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In this interview with Varoufakis, the Greece finance minister in the negotiations with the European Union and the IMF in 2015, Suzy Hansen provides a detailed account of Varoufakis's view on the Greece bailouts and a sense of looming failure in the negotiations. Varoufakis says he was willing to make concessions by holding off on action on the minimum wage, but cannot make concessions on paying out pensions to the elderly. Varoufakis concedes he is not a good negotiator or a politician, and negotiating skills were critical for Greece to tap into the goodwill in the eurozone's southern region to win a package that would give the Greek economy a chance to grow. Additional handicaps may be his outlook which was shaped in his younger years by the "junta years" when Greece was ruled by a military dictatorship, and a family history relating to Greece's civil war between royalists and communists. In this interview he compares himself to Margaret Thatcher, who he says should not be held responsible for the state corporatism following the war, remarks that may show a finance minister out of touch with the present situation. There is no lack of criticism of the way some of the bailout actions took place to protect French and German banks in 2011 and 2012- in fact some of the strongest criticism, well formulated, was on the editorial pages of the Wall Street Journal. Yet Varoufakis had a special responsibility to build on the goodwill generated after years of austerity, and the efforts of the Samaras administration to work with the EU. On both counts he appears to have failed as he realizes that the 4 months of uncertainty ending in a total lack of communication between both sides, has cost Greece by worsening the economy. Posturing and personality, compounded by inexperience, may have distracted from the real work of serious negotiations. The IMF chief Christine Lagarde had emphasized at the outset the need for Greece to fix its tax system with high degree of tax evasion, an issue on which Syriza could have acted quickly. Some of the period before the elections was used to prepare the EU for negotiations with Syriza, and Syriza needed to be prepared on this issue. Yet no action was taken on a plan to tackle this issue- on the grounds, says Varoufakis, of lack of time. He only rationalizes this when he says it is only a short term cost for the long term future of young people. ...

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Wall Street Journal reporters Walker in Berlin, Forelle in Brussels, and Meichtry in Rome, reconstruct the events during critical days after the indecision and failure to reach agreement during the July summit of eurozone countries. This took the form of intervews with leading players and over 25 policy makers. What emerges are accounts of how Germany's Angela Merkel, daughter of a Lutheran pastor, and protege of Eurozone founder, former German chancellor Helmut Kohl, handled the crisis. Merkel was widely criticized in the media for indecision. What emerges is an account of a leader who took decisive action at key moments in the crisis- leading to the formation of new governments in Greece and Italy taking action to improve finances, and negotiations with banks represented by the International Finance Corporation leading to acceptance by banks of a 50% loss on loans to Greece to reduce Greece's unsustainable debt burden. Merkel also worked with the European Central Bank's departing president Frenchman Claude Trichet and new president Italian Mario Draghi to resist French president Sarkozy's efforts to have the ECB assume responsibility for the crisis through large scale buying of Italian and Spanish bonds; which was opposed by German public opinion as a backdoor way of having German taxpayers assume responsibility for European debt. Shown are three critical moments when Merkel intervened. In October 2011, after Italian prime minister Berlusconi reneged on promises to make pension and other reforms to improve Italian finances because of political resistance. He survived a parliamentary no-confidence vote by one vote. Merkel took the lead on October 20, by directly calling Italian President Georgio Napolitano on the phone, to urge him to take action for forming a new government in Italy. The result was Napolitano talking with all political parties to form a new government, leading to the formation of a government by a non-political figure respected in Italy, former EU commissioner Mario Monti. A day earlier, on October 19, French President Sarkozy met ECB president, Trichet, at an event honoring him as departing ECB president in Frankfurt's Alte Oper concert hall. Trichet, Merkel and Sarkozy met in a side room. Sarkozy asked for decisive help from the ECB for large scale buying of Italian and Spanish bonds to lower yields, which had reached 7% on Italian bonds. Trichet responded that the ECB's charter did not allow it to finance governments, with the meeting ending in a shouting match between the two leaders. On October 21, EU and IMF inspectors warned that Greece's debt was reaching unsustainable proportions and austerity measures alone would not work, unless the bondholders, the European banks, took losses of 60% on their excessive lending to Greece. At this point France agreed to the German position arguing for this level of bondholder haircuts or losses, fearing the prospect of large future bailouts that would jeopardize France's triple AAA credit rating. The July 2011 summit accord had only provided for 10% in losses for bondholders. On October 27, at a meeting that went past midnight, Merkel and Sarkozy called IIF head Charles Dallara, who headed negotiating for the banks, to EU headquarters in Brussels. Merkel handed Dallara an agreement containing the 50% bondholder loss demand, and told Dallara- "This is the last offer." Merkel was saying banks would be left with nothing if they rejected it and Greece defaulted. Dallara called bankers and the IIF accepted Merkel's agreement. The final moment that October came on October 31, when Greece's prime minister Papandreou said he would call a referendum on the bailout provisions and austerity measures demanded by the IMF, the EU and the ECB. Bond markets reacted negatively to the announcement fearing a rejection and a Greek default. The Group of 20 leaders was meeting in Cannes, France on Nov. 2, 2011. Papandreou was asked to come to Cannes for a pre-summit meeting. Here Merkel told Papandreou- "the real question" for the referendum was, "Do you want to be in the euro, or not?" Days later Papandreou, lacking support in Greece from political parties and opposition inside his party, submitted his resignation. A non-political figure respected in Greece, former ECB vice president, Lucas Papademos, was appointed prime minister to head a Unity government. Polls after the appointment showed three fourths of Greeks said that this was "a positive step for Greece," with Papandreou's party getting only 11% support and the opposition led by Samaras about 20%. The criticism leveled at Merkel is that Germany should take responsibility for debt throughout the euro area through the issuance of eurozone bonds or the ECB buying large amount of bonds of Spain and Italy. Merkel faced strong opposition inside Germany and from the Bundesbank to this idea. The other criticism was based on austerity measures worsening the finances of Greece because of a lack of growth in the economy, which is true; yet Germany may see the situation in Greece as taking a long time to be resolved in any event because of excessive and faulty financial management. For Italy and Spain putting finances in order was a necessity, and austerity measures should lead to short term sacrifice but improve prospects for the long term by returning the economies to growth. Another criticism is the installation of governments that lack popular or electoral support. As the polls in Greece showed the Unity government there has far greater support and public opinion blames the politicians for the huge mess. In Italy, Berlusconi was widely seen as losing popular support when he resigned. And in Spain Mariano Rajoy, the newly elected prime minister, was elected with a huge majority in parliament following winning in local government elections. Merkel also held her own party, the Chrisitian Democrats together at the recent Leipzig convention. Mario Draghi, was elected with German support to head the European Central Bank. He has long argued for better management of Italian finances as head of Italy's central bank. Draghi was able to support Merkel with carefully planned and managed actions. First to reduce interest rates to support economic growth in a slowing eurozone. Following this with the ECB's Long Term Financing Operation in late December 2011, to provide unlimited loans to European banks at 1% interest for three years in exchange for a broadened list of collateral deposited at the ECB. In a final twist in this drama, Charles Dallara, who was a key negotiator for the U.S. Treasury in setting up the Brady Bonds- that converted bad Latin American government debt owed to U.S. banks in the 1980's into long term debt with large reductions in principal owed and lower interest rates. This was in exchange for guaranteed repayment with 30 year U.S. zero coupon bonds. Dallara was now a negotiator for the banks to reduce the chance of the very same bondholder haircuts that he had negotiated in an earlier period to solve the Latin American debt crisis. Other players in the drama were Axel Weber, head of the Bundesbank, Germany's central bank, who resigned after strong and outspoken opposition to the ECB's large scale purchase of bonds of Greece, Italy and Spain. Jens Weidmann, his protege, who replaced him. And Jurgen Stark, German representative at the ECB, who also resigned in opposition to Germany assuming responsibility for eurozone debt. ...

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John Taylor looks one step ahead of the March 2012 Greece bailout and sets up the most plausible scenario for the future. He says the risks of contagion were always exaggerated from the beginning- a planned default or restructuring of debt such as happened in Argentina in 2001, does not have the contagion risks associated with a chaotic and unplanned default as in Russia in 1998. Predicability in policy makes a huge difference, says Taylor. The European banks which stood to lose from writedowns exaggerated the fears of contagion- a process that always occurs for people who are adversely affected by writedowns- resulting in top officials in the European Union delaying the unavoidable serious restructuring. It was not until Chancellor Merkel handed Charles Dallara, who negotiated for the European banks, a note stating a demand for 50% bondholder writedown, on October 27, 2011, at EU headquarters in Brussels, did any serious writedown of debt begin. Merkel told Dallara: "this is my last offer." The July 2011 summit by contrast had only a 10% bondholder writedown in the agreement, when insolvency not illiquidity was the real issue. Walker Forelle and Meichtry, give a detailed account of what happened in the Wall Street Journal, Dec. 30, 2011. The important thing for Greece, says Taylor, is for what the IMF calls "growth enhancing structural reforms" - greater reliance on private markets, incentives, rule of law. He says this bailout won't work because IMF growth forecasts do not reflect the rapid shrinking of the Greek economy. Antonis Samaras, leader of the major opposition party, is in favor of pro-growth measures and has stated his desire to change the agreement. The 130 billion euro bailout provides 90 billion euros for recapitalizing Greece's banks, and financing the budget. This puts Greece in a situation where the political leaders win voter support by discarding the conditions from the Northern EU nations and come with a plan that is better suited for Greece. The EU in this scenario would cut off further bailout funds to Greece. Taylor sees this as the better outcome for Greece than the current situation, which leaves Greece no hope for growth, and also for the EU by getting out of bailouts that have little prospect of working. It would be difficult but doable for Greece says Taylor, because interest payments would be low and Greek banks would be recapitalized after the current March 2012 bailout. ...

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In the most recent Global Financial Stability Report out in Sept. 2011, the increase in the ratio of a country's outstanding credit to GDP is highlighted as a key warning light indicator for country economies. An increase in this ratio of over 5% signals a warning light according to the IMF. It tells us that borrowing is expanding at significantly faster rate than the growth of the economy. Using this indicator would have set a warning light up for the U.S. before the 2008 mortgage crisis, and a warning light well before the financial crises in Greece, Portugal and Ireland. The outstanding credit to GDP ratio went up for China by 24 percentage points in 2009, with 4% percentage point increase in 2010. The ratio was up 30 percentage points in Hong Kong for 2010. The warning light is also up for Turkey and Vietnam. Capital inflows into countries that can be suddenly reversed, and overvalued currencies are a danger for emerging market countries and act as supplemental indicator warning lights. Brazil and South Africa have overvalued currencies. Turkey has high capital inflows. Only a small portion of this is foreign direct investment, the rest helps support a high amount of lending and credit provided by the banks. That a significant portion of this is in short term borrowing poses additional risks, as evident in the 1997 Asian financal crisis for S. Korea, Thailand and Malaysia....

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Moody's downgraded its outlook on Germany's triple-A credit rating to negative. It also shifted to negative the outlook on triple-A ratings of Netherlands. Spain's ten year bond yield went up to 7.51% on July 23, 2012 according to Tradeweb. Analysts estimate Spain needs to issue 28 billion euros of debt for the rest of 2012 to cover deficits and repay maturing debt, and 50 billion euros in short term Treasury bills. An additional 30 billion euros may be needed if tax revenues decline increasing the deficit, and to meet the needs of regional governments. In changing the outlook for Germany, Moody's emphasized the costs Germany would incur if Spain needed a full bailout and if the situation spread to Italy, including the large exposures of German banks to Italy and Spain.

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Nikos Voutsis, Greece's interior minister, says Greece lacks the money to make debt repayments of 1.6 billion euros to the IMF in June 2015. A proposal by the Left Platform, a faction within Syriza party led by energy minister Lafazanis, which has support of 30 of the 149 Syriza representatives in the Greek parliament, calls for not making debt repayments and looking for an alternate plan. It was defeated by the central committee of the Syriza party on May 24, 2015, with the vote 95 to 75 showing intense opposition within Syriza. Instead Syriza voted for a proposal to call for mutually beneficial negotiations and a deal that would preserve its core goals- a low target for the primary budget surplus, avoid more cuts to pensions, and restructuring Greece's debt to include an investment plan for economic recovery. Both sides in the negotiations, the EU/IMF and Syriza government in Greece, reached an impasse as the negotiating tactics of finance minister Varoufakis led to German finance minister Schauble also taking a tougher stance, saying he could not rule out Greece defaulting on its debt. ...

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Krugman is critical of ECB president Trichet's decision to raise interest rates in 2010, because of the way it affects Spain, Italy, and Portugal. Increase in interest rates by the ECB affect the entire eurozone and this means, he points out, that inflation in Germany would be extremely low -about 1% for the next five years- and the result being that inflation would be much lower in debtor countries like Spain. A decrease in interest rates with inflation at 3-4 % in Germany would be better for the debtor countries (Spain, Italy, Portugal, Ireland) as this would enable them to cut prices and costs relative to Germany and other creditor countries. The first step taken by the new ECB president, Mario Draghi, was a small increase in interest rates. Krugman asks if the private demand is affected negatively by the end of a debt financed boom in the debtor countries, and austerity programs reduce any growth in the public sector, then where are the new jobs supposed to come from? A policy that reduces the prices of the products of debtor countries relative to creditor countries like Germany- so that exports can generate necessary growth- is needed says Krugman. ...

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Polls by Renato Mannheimer show popular support for the People of Freedom party of Mr. Berlusconi, which won 37% of the vote in 2008, is now down to 17% This comes after a series of corruption scandals. The most recent involves embezzlement of 1.7 million dollars by a politician from the Rome-Lazio regional government. New parties are being formed which are drawing increasing support. The Five Star Movement of Beppe Grillo, a former comedian, which opposes being in the eurozone and calls it a "noose" for Italy shows 18% support, according to a poll by the SWG agency. In that poll the Italy of Values party had 6% support, and the Left Ecology party 6%. Mannheimer says only one third of Italian voters are now in favor of the large established parties, indicating a big change is underway in Italian politics. The new parties are also critical of prime minister Monti's policies. This happens just as political and business leaders in Italy are calling for Monti to run for office to continue policy changes he has made to improve Italy's competitiveness and lead to economic recovery. Monti, a former EU Commissioner, was appointed as prime minister after pressure from German chancellor Merkel and the EU led to a loss of parliamentary support for Mr Berlusconi with key members of his own party defecting. After passing legislation for changes to Italian labor laws and making other shanges to improve Italy's competitiveness since taking office in November 2011, Monti is now seen in Italy, and outside Italy in EU circles, as the only person who can lead Italy out of the economic crisis; even though his reforms and austerity measures have not proved popular....

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The WSJ's Alessandra Galloni speaks with Mario Monti, the Italian premier, for in-depth interviews. Here Galloni and Walker provide an account of what happened during and after the June 28, 2012 summit of European leaders. Monti described the comments of ECB president Draghi in early August- about ECB buying of bonds of Italy and Spain being within the mandate of the ECB if monetary transmission channels were not working properly to reduce yields- as a bold effort following the agreement made at the June 28 summit to support Italy and Spain. Monti expressed the idea that Draghi should feel morally and politically justified if and when he makes the bold moves to rescue the euro. The only problem he says is whether one has to wait till the night before the euro is about to disintegrate for this to happen. This is the first time Monti has publicly expressed the possibility of this happening.

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Eurozone finance ministers meeting in Brussels give Spain one more year to meet deficit targets because of a slumping economy and lower tax receipts after raising taxes. Spain now has till 2014 instead of 2013 to meet the EU's 3% deficit target. Spain can now run a deficit of 6.3% in 2012, down from 8.9% in 2011, without risking EU penalties. The 2013 deficit target is 4.5% of GDP and the 2014 target is 2.8%. Spain can also have $30 billion by the end of July in the event that a Spanish bank needs to be recapitalized quickly.

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Cochrane says the best option today is for Europe to accept a sovereign default for Greece. He says the European Central Bank which stands behind the euro, should not be used for buying bonds of troubled countries with shaky "collateral." This would only lead to a situation where EU countries would have to recapitalize the ECB. He emphasizes the fact that Greece will not pay back this debt. And the only way out is to have a situation similiar to Argentina where it needs to start over, and it would at some point be able to borrow again. Austerity is deeply unpopular in Greece and with higher unemployment Greece's financial situation is rapidly deteriorating. Making austerity something that was tried to buy time but will not work. Cochrane also makes the point that the euro itself acts like the euro bonds that EU countries are reluctant to support, it means the ECB backs the currency and supports it- which makes it vital to keep the ECB whole and prevent the dilution of its financial strength. Axel Weber, former head of the Bundesbank, resigned to express his opposition to the ECB buying the bonds of troubled eurozone countries, which he said was outside the ECB's mandate to conduct monetary policy....

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Amar Bhide touches on the unpredictable consequences of devaluations while commenting on the supposed benefit of a country having its own currency vs a currency such as the euro. The euro takes away the advatantage of devaluing the national currency as a way to regain competitiveness. Bhide points out that devaluations hurt the elderly on fixed incomes and low wage workers. Protections have to be put in place for the sections of the population that are badly affected. Large union negotiated wage increases can also reduce the benefits of devaluation in terms of regaining competitiveness.

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Landon Thomas Jr. looks at the situation in Spain and finds it hard not to conclude that austerity policies are not working in the absence of economic growth, and increasing unemployment. Unemployment in Spain is at 24% and growing. Deficit reduction is likely to take longer with the deteriorating economic outlook. Spain's economy minister, Luis de Guindos has announced Spain plans to increase consumer taxes in 2013, including the VAT, which is currently at 18%. This would further depress consumer spending. Bondholders sense dangers from lack of economic growth and competitiveness, as much as they sense dangers from uncontrolled regional spending. As a result investors are leaving Spain. According to analysts at Credit Agricole Cheuvreux in Madrid, 100 billion euros (132 billion) have left Spain, including distress sales- coming from insurance companies, pension and sovereign wealth funds reducing holdings of Spanish bonds.

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Hugo Dixon says the deal made by eurozone leaders for Greece in July 2011 favors private creditors. The bondholder haircut was much smaller, eurozone governments and taxpayers will make up the difference. This he says is like a cat in the bag presented to the receiver as a pig as long as he does not look inside, called a "poke." Dixon says that if Greece cannot implement austerity measures under a new government and the deal has to be renegotiated bondholders may face a larger haircut than the 20% under the current arrangement. It would have been better he says to do this now but the ECB's threats may have led to the German and French governments treating private creditors with kids gloves.

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Austin Goolsbee says the overvalued currencies of Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal and the lack of growth under austerity plans proposed for these countries create impossible odds for resolution of the financial problems in these countries. The German position is that profligate spending and irresponsible accounting in Greece, and structural issues in Italy ranging from entitlement spending to tax evasion, need to be resolved.

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Proposals from the Vickers Commission on banking reforms in the UK that could be adopted in the U.S. to reduce systemic risks from proprietary trading.

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The IMF's changing views on the value of fiscal austerity. In the current debate about the value of fiscal austerity, there is the IMF view, a German view based on its own experience, and the views of other countries in Europe. The IMF's view has shifted over time. The IMF World Economic Outlook 2010, describes its view of the effects of austerity measures in the form of spending cuts and tax increases- "Fiscal consolidation typically has a contractionary effect on output. A fiscal consolidation equal to 1% of GDP typically reduces GDP by about 0.5% within 2 years and raises the unemployment rate by about 0.3% percentage points." Over the longer term there are benefits as the private sector is not crowded out in the search for captal funding by the excessive government borrowing. The IMF's economic models suggest that it would take 5 years before reaching the breakeven point when the benefits of austerity measures exceed the effects of austerity. The German view held by German central bankers is that the actions stimulate growth in the short term. Manfred Neumann, professor emeritus at the Institute for Economic Policy at the University of Bonn, says this is called the "German hypothesis" as it reflects the experience of Germany from austerity actions taken by Germany. Laurence Ball, professor of Economics at John Hopkins University, is critical of the "German hypothesis" and its application across Europe in different situations. Germany is a large exporting nation and exports helped counterbalance the effects of austerity measures. Within the eurozone with fixed exchange rates the exports of less competitive countries cannot be boosted through devaluing the currency to gain price competitiveness. The other problem is that with interest rates close to zero in the euro zone the central banks cannot cut rates aggressively to counteract the effects of spending cuts. The problem gets compounded when a number of countries are taking austerity measures at the same time accentuating the downturn....