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Experts say there may not be much difference whether a voluntary deal is reached between Greece and the Institute of International Finance or a deal is forced on private bondholders by Greece for the 93% of Greek bonds that are based on Greek laws. Most of the large banks that hold Greek bonds will be subject to persuasion by European authorites (EU, ECB) to accept the deal offered by Greece that brings debt down to 120% of GDP by 2020. The remaining holdouts are the hedge funds that will want to opt out of a voluntary arrangement anyway, because a forced deal by Greece would allow them to collect payments on their credit default swaps. Adam Lerrick, an expert on sovereign debt restructurings, says the hedge funds and other private bondholders are framing the discussion into one of a voluntary agreement that is orderly and an involuntary agreement that is disorderly, as a tactic to scare the European authorites (the EU, ECB) and Greece. He says not only can forced restructurings be orderly, but in this case the improved prospects for Greece with serious debt reduction would lead to a ratings upgrade for Greece. Some hedge funds have said they will sue if forced into the deal. Michael Waibel, at the Lauerpacht Centre for International Law at Cambridge University, says the case would first go to Greek courts where it would be received without much sympathy, and then to the European Court of Human Rights. Only the small number of bonds under Swiss and English law with pari passu clauses insisting on equal treatment of bondholders have any prospects, and even then legal enforcement of any awards is uncertain as shown in the case of Argentina. The 93% of bonds under Greek law have no such clauses and this gives Greece the option for special treatment of bonds held by the ECB....

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Blackston and Karnitschnig describe the European Central Bank's role in the current crisis and buying of bonds of troubled eurozone countries. And the resistance in Germany to the ECB's purchase of bonds of eurozone countries to prevent contagion effects in the eurozone. ECB President Trichet only reluctantly pushed the ECB into bond purchases in the recurring crises, and saw the ECB's role as strictly limited to controlling inflation and maintaining a stable euro currency. There is resistance in Germany to the ECB printing money to cover eurozone debt of Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain. This comes from the searing experience with hyperinflation, an economic crisis similiar to that of the U.S. with the Great Depression, when the Reichsbank printed money in the 1920's to buy large quantities of government bonds. The Bundesbank that ensured Germany's postwar recovery focussed on a single mandate to control inflation, and this is a key part of the ECB's charter. The first president of the ECB when it was founded in 1998, was Dutchman Wim Duisenberg, who would tell politicians: "I hear you, but I don't listen." When Frenchman Trichet became the second ECB president, he focussed on inflation fighting efforts. He warned against the extravagant spending and fiscal irresponsibility of some eurozone countries saying "we are dancing on a volcano."...

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Dart Management, a vulture fund based in the Cayman Islands, received 90% of the 436 million euros bond payment by Greece on May 15, 2012. Dart is one of the holdout investors who did not participate in the Greek debt restructuring deal. It planned to sue the Greek government. This has implications for the other holdout investors with about 6-7 billion euros of Greek bonds. The reason given by the Greek government was that this caught Greece at a bad time- suing Greece could have tied up European bailout funds that Greece needs to make interest payments on its debt. The timing is bad from another standpoint, as it will further exacerbate voter discontent with the parties associated with the government just before the second Greek elections in June 2012.

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Richard Portes of the London Business School provides two good reasons why the EU's decision to adopt the French Banking Federation's proposal for rollovers with 10% interest costs is a serious mistake. It doubles the interest costs from 4-6% to 10% with 2% Greek GDP growth and makes debt servicing untenable. Portes says the real Brady Plan from the 1980's included a 35-40% bondholders haircut. Deals of this type have a precedent- in Mexico in 1988 and in Argentina in 2001 such bond exchanges were soon followed by deals that placed bondholder haricuts on creditors. The lesson from Latin America in the 1980's, says Portes, is that the burdens of servicing a debt of such proportions under onerous conditions only extinguishes the enterprise, investment and productive capabilities of the particular country trying to service that debt, making the debt even less serviceable. See the Wall Street Journal's editorial on this deal which it calls "The French Deception." The terms sound like Greek to the editors leaving a sense that French banks are only saying "gimme." The only benefit achieved may be putting off the problem and avoiding contagion to Portugal and Spain. Yet this is not that much of a benefit when one realizes that the problem has not gone away, and is likely to look much worse six or nine months from now....

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The logjam continues between the French and German banks- represented by the Institute of International Finance and its negotiator Charles Dallara- and the governments of Germany and Greece, supported by the IMF. The position of the Greek government is that the interest rate on new bonds stretching out over a long time period that woud be exchanged at 50% face value of existing bonds should be set at rates well below 4%, because Greece faces a growing deficit and rapidly worsening economy. The German government which is faced with the prospect of providing additional funds to Greece supports this. The IIF position is for an interest rate of between 4-5%.

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Criticism of the EU's handling of the Greece crisis by IMF officials in a report. The report says the actions taken for debt restructuring in 2012 should have come much earlier to reduce the debt burden and the size of austerity measures in Greece. Similiar criticism has been voiced by president Hollande of France and in editorials by the WSJ. President Samaras of Greece says the sharp cuts in spending reduced potential for growth in the economy.

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Austin Goolsbee says the overvalued currencies of Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal and the lack of growth under austerity plans proposed for these countries create impossible odds for resolution of the financial problems in these countries. The German position is that profligate spending and irresponsible accounting in Greece, and structural issues in Italy ranging from entitlement spending to tax evasion, need to be resolved.

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John Taylor looks one step ahead of the March 2012 Greece bailout and sets up the most plausible scenario for the future. He says the risks of contagion were always exaggerated from the beginning- a planned default or restructuring of debt such as happened in Argentina in 2001, does not have the contagion risks associated with a chaotic and unplanned default as in Russia in 1998. Predicability in policy makes a huge difference, says Taylor. The European banks which stood to lose from writedowns exaggerated the fears of contagion- a process that always occurs for people who are adversely affected by writedowns- resulting in top officials in the European Union delaying the unavoidable serious restructuring. It was not until Chancellor Merkel handed Charles Dallara, who negotiated for the European banks, a note stating a demand for 50% bondholder writedown, on October 27, 2011, at EU headquarters in Brussels, did any serious writedown of debt begin. Merkel told Dallara: "this is my last offer." The July 2011 summit by contrast had only a 10% bondholder writedown in the agreement, when insolvency not illiquidity was the real issue. Walker Forelle and Meichtry, give a detailed account of what happened in the Wall Street Journal, Dec. 30, 2011. The important thing for Greece, says Taylor, is for what the IMF calls "growth enhancing structural reforms" - greater reliance on private markets, incentives, rule of law. He says this bailout won't work because IMF growth forecasts do not reflect the rapid shrinking of the Greek economy. Antonis Samaras, leader of the major opposition party, is in favor of pro-growth measures and has stated his desire to change the agreement. The 130 billion euro bailout provides 90 billion euros for recapitalizing Greece's banks, and financing the budget. This puts Greece in a situation where the political leaders win voter support by discarding the conditions from the Northern EU nations and come with a plan that is better suited for Greece. The EU in this scenario would cut off further bailout funds to Greece. Taylor sees this as the better outcome for Greece than the current situation, which leaves Greece no hope for growth, and also for the EU by getting out of bailouts that have little prospect of working. It would be difficult but doable for Greece says Taylor, because interest payments would be low and Greek banks would be recapitalized after the current March 2012 bailout. ...

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The warning light is again on for Greece in the beginning of 2012, as the rapidly deteriorating economy makes a 50% loss by private creditors insufficient to help it meet repayment or refinancing of bonds coming due in 2012. Additional funds will be needed from EU countries unwilling to do this. 14.5 billion euros in Greek bonds come due on March 20, 2012. Greece also faces a public increasingly resistant to austerity cuts. A vountary exchage of existing Greek bonds by private creditors for new bonds at 50% face value and maturing over a longer period will be done under English law. This will be harder to change in the future. Most of the existing bonds were issued under Greek law which can be altered by Greece's parliament.

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The terms of the debt restructuring deal with the bond swap in Greece become clear on March 9, 2012. In the deal with private bondholders -using collective action clauses to force remaining bondholders into the deal- about 96% of the 206 billion euros of Greece's bonds will be exchanged. Private bondholders held out throughout most of 2011, delaying the inevitable as Greece's economic situation became increasingly hopeless. This created a logjam with the German government, which insisted on serious private sector participation and bondholder haircut as the cost of poor lending decisions of the French, German and other European banks that made loans to Greece out of proportion of the ability of Greece to payback loans. Charles Dallara of the Institute of International Finance, negotiating for European banks, offered a 10% average loss on the bonds in July 2009. It was not until German Chancellor Merkel told Dallara at a late night meeting on October 27, 2011: "this is my last offer," for a 50% loss on the face value of the bonds, was agreement reached. The Greek debt swap that now takes place will give private bondholders a loss of 53.5% from the face value of 200 billion euros of bonds that they hold. The new Greek bonds issued in place of the old bonds include short-term bonds issued by the eurozone rescue fund at 15% of the face value of the old bonds, and a series of Greek bonds with maturity ranging from 11-30 years valued at 31.5% of the face value of old bonds. That even this 53.5% bondholder loss will not be adequate, as Greece's economy looks irretrievably damaged as it spirals downwards, is shown by the value of these bonds already trading in a hypothetical "gray market." The new 30 year bond is quoted at 17 cents and the 11 year bond at 22 cents. The questions remain about the stalling by the banks in taking the losses earlier- was this the wisest move considering the losses beyond Greece as the eurozone economy as a whole has suffered from the prolonged negotiations stretching through 2011, lurching from one crisis to the next? Even if the stalling was designed to give time for banks to repair their balance sheets, was this the best strategy, considering the damage inflicted on European economic growth. John Taylor of Stanford points out that the European banks delayed the unavoidable serious debt restructuring for too long, when insolvency was the real issue not illiquidity, and exaggerated the effect of contagion from the beginning- in John Taylor, WSJ, 2/22/2012, A Better Grecian Bailout. And John Cochrane of the University of Chicago, points out that French and German governments if they bailout French and German banks should do so openly and frankly rather than cover this up as bailouts of countries, because this would lead to serious questions about the poor lending decisions of the European banks and government supervision of the banks- in Cochrane, WSJ, 12/2/2010, 'Contagion' and other Euro Myths. As early as Feb. 2010, Cochrane was suggesting the forced exchange of new bonds with long debt maturities for exisiting bonds with short debt maturities, as short term debt was the major issue here. ...

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An account by Journal reporters based on over 25 interviews with eurozone policymakers shows how the central players in the eurozone drama acted to defend their national interests during the period April to July 2011. On one side France's president Sarkozy, Frenchman Claude Trichet at the European Central Bank, arguing in favor of the banks not to take bondholder losses or haircuts on loans made to Greece. On the other side the Bundesbanks Axel Weber, and Jens Weidman, Jurgen Stark and German Finance Minister Schauble. The Germans argued strongly for bondholder losses to take responsibility for bad loan decisions by French and German banks. French banks had committed more loans to Greece than German banks and had more at stake. German public opinion was strongly against German taxpayers paying for the losses, making German politicians insistent that European banks take losses on their bad loan decisions, or Germany would not support additional loans to Greece. Throughout April to July the two sides were locked in an impasse. The French feared losses for their banks and a Lehman Brothers bankruptcy style situation. The Germans at the Bundesbank and the Finance Ministry were equally insistent. A July 2011 summit meeting did not settle the issue. The events not covered here from the July to the December summit of eurozone leaders resulted in bondholders taking 50% haircut on loans to Greece, reducing the debt burden in Greece after austerity measures led to popular protests. The French pushed hard for the ECB or the EFSF to be allowed to make large purchases of bonds of troubled eurozone countries in an effort to protect Spain and Italy from contagion through higher bond yields. The Netherlands and Finland supported Germany's position. German bankers Weber, Weidman at the Bundesbank and Finance Minister Schauble opposed large scale buying by the ECB of Italy's and Spain's bonds and Chancellor Merkel said about a common eurobond that "this is not going to happen." Governments changed in Greece, Italy, and Spain by Dec. 2011, which committed to austerity programs and spending cuts. Italian Mario Draghi was appointed with German support as new head of the ECB. In late December 2011 Draghi launched the Long Term Financing Operation for lending unlimited amounts at 1% for three year loans to European banks and relaxing the terms to accept government bonds and other debt as collateral for loans. The effect of this was to provide a large infusion of liquidity into the banking system in Europe and drastically bring down the yields on bonds issued by Italy and Spain....

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Wall Street Journal reporters Walker in Berlin, Forelle in Brussels, and Meichtry in Rome, reconstruct the events during critical days after the indecision and failure to reach agreement during the July summit of eurozone countries. This took the form of intervews with leading players and over 25 policy makers. What emerges are accounts of how Germany's Angela Merkel, daughter of a Lutheran pastor, and protege of Eurozone founder, former German chancellor Helmut Kohl, handled the crisis. Merkel was widely criticized in the media for indecision. What emerges is an account of a leader who took decisive action at key moments in the crisis- leading to the formation of new governments in Greece and Italy taking action to improve finances, and negotiations with banks represented by the International Finance Corporation leading to acceptance by banks of a 50% loss on loans to Greece to reduce Greece's unsustainable debt burden. Merkel also worked with the European Central Bank's departing president Frenchman Claude Trichet and new president Italian Mario Draghi to resist French president Sarkozy's efforts to have the ECB assume responsibility for the crisis through large scale buying of Italian and Spanish bonds; which was opposed by German public opinion as a backdoor way of having German taxpayers assume responsibility for European debt. Shown are three critical moments when Merkel intervened. In October 2011, after Italian prime minister Berlusconi reneged on promises to make pension and other reforms to improve Italian finances because of political resistance. He survived a parliamentary no-confidence vote by one vote. Merkel took the lead on October 20, by directly calling Italian President Georgio Napolitano on the phone, to urge him to take action for forming a new government in Italy. The result was Napolitano talking with all political parties to form a new government, leading to the formation of a government by a non-political figure respected in Italy, former EU commissioner Mario Monti. A day earlier, on October 19, French President Sarkozy met ECB president, Trichet, at an event honoring him as departing ECB president in Frankfurt's Alte Oper concert hall. Trichet, Merkel and Sarkozy met in a side room. Sarkozy asked for decisive help from the ECB for large scale buying of Italian and Spanish bonds to lower yields, which had reached 7% on Italian bonds. Trichet responded that the ECB's charter did not allow it to finance governments, with the meeting ending in a shouting match between the two leaders. On October 21, EU and IMF inspectors warned that Greece's debt was reaching unsustainable proportions and austerity measures alone would not work, unless the bondholders, the European banks, took losses of 60% on their excessive lending to Greece. At this point France agreed to the German position arguing for this level of bondholder haircuts or losses, fearing the prospect of large future bailouts that would jeopardize France's triple AAA credit rating. The July 2011 summit accord had only provided for 10% in losses for bondholders. On October 27, at a meeting that went past midnight, Merkel and Sarkozy called IIF head Charles Dallara, who headed negotiating for the banks, to EU headquarters in Brussels. Merkel handed Dallara an agreement containing the 50% bondholder loss demand, and told Dallara- "This is the last offer." Merkel was saying banks would be left with nothing if they rejected it and Greece defaulted. Dallara called bankers and the IIF accepted Merkel's agreement. The final moment that October came on October 31, when Greece's prime minister Papandreou said he would call a referendum on the bailout provisions and austerity measures demanded by the IMF, the EU and the ECB. Bond markets reacted negatively to the announcement fearing a rejection and a Greek default. The Group of 20 leaders was meeting in Cannes, France on Nov. 2, 2011. Papandreou was asked to come to Cannes for a pre-summit meeting. Here Merkel told Papandreou- "the real question" for the referendum was, "Do you want to be in the euro, or not?" Days later Papandreou, lacking support in Greece from political parties and opposition inside his party, submitted his resignation. A non-political figure respected in Greece, former ECB vice president, Lucas Papademos, was appointed prime minister to head a Unity government. Polls after the appointment showed three fourths of Greeks said that this was "a positive step for Greece," with Papandreou's party getting only 11% support and the opposition led by Samaras about 20%. The criticism leveled at Merkel is that Germany should take responsibility for debt throughout the euro area through the issuance of eurozone bonds or the ECB buying large amount of bonds of Spain and Italy. Merkel faced strong opposition inside Germany and from the Bundesbank to this idea. The other criticism was based on austerity measures worsening the finances of Greece because of a lack of growth in the economy, which is true; yet Germany may see the situation in Greece as taking a long time to be resolved in any event because of excessive and faulty financial management. For Italy and Spain putting finances in order was a necessity, and austerity measures should lead to short term sacrifice but improve prospects for the long term by returning the economies to growth. Another criticism is the installation of governments that lack popular or electoral support. As the polls in Greece showed the Unity government there has far greater support and public opinion blames the politicians for the huge mess. In Italy, Berlusconi was widely seen as losing popular support when he resigned. And in Spain Mariano Rajoy, the newly elected prime minister, was elected with a huge majority in parliament following winning in local government elections. Merkel also held her own party, the Chrisitian Democrats together at the recent Leipzig convention. Mario Draghi, was elected with German support to head the European Central Bank. He has long argued for better management of Italian finances as head of Italy's central bank. Draghi was able to support Merkel with carefully planned and managed actions. First to reduce interest rates to support economic growth in a slowing eurozone. Following this with the ECB's Long Term Financing Operation in late December 2011, to provide unlimited loans to European banks at 1% interest for three years in exchange for a broadened list of collateral deposited at the ECB. In a final twist in this drama, Charles Dallara, who was a key negotiator for the U.S. Treasury in setting up the Brady Bonds- that converted bad Latin American government debt owed to U.S. banks in the 1980's into long term debt with large reductions in principal owed and lower interest rates. This was in exchange for guaranteed repayment with 30 year U.S. zero coupon bonds. Dallara was now a negotiator for the banks to reduce the chance of the very same bondholder haircuts that he had negotiated in an earlier period to solve the Latin American debt crisis. Other players in the drama were Axel Weber, head of the Bundesbank, Germany's central bank, who resigned after strong and outspoken opposition to the ECB's large scale purchase of bonds of Greece, Italy and Spain. Jens Weidmann, his protege, who replaced him. And Jurgen Stark, German representative at the ECB, who also resigned in opposition to Germany assuming responsibility for eurozone debt. ...

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The ECB's annual report for 2012 and the role the ECB under Mario Draghi played in the eurozone crisis in 2011-2012. The gains made in eurozone financial architecture, especially the agreement for the ECB as financial supervisor for European banks. The ECB sees itself as the supervisor for all European banks- the French position in the discussions in Brussels. The agreement of Dec. 12, 2012 only says banks with assets over 30 billion euros, or 20% of GDP of countries, or operations in two or more countries will come under supervision by the ECB.

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Greg Ip provides useful insights into the nature of the economic recovery in Britain compared to the U.S. by 2015. The recovery in Britain has done better than in the U.S. in job creation, but has lagged behind in productivity gains. The labor force participation rate is 72% in Britain compared to 68% in the U.S., going back up to 2007 levels in Britain, whereas in the U.S. it has steadily declined with some older working class Americans too discouraged to look for work and left behind. Stagnant wage growth is a major issue in Britain, more so than in the U.S. where wage growth is slow. Economic austerity is not the main cause of the economic difficulties as the coalition government of prime minister Cameron relaxed earlier goals for austerity by 2012 with tax revenues and growth below forecasts. The structural budget deficit has been reduced by 6.6% of GDP since the peak, and the Office of Budget Responsibility estimates the UK economy was 1.5%-2% smaller by 2013 because of the austerity policies. Britain was also affected by the eurozone crisis to a larger degree than the U.S. Productivity remains a long term challenge- with needed investments in housing, education and infrastructure, improved lending for new business, and higher tech improvement exports....