leads to shrinking economies in southern Europe in the name of fianncial discipline, then the plan fails as tax revenues decline and budget deficits increase. Given this experience Germany faces the challenge of convincing neighbors of the need for good governance and sound spending practices for long term stability of the currency, even as it leads the effort for providing short term funding. In the short run this reaps criticism for Germany, including criticism for some members such as Greece having to leave the euro as a way to regain competitiveness and growth. Experts have suggested that this would be a better option for Greece than a shrinking economy after strong austerity measures, and the referendum proposed by former prime minister Papandreou on strict austerity measures is likely to have gone in this direction. ...

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Prof. Gorton and Prof. Metrick of the Yale School of Management review 16 scholarly studies and papers on the causes of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis in the current isue of the Journal of Economic Literature. Another article in the same journal reviews 21 books on the subject. Samuelson says the most cited causes- lax regulation and passive regulators, and the policy of home ownership that encourage the packaging and of securitization of mortgages to government sponsored agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac- are only the surface causes. If we are to explain how a whole society seemed to believe in the idea that somehow there was a way to maintain a rising tide continuously, with only small corrections over several decades, by the clever manipulation of monetary and fiscal policies; then one has to look to the hubris of economists who acted as if this was possible and the gullibility of business and a public that desperately wanted to believe as some have put it "that this time it was different," or that shrewd management of economic policy could actually bring about such a panacea. The abiding lesson is economic policies based on a better understanding of how modern industrial economies work are merely useful tools, no more no less, and there is no substitute for a good ethic, wise management and careful thinking on the part of the public, business and government, particularly for the people in leadership positions. ...

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Failure by EU leaders to take early and decisive action to reduce Greece's debt to sustainable levels in 2009. This was when the IMF report by Dutchman Bob Traa blew the cover off the Greek coverup of deteriorated finances. Policy missteps included ECB president Trichet and other EU leaders pushing austerity measures and not taking needed tough action on reducing the debt. By November 2011 a 50% reduction in debt with bondholders taking the losses is not enough to correct the situation. Greece's debt is discounted by 70% by Nov 2011. Analysts estimate an 85% reduction in Greek debt being necessary for Greece to pull through without a default.

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ECB President Mario Draghi stated in his first speech to bankers and policy makers in Frankfurt that governments in Italy, Spain and other eurozone countries need to take stronger action and stop delaying. He said: "Where is the implementation of these long-standing decisions. We should not be waiting any longer." Jens Weidmann, president of the Bundesbank stated Germany's view: "The economic costs of any form of monetary financing of public debts and deficits outweigh its benefits so clearly that it will not help to stabilize the current situation." The ECB continues to maintain limited purchases of Italian and Spanish bonds, leading to a small easing of bond yields, but has ruled out large scale purchases. ECB officials fear that taking the heat off politicians in Italy and other eurozone countries through large scale bond purchases will only lead to a lack of action on irresponsible fiscal policies. Meanwhile the debate in Germany continues with the mass circulation tabloid Bild saying calls for the ECB to act were "hysteria." The conservative leaning newspaper Die Welt says Merkel could still change her mind. Die Welt pointed out that Germans remember the hyperinflation of the 1920's as what can result from printing money to buy government issued bonds, but forget the period in the early 1930's under Chancellor Heinrich Bruning, another deeply troubling period, when deep austerity led to mass unemployment and a prolonged depression....

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John Taylor looks one step ahead of the March 2012 Greece bailout and sets up the most plausible scenario for the future. He says the risks of contagion were always exaggerated from the beginning- a planned default or restructuring of debt such as happened in Argentina in 2001, does not have the contagion risks associated with a chaotic and unplanned default as in Russia in 1998. Predicability in policy makes a huge difference, says Taylor. The European banks which stood to lose from writedowns exaggerated the fears of contagion- a process that always occurs for people who are adversely affected by writedowns- resulting in top officials in the European Union delaying the unavoidable serious restructuring. It was not until Chancellor Merkel handed Charles Dallara, who negotiated for the European banks, a note stating a demand for 50% bondholder writedown, on October 27, 2011, at EU headquarters in Brussels, did any serious writedown of debt begin. Merkel told Dallara: "this is my last offer." The July 2011 summit by contrast had only a 10% bondholder writedown in the agreement, when insolvency not illiquidity was the real issue. Walker Forelle and Meichtry, give a detailed account of what happened in the Wall Street Journal, Dec. 30, 2011. The important thing for Greece, says Taylor, is for what the IMF calls "growth enhancing structural reforms" - greater reliance on private markets, incentives, rule of law. He says this bailout won't work because IMF growth forecasts do not reflect the rapid shrinking of the Greek economy. Antonis Samaras, leader of the major opposition party, is in favor of pro-growth measures and has stated his desire to change the agreement. The 130 billion euro bailout provides 90 billion euros for recapitalizing Greece's banks, and financing the budget. This puts Greece in a situation where the political leaders win voter support by discarding the conditions from the Northern EU nations and come with a plan that is better suited for Greece. The EU in this scenario would cut off further bailout funds to Greece. Taylor sees this as the better outcome for Greece than the current situation, which leaves Greece no hope for growth, and also for the EU by getting out of bailouts that have little prospect of working. It would be difficult but doable for Greece says Taylor, because interest payments would be low and Greek banks would be recapitalized after the current March 2012 bailout. ...

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Wall Street Journal reporters Walker in Berlin, Forelle in Brussels, and Meichtry in Rome, reconstruct the events during critical days after the indecision and failure to reach agreement during the July summit of eurozone countries. This took the form of intervews with leading players and over 25 policy makers. What emerges are accounts of how Germany's Angela Merkel, daughter of a Lutheran pastor, and protege of Eurozone founder, former German chancellor Helmut Kohl, handled the crisis. Merkel was widely criticized in the media for indecision. What emerges is an account of a leader who took decisive action at key moments in the crisis- leading to the formation of new governments in Greece and Italy taking action to improve finances, and negotiations with banks represented by the International Finance Corporation leading to acceptance by banks of a 50% loss on loans to Greece to reduce Greece's unsustainable debt burden. Merkel also worked with the European Central Bank's departing president Frenchman Claude Trichet and new president Italian Mario Draghi to resist French president Sarkozy's efforts to have the ECB assume responsibility for the crisis through large scale buying of Italian and Spanish bonds; which was opposed by German public opinion as a backdoor way of having German taxpayers assume responsibility for European debt. Shown are three critical moments when Merkel intervened. In October 2011, after Italian prime minister Berlusconi reneged on promises to make pension and other reforms to improve Italian finances because of political resistance. He survived a parliamentary no-confidence vote by one vote. Merkel took the lead on October 20, by directly calling Italian President Georgio Napolitano on the phone, to urge him to take action for forming a new government in Italy. The result was Napolitano talking with all political parties to form a new government, leading to the formation of a government by a non-political figure respected in Italy, former EU commissioner Mario Monti. A day earlier, on October 19, French President Sarkozy met ECB president, Trichet, at an event honoring him as departing ECB president in Frankfurt's Alte Oper concert hall. Trichet, Merkel and Sarkozy met in a side room. Sarkozy asked for decisive help from the ECB for large scale buying of Italian and Spanish bonds to lower yields, which had reached 7% on Italian bonds. Trichet responded that the ECB's charter did not allow it to finance governments, with the meeting ending in a shouting match between the two leaders. On October 21, EU and IMF inspectors warned that Greece's debt was reaching unsustainable proportions and austerity measures alone would not work, unless the bondholders, the European banks, took losses of 60% on their excessive lending to Greece. At this point France agreed to the German position arguing for this level of bondholder haircuts or losses, fearing the prospect of large future bailouts that would jeopardize France's triple AAA credit rating. The July 2011 summit accord had only provided for 10% in losses for bondholders. On October 27, at a meeting that went past midnight, Merkel and Sarkozy called IIF head Charles Dallara, who headed negotiating for the banks, to EU headquarters in Brussels. Merkel handed Dallara an agreement containing the 50% bondholder loss demand, and told Dallara- "This is the last offer." Merkel was saying banks would be left with nothing if they rejected it and Greece defaulted. Dallara called bankers and the IIF accepted Merkel's agreement. The final moment that October came on October 31, when Greece's prime minister Papandreou said he would call a referendum on the bailout provisions and austerity measures demanded by the IMF, the EU and the ECB. Bond markets reacted negatively to the announcement fearing a rejection and a Greek default. The Group of 20 leaders was meeting in Cannes, France on Nov. 2, 2011. Papandreou was asked to come to Cannes for a pre-summit meeting. Here Merkel told Papandreou- "the real question" for the referendum was, "Do you want to be in the euro, or not?" Days later Papandreou, lacking support in Greece from political parties and opposition inside his party, submitted his resignation. A non-political figure respected in Greece, former ECB vice president, Lucas Papademos, was appointed prime minister to head a Unity government. Polls after the appointment showed three fourths of Greeks said that this was "a positive step for Greece," with Papandreou's party getting only 11% support and the opposition led by Samaras about 20%. The criticism leveled at Merkel is that Germany should take responsibility for debt throughout the euro area through the issuance of eurozone bonds or the ECB buying large amount of bonds of Spain and Italy. Merkel faced strong opposition inside Germany and from the Bundesbank to this idea. The other criticism was based on austerity measures worsening the finances of Greece because of a lack of growth in the economy, which is true; yet Germany may see the situation in Greece as taking a long time to be resolved in any event because of excessive and faulty financial management. For Italy and Spain putting finances in order was a necessity, and austerity measures should lead to short term sacrifice but improve prospects for the long term by returning the economies to growth. Another criticism is the installation of governments that lack popular or electoral support. As the polls in Greece showed the Unity government there has far greater support and public opinion blames the politicians for the huge mess. In Italy, Berlusconi was widely seen as losing popular support when he resigned. And in Spain Mariano Rajoy, the newly elected prime minister, was elected with a huge majority in parliament following winning in local government elections. Merkel also held her own party, the Chrisitian Democrats together at the recent Leipzig convention. Mario Draghi, was elected with German support to head the European Central Bank. He has long argued for better management of Italian finances as head of Italy's central bank. Draghi was able to support Merkel with carefully planned and managed actions. First to reduce interest rates to support economic growth in a slowing eurozone. Following this with the ECB's Long Term Financing Operation in late December 2011, to provide unlimited loans to European banks at 1% interest for three years in exchange for a broadened list of collateral deposited at the ECB. In a final twist in this drama, Charles Dallara, who was a key negotiator for the U.S. Treasury in setting up the Brady Bonds- that converted bad Latin American government debt owed to U.S. banks in the 1980's into long term debt with large reductions in principal owed and lower interest rates. This was in exchange for guaranteed repayment with 30 year U.S. zero coupon bonds. Dallara was now a negotiator for the banks to reduce the chance of the very same bondholder haircuts that he had negotiated in an earlier period to solve the Latin American debt crisis. Other players in the drama were Axel Weber, head of the Bundesbank, Germany's central bank, who resigned after strong and outspoken opposition to the ECB's large scale purchase of bonds of Greece, Italy and Spain. Jens Weidmann, his protege, who replaced him. And Jurgen Stark, German representative at the ECB, who also resigned in opposition to Germany assuming responsibility for eurozone debt. ...

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The IMF's changing views on the value of fiscal austerity. In the current debate about the value of fiscal austerity, there is the IMF view, a German view based on its own experience, and the views of other countries in Europe. The IMF's view has shifted over time. The IMF World Economic Outlook 2010, describes its view of the effects of austerity measures in the form of spending cuts and tax increases- "Fiscal consolidation typically has a contractionary effect on output. A fiscal consolidation equal to 1% of GDP typically reduces GDP by about 0.5% within 2 years and raises the unemployment rate by about 0.3% percentage points." Over the longer term there are benefits as the private sector is not crowded out in the search for captal funding by the excessive government borrowing. The IMF's economic models suggest that it would take 5 years before reaching the breakeven point when the benefits of austerity measures exceed the effects of austerity. The German view held by German central bankers is that the actions stimulate growth in the short term. Manfred Neumann, professor emeritus at the Institute for Economic Policy at the University of Bonn, says this is called the "German hypothesis" as it reflects the experience of Germany from austerity actions taken by Germany. Laurence Ball, professor of Economics at John Hopkins University, is critical of the "German hypothesis" and its application across Europe in different situations. Germany is a large exporting nation and exports helped counterbalance the effects of austerity measures. Within the eurozone with fixed exchange rates the exports of less competitive countries cannot be boosted through devaluing the currency to gain price competitiveness. The other problem is that with interest rates close to zero in the euro zone the central banks cannot cut rates aggressively to counteract the effects of spending cuts. The problem gets compounded when a number of countries are taking austerity measures at the same time accentuating the downturn....

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In remarks published in English on the Bundesbank website, Jens Weidmann, Bundesbank president and member of the ECB governing council said: "The ECB should be aware of its independence. This also requires it to respect, and not to overstep its own mandate." This is seen as a pushback by the Bundesbank to ECB president Draghi's comments on July 23, 2012, about doing all that is necessary to keep the eurozone together. Weidmann referring to the situation in France recollecting his days as a student in France in 1987, said there were "two different worldviews colliding." And that this situation prevailed in all political debates right up to the present day. He says about deflationary tendencies -"If these countries go through adjustment processes which result in decreases in wages and prices, then this constitutes one-off shifts in the wage and price structure and not deflation."

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The ECB's annual report for 2012 and the role the ECB under Mario Draghi played in the eurozone crisis in 2011-2012. The gains made in eurozone financial architecture, especially the agreement for the ECB as financial supervisor for European banks. The ECB sees itself as the supervisor for all European banks- the French position in the discussions in Brussels. The agreement of Dec. 12, 2012 only says banks with assets over 30 billion euros, or 20% of GDP of countries, or operations in two or more countries will come under supervision by the ECB.