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An internal IMF document that estimates Europe's banks are short of capital by $273 billion. IMF managing director, Christine Lagarde, tries to downplay the report by saying this is not from a stress test that the IMF conducts. In August, Lagarde, called for an "urgent recapitalization" of European banks. As France's finance minister, Lagarde, steadfastly insisted French banks were well capitalized. France worked hard to prevent requirements for significant capital reserves under the Basel III rules. The higher capital requirements were supported by the U.S.. Simon Johnson said in his blog, that as long as European banks had inadequate capital to act as a buffer against losses, European countries had no safe route for restructuring their debts.

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Wall Street Journal reporters Walker in Berlin, Forelle in Brussels, and Meichtry in Rome, reconstruct the events during critical days after the indecision and failure to reach agreement during the July summit of eurozone countries. This took the form of intervews with leading players and over 25 policy makers. What emerges are accounts of how Germany's Angela Merkel, daughter of a Lutheran pastor, and protege of Eurozone founder, former German chancellor Helmut Kohl, handled the crisis. Merkel was widely criticized in the media for indecision. What emerges is an account of a leader who took decisive action at key moments in the crisis- leading to the formation of new governments in Greece and Italy taking action to improve finances, and negotiations with banks represented by the International Finance Corporation leading to acceptance by banks of a 50% loss on loans to Greece to reduce Greece's unsustainable debt burden. Merkel also worked with the European Central Bank's departing president Frenchman Claude Trichet and new president Italian Mario Draghi to resist French president Sarkozy's efforts to have the ECB assume responsibility for the crisis through large scale buying of Italian and Spanish bonds; which was opposed by German public opinion as a backdoor way of having German taxpayers assume responsibility for European debt. Shown are three critical moments when Merkel intervened. In October 2011, after Italian prime minister Berlusconi reneged on promises to make pension and other reforms to improve Italian finances because of political resistance. He survived a parliamentary no-confidence vote by one vote. Merkel took the lead on October 20, by directly calling Italian President Georgio Napolitano on the phone, to urge him to take action for forming a new government in Italy. The result was Napolitano talking with all political parties to form a new government, leading to the formation of a government by a non-political figure respected in Italy, former EU commissioner Mario Monti. A day earlier, on October 19, French President Sarkozy met ECB president, Trichet, at an event honoring him as departing ECB president in Frankfurt's Alte Oper concert hall. Trichet, Merkel and Sarkozy met in a side room. Sarkozy asked for decisive help from the ECB for large scale buying of Italian and Spanish bonds to lower yields, which had reached 7% on Italian bonds. Trichet responded that the ECB's charter did not allow it to finance governments, with the meeting ending in a shouting match between the two leaders. On October 21, EU and IMF inspectors warned that Greece's debt was reaching unsustainable proportions and austerity measures alone would not work, unless the bondholders, the European banks, took losses of 60% on their excessive lending to Greece. At this point France agreed to the German position arguing for this level of bondholder haircuts or losses, fearing the prospect of large future bailouts that would jeopardize France's triple AAA credit rating. The July 2011 summit accord had only provided for 10% in losses for bondholders. On October 27, at a meeting that went past midnight, Merkel and Sarkozy called IIF head Charles Dallara, who headed negotiating for the banks, to EU headquarters in Brussels. Merkel handed Dallara an agreement containing the 50% bondholder loss demand, and told Dallara- "This is the last offer." Merkel was saying banks would be left with nothing if they rejected it and Greece defaulted. Dallara called bankers and the IIF accepted Merkel's agreement. The final moment that October came on October 31, when Greece's prime minister Papandreou said he would call a referendum on the bailout provisions and austerity measures demanded by the IMF, the EU and the ECB. Bond markets reacted negatively to the announcement fearing a rejection and a Greek default. The Group of 20 leaders was meeting in Cannes, France on Nov. 2, 2011. Papandreou was asked to come to Cannes for a pre-summit meeting. Here Merkel told Papandreou- "the real question" for the referendum was, "Do you want to be in the euro, or not?" Days later Papandreou, lacking support in Greece from political parties and opposition inside his party, submitted his resignation. A non-political figure respected in Greece, former ECB vice president, Lucas Papademos, was appointed prime minister to head a Unity government. Polls after the appointment showed three fourths of Greeks said that this was "a positive step for Greece," with Papandreou's party getting only 11% support and the opposition led by Samaras about 20%. The criticism leveled at Merkel is that Germany should take responsibility for debt throughout the euro area through the issuance of eurozone bonds or the ECB buying large amount of bonds of Spain and Italy. Merkel faced strong opposition inside Germany and from the Bundesbank to this idea. The other criticism was based on austerity measures worsening the finances of Greece because of a lack of growth in the economy, which is true; yet Germany may see the situation in Greece as taking a long time to be resolved in any event because of excessive and faulty financial management. For Italy and Spain putting finances in order was a necessity, and austerity measures should lead to short term sacrifice but improve prospects for the long term by returning the economies to growth. Another criticism is the installation of governments that lack popular or electoral support. As the polls in Greece showed the Unity government there has far greater support and public opinion blames the politicians for the huge mess. In Italy, Berlusconi was widely seen as losing popular support when he resigned. And in Spain Mariano Rajoy, the newly elected prime minister, was elected with a huge majority in parliament following winning in local government elections. Merkel also held her own party, the Chrisitian Democrats together at the recent Leipzig convention. Mario Draghi, was elected with German support to head the European Central Bank. He has long argued for better management of Italian finances as head of Italy's central bank. Draghi was able to support Merkel with carefully planned and managed actions. First to reduce interest rates to support economic growth in a slowing eurozone. Following this with the ECB's Long Term Financing Operation in late December 2011, to provide unlimited loans to European banks at 1% interest for three years in exchange for a broadened list of collateral deposited at the ECB. In a final twist in this drama, Charles Dallara, who was a key negotiator for the U.S. Treasury in setting up the Brady Bonds- that converted bad Latin American government debt owed to U.S. banks in the 1980's into long term debt with large reductions in principal owed and lower interest rates. This was in exchange for guaranteed repayment with 30 year U.S. zero coupon bonds. Dallara was now a negotiator for the banks to reduce the chance of the very same bondholder haircuts that he had negotiated in an earlier period to solve the Latin American debt crisis. Other players in the drama were Axel Weber, head of the Bundesbank, Germany's central bank, who resigned after strong and outspoken opposition to the ECB's large scale purchase of bonds of Greece, Italy and Spain. Jens Weidmann, his protege, who replaced him. And Jurgen Stark, German representative at the ECB, who also resigned in opposition to Germany assuming responsibility for eurozone debt. ...

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An account by Journal reporters based on over 25 interviews with eurozone policymakers shows how the central players in the eurozone drama acted to defend their national interests during the period April to July 2011. On one side France's president Sarkozy, Frenchman Claude Trichet at the European Central Bank, arguing in favor of the banks not to take bondholder losses or haircuts on loans made to Greece. On the other side the Bundesbanks Axel Weber, and Jens Weidman, Jurgen Stark and German Finance Minister Schauble. The Germans argued strongly for bondholder losses to take responsibility for bad loan decisions by French and German banks. French banks had committed more loans to Greece than German banks and had more at stake. German public opinion was strongly against German taxpayers paying for the losses, making German politicians insistent that European banks take losses on their bad loan decisions, or Germany would not support additional loans to Greece. Throughout April to July the two sides were locked in an impasse. The French feared losses for their banks and a Lehman Brothers bankruptcy style situation. The Germans at the Bundesbank and the Finance Ministry were equally insistent. A July 2011 summit meeting did not settle the issue. The events not covered here from the July to the December summit of eurozone leaders resulted in bondholders taking 50% haircut on loans to Greece, reducing the debt burden in Greece after austerity measures led to popular protests. The French pushed hard for the ECB or the EFSF to be allowed to make large purchases of bonds of troubled eurozone countries in an effort to protect Spain and Italy from contagion through higher bond yields. The Netherlands and Finland supported Germany's position. German bankers Weber, Weidman at the Bundesbank and Finance Minister Schauble opposed large scale buying by the ECB of Italy's and Spain's bonds and Chancellor Merkel said about a common eurobond that "this is not going to happen." Governments changed in Greece, Italy, and Spain by Dec. 2011, which committed to austerity programs and spending cuts. Italian Mario Draghi was appointed with German support as new head of the ECB. In late December 2011 Draghi launched the Long Term Financing Operation for lending unlimited amounts at 1% for three year loans to European banks and relaxing the terms to accept government bonds and other debt as collateral for loans. The effect of this was to provide a large infusion of liquidity into the banking system in Europe and drastically bring down the yields on bonds issued by Italy and Spain....

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The majority report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commisssion says Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke, regulators, and several financial institutions were responsible for what was an "avoidable disaster." The report criticizes Mr Greenspan for advocating deregulation and considers the failure to stem the flow of toxic mortgages under his leadership at the central bank as a "prime example" of negligence. The report also says that the New York Fed under Timothy Geithner, now Treasury Secretary, also missed signs of trouble at Citigroup and Lehman. There are 6 Democrats and 4 Republicans on the Commission. The fourth Republican has his dissent, calling policies to promote home ownership, the role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac a major cause. The panel was hobbled by internal divisions and staff turnover, which have made what should have been a report of major significance into one marred by partisan differences. The majority report itself was heavily shaped by Phil Angelides, the committee's chairman, and it has many literary phrases. Overleveraging was a critical factor in the crisis. For every $40 in assets, the US's 5 largest investment banks had only $1 in capital to cover losses. The banks hid their leveraging with derivatives, off-balance sheet entities and other devices. The banks relied heavily on short-term debt which worsened the crisis. The report also said the Clinton adminstration's decision to exempt over-the counter derivatives from regulation- made in the last year of Clinton's term- also helped set up the ground for later events leading to the crisis....

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John Taylor looks one step ahead of the March 2012 Greece bailout and sets up the most plausible scenario for the future. He says the risks of contagion were always exaggerated from the beginning- a planned default or restructuring of debt such as happened in Argentina in 2001, does not have the contagion risks associated with a chaotic and unplanned default as in Russia in 1998. Predicability in policy makes a huge difference, says Taylor. The European banks which stood to lose from writedowns exaggerated the fears of contagion- a process that always occurs for people who are adversely affected by writedowns- resulting in top officials in the European Union delaying the unavoidable serious restructuring. It was not until Chancellor Merkel handed Charles Dallara, who negotiated for the European banks, a note stating a demand for 50% bondholder writedown, on October 27, 2011, at EU headquarters in Brussels, did any serious writedown of debt begin. Merkel told Dallara: "this is my last offer." The July 2011 summit by contrast had only a 10% bondholder writedown in the agreement, when insolvency not illiquidity was the real issue. Walker Forelle and Meichtry, give a detailed account of what happened in the Wall Street Journal, Dec. 30, 2011. The important thing for Greece, says Taylor, is for what the IMF calls "growth enhancing structural reforms" - greater reliance on private markets, incentives, rule of law. He says this bailout won't work because IMF growth forecasts do not reflect the rapid shrinking of the Greek economy. Antonis Samaras, leader of the major opposition party, is in favor of pro-growth measures and has stated his desire to change the agreement. The 130 billion euro bailout provides 90 billion euros for recapitalizing Greece's banks, and financing the budget. This puts Greece in a situation where the political leaders win voter support by discarding the conditions from the Northern EU nations and come with a plan that is better suited for Greece. The EU in this scenario would cut off further bailout funds to Greece. Taylor sees this as the better outcome for Greece than the current situation, which leaves Greece no hope for growth, and also for the EU by getting out of bailouts that have little prospect of working. It would be difficult but doable for Greece says Taylor, because interest payments would be low and Greek banks would be recapitalized after the current March 2012 bailout. ...

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After the debt swap of old bonds for new bonds with private bondholders for an estimated 53% haircut, the IMF's March 2012 report on Greece says a lot remains unresolved. It predicts a "disorderly exit from the euro" without further help. The April 2012 elections may result in a dilution to committments to austerity policies in Greece, as these policies are highly unpopular in Greece. Greece is still "accident-prone." And competitiveness issues may take over a decade to resolve.

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Failure by EU leaders to take early and decisive action to reduce Greece's debt to sustainable levels in 2009. This was when the IMF report by Dutchman Bob Traa blew the cover off the Greek coverup of deteriorated finances. Policy missteps included ECB president Trichet and other EU leaders pushing austerity measures and not taking needed tough action on reducing the debt. By November 2011 a 50% reduction in debt with bondholders taking the losses is not enough to correct the situation. Greece's debt is discounted by 70% by Nov 2011. Analysts estimate an 85% reduction in Greek debt being necessary for Greece to pull through without a default.

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Richard Portes of the London Business School provides two good reasons why the EU's decision to adopt the French Banking Federation's proposal for rollovers with 10% interest costs is a serious mistake. It doubles the interest costs from 4-6% to 10% with 2% Greek GDP growth and makes debt servicing untenable. Portes says the real Brady Plan from the 1980's included a 35-40% bondholders haircut. Deals of this type have a precedent- in Mexico in 1988 and in Argentina in 2001 such bond exchanges were soon followed by deals that placed bondholder haricuts on creditors. The lesson from Latin America in the 1980's, says Portes, is that the burdens of servicing a debt of such proportions under onerous conditions only extinguishes the enterprise, investment and productive capabilities of the particular country trying to service that debt, making the debt even less serviceable. See the Wall Street Journal's editorial on this deal which it calls "The French Deception." The terms sound like Greek to the editors leaving a sense that French banks are only saying "gimme." The only benefit achieved may be putting off the problem and avoiding contagion to Portugal and Spain. Yet this is not that much of a benefit when one realizes that the problem has not gone away, and is likely to look much worse six or nine months from now....

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Von Mark Schieritz of Germany's Zeit Online describes the changes underway following the election campaigns in the U.S., and France, and the Brexit vote in Britain, all signalling the discontent of people left behind by the tech, capitalism, trade and globalization changes of the last two decades. The appeal of one time fringe politicians using racist slogans and divisive rhetoric to appeal to those left behind, appealing to people lacking intergenerational mobility, and without much hope for a better future, is a serious concern. People who are gullible enough, lack college education, or racially isolated so that they are not likely to look carefully at what is being offered in terms of programs and change of competing parties, and likely to overlook the hard and difficult road for corrective course of action, because of anger and pentup fears. Schieritz cites as part of this change the unanimously approved conclusion in its final declaration at the G-20 meeting in Chengdu, China- "The benefits of growth need to be shared more broadly within and among countries to promote inclusiveness." Yet this can be a sort of "too little, too late."  Bankers who are cited in an email going around Wall Street lack credibility with groups on Main Street, to people adversely affected by tech, trade and globalization changes that have been persistently ignored for over a decade, close to two decades. More convincing is the tone of Theresa May, the British prime minister's first statement outside 10 Downing Street- who spoke of the "burning injustices" and her determination to make this a top priority of her government. Still more convincing are the programs to invest $275 billion over 10 years in infrastructure put forward by the leading candidate in the U.S. presidential election of 2016, to provide easier access to public universities and colleges to those left behind, as a sure way to create new jobs and address intergenerational mobility. In fact every leading candidate had made the loss of upward mobility their central plank already in 2015, long before Trump and Sanders started their campaign. The real hope lies in western leaders Merkel, May, and Clinton, all keenly aware students of changes, all women by the way who have sensed the injustice and have the ability to come up with something new and promising for the future, after learning the lessons of the past. ...

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In its May 2011 special report on international banking the Economist points out the need for banking regulators to take stronger action than they have so far. What it calls "pre-emptive insurance" it says is needed - stronger regulation, larger capital cushions, and some form of separation of different kinds of banking. Without this the dangers of excessive risk taking and banks that are "too big to fail" will continue to threaten the world's economy. Banks that are smaller and better capitalized says the Economist can fail more gracefully than the large mega banks that exist at this time. In fact the banks today in the U.S. are larger than at the time of the 2008 crisis. Other analysts also point to the lack of major changes in banking and financial structures today compared to the situation before the 2008 crisis, both in Europe and the U.S.

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Prof. Gorton and Prof. Metrick of the Yale School of Management review 16 scholarly studies and papers on the causes of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis in the current isue of the Journal of Economic Literature. Another article in the same journal reviews 21 books on the subject. Samuelson says the most cited causes- lax regulation and passive regulators, and the policy of home ownership that encourage the packaging and of securitization of mortgages to government sponsored agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac- are only the surface causes. If we are to explain how a whole society seemed to believe in the idea that somehow there was a way to maintain a rising tide continuously, with only small corrections over several decades, by the clever manipulation of monetary and fiscal policies; then one has to look to the hubris of economists who acted as if this was possible and the gullibility of business and a public that desperately wanted to believe as some have put it "that this time it was different," or that shrewd management of economic policy could actually bring about such a panacea. The abiding lesson is economic policies based on a better understanding of how modern industrial economies work are merely useful tools, no more no less, and there is no substitute for a good ethic, wise management and careful thinking on the part of the public, business and government, particularly for the people in leadership positions. ...