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Experts say there may not be much difference whether a voluntary deal is reached between Greece and the Institute of International Finance or a deal is forced on private bondholders by Greece for the 93% of Greek bonds that are based on Greek laws. Most of the large banks that hold Greek bonds will be subject to persuasion by European authorites (EU, ECB) to accept the deal offered by Greece that brings debt down to 120% of GDP by 2020. The remaining holdouts are the hedge funds that will want to opt out of a voluntary arrangement anyway, because a forced deal by Greece would allow them to collect payments on their credit default swaps. Adam Lerrick, an expert on sovereign debt restructurings, says the hedge funds and other private bondholders are framing the discussion into one of a voluntary agreement that is orderly and an involuntary agreement that is disorderly, as a tactic to scare the European authorites (the EU, ECB) and Greece. He says not only can forced restructurings be orderly, but in this case the improved prospects for Greece with serious debt reduction would lead to a ratings upgrade for Greece. Some hedge funds have said they will sue if forced into the deal. Michael Waibel, at the Lauerpacht Centre for International Law at Cambridge University, says the case would first go to Greek courts where it would be received without much sympathy, and then to the European Court of Human Rights. Only the small number of bonds under Swiss and English law with pari passu clauses insisting on equal treatment of bondholders have any prospects, and even then legal enforcement of any awards is uncertain as shown in the case of Argentina. The 93% of bonds under Greek law have no such clauses and this gives Greece the option for special treatment of bonds held by the ECB....

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The majority report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commisssion says Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke, regulators, and several financial institutions were responsible for what was an "avoidable disaster." The report criticizes Mr Greenspan for advocating deregulation and considers the failure to stem the flow of toxic mortgages under his leadership at the central bank as a "prime example" of negligence. The report also says that the New York Fed under Timothy Geithner, now Treasury Secretary, also missed signs of trouble at Citigroup and Lehman. There are 6 Democrats and 4 Republicans on the Commission. The fourth Republican has his dissent, calling policies to promote home ownership, the role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac a major cause. The panel was hobbled by internal divisions and staff turnover, which have made what should have been a report of major significance into one marred by partisan differences. The majority report itself was heavily shaped by Phil Angelides, the committee's chairman, and it has many literary phrases. Overleveraging was a critical factor in the crisis. For every $40 in assets, the US's 5 largest investment banks had only $1 in capital to cover losses. The banks hid their leveraging with derivatives, off-balance sheet entities and other devices. The banks relied heavily on short-term debt which worsened the crisis. The report also said the Clinton adminstration's decision to exempt over-the counter derivatives from regulation- made in the last year of Clinton's term- also helped set up the ground for later events leading to the crisis....

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The truth is very different from the rhetoric coming from the Obama administration about helping Main Street America and ordinary workers against "fat-cat bankers," says Goldfarb. Under the Obama administration banks have grown larger and gained more influence over administration decisions. No conditions were made part of the agreement that would require banks to lend a portion of the money handed out to the banks to ordinary borrowers. And not much of significance was done to help homeowners under water, which would enable a faster recovery. In this respect the policies slanted in favor of banks of the Obama administration worsened the prospects of an economic recovery. Experts from Reagan advisor Martin Feldstein- who as early as 2008 advocated serious help to homeowners under water to reduce principal and interest- to the FDIC's Sheila Bair and Princeton Prof. Krugman, across the ideological spectrum, perceived this being in the national interest. Feldstein's first op-ed on his plan appeared in the Wall Street Journal on 3/7/2008, followed by ones on 4/15/2008, 10/4/2008, 1/20/2010/ 10/12/2011 in WSJ, and a oped on 10/30/2008 in the Washington Post, repeating the call for siginificant debt reduction to homeowners. Banks had extraordinary influence on successive administrations in the U.S., both Republican and Democratic- the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations- so that policy actions could be distorted from what would otherwise take place. A study by two University of Michigan professors shows that banks did not increase lending after receiving government money. Instead taxpayer money was used to invest in risky securities for profits from short term price movements, resulting in gains of about 10% in investment returns. Ran Duchin, one of the two professors, says helping ordinary borrowers was not the most profitable use of capital for banks. Without the necessary conditions from the Obama administration, the banks depolyed capital in ways that did not help the economy. Similiarly when banks needed to be restructured no preparatory action was taken because of resistance within the administration- a request by President Obama to Treasury Secretary Geithner for preparing a plan for the restructuring of Citigroup was ignored, according to a report by Goldfarb and Wallsten on 9/17/2011 in the Washington Post....

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The terms of the debt restructuring deal with the bond swap in Greece become clear on March 9, 2012. In the deal with private bondholders -using collective action clauses to force remaining bondholders into the deal- about 96% of the 206 billion euros of Greece's bonds will be exchanged. Private bondholders held out throughout most of 2011, delaying the inevitable as Greece's economic situation became increasingly hopeless. This created a logjam with the German government, which insisted on serious private sector participation and bondholder haircut as the cost of poor lending decisions of the French, German and other European banks that made loans to Greece out of proportion of the ability of Greece to payback loans. Charles Dallara of the Institute of International Finance, negotiating for European banks, offered a 10% average loss on the bonds in July 2009. It was not until German Chancellor Merkel told Dallara at a late night meeting on October 27, 2011: "this is my last offer," for a 50% loss on the face value of the bonds, was agreement reached. The Greek debt swap that now takes place will give private bondholders a loss of 53.5% from the face value of 200 billion euros of bonds that they hold. The new Greek bonds issued in place of the old bonds include short-term bonds issued by the eurozone rescue fund at 15% of the face value of the old bonds, and a series of Greek bonds with maturity ranging from 11-30 years valued at 31.5% of the face value of old bonds. That even this 53.5% bondholder loss will not be adequate, as Greece's economy looks irretrievably damaged as it spirals downwards, is shown by the value of these bonds already trading in a hypothetical "gray market." The new 30 year bond is quoted at 17 cents and the 11 year bond at 22 cents. The questions remain about the stalling by the banks in taking the losses earlier- was this the wisest move considering the losses beyond Greece as the eurozone economy as a whole has suffered from the prolonged negotiations stretching through 2011, lurching from one crisis to the next? Even if the stalling was designed to give time for banks to repair their balance sheets, was this the best strategy, considering the damage inflicted on European economic growth. John Taylor of Stanford points out that the European banks delayed the unavoidable serious debt restructuring for too long, when insolvency was the real issue not illiquidity, and exaggerated the effect of contagion from the beginning- in John Taylor, WSJ, 2/22/2012, A Better Grecian Bailout. And John Cochrane of the University of Chicago, points out that French and German governments if they bailout French and German banks should do so openly and frankly rather than cover this up as bailouts of countries, because this would lead to serious questions about the poor lending decisions of the European banks and government supervision of the banks- in Cochrane, WSJ, 12/2/2010, 'Contagion' and other Euro Myths. As early as Feb. 2010, Cochrane was suggesting the forced exchange of new bonds with long debt maturities for exisiting bonds with short debt maturities, as short term debt was the major issue here. ...

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Compared to the situation in 2008-2009 during the global financial crisis with the excess supply of labor, China in 2012 faces an excess in demand for labor. In 2009 about 20% of migrant workers were unemployed when the crisis hit, and wages dropped 10% for migrant workers, according to the Chinese Academy of Sciences and Stanford University. The situation three years later is one of tight labor markets and higer wages. A large stimulus in not only not needed today in the way it was in 2008-2009 as a way to maintain social stability, it would reduce the benefits of the anti-inflationary steps taken in 2011-2012, by putting more pressure on wages and prices. Manufacturing sector wages increased by 20.1% in 2011, according to China's statistics bureau. This may be why the Chinese government is taking measured steps to avoid creating more bad loans through indiscriminate lending, and being more selective in accelerating development projects in the pipeline. According to Hong Kong's new Chief Executive Officer China plans to have about 7% growth. This shift in approach would help China refocus on growth strategies recommended in the recent Development Reform Commission and World Bank Report on China....

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In its May 2011 special report on international banking the Economist points out the need for banking regulators to take stronger action than they have so far. What it calls "pre-emptive insurance" it says is needed - stronger regulation, larger capital cushions, and some form of separation of different kinds of banking. Without this the dangers of excessive risk taking and banks that are "too big to fail" will continue to threaten the world's economy. Banks that are smaller and better capitalized says the Economist can fail more gracefully than the large mega banks that exist at this time. In fact the banks today in the U.S. are larger than at the time of the 2008 crisis. Other analysts also point to the lack of major changes in banking and financial structures today compared to the situation before the 2008 crisis, both in Europe and the U.S.

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The logjam continues between the French and German banks- represented by the Institute of International Finance and its negotiator Charles Dallara- and the governments of Germany and Greece, supported by the IMF. The position of the Greek government is that the interest rate on new bonds stretching out over a long time period that woud be exchanged at 50% face value of existing bonds should be set at rates well below 4%, because Greece faces a growing deficit and rapidly worsening economy. The German government which is faced with the prospect of providing additional funds to Greece supports this. The IIF position is for an interest rate of between 4-5%.

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The Social Democrats leader Sigmar Gabriel is Economics Minister in the coalition government of Angela Merkel in Germany. He is sympathetic to French premier Manuel Valls effort to reduce austerity in the 2015 French budget now being reviewed by Brussels. Here he takes the initiative to call for discussion on the issue of growth and austerity facing the European Union, by joining French Economics minister Emmanuel Macron in asking two economists Pisani-Ferry and Enderlein at the Berlin Institute of Governance for advice on generating growth. The process started in late summer with the defeat of the centre right government in Sweden which supported Merkel's strict austerity policies for balanced budgets. The elections to the European parliament showed the dire situation facing Cameron in Britain and Hollande in France with the unpopularity of austerity policies, higher taxes and cutbacks. The Socialist Hollande government has the lowest public opinion ratings of any postwar government in France, at 18%, and it is unwilling to go further down the road with austerity. At the same time Valls has found a partner in Italy with the growing popularity of Matteo Renzi in Italy who won 40% of the vote in Italy for the EU parliamentary elections of 2014. ECB president Mario Draghi, has generated the debate by saying at a October 2014 Brookings Institution conference in Washington D.C. that countries that have fiscal space (referring to Germany) should use it. He added that governments that did not take action in the economic crisis facing the eurozone of no growth will be swept away by public opinion. IMF president Lagarde, a former French Finance Minister under Sarkozy, has also questioned policy of strict austerity. For the first time since the start of the eurozone crisis in 2010 there is an opportunity for open discussion on future policies for renewal in the eurozone....

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The warning light is again on for Greece in the beginning of 2012, as the rapidly deteriorating economy makes a 50% loss by private creditors insufficient to help it meet repayment or refinancing of bonds coming due in 2012. Additional funds will be needed from EU countries unwilling to do this. 14.5 billion euros in Greek bonds come due on March 20, 2012. Greece also faces a public increasingly resistant to austerity cuts. A vountary exchage of existing Greek bonds by private creditors for new bonds at 50% face value and maturing over a longer period will be done under English law. This will be harder to change in the future. Most of the existing bonds were issued under Greek law which can be altered by Greece's parliament.

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Frank Rich on the ticking bomb in the banking system and the bank lobbying that has kept reform from happening. Phil Angelides leads the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission which is due to begin hearings soon. But says Rich, Angelides who is following in the footsteps of Ferdinand Pecora who investigated the 1929 crash as chief counsel of the Senate committee that did the investigating, will have to deal with a lot of resistance as he tries to alert the public to the need for action before a new crisis develops. For this to happen there will be aneed for more awareness of what happened, and a serious investigation, and prosecutions where necessary. Interestingly National City Bank was investigated then by Pecora. It is the predecessor of today's Citibank. At the time National City repackaged bad Latin American debt as new securities which it sold eaily to investors who later lost badly. Weill and Rubin at Citigroup made a series of bad decisions at Citigroup leading to huge losses at the bank, for which they have not accepted responsibility....

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U.S. Federal Reserve governor Daniel Tarullo tells the Council on Foreign Relations that so much remains to be done four years after the financial crisis. The law firm of Davis Polk says 67 percent of deadlines were missed for new rules required to be set in place by the Dodd-Frank legislation, including the Volcker Rule. Tarullo said: "It is sobering to recognize that more than four years after the failure of Bear Stearns began the acute phase of the financial crisis, so much remains to be done." Tarullo fears that crucial momentum may be lost because of the long delays stemming from resistance by the banks. Tarullo met with bank CEO's in April 2012. Banks have protested that Fed stress tests have not revealed the parameters for the testing. Tarullo's response given at a recent Fed conference in Chicago were that this would let banks game the exercize by running the Federal Reserve model and not improving risk management and capital planning, making this a mechanical compliance exercize. Banks have particularly opposed a requirement that limits the risk in business between two banks to 10% of their credit risk....

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At the height of the Eurozone crisis in December 2011, David Brooks points out that it is important not to forget what the Germans are saying in this crisis. They are arguing for truth in accounting, which the government in Greece failed to do, and which may have more to do with negative opinion in the media and with the public in Germany about Greece than any other factor. They are arguing against speculative excesses that enabled Greece to borrow recklessly. And they are making the argument that the only way to put the finances of the eurozone on a sound basis is to have the financial discipline that is necessary for a sound currency. Anthony Faiola pointed out recently that one estimate for tax evasion in Italy is $340 billion a year- Washington Post, 11/25/2011. Greece has a similiar problem, which needs to be addressed. This view has credibility and the backing of every principle of sound financial practices, irrespective of country or region. For ordinary Germans who have gone through years of wage restraint during the period of high unemployment, their attitude is captured in one German workers response to Greece's situation - when she said there are "poor children in Germany also." Years after reunification were a difficult experience for Germany, and left parts of the country still affected by the experience. The period of high unemployment is still a fresh memory, as the economic recovery is fairly recent. There is a feeling that the situation is precarious, depending on exports, as the 2009 downturn showed. These facts remain even when one considers the criticism levelled at Germany. Germany benefitted from the bubble in the economies of Southern Europe through surging exports- from a currency that was undervalued in relation to neighbors- because of the common currency. German banks lent heavily to Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, along with French and British banks, and bear responsibility for reckless lending and not doing due diligence for loans to Greece and other countries. Germany also carries the burden of memories of hyperinflation in the 1920's, and the sense along with France that partnership is necessary for peace in Europe. Germany's position on austerity measures also has one underlying weakness - if this leads to shrinking economies in southern Europe in the name of fianncial discipline, then the plan fails as tax revenues decline and budget deficits increase. Given this experience Germany faces the challenge of convincing neighbors of the need for good governance and sound spending practices for long term stability of the currency, even as it leads the effort for providing short term funding. In the short run this reaps criticism for Germany, including criticism for some members such as Greece having to leave the euro as a way to regain competitiveness and growth. Experts have suggested that this would be a better option for Greece than a shrinking economy after strong austerity measures, and the referendum proposed by former prime minister Papandreou on strict austerity measures is likely to have gone in this direction. ...

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J.P. Morgan Chase announces $2 billion in trading losses in May 2012. The Chief Investment Office unit made a bet with a trading strategy that CEO Jamie Dimon said had grown very complex. These losses could grow or shrink during the rest of the year.

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Julia Preston of the NYT looks at Mr. Trump's speech on August 31, 2016 in Pheonix, Arizona, and compares what one can discern about the Trump policies on immigration with that of president Obama. She points out that it is similar to the deportation that was conducted under president Obama in some ways, but is more extensive in its dimensions. It includes sanctioning sanctuary cities, expanding the deportation law enforcement personnel, and deporting about 2 million people with criminal backgrounds. The estimate under the Obama administration is for about 176,000 people with such backgrounds. The Trump estimate appears to include people with minor offenses says Preston, because it is so much higher. As a result this could also include people who have no criminal background and disrupt families on a large scale, with hundreds of thousands of longtime residents and families deported. Under the sanctuary example of Trump, Denver, New York and counties in California would be places where Trump would cut off federal funding. On the wall itself, Mexico's president Nieto says he told Trump Mexico would not pay for the wall, and Trump says exactly the opposite that Mexico would pay for the wall in his speech to supporters.  A Gallup poll shows that 76% of Republicans, 91% of Democrats favor a path to citizenship for those here in the U.S. illegally. For the whole population only 15% oppose giving illegal immigrants a pathway to citizenship and 84% support doing this. Which suggests that Trump is only appealing to his base of support, not adding to it, as Cillizza points out in the WP fact check.   ...

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John Taylor looks one step ahead of the March 2012 Greece bailout and sets up the most plausible scenario for the future. He says the risks of contagion were always exaggerated from the beginning- a planned default or restructuring of debt such as happened in Argentina in 2001, does not have the contagion risks associated with a chaotic and unplanned default as in Russia in 1998. Predicability in policy makes a huge difference, says Taylor. The European banks which stood to lose from writedowns exaggerated the fears of contagion- a process that always occurs for people who are adversely affected by writedowns- resulting in top officials in the European Union delaying the unavoidable serious restructuring. It was not until Chancellor Merkel handed Charles Dallara, who negotiated for the European banks, a note stating a demand for 50% bondholder writedown, on October 27, 2011, at EU headquarters in Brussels, did any serious writedown of debt begin. Merkel told Dallara: "this is my last offer." The July 2011 summit by contrast had only a 10% bondholder writedown in the agreement, when insolvency not illiquidity was the real issue. Walker Forelle and Meichtry, give a detailed account of what happened in the Wall Street Journal, Dec. 30, 2011. The important thing for Greece, says Taylor, is for what the IMF calls "growth enhancing structural reforms" - greater reliance on private markets, incentives, rule of law. He says this bailout won't work because IMF growth forecasts do not reflect the rapid shrinking of the Greek economy. Antonis Samaras, leader of the major opposition party, is in favor of pro-growth measures and has stated his desire to change the agreement. The 130 billion euro bailout provides 90 billion euros for recapitalizing Greece's banks, and financing the budget. This puts Greece in a situation where the political leaders win voter support by discarding the conditions from the Northern EU nations and come with a plan that is better suited for Greece. The EU in this scenario would cut off further bailout funds to Greece. Taylor sees this as the better outcome for Greece than the current situation, which leaves Greece no hope for growth, and also for the EU by getting out of bailouts that have little prospect of working. It would be difficult but doable for Greece says Taylor, because interest payments would be low and Greek banks would be recapitalized after the current March 2012 bailout. ...

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An account by Journal reporters based on over 25 interviews with eurozone policymakers shows how the central players in the eurozone drama acted to defend their national interests during the period April to July 2011. On one side France's president Sarkozy, Frenchman Claude Trichet at the European Central Bank, arguing in favor of the banks not to take bondholder losses or haircuts on loans made to Greece. On the other side the Bundesbanks Axel Weber, and Jens Weidman, Jurgen Stark and German Finance Minister Schauble. The Germans argued strongly for bondholder losses to take responsibility for bad loan decisions by French and German banks. French banks had committed more loans to Greece than German banks and had more at stake. German public opinion was strongly against German taxpayers paying for the losses, making German politicians insistent that European banks take losses on their bad loan decisions, or Germany would not support additional loans to Greece. Throughout April to July the two sides were locked in an impasse. The French feared losses for their banks and a Lehman Brothers bankruptcy style situation. The Germans at the Bundesbank and the Finance Ministry were equally insistent. A July 2011 summit meeting did not settle the issue. The events not covered here from the July to the December summit of eurozone leaders resulted in bondholders taking 50% haircut on loans to Greece, reducing the debt burden in Greece after austerity measures led to popular protests. The French pushed hard for the ECB or the EFSF to be allowed to make large purchases of bonds of troubled eurozone countries in an effort to protect Spain and Italy from contagion through higher bond yields. The Netherlands and Finland supported Germany's position. German bankers Weber, Weidman at the Bundesbank and Finance Minister Schauble opposed large scale buying by the ECB of Italy's and Spain's bonds and Chancellor Merkel said about a common eurobond that "this is not going to happen." Governments changed in Greece, Italy, and Spain by Dec. 2011, which committed to austerity programs and spending cuts. Italian Mario Draghi was appointed with German support as new head of the ECB. In late December 2011 Draghi launched the Long Term Financing Operation for lending unlimited amounts at 1% for three year loans to European banks and relaxing the terms to accept government bonds and other debt as collateral for loans. The effect of this was to provide a large infusion of liquidity into the banking system in Europe and drastically bring down the yields on bonds issued by Italy and Spain....

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Thomas Sargent of New York University, the 2012 Nobel prize winner in economics, says the EU leaders can learn from the way the federal government in the U.S. handled the issue of state's debt when it came up in the 1790's and in 1840. In 1790 the federal government- under the leadership of Washington and Hamilton- saw the need to honor state's debt because of the contribution made by states in the war of independence and the U.S. assumed state's debt. In 1840 the U.S. refused to assume state's debt and states went into default. The result was beneficial because state's passed balanced budget rules and restrained reckless spending. Another benefit was that this preserved state rights to manage their finances and the federal structure setup under the constitution.

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After the debt swap of old bonds for new bonds with private bondholders for an estimated 53% haircut, the IMF's March 2012 report on Greece says a lot remains unresolved. It predicts a "disorderly exit from the euro" without further help. The April 2012 elections may result in a dilution to committments to austerity policies in Greece, as these policies are highly unpopular in Greece. Greece is still "accident-prone." And competitiveness issues may take over a decade to resolve.

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Wall Street Journal reporters Walker in Berlin, Forelle in Brussels, and Meichtry in Rome, reconstruct the events during critical days after the indecision and failure to reach agreement during the July summit of eurozone countries. This took the form of intervews with leading players and over 25 policy makers. What emerges are accounts of how Germany's Angela Merkel, daughter of a Lutheran pastor, and protege of Eurozone founder, former German chancellor Helmut Kohl, handled the crisis. Merkel was widely criticized in the media for indecision. What emerges is an account of a leader who took decisive action at key moments in the crisis- leading to the formation of new governments in Greece and Italy taking action to improve finances, and negotiations with banks represented by the International Finance Corporation leading to acceptance by banks of a 50% loss on loans to Greece to reduce Greece's unsustainable debt burden. Merkel also worked with the European Central Bank's departing president Frenchman Claude Trichet and new president Italian Mario Draghi to resist French president Sarkozy's efforts to have the ECB assume responsibility for the crisis through large scale buying of Italian and Spanish bonds; which was opposed by German public opinion as a backdoor way of having German taxpayers assume responsibility for European debt. Shown are three critical moments when Merkel intervened. In October 2011, after Italian prime minister Berlusconi reneged on promises to make pension and other reforms to improve Italian finances because of political resistance. He survived a parliamentary no-confidence vote by one vote. Merkel took the lead on October 20, by directly calling Italian President Georgio Napolitano on the phone, to urge him to take action for forming a new government in Italy. The result was Napolitano talking with all political parties to form a new government, leading to the formation of a government by a non-political figure respected in Italy, former EU commissioner Mario Monti. A day earlier, on October 19, French President Sarkozy met ECB president, Trichet, at an event honoring him as departing ECB president in Frankfurt's Alte Oper concert hall. Trichet, Merkel and Sarkozy met in a side room. Sarkozy asked for decisive help from the ECB for large scale buying of Italian and Spanish bonds to lower yields, which had reached 7% on Italian bonds. Trichet responded that the ECB's charter did not allow it to finance governments, with the meeting ending in a shouting match between the two leaders. On October 21, EU and IMF inspectors warned that Greece's debt was reaching unsustainable proportions and austerity measures alone would not work, unless the bondholders, the European banks, took losses of 60% on their excessive lending to Greece. At this point France agreed to the German position arguing for this level of bondholder haircuts or losses, fearing the prospect of large future bailouts that would jeopardize France's triple AAA credit rating. The July 2011 summit accord had only provided for 10% in losses for bondholders. On October 27, at a meeting that went past midnight, Merkel and Sarkozy called IIF head Charles Dallara, who headed negotiating for the banks, to EU headquarters in Brussels. Merkel handed Dallara an agreement containing the 50% bondholder loss demand, and told Dallara- "This is the last offer." Merkel was saying banks would be left with nothing if they rejected it and Greece defaulted. Dallara called bankers and the IIF accepted Merkel's agreement. The final moment that October came on October 31, when Greece's prime minister Papandreou said he would call a referendum on the bailout provisions and austerity measures demanded by the IMF, the EU and the ECB. Bond markets reacted negatively to the announcement fearing a rejection and a Greek default. The Group of 20 leaders was meeting in Cannes, France on Nov. 2, 2011. Papandreou was asked to come to Cannes for a pre-summit meeting. Here Merkel told Papandreou- "the real question" for the referendum was, "Do you want to be in the euro, or not?" Days later Papandreou, lacking support in Greece from political parties and opposition inside his party, submitted his resignation. A non-political figure respected in Greece, former ECB vice president, Lucas Papademos, was appointed prime minister to head a Unity government. Polls after the appointment showed three fourths of Greeks said that this was "a positive step for Greece," with Papandreou's party getting only 11% support and the opposition led by Samaras about 20%. The criticism leveled at Merkel is that Germany should take responsibility for debt throughout the euro area through the issuance of eurozone bonds or the ECB buying large amount of bonds of Spain and Italy. Merkel faced strong opposition inside Germany and from the Bundesbank to this idea. The other criticism was based on austerity measures worsening the finances of Greece because of a lack of growth in the economy, which is true; yet Germany may see the situation in Greece as taking a long time to be resolved in any event because of excessive and faulty financial management. For Italy and Spain putting finances in order was a necessity, and austerity measures should lead to short term sacrifice but improve prospects for the long term by returning the economies to growth. Another criticism is the installation of governments that lack popular or electoral support. As the polls in Greece showed the Unity government there has far greater support and public opinion blames the politicians for the huge mess. In Italy, Berlusconi was widely seen as losing popular support when he resigned. And in Spain Mariano Rajoy, the newly elected prime minister, was elected with a huge majority in parliament following winning in local government elections. Merkel also held her own party, the Chrisitian Democrats together at the recent Leipzig convention. Mario Draghi, was elected with German support to head the European Central Bank. He has long argued for better management of Italian finances as head of Italy's central bank. Draghi was able to support Merkel with carefully planned and managed actions. First to reduce interest rates to support economic growth in a slowing eurozone. Following this with the ECB's Long Term Financing Operation in late December 2011, to provide unlimited loans to European banks at 1% interest for three years in exchange for a broadened list of collateral deposited at the ECB. In a final twist in this drama, Charles Dallara, who was a key negotiator for the U.S. Treasury in setting up the Brady Bonds- that converted bad Latin American government debt owed to U.S. banks in the 1980's into long term debt with large reductions in principal owed and lower interest rates. This was in exchange for guaranteed repayment with 30 year U.S. zero coupon bonds. Dallara was now a negotiator for the banks to reduce the chance of the very same bondholder haircuts that he had negotiated in an earlier period to solve the Latin American debt crisis. Other players in the drama were Axel Weber, head of the Bundesbank, Germany's central bank, who resigned after strong and outspoken opposition to the ECB's large scale purchase of bonds of Greece, Italy and Spain. Jens Weidmann, his protege, who replaced him. And Jurgen Stark, German representative at the ECB, who also resigned in opposition to Germany assuming responsibility for eurozone debt. ...