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Wall Street Journal Original article ›
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Wall Street Journal reporters Walker in Berlin, Forelle in Brussels, and Meichtry in Rome, reconstruct the events during critical days after the indecision and failure to reach agreement during the July summit of eurozone countries. This took the form of intervews with leading players and over 25 policy makers. What emerges are accounts of how Germany's Angela Merkel, daughter of a Lutheran pastor, and protege of Eurozone founder, former German chancellor Helmut Kohl, handled the crisis. Merkel was widely criticized in the media for indecision. What emerges is an account of a leader who took decisive action at key moments in the crisis- leading to the formation of new governments in Greece and Italy taking action to improve finances, and negotiations with banks represented by the International Finance Corporation leading to acceptance by banks of a 50% loss on loans to Greece to reduce Greece's unsustainable debt burden. Merkel also worked with the European Central Bank's departing president Frenchman Claude Trichet and new president Italian Mario Draghi to resist French president Sarkozy's efforts to have the ECB assume responsibility for the crisis through large scale buying of Italian and Spanish bonds; which was opposed by German public opinion as a backdoor way of having German taxpayers assume responsibility for European debt. Shown are three critical moments when Merkel intervened. In October 2011, after Italian prime minister Berlusconi reneged on promises to make pension and other reforms to improve Italian finances because of political resistance. He survived a parliamentary no-confidence vote by one vote. Merkel took the lead on October 20, by directly calling Italian President Georgio Napolitano on the phone, to urge him to take action for forming a new government in Italy. The result was Napolitano talking with all political parties to form a new government, leading to the formation of a government by a non-political figure respected in Italy, former EU commissioner Mario Monti. A day earlier, on October 19, French President Sarkozy met ECB president, Trichet, at an event honoring him as departing ECB president in Frankfurt's Alte Oper concert hall. Trichet, Merkel and Sarkozy met in a side room. Sarkozy asked for decisive help from the ECB for large scale buying of Italian and Spanish bonds to lower yields, which had reached 7% on Italian bonds. Trichet responded that the ECB's charter did not allow it to finance governments, with the meeting ending in a shouting match between the two leaders. On October 21, EU and IMF inspectors warned that Greece's debt was reaching unsustainable proportions and austerity measures alone would not work, unless the bondholders, the European banks, took losses of 60% on their excessive lending to Greece. At this point France agreed to the German position arguing for this level of bondholder haircuts or losses, fearing the prospect of large future bailouts that would jeopardize France's triple AAA credit rating. The July 2011 summit accord had only provided for 10% in losses for bondholders. On October 27, at a meeting that went past midnight, Merkel and Sarkozy called IIF head Charles Dallara, who headed negotiating for the banks, to EU headquarters in Brussels. Merkel handed Dallara an agreement containing the 50% bondholder loss demand, and told Dallara- "This is the last offer." Merkel was saying banks would be left with nothing if they rejected it and Greece defaulted. Dallara called bankers and the IIF accepted Merkel's agreement. The final moment that October came on October 31, when Greece's prime minister Papandreou said he would call a referendum on the bailout provisions and austerity measures demanded by the IMF, the EU and the ECB. Bond markets reacted negatively to the announcement fearing a rejection and a Greek default. The Group of 20 leaders was meeting in Cannes, France on Nov. 2, 2011. Papandreou was asked to come to Cannes for a pre-summit meeting. Here Merkel told Papandreou- "the real question" for the referendum was, "Do you want to be in the euro, or not?" Days later Papandreou, lacking support in Greece from political parties and opposition inside his party, submitted his resignation. A non-political figure respected in Greece, former ECB vice president, Lucas Papademos, was appointed prime minister to head a Unity government. Polls after the appointment showed three fourths of Greeks said that this was "a positive step for Greece," with Papandreou's party getting only 11% support and the opposition led by Samaras about 20%. The criticism leveled at Merkel is that Germany should take responsibility for debt throughout the euro area through the issuance of eurozone bonds or the ECB buying large amount of bonds of Spain and Italy. Merkel faced strong opposition inside Germany and from the Bundesbank to this idea. The other criticism was based on austerity measures worsening the finances of Greece because of a lack of growth in the economy, which is true; yet Germany may see the situation in Greece as taking a long time to be resolved in any event because of excessive and faulty financial management. For Italy and Spain putting finances in order was a necessity, and austerity measures should lead to short term sacrifice but improve prospects for the long term by returning the economies to growth. Another criticism is the installation of governments that lack popular or electoral support. As the polls in Greece showed the Unity government there has far greater support and public opinion blames the politicians for the huge mess. In Italy, Berlusconi was widely seen as losing popular support when he resigned. And in Spain Mariano Rajoy, the newly elected prime minister, was elected with a huge majority in parliament following winning in local government elections. Merkel also held her own party, the Chrisitian Democrats together at the recent Leipzig convention. Mario Draghi, was elected with German support to head the European Central Bank. He has long argued for better management of Italian finances as head of Italy's central bank. Draghi was able to support Merkel with carefully planned and managed actions. First to reduce interest rates to support economic growth in a slowing eurozone. Following this with the ECB's Long Term Financing Operation in late December 2011, to provide unlimited loans to European banks at 1% interest for three years in exchange for a broadened list of collateral deposited at the ECB. In a final twist in this drama, Charles Dallara, who was a key negotiator for the U.S. Treasury in setting up the Brady Bonds- that converted bad Latin American government debt owed to U.S. banks in the 1980's into long term debt with large reductions in principal owed and lower interest rates. This was in exchange for guaranteed repayment with 30 year U.S. zero coupon bonds. Dallara was now a negotiator for the banks to reduce the chance of the very same bondholder haircuts that he had negotiated in an earlier period to solve the Latin American debt crisis. Other players in the drama were Axel Weber, head of the Bundesbank, Germany's central bank, who resigned after strong and outspoken opposition to the ECB's large scale purchase of bonds of Greece, Italy and Spain. Jens Weidmann, his protege, who replaced him. And Jurgen Stark, German representative at the ECB, who also resigned in opposition to Germany assuming responsibility for eurozone debt. ...
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
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An account by Journal reporters based on over 25 interviews with eurozone policymakers shows how the central players in the eurozone drama acted to defend their national interests during the period April to July 2011. On one side France's president Sarkozy, Frenchman Claude Trichet at the European Central Bank, arguing in favor of the banks not to take bondholder losses or haircuts on loans made to Greece. On the other side the Bundesbanks Axel Weber, and Jens Weidman, Jurgen Stark and German Finance Minister Schauble. The Germans argued strongly for bondholder losses to take responsibility for bad loan decisions by French and German banks. French banks had committed more loans to Greece than German banks and had more at stake. German public opinion was strongly against German taxpayers paying for the losses, making German politicians insistent that European banks take losses on their bad loan decisions, or Germany would not support additional loans to Greece. Throughout April to July the two sides were locked in an impasse. The French feared losses for their banks and a Lehman Brothers bankruptcy style situation. The Germans at the Bundesbank and the Finance Ministry were equally insistent. A July 2011 summit meeting did not settle the issue. The events not covered here from the July to the December summit of eurozone leaders resulted in bondholders taking 50% haircut on loans to Greece, reducing the debt burden in Greece after austerity measures led to popular protests. The French pushed hard for the ECB or the EFSF to be allowed to make large purchases of bonds of troubled eurozone countries in an effort to protect Spain and Italy from contagion through higher bond yields. The Netherlands and Finland supported Germany's position. German bankers Weber, Weidman at the Bundesbank and Finance Minister Schauble opposed large scale buying by the ECB of Italy's and Spain's bonds and Chancellor Merkel said about a common eurobond that "this is not going to happen." Governments changed in Greece, Italy, and Spain by Dec. 2011, which committed to austerity programs and spending cuts. Italian Mario Draghi was appointed with German support as new head of the ECB. In late December 2011 Draghi launched the Long Term Financing Operation for lending unlimited amounts at 1% for three year loans to European banks and relaxing the terms to accept government bonds and other debt as collateral for loans. The effect of this was to provide a large infusion of liquidity into the banking system in Europe and drastically bring down the yields on bonds issued by Italy and Spain....
New York Times Original article ›
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The ECB's annual report for 2012 and the role the ECB under Mario Draghi played in the eurozone crisis in 2011-2012. The gains made in eurozone financial architecture, especially the agreement for the ECB as financial supervisor for European banks. The ECB sees itself as the supervisor for all European banks- the French position in the discussions in Brussels. The agreement of Dec. 12, 2012 only says banks with assets over 30 billion euros, or 20% of GDP of countries, or operations in two or more countries will come under supervision by the ECB.
Washington Post Original article ›
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Germany went through a period of stagnant growth and persistently high unemployment leading to reforms of the welfare system and entitlements under the Schroeder administration. The reforms led to lower unemployment benefits and an effort to get the unemployed take up jobs. Instead of unemployment benefits that amounted to half the salary indefinitely, unemployment benefits ended in 12 months under the reforms, and workers were forced to take up jobs or dig into their savings. The cuts to benefits led to more of the unemployed taking jobs that were not their first choice with lower incomes. Unions agreed to defer wage demands and wages remained relatively flat for a long period. The "kurzarbeit" system of government subsidizing employers to retain workers during economic downturns, helped cushion the workforce from ups and downs in the economy. Unemployment which was in double digits a decade ago, is now 6.1%. The system still preserved some other aspects of generous benefits- parental leave of 14 months at two-thirds salary, vacation time and publicly sponsored health insurance. Recent changes include raising the retirement age to 67 from 65. The Organization of Economc Cooperation and Development estimates that the 200,000 jobs saved in Germany during the recession of 2008-2009 cost the government $7 billion. Government funds helped companies retain workers by paying a portion of worker salaries and averting layoffs.This comes to $35,000 per job. Compare this with the $38.9 billion allocated to a loan program at the Energy Department under the U.S. stimulus. 8050 jobs were created under this program according to the Washington Post- for the money spent so far in Sept 2011- 2 years into the loan program, of $19.3 billion. This comes to $2.4 million in government guaranteed loans per job. The Energy Department says that 33,000 jobs were saved under the $5.9 billion that was given to the auto industry under this program for investments in manufacturing to improve fuel efficiency. This comes to $178,000 per job. The Energy Department and Congress estimated a 5%-10% loss on the $38.6 billion loan program for loans that go sour, such as the Solyndra solar company $535 million loan. This comes to $1.9 billion at 5% loss and $3.8 billion for a 10% loss. The purpose of these figures is to show the cost of programs when the programs fail to achieve job goals or produce too little for the investment. The $3.8 billion loss under the program is over half the $7 billon Germany invested for the 200,000 jobs saved as estimated by the OECD. That ranks as a far superior investment than the Energy Department program. For the U.S. there are aspects of German reforms such as "kurzarbeit" that bear emulation, with serious questions about the effective use of the U.S. stimulus funds. For the rest of Europe the stingier unemployment benefits, raising the retirement age to 67, and other reforms send a different message. From the average German the message is: we made the tough changes, the rest of Europe cannot expect Germans to pay higher taxes while they put off similiar changes. Italy needs to change its retirement age, just as the Germans have done. As Chancellor Merkel puts it: "People in countries like Greece, Spain, Portugal shouldn't be able to retire earlier than in Germany. It's important for everybody to put in effort to make it roughly equal. Germany will only help when others really make an effort." Which is why Greece, Spain, Italy, even France are faced with making serious changes. This isn't stalling when it comes to euro bonds, from the German perspective. And it isn't about the lack of committment to the idea of a European Union, as all major political parties in Germany, the CDP, the SDP and the Greens, all strongly support the idea of a European Union. ...
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
Cochrane says the best option today is for Europe to accept a sovereign default for Greece. He says the European Central Bank which stands behind the euro, should not be used for buying bonds of troubled countries with shaky "collateral." This would only lead to a situation where EU countries would have to recapitalize the ECB. He emphasizes the fact that Greece will not pay back this debt. And the only way out is to have a situation similiar to Argentina where it needs to start over, and it would at some point be able to borrow again. Austerity is deeply unpopular in Greece and with higher unemployment Greece's financial situation is rapidly deteriorating. Making austerity something that was tried to buy time but will not work. Cochrane also makes the point that the euro itself acts like the euro bonds that EU countries are reluctant to support, it means the ECB backs the currency and supports it- which makes it vital to keep the ECB whole and prevent the dilution of its financial strength. Axel Weber, former head of the Bundesbank, resigned to express his opposition to the ECB buying the bonds of troubled eurozone countries, which he said was outside the ECB's mandate to conduct monetary policy....
New York Times Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
Steven Erlanger describes the mood in France as it faces problems of improving competitiveness in a rapidly moving global economy. A sense that the actions of the Hollande government will not be enough to tackle the need for deeper changes.
New York Times Original article ›
New York Times Original article ›
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Vannis Varoufakis, Greece's feisty finance minister in the debt negotiations with the IMF and the EU, dispels the notion that the Argentina default is an example for Greece to follow, both in his blog and talking to James Stewart of the NYT. He says in his blog, that this is "profoundly wrong." Greece's economy is dependent on the euro, its banks and private sector borrowings tied to the euro, and going back to the drachma would be harder than Argentina removing the peg to the dollar and devaluing sharply in 2001. Even then half of the purchasing power was gone in conversion from dollar denominated deposits to pesos. In December 2001 Argentina defaulted on $93 billion in debt, sharply devalued the peso, resulting in a economic depression, riots and demonstrations. The economy stabilized in 2002, and paid back debt owed to the IMF by 2006, only because of export demand for Argentina's main products of soya beans, and corn, soya oil with high demand from China and Brazil. Greece's exports of cotton and fish cannot provide the basis for such a recovery, says Varoufakis. Arturo Porzecanski at American University, and Daniel Gros, Director of the Center for European Policy Studies have written 2 separate papers on Greece following the Argentine example, and agree with this conclusion....
Foreign Affairs Original article ›
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Mark Gilbert, a visiting associate professsor of European History at the John Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies in Bologna, describes the crisis of the political culture in Italy that goes deeper than the economic crisis and has lasted for most of the post war period. Gilbert says the political parties have avoided implementing financial discipline and opening up the economy for most of the last two decades, except for brief periods, and did not take the opportunity of joining the eurozone to make serious changes. Italy has many parties with the Democratic Party having 25-30% support in the polls and Berluconi's People of Liberty (PdL) having the support of 20-25% of voters. There is also the Northern League, the Third Pole of centrist Catholic parties, the Italy of Values party, and the Ecology Freedom party. Italy lacks a national consensus on making the changes. The risk is that Monti will not have enough time to make the changes, as new elections may be held by April 2013. His government was formed as a government of technocrats led by former EU commissioner Mario Monti, after President Napolitano forced the PdL, the PD, and the Third Pole to work together to support the new government. Changes are needed in the legal system, local government, the health sector, and in the university system. One factor favoring Monti is that 90% of Italians voters are dissatisfied with the political parties, according to Italian think tank ISPI. For Italy the EU crisis has in this sense a positive aspect as it has forced Italy to come to grips with economic and cultural changes under a leadership from outside the political system....
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
Analysts see the likelihood of Greece exiting the eurozone at over 50%. The actions of the ECB under Mario Draghi to provide funding to weak banks through the Long Term Financing Operation have reduced the effect the effects of contagion from a Greek default spreading to banks in other EU countries. The fiscal pact signed in Jan 2012 at the EU summit with automatic penalties for countries lacking budget discipline provides Angela Merkel more room with her domestic political base to support the EFSF's capacity to help other eurozone countries. Greece with its deteriorating economic situation would then be considered a special case.
New York Times Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
Krugman points to the connection between the failure to achieve debt reduction through debt forgiveness and the sluggish economic growth in the eurozone and U.S., five years after the global banking and financial crisis of 2009 and four years after the beginning of the eurozone debt crisis in 2010. In the U.S. debt reduction for homeowners was delayed with a wave of foreclosures, and in Europe austerity budgets were the norm as Germany pushed hard for austerity policies. In 2014 small relaxation of austerity to give relief to voters took place in Greece, France, Italy and Spain, with austerity budgets still in place. Growth also slowed in Germany to slight contraction in the third quarter and no growth in the fourth quarter of 2014. This is leading to the formulation of new policy to address growth challenges in the eurozone. Debt to GDP is growing in eurozone countries and Britain because of lack of growth, even though spending cuts have been made, showing the need for rethinking policy. ...
New York Times Original article ›
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The Italian comedy movie "Quo Vado," became a hit in Italy in 2016, premiering on Jan. 1. It tells the story of a government clerk played by Checco Zalone, whose only aspiration in life is a 9 to 5 government job for life. It lets Italians laugh at the past in a Italy that is changing. Today, the Turin newspaper La Stampa points out from its survey, two of three Italians would take some risk if it means career advancement. Yet public sector job protections remain firmly in place even as the private sector is changing rapidly not just in Italy but in Spain and other parts of the European Union.
New York Times Original article ›
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
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IMF Managing Director, Christine Lagarde says Greece should have 2 more years to achieve the deficit targets. Speaking at a news conference during the annual meeting of the IMF in Tokyo in Oct 2012, Lagarde said: "it is sometimes better, given circumstances.. to have a bit more time... This is what we advocated for Portugal, it's what we advocated for Spain, and it's what we are advocating for Greece, where I have said repeatedly that an additional two years was necessary for the country to actually face the fiscal consolidation program that is considered." A two year extension would add an estimated 20 billion euros to the financing cost for Greece, at the same it improves the chances for growth and means having a program that is more likely to work.
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
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The Journal editorial title suggests that Greece chose economic decline. It puts the responsibility for this choice on one political party that lied about its fiscal position, and another party that failed to take strong action. The government unions were uncooperative and resisted making changes. Making matters worse was policy from the EU that misread the Greece situation as a liquidity problem, and not as a solvency problem considering the huge debt Greece has piled up. And austerity measures pushed by the EU are doing little for growth- leading to an acceleration in the economic decline in recent months.
New York Times Original article ›
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The Gallois Report and France's efforts to improve competitiveness under the Hollande administration.
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
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The yuan is up 5.5% since the peg to the dollar ended in 2010, reaching 6.469 to the dollar. But this is not helping the U.S. trade deficit. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics shows the price of imports from China are up 2.8% in May over the same month prior year. And the trade surplus for China in the first four months of 2011 is higher than the same period in 2010. What is happening? The improvements in productivity of Chinese manufacturers and the acceptance of lower margins is reducing the effects on trade balance of a small appreciation of the yuan, so that only a fraction of that appreciation is showing up in higher prices for Chinese goods. Also significant is that the yuan's small appreciation against the dollar is not enough to make up for the dollar's fall against other currencies. The yuan is down 8.3% against the euro and has actually declined 3.7% on a trade weighted basis in the last year.
New York Times Original article ›
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Speaking at the annual meeting of Italy's banking association on July 11, 2012, prime minister Mario Monti calls the struggle he is leading to change the economic performance of Italy, and especially against structural vices in the economy, "a very tough war." He added that the plan to reduce Italy's borrowing rates with the agreement to use the ESM or EFSF, the EU's rescue fund, "must be consolidated both in its substance and the way it is communicated." Bank of Italy governor, Ignazio Visco, said the spread between Italian and German bonds and the borrowing rates approaching 7% for Italy compared to about zero for Germany and France, were "far above what would be justified by the fundamentals of our economy." Deputy finance minister, Vittorio Grilli, is taking over the role of finance minister which Monti had assumed earlier. Monti will lead a new economic and financial policy committee which includes Mr. Grilli and development minister Corrado Passera.
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
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Alexis Tsipras, leader of Syriza, Greece's second largest party, is interviewed by WSJ's Bret Stephens. Tsipras describes the problems inside Greece. He describes the bribery in healthcare, tax evasion, burden of taxes on the middle class and honest citizens, a large and inefficient bureaucracy. In its current state Greece would build up debt and deficits all over again if the debts were forgiven tomorrow, says Tsipras. He is for Greece remaining in the eurozone. Tsipras understands the problems Germans have with putting money into Greece with the current state of economic management and lack of conscience of its elite, and why they see this as not fair. He suggests as a model for solving the Greece debt crisis, the London Conference of 1953 forgiving half of Germany's debts and putting the rest on a 30 year scheduled repayment. This would have to come with results in cutting bureaucracy, reducing corruption, and efficient tax collection for Greece democracy to work.
New York Times Original article ›
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Porter cites a report by Kai Daniel Schmid and Ulrike Stein of the Macroeconomic Policy Institute in Dusseldorf. The report shows the top 10% of Germans having 26% of the country's income before taxes and transfers in 1991. This increased to 31% by 2010. For the same period of about 20 years the bottom half of the population took in 17% in 2010 dropping by 5% from 22%. The growing income inequality in Germany is comparable to what has happened in the U.S. over this period.
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
Greg Ip provides useful insights into the nature of the economic recovery in Britain compared to the U.S. by 2015. The recovery in Britain has done better than in the U.S. in job creation, but has lagged behind in productivity gains. The labor force participation rate is 72% in Britain compared to 68% in the U.S., going back up to 2007 levels in Britain, whereas in the U.S. it has steadily declined with some older working class Americans too discouraged to look for work and left behind. Stagnant wage growth is a major issue in Britain, more so than in the U.S. where wage growth is slow. Economic austerity is not the main cause of the economic difficulties as the coalition government of prime minister Cameron relaxed earlier goals for austerity by 2012 with tax revenues and growth below forecasts. The structural budget deficit has been reduced by 6.6% of GDP since the peak, and the Office of Budget Responsibility estimates the UK economy was 1.5%-2% smaller by 2013 because of the austerity policies. Britain was also affected by the eurozone crisis to a larger degree than the U.S. Productivity remains a long term challenge- with needed investments in housing, education and infrastructure, improved lending for new business, and higher tech improvement exports....
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
Washington Post Original article ›
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Italy's prime minister, Mario Monti, a senior EU official before becoming prime minister, has the credibility and credentials to bring the French and German sides together on a new plan forward for the European Union, says Steven Pearlstein of the Washington Post. In this report from Rome, where leaders of Italy, Spain, France and Germany are meeting to discuss solutions Pearlstein describes the solutions Monti is putting forward. The European Investment Fund would be built up so that it has funding of about $175 billion or 1% of Europe's GDP to finance truly productivity and growth enhancing projects of innovative small and medium sized business in transportation, energy, education and environmental sectors. These companies have suffered shortages of capital as banks pulled bank from lending. It is the inadequate private investment that is causing the greatest damage in this crisis and $175 billion is at the low end of the amount needed in this crisis. Other steps Monti is pushing forward- for immediate steps to tackle the crisis deposit insurance to prevent a run on banks is essential for European banks. This would come with a eurozone regulatory authority that would have the powers to regulate European banks. The European Financial Stability Facility would be the "sovereign buyer of last resort," under Monti's proposal. Eurobonds come up as a key part of the solution. This is not because German and French taxpayers would be required to finance economies of Spain and Italy. As was shown by the U.S. Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) a well designed program could pay for itself. This would include the EU financial authority taking up stakes in the banks getting help and closing banks that are insolvent. The key point is that if properly executed and executed in a timely and appropriate way this does not have to cost French and German taxpayers- the important thing being to support the eurozone economies before the situation deteriorates. Borrowing at 6% for Spain and Italy will only put the situation out of control as deficits rise rapidly. The concessions for tighter regulation of European banking systems, reducing risk in banking, setting up adequate reserves, closing poorly run banks, and ceding powers to a European Financial Authority that can make the final decisions, are the steps that would have to go with these arrangements. Sound financial management requires that the kind of banking risks taken in the speculative bubbles in Spain, the lack of transparency and credibility in banking estimates of bad loans in the system, and the glossing over the problems at Bankia, would have to be addressed in solutions through regulation by a credible European Financial Authority to convince skeptical German public opinion that financial accounts are conducted in a proper manner....

The French Deception

Wall Street Journal Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
This editorial deserves an award for best editorial on international economic matters in 2011. The editorial, goes right to the point, when it says the French, the Germans, and the European Central Bank are deluding themselves if they call this weeks resolution of the Greece debt crisis a realistic solution. It is anything but a solution. The Journal calls it a French deception. It is unworkable because the main problem, the high ratio of Greek debt to GDP -which is now 155% and is expected to reach 170% by the end of 2011- is sure to get worse under the arrrangement designed in the interest of French and German banks. Under the arrangement French and German banks and other creditors will get to double their return from 4-5% today to an effective interest rate of 10% if Greece grows by 2% a year, on 49% of the bonds they hold. These bonds will be converted into 30 year bonds. This effectively doubles the interest cost for Greece in servicing this debt. On the other approximately 51% of the bonds the French and German banks would redeem the bonds for cash and a triple A, sovereign zero coupon bond. The Journal asks what is the point of making Greece's debt problem worse than it is now and calling it a solution. The austerity cuts are already expected to lead to a deep recession, something that is also happening in Portugal, leading to a worsening of the debt situation. Creditors are not sharing in the losses under this arrangement, as Germany and the Netherlands have insisted. As the Journal points out they are instead taking out half of their investment and doubling their return on the remainder. And the fears of contagion for Spain are not lessened, as financial markets can clearly see through this for what it is- unworkable and unrealistic. ...
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
Richard Portes of the London Business School provides two good reasons why the EU's decision to adopt the French Banking Federation's proposal for rollovers with 10% interest costs is a serious mistake. It doubles the interest costs from 4-6% to 10% with 2% Greek GDP growth and makes debt servicing untenable. Portes says the real Brady Plan from the 1980's included a 35-40% bondholders haircut. Deals of this type have a precedent- in Mexico in 1988 and in Argentina in 2001 such bond exchanges were soon followed by deals that placed bondholder haricuts on creditors. The lesson from Latin America in the 1980's, says Portes, is that the burdens of servicing a debt of such proportions under onerous conditions only extinguishes the enterprise, investment and productive capabilities of the particular country trying to service that debt, making the debt even less serviceable. See the Wall Street Journal's editorial on this deal which it calls "The French Deception." The terms sound like Greek to the editors leaving a sense that French banks are only saying "gimme." The only benefit achieved may be putting off the problem and avoiding contagion to Portugal and Spain. Yet this is not that much of a benefit when one realizes that the problem has not gone away, and is likely to look much worse six or nine months from now....

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