LyrArc Article Gist
The Portuguese government asked the European Union for bailout loans. The aid the EU is providing to Portugal comes with conditions- asking Portugal to make additional austerity cuts even as new elections loom. The aid is essentially more loans at high interest rates, even if the rates are lower than the steep rates in financial markets for a country with a collapsing credit rating. There is serious concern about whether this formula applied by the EU is going to work because at this rate it may take a decade or more for Portugal to pay off all the loans. The major problem is that with severe spending cuts- a country that lacks competitiveness and cannot devalue its currency because of being the euro zone- it is that much harder to generate growth. Simon Tilford, chief economist for the Center for European Reform in London, says the EU leaders have failed to come to grips with the core of the problem for Ireland, Greece and now Portugal- which is how to restore the finances to some sustainability, and how this could ever be achieved by a policy of deeper and deeper spending cuts. Tilford points out that the other more fundamental problem EU leaders are not tackling, is that the problem is deep down the large amount of Portuguese, Irish and Greek debt held by German, French, British, Spanish and Dutch banks. If these countries default the governments of these countries would have to recapitalize their banks at the expense of the taxpayers of Germany, France, Britain, Netherlands. Political leaders of these countries want to avoid confronting angry taxpayers and lose political support. Germany has called for a bondholder haircut, something that banking interests do not support. Tilford says Portugal is not getting a bailout, because for a bailout there would need to be a default by Portugal. What it is getting along with Ireland and Greece, are loans at high interest rates, and an EU plan that simply stifles the ability to pay back accumulated debt, leaving the situation in limbo for some future resolution....

LyrArc Article Gist
Problems with the July 2011 plan for Greece and other troubled eurozone economies include the lack of funding and powers for the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). The contagion effects to Italy and Spain will require larger funding and powers for the EFSF for it to be able to deal with future crises. The bondholder debt haircut for Portuguese and Irish bondholders, and the sense that the crisis in Greece may have to be revisted yet again, are other issues that remain unresolved. Analysts sense that the EU's governance mechanisms are always a step behind in dealing with the repeated crises and EU leaders are doing only enough to get to the next crisis moment.

LyrArc Article Gist
Ireland is paying close to 6% for the cash it is getting while European authorites are paying 3% to issue bonds in January 2011. With the rate at 3.5% over German bond yields, J.P. Morgan estimates that Ireland would have to generate a primary surplus, excluding interest costs, of 2.3% in 2015. This is what it would take to stabilize debt against GDP. Borrowing at one percent lower Ireland would need a primary deficit of 0.2%. Ireland is in its third year of fiscal austerity, and this unjustly penalizes Ireland. An interest rate reduction would be contingent on Ireland achieving fiscal targets and monitoring by the European authorites.

LyrArc Article Gist
Richard Portes of the London Business School provides two good reasons why the EU's decision to adopt the French Banking Federation's proposal for rollovers with 10% interest costs is a serious mistake. It doubles the interest costs from 4-6% to 10% with 2% Greek GDP growth and makes debt servicing untenable. Portes says the real Brady Plan from the 1980's included a 35-40% bondholders haircut. Deals of this type have a precedent- in Mexico in 1988 and in Argentina in 2001 such bond exchanges were soon followed by deals that placed bondholder haricuts on creditors. The lesson from Latin America in the 1980's, says Portes, is that the burdens of servicing a debt of such proportions under onerous conditions only extinguishes the enterprise, investment and productive capabilities of the particular country trying to service that debt, making the debt even less serviceable. See the Wall Street Journal's editorial on this deal which it calls "The French Deception." The terms sound like Greek to the editors leaving a sense that French banks are only saying "gimme." The only benefit achieved may be putting off the problem and avoiding contagion to Portugal and Spain. Yet this is not that much of a benefit when one realizes that the problem has not gone away, and is likely to look much worse six or nine months from now....

LyrArc Article Gist
This editorial deserves an award for best editorial on international economic matters in 2011. The editorial, goes right to the point, when it says the French, the Germans, and the European Central Bank are deluding themselves if they call this weeks resolution of the Greece debt crisis a realistic solution. It is anything but a solution. The Journal calls it a French deception. It is unworkable because the main problem, the high ratio of Greek debt to GDP -which is now 155% and is expected to reach 170% by the end of 2011- is sure to get worse under the arrrangement designed in the interest of French and German banks. Under the arrangement French and German banks and other creditors will get to double their return from 4-5% today to an effective interest rate of 10% if Greece grows by 2% a year, on 49% of the bonds they hold. These bonds will be converted into 30 year bonds. This effectively doubles the interest cost for Greece in servicing this debt. On the other approximately 51% of the bonds the French and German banks would redeem the bonds for cash and a triple A, sovereign zero coupon bond. The Journal asks what is the point of making Greece's debt problem worse than it is now and calling it a solution. The austerity cuts are already expected to lead to a deep recession, something that is also happening in Portugal, leading to a worsening of the debt situation. Creditors are not sharing in the losses under this arrangement, as Germany and the Netherlands have insisted. As the Journal points out they are instead taking out half of their investment and doubling their return on the remainder. And the fears of contagion for Spain are not lessened, as financial markets can clearly see through this for what it is- unworkable and unrealistic. ...

LyrArc Article Gist
In an interview with the Wall Street Journal Deutschland, Hans Werner Sinn, head of the Ifo Institute in Germany, says Greece's bondholders are overly exaggerating the effects on the eurozone of an exit by Greece. He sees it in the best interests of Greece to improve its competitiveness and return to growth by going back to the drachma. Just to get to the level of Turkey Greece would need to reduce prices by 31%, which is impossible to do within the eurozone without risking a complete breakdown in civil order. The best way to use the 130 billion euro second bailout package is to use it to recapitalize its banking system, says Sinn. Sinn says Portugal's faces the risk of a debt crisis following the crisis in Greece.

LyrArc Article Gist
Failure by EU leaders to take early and decisive action to reduce Greece's debt to sustainable levels in 2009. This was when the IMF report by Dutchman Bob Traa blew the cover off the Greek coverup of deteriorated finances. Policy missteps included ECB president Trichet and other EU leaders pushing austerity measures and not taking needed tough action on reducing the debt. By November 2011 a 50% reduction in debt with bondholders taking the losses is not enough to correct the situation. Greece's debt is discounted by 70% by Nov 2011. Analysts estimate an 85% reduction in Greek debt being necessary for Greece to pull through without a default.

LyrArc Article Gist
A review of the aid program for Greece done for European leaders meeting in Brussels on October 23, 2011, shows that most of the money sent to Greece has gone to pay off bondholders (mostly European banks that lent to Greece). For the initial bailout program of the European Union and the IMF in May 2010, international loans amount to $91 billion. Of this $52 billion has gone to repay bonds that came due between May 2010 and September 2011, according to this review. The report was prepared by the European Commission in coordination with the IMF and the ECB. Greece owes over $300 billion dollars and Greece's borrowing extends far beyond the country's size and ability to repay, creating extraordinary risks to the financial system in Europe. The initial bailout program based its lending on little or no haircuts for the bondholders, who are mainly the European banks (mostly French and German banks) that loaned the money, which creates another set of risks, and a logjam, because taxpayers in the stronger financial countries such as Germany are equally adamant on not paying for the excess lending of the French and German banks. The financial leaders in Germany, Finance Minister Schauble, Axel Weber, the former head of the Bundesbank, and other prominent financial experts have also adamantly insisted on following prudent financial practices, and are opposed to using the European Central Bank to buy the sovereign bonds of France, Italy and Spain....

LyrArc Article Gist
German chancellor Angela Merkel arrived for a meeting of eurozone leaders in Brussels on October 23, 2011. She said: "I believe that now we have reached a more realistic view of the situation in Greece and that we will provide the necessary means to be able to protect the euro." Germany has insisted that bondholders take writeoffs of between 50-60% of Greek debt so that Greece would have sustainable debt. A review of Greece's debt by the European Commission in coordination with the ECB and the IMF shows that Greece's debt situation is totally unsustainable and will require a bondholder writeoff of around 60%. according to that report a 60% writeoff for bondholders would be required to bring Greece's debt below 110 percent of GDP by 2020. This has supported the German "realistic" view and Jean-Claude Juncker of Luxembourg, who heads the euro group of finance ministers stated that "we agreed yesterday (Friday, Oct. 21) that we have to have a significant increase in the banks' contribution." France also backed away from the plan it was supporting for the European Financial Stability Facility (the fund established to lend to troubled countries) to borrow from the European Central Bank, something Germany opposes. French finance minister Francois Baroin, said the issue was "not a definitive point of discussion for us,... what matters is what works." The Dutch support the Germans on these issues and Dutch finance minister, Jan Kees de Jager, said the use of the European central bank was "no longer an option." Options being considered are for the European Financial Stability Facility to offer insurance against a portion of losses on Italian and Spanish bonds....

LyrArc Article Gist
Amar Bhide touches on the unpredictable consequences of devaluations while commenting on the supposed benefit of a country having its own currency vs a currency such as the euro. The euro takes away the advatantage of devaluing the national currency as a way to regain competitiveness. Bhide points out that devaluations hurt the elderly on fixed incomes and low wage workers. Protections have to be put in place for the sections of the population that are badly affected. Large union negotiated wage increases can also reduce the benefits of devaluation in terms of regaining competitiveness.

LyrArc Article Gist
Thomas Sargent of New York University, the 2012 Nobel prize winner in economics, says the EU leaders can learn from the way the federal government in the U.S. handled the issue of state's debt when it came up in the 1790's and in 1840. In 1790 the federal government- under the leadership of Washington and Hamilton- saw the need to honor state's debt because of the contribution made by states in the war of independence and the U.S. assumed state's debt. In 1840 the U.S. refused to assume state's debt and states went into default. The result was beneficial because state's passed balanced budget rules and restrained reckless spending. Another benefit was that this preserved state rights to manage their finances and the federal structure setup under the constitution.

LyrArc Article Gist
The IMF's changing views on the value of fiscal austerity. In the current debate about the value of fiscal austerity, there is the IMF view, a German view based on its own experience, and the views of other countries in Europe. The IMF's view has shifted over time. The IMF World Economic Outlook 2010, describes its view of the effects of austerity measures in the form of spending cuts and tax increases- "Fiscal consolidation typically has a contractionary effect on output. A fiscal consolidation equal to 1% of GDP typically reduces GDP by about 0.5% within 2 years and raises the unemployment rate by about 0.3% percentage points." Over the longer term there are benefits as the private sector is not crowded out in the search for captal funding by the excessive government borrowing. The IMF's economic models suggest that it would take 5 years before reaching the breakeven point when the benefits of austerity measures exceed the effects of austerity. The German view held by German central bankers is that the actions stimulate growth in the short term. Manfred Neumann, professor emeritus at the Institute for Economic Policy at the University of Bonn, says this is called the "German hypothesis" as it reflects the experience of Germany from austerity actions taken by Germany. Laurence Ball, professor of Economics at John Hopkins University, is critical of the "German hypothesis" and its application across Europe in different situations. Germany is a large exporting nation and exports helped counterbalance the effects of austerity measures. Within the eurozone with fixed exchange rates the exports of less competitive countries cannot be boosted through devaluing the currency to gain price competitiveness. The other problem is that with interest rates close to zero in the euro zone the central banks cannot cut rates aggressively to counteract the effects of spending cuts. The problem gets compounded when a number of countries are taking austerity measures at the same time accentuating the downturn....

LyrArc Article Gist
Casey describes the crucial policy errors in Brazil with over spending and lack of transparency in the years leading to the crisis in 2014-2015. Brazil raised interest rates half a percentage point in May 2015 to 13.25%. Inflation was at 8.13% in Brazil in March 2015. Brazilian companies have large dollar denominated debt accumulated during the boom years which needs to be refinanced as its currency the real declines. With current policies economic growth is likely to continue at 0-1%. Russia made policy errors with the departure of Kudrin as finance minister for Putin's second term as president. Policies to attract foreign investment, controlling military expenditures, and continuing growth were reversed as Russia took positions on Ukraine that led to western sanctions, capital outflows, and a sharp decline in the ruble. By May 2015 the ruble and oil prices had recovered from lows, but the ruble was still 35% below the level in June 2014, and the oil prices were still only two thirds of the peak in 2014. Russia sees the decline in the ruble as a way to reduce imports and increase import substitution for many products. The economy is weakened by high inflation- inflation was 6.9% in March 2014, going up to 16.9% in March 2015. In May 2015 Russia lowered the target repo rate by 1.5 percentage points to 12%. Russia faces stagflation- high unemployment with low GDP growth, and high inflation....

LyrArc Article Gist
Austin Goolsbee says the overvalued currencies of Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal and the lack of growth under austerity plans proposed for these countries create impossible odds for resolution of the financial problems in these countries. The German position is that profligate spending and irresponsible accounting in Greece, and structural issues in Italy ranging from entitlement spending to tax evasion, need to be resolved.

LyrArc Article Gist
Prof. Gorton and Prof. Metrick of the Yale School of Management review 16 scholarly studies and papers on the causes of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis in the current isue of the Journal of Economic Literature. Another article in the same journal reviews 21 books on the subject. Samuelson says the most cited causes- lax regulation and passive regulators, and the policy of home ownership that encourage the packaging and of securitization of mortgages to government sponsored agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac- are only the surface causes. If we are to explain how a whole society seemed to believe in the idea that somehow there was a way to maintain a rising tide continuously, with only small corrections over several decades, by the clever manipulation of monetary and fiscal policies; then one has to look to the hubris of economists who acted as if this was possible and the gullibility of business and a public that desperately wanted to believe as some have put it "that this time it was different," or that shrewd management of economic policy could actually bring about such a panacea. The abiding lesson is economic policies based on a better understanding of how modern industrial economies work are merely useful tools, no more no less, and there is no substitute for a good ethic, wise management and careful thinking on the part of the public, business and government, particularly for the people in leadership positions. ...

LyrArc Article Gist
Cochrane says the best option today is for Europe to accept a sovereign default for Greece. He says the European Central Bank which stands behind the euro, should not be used for buying bonds of troubled countries with shaky "collateral." This would only lead to a situation where EU countries would have to recapitalize the ECB. He emphasizes the fact that Greece will not pay back this debt. And the only way out is to have a situation similiar to Argentina where it needs to start over, and it would at some point be able to borrow again. Austerity is deeply unpopular in Greece and with higher unemployment Greece's financial situation is rapidly deteriorating. Making austerity something that was tried to buy time but will not work. Cochrane also makes the point that the euro itself acts like the euro bonds that EU countries are reluctant to support, it means the ECB backs the currency and supports it- which makes it vital to keep the ECB whole and prevent the dilution of its financial strength. Axel Weber, former head of the Bundesbank, resigned to express his opposition to the ECB buying the bonds of troubled eurozone countries, which he said was outside the ECB's mandate to conduct monetary policy....