Abut 3 million homeowners are expected to default on their mortgages in the 30 months ending in mid 2009, and two thirds of this or 2 million will go into foreclosure, according to Moody's Economy.com. So what led to all this which eventually hit the financial markets in the U.S., and also to a lesser degree in Europe, through the opacity of the mortgage securities created from bad mortgages with falsely tagged triple AAA ratings that ended up in the assets of banks and investment firms? The motivations of each group were perverted as things unfolded. When the packagers of securties were not responsible for what they were doing they pursued profit before ethical behaviour and all sorts of securities were created. As these packagers were allowed to shop for ratings the ratings companies gradually lowered their standards to attract business. Politicians failed in the free market atmosphere of the Republican Bush administration and Republican led Congress. Senator Bachus and Congressman Frank introduced legislation during the later period of the bubble but failed to draw support to curb the bad lending. Republicans blocked a new antipredatory lending law in North Carolina from being enacted for the country from 1999 onwards. And Bush without realizing the ramifications prodded HUD to push Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to require higher percentage of loans to go to low income borrowers. Fannie and Freddie in turn met this requirement by increasing the demand for these subprime loans by buying the mortgage securities, which the packagers of these securities backed by subprime mortgage loans and incorrectly rated AAA by conniving ratings agencies were happy to supply. It was a sad situation with a happy -everyone could say the were bringing home ownership and the American dream to low income people, and business was signing up for this ride with short term gain in mind. And in all this financial innovation lost its legs as packaging these securities and constructing new investment vehicles like the conduits were being used in perverse ways. The basics of labeling something correctly was torn apart. You could not turn a subprime loan to low income borrowers or a loan without documentation to flippers and speculators into something different by simply labeling it as AAA. What the confidence in financial innovation in the American system did was help spread these securities all over the globe, where they were held with confidence by towns in remote parts of the Scandinavian north country as well as financial centres in Europe and Asia. At the state level politicians in California saw this as one of the state's star industries and protected it from legislation to curb bad lending, as most of the big lenders were based in California. Due to a strange set of affairs the Department of Corporations was left with the tasks of oversight of mortgage lenders in the state. It was concerned more with issues like protecting senior citizens from financial scams and was not staffed to meet the supervisory role of a huge mortgage lending business. When it comes to the Fed's role Greenspan also took the laissez fairre stand of not interfering with free markets, even when a lot of the bad lending was obvious and one Fed Governor Gramlich was pushing for better lending standards. The Fed supervisory role was over banks and banks were required to follow lending standards, but most of this lending had shifted to mortgage brokers and financial companies which were beyond the supervision of the Fed. Had the Fed extended its supervision to mortgage affiliates of the banks this could have increased the level of supervision and made a difference. But state regulation mechanisms in California by Department of Corporations show that the regulatory mechanism did not take into account the realities of mortgage lending and how it had changed. ...