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An audit of Spain's banking system by the consulting firm Oliver Wyman, shows that Spanish banks would need 53.745 billion euros to be cleaned up if mergers and acquisitions underway are completed.The amount goes up to 59.3 billion euros if this does not happen. Bankia bank will need 24.7 billion euros to meet capital requirements. Three other nationalized banks need 21.5 billion euros, including 3.2 billion euros for Banco Popular. Of the 14 audited banks only 7 need capital infusions. The other banks considered healthy include BBVA, Santander and La Caixa. These findings are similiar to a preliminary finding by Oliver Wyman and estimates provided by Luis de Guindos, Spain's economy minister, that Spanish banks will need 51 billion to 62 billion euros of capital infusion. Spain's secretary of state for the economy, Fernando Jimenez Latorre, says Spain will soon request about 40 billion euros of the 100 billion euro bailout offer for banks negotiated by Spain in June with the EU. It is not clear whether the capital infusion will go directly to Spain's banks as Spain has argued, or go through the Spanish government. The audits were important to provide credibility through independent assessment of losses in Spain's banking system, and remove the fog of uncertainty that is pushing up Spain's borrowing rate in capital markets....

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The IMF's managing director, Christine Lagarde, pointed to the urgent need to recapitalize European banks in September 2011. European banks face potential losses of 120 billion euros for Belgium, Spain and Italy, 60 billion euros for Greece, 20 billion euros for Ireland and Portugal, and 100 billion euros for other banking exposure, for a total of 300 billion euros, according to the International Monetary Fund. In the absence of recapitalization there could be further damage to EU economies from restricted lending by banks. IMF estimates show that deteriorating credit conditions could damage growth in the eurozone countries by 3.5 percentage points, and in the U.S. by 2.2 percentage points, creating another recession.

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Transcripts released for the U.S. Federal Reserve's Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) 2006 meetings show Fed chairman Bernanke and then New York Fed president Geithner ignored the risks of a hard landing from the mortgage and housing bubble. Geithner even went so far as to say about retiring chairman Greenspan, who also ignored the risks from the bubble and set the tone during his long period as chairman at the Fed: "I'd like the record to show that I think you're pretty terrific, too...And thinking about the probabilities, I think the risk that we decide in the future that you're even better than we think is higher than the alternative." In evaluating the risks facing the U.S. economy in December 2006, at the height of the bubble, Geithner stated: "The current weakness in the economy still seems principally to stem from the direct effects of the slowdown in housing on construction activity... The softer than expected recent numbers don't argue in our view, for a substantial reassessment of the risks in the outlook." The Fed chairman, Ben Bernanke, said at the first meeting in March 2006: " Strong fundamentals support a relatively soft landing in housing... I think we are unlikely to see growth being derailed by the housing market." When a Fed economist gave a presentation in March 2006 on the risks in Iceland, Bernanke said- "We'd like a full report on the Icelandic," at which point the rest of the group erupted with laughter. Iceland defaulted on its debts in 2008. Warnings about housing by Fed Governor Susan Bies were ignored by Bernanke and Geithner. Two highly leveraged Wall Street investment banks collapsed in 2008- Bear Stearns in March and Lehman in September- from the impact of the bursting of the bubble in housing and mortgages. When they collapsed these banks were leveraged at about 30 to 1, as most of the warning signs had been ignored by regulators including the Federal Reserve....

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Critics of the Obama administration's so-called "light footprint strategy" for the Middle East say it is more about keeping distance from problems in that region. This is a reaction to the extensive involvement of the U.S. in two wars in that region and intuitively makes sense, as well as being in line with American public opinion to focus on problems at home. The shift or pivot to Asia of president Obama also comes in that context. The problem with this approach is that this ignores the fact that most of the momentum and effort for the freedom struggles throughout the Middle East from Tunisia first, then Libya, Egypt, and now Syria, comes from within. The lead role is now being taken by France and Britain, with German public opinion also lined up in support. The U.S. in forfeiting its role as a facilitator with strategies such as "no-fly-zones" is losing the opportunity to gain the goodwill in the Middle East with cost that is negligible in comparison to the cost of Iraq and Afghanistan, and comes after the huge U.S. effort to remove one dictator in Iraq. A minor followup effort is all that is required from an administration that pushed for the "surge" in Afghanistan. When history is written the investment of the Obama administration in Afghanistan may show little results, if what is considered by the media and experts as an unpopular and undemocratic government of Karzai falls in the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal. There is little doubt in public opinion in the U.S. and worldwide that the movement for freedom and democracy in the Middle East and democratically elected governments will become a lasting facet of the new Middle East. It also provides huge opportunties for trade and investment as is shown by the gains made by Turkey in just 2 years. This is why the Obama adminstration policies in the Middle East show a lack of grasp of the facts showing the Middle East as opportunity more than threat for the next decade, especially in its overreaction to the Bush era policies. This happens as there is a demographic explosion of young people in the Middle East. An administration that was keen to sense the demographic changes in North America, has failed to grasp this fact and why the struggle in the Middle East flashes daily on television screens young people carrying on the struggle. A pivot to Asia means a pivot to the Far East more than Asia because India is part of the South Asian-Middle Eastern region, which presents another paradox because as China is slowing the entire South Asian-Middle Eastern region of Asia is where future growth is expected to accelerate in the next decade. ...

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Amar Bhide touches on the unpredictable consequences of devaluations while commenting on the supposed benefit of a country having its own currency vs a currency such as the euro. The euro takes away the advatantage of devaluing the national currency as a way to regain competitiveness. Bhide points out that devaluations hurt the elderly on fixed incomes and low wage workers. Protections have to be put in place for the sections of the population that are badly affected. Large union negotiated wage increases can also reduce the benefits of devaluation in terms of regaining competitiveness.

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The shift of voters from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party in the South such as Georgia and South Carolina, and the Deep South such as Mississippi and Alabama, started in the sixties with the civil rights movement. Reagan tapped into it by making his first post convention trip to Alabama, where George Wallace had already worked up white southern voters on segregation in the way Trump is doing today on immigration. Strom Thurmond was one of the high profile southerners shifting from Dixiecrat Democrat to Republican in South Carolina. After Thurmond in the fifties the Republican formula was to mix cultural issues with economic conservatism, with Nixon, then Reagan, and then Bush. Reagan added religious conservatives to the cause. Now says Emory University Prof. Joseph Crespino, this is changing as the more educated college educated white collar professionals that Goldwater once appealed to shifting in 2016 to the Democratic Party in places like Georgia and South Carolina. This is a result of the rhetoric of Trump resembling that of George Wallace and Thurmond in the Deep South. With demographic changes there is also new infusion of people from the North to the South in major urban areas. The result in 2016 is that the South no longer appears the way it once was. ...

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U.S. Federal Reserve governor Daniel Tarullo tells the Council on Foreign Relations that so much remains to be done four years after the financial crisis. The law firm of Davis Polk says 67 percent of deadlines were missed for new rules required to be set in place by the Dodd-Frank legislation, including the Volcker Rule. Tarullo said: "It is sobering to recognize that more than four years after the failure of Bear Stearns began the acute phase of the financial crisis, so much remains to be done." Tarullo fears that crucial momentum may be lost because of the long delays stemming from resistance by the banks. Tarullo met with bank CEO's in April 2012. Banks have protested that Fed stress tests have not revealed the parameters for the testing. Tarullo's response given at a recent Fed conference in Chicago were that this would let banks game the exercize by running the Federal Reserve model and not improving risk management and capital planning, making this a mechanical compliance exercize. Banks have particularly opposed a requirement that limits the risk in business between two banks to 10% of their credit risk....

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The Japan Automobile Dealer's Association says Toyota's Prius hybrid was No. 1 in sales in Japan in 2009 with 209,000 sales, three times the sales in 2008. This shows the high popularity of green cars in Japan and a sign of future trends. Hybrid sales made up 10% of new vehicle sales in Japan in 2009. By comparison hybrid sales in the U.S. were 2.8%. Second in car sales in Japan was the Honda Fit, third the Toyota Vitz, both small fuel efficient cars. About 1.6 million Prius cars were sold worldwide from 1997 to 2009, according to Toyota. Toyota has kept the price of the Prius affordable by pricing it at around $22,000.

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The Obama administration is pushing for new U.S. fuel efficiency standards of 56.2 mpg by 2025. In May 2009 President Obama announced domestic car and light truck fuel efficiency standards of 35 mpg by 2016. Europe is expected to reach fuel efficiency of 60 mpg by 2020. This would still leave Europe considerably ahead of the U.S. in fuel efficiency for automobiles, but the gap would be much smaller. For the last several decades the U.S. has fallen sadly behind Europe and Japan in fuel efficiency. The perception of poor fuel efficiency hurt the automakers badly during periods of high fuel prices and when buyers were facing difficult economic choices. The automakers are beginning to grasp this fact. Mark Reuss, president of General Motors, commented that- "it's very challenging, but its upto us engineers to provide high value to the customer and support the environment." This is an issue that has serious national and global implications as it affects the future prices and demand for oil, emissions, and future economic growth. It would also bring the U.S. in line with Europe and Japan when it comes to fuel efficiency of automobiles. ...

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Richard Portes of the London Business School provides two good reasons why the EU's decision to adopt the French Banking Federation's proposal for rollovers with 10% interest costs is a serious mistake. It doubles the interest costs from 4-6% to 10% with 2% Greek GDP growth and makes debt servicing untenable. Portes says the real Brady Plan from the 1980's included a 35-40% bondholders haircut. Deals of this type have a precedent- in Mexico in 1988 and in Argentina in 2001 such bond exchanges were soon followed by deals that placed bondholder haricuts on creditors. The lesson from Latin America in the 1980's, says Portes, is that the burdens of servicing a debt of such proportions under onerous conditions only extinguishes the enterprise, investment and productive capabilities of the particular country trying to service that debt, making the debt even less serviceable. See the Wall Street Journal's editorial on this deal which it calls "The French Deception." The terms sound like Greek to the editors leaving a sense that French banks are only saying "gimme." The only benefit achieved may be putting off the problem and avoiding contagion to Portugal and Spain. Yet this is not that much of a benefit when one realizes that the problem has not gone away, and is likely to look much worse six or nine months from now....

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Gen. Martin Dempsey took a cautious approach to U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and Syria. He did not approve of the way Gen. McChrystal expanded U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, and the hasty manner in which the Iraqi army was trained under his predecessors leading to some commanders being appointed who later became members of sectarian death squads. Under his command the U.S. limited its role in Afghanistan and Iraq and handed more responsibility to local forces. Gen. Dunford who succeeded Dempsey as chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff for the U.S. follows the cautious approach set by Dempsey. Dempsey's approach extends to what he believes is an Heisenberg effect in physics where when you you observe or touch something it changes the way it functions and operates. For critics such as Senator McCain, who served in Vietnam as a pilot, if Dempsey did not want to intervene in some country, he could invent the reasons not to get involved. President Obama exceeded the caution exercized by Dempsey, leading to a situation where the U.S. after hasty action under a Republican president seemed to lurch in the opposite direction under his Democratic successor by not taking action where U.S. presence was needed, followed by a corrective course to make up for this....

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John Taylor looks one step ahead of the March 2012 Greece bailout and sets up the most plausible scenario for the future. He says the risks of contagion were always exaggerated from the beginning- a planned default or restructuring of debt such as happened in Argentina in 2001, does not have the contagion risks associated with a chaotic and unplanned default as in Russia in 1998. Predicability in policy makes a huge difference, says Taylor. The European banks which stood to lose from writedowns exaggerated the fears of contagion- a process that always occurs for people who are adversely affected by writedowns- resulting in top officials in the European Union delaying the unavoidable serious restructuring. It was not until Chancellor Merkel handed Charles Dallara, who negotiated for the European banks, a note stating a demand for 50% bondholder writedown, on October 27, 2011, at EU headquarters in Brussels, did any serious writedown of debt begin. Merkel told Dallara: "this is my last offer." The July 2011 summit by contrast had only a 10% bondholder writedown in the agreement, when insolvency not illiquidity was the real issue. Walker Forelle and Meichtry, give a detailed account of what happened in the Wall Street Journal, Dec. 30, 2011. The important thing for Greece, says Taylor, is for what the IMF calls "growth enhancing structural reforms" - greater reliance on private markets, incentives, rule of law. He says this bailout won't work because IMF growth forecasts do not reflect the rapid shrinking of the Greek economy. Antonis Samaras, leader of the major opposition party, is in favor of pro-growth measures and has stated his desire to change the agreement. The 130 billion euro bailout provides 90 billion euros for recapitalizing Greece's banks, and financing the budget. This puts Greece in a situation where the political leaders win voter support by discarding the conditions from the Northern EU nations and come with a plan that is better suited for Greece. The EU in this scenario would cut off further bailout funds to Greece. Taylor sees this as the better outcome for Greece than the current situation, which leaves Greece no hope for growth, and also for the EU by getting out of bailouts that have little prospect of working. It would be difficult but doable for Greece says Taylor, because interest payments would be low and Greek banks would be recapitalized after the current March 2012 bailout. ...

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Individual investors reacted strongly to declining prospects for emerging markets with slowing growth, depreciating currencies, corruption and political uncertainty in 2013. As of the beginning of June, retail investors pulled $18.1 billion from emerging market bond funds, about one third of the amount that went in to emerging markets since the financial crisis in 2007, according to fund tracker EPFR Global. Institutional investors have pulled out less, about $9.3 billion, or 10% of their investments in emerging markets bonds since 2007. A similiar pattern is seen for investment in the stock markets of emerging market countries. The U.S. Federal Reserve's monetary expansion helped pull more money into emerging markets such as India, Indonesia, Brazil and Turkey. As the Fed shifts away from these policies in 2013 emerging market countries have large current account deficits and less money to finance imports and debt.

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An account by Journal reporters based on over 25 interviews with eurozone policymakers shows how the central players in the eurozone drama acted to defend their national interests during the period April to July 2011. On one side France's president Sarkozy, Frenchman Claude Trichet at the European Central Bank, arguing in favor of the banks not to take bondholder losses or haircuts on loans made to Greece. On the other side the Bundesbanks Axel Weber, and Jens Weidman, Jurgen Stark and German Finance Minister Schauble. The Germans argued strongly for bondholder losses to take responsibility for bad loan decisions by French and German banks. French banks had committed more loans to Greece than German banks and had more at stake. German public opinion was strongly against German taxpayers paying for the losses, making German politicians insistent that European banks take losses on their bad loan decisions, or Germany would not support additional loans to Greece. Throughout April to July the two sides were locked in an impasse. The French feared losses for their banks and a Lehman Brothers bankruptcy style situation. The Germans at the Bundesbank and the Finance Ministry were equally insistent. A July 2011 summit meeting did not settle the issue. The events not covered here from the July to the December summit of eurozone leaders resulted in bondholders taking 50% haircut on loans to Greece, reducing the debt burden in Greece after austerity measures led to popular protests. The French pushed hard for the ECB or the EFSF to be allowed to make large purchases of bonds of troubled eurozone countries in an effort to protect Spain and Italy from contagion through higher bond yields. The Netherlands and Finland supported Germany's position. German bankers Weber, Weidman at the Bundesbank and Finance Minister Schauble opposed large scale buying by the ECB of Italy's and Spain's bonds and Chancellor Merkel said about a common eurobond that "this is not going to happen." Governments changed in Greece, Italy, and Spain by Dec. 2011, which committed to austerity programs and spending cuts. Italian Mario Draghi was appointed with German support as new head of the ECB. In late December 2011 Draghi launched the Long Term Financing Operation for lending unlimited amounts at 1% for three year loans to European banks and relaxing the terms to accept government bonds and other debt as collateral for loans. The effect of this was to provide a large infusion of liquidity into the banking system in Europe and drastically bring down the yields on bonds issued by Italy and Spain....

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Anxiety in financial markets about exposure of French banks to Greece pulled down French bank stocks on August 10, 2011. Societe Generale shares were down 15%. A British tabloid the Daily Mail published an article on Societe Generale saying that it was in a perilous condition, and on the "brink of disaster." The Daily Mail later retracted its report. The rumors spread quickly in a jittery market, reminiscent of the rumors that affected Morgan Stanley at the height of the U.S. financial crisis in 2008. Sanford Bernstein analysts say in a report that the selloff in French banking stocks was based more on anxiety and the rising price of insurance of thinly traded credit default swaps, and not based on rational concerns about earnings and raising capital. Societe Generale says it has no exposure to Greek bonds maturing after 2020 on its books- to deflect fears of additional bank bondholder haircuts beyond 2020- and has taken a 395 million euro provision against losses on Greek sovereign bonds maturing upto 2020. The jittery condition of markets was also affected by rumors that France was about to be downgraded. Moody's, Fitch, and S&P reaffirmed that French credit ratings of triple A and stable outlook would not change....

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Wall Street Journal reporters Walker in Berlin, Forelle in Brussels, and Meichtry in Rome, reconstruct the events during critical days after the indecision and failure to reach agreement during the July summit of eurozone countries. This took the form of intervews with leading players and over 25 policy makers. What emerges are accounts of how Germany's Angela Merkel, daughter of a Lutheran pastor, and protege of Eurozone founder, former German chancellor Helmut Kohl, handled the crisis. Merkel was widely criticized in the media for indecision. What emerges is an account of a leader who took decisive action at key moments in the crisis- leading to the formation of new governments in Greece and Italy taking action to improve finances, and negotiations with banks represented by the International Finance Corporation leading to acceptance by banks of a 50% loss on loans to Greece to reduce Greece's unsustainable debt burden. Merkel also worked with the European Central Bank's departing president Frenchman Claude Trichet and new president Italian Mario Draghi to resist French president Sarkozy's efforts to have the ECB assume responsibility for the crisis through large scale buying of Italian and Spanish bonds; which was opposed by German public opinion as a backdoor way of having German taxpayers assume responsibility for European debt. Shown are three critical moments when Merkel intervened. In October 2011, after Italian prime minister Berlusconi reneged on promises to make pension and other reforms to improve Italian finances because of political resistance. He survived a parliamentary no-confidence vote by one vote. Merkel took the lead on October 20, by directly calling Italian President Georgio Napolitano on the phone, to urge him to take action for forming a new government in Italy. The result was Napolitano talking with all political parties to form a new government, leading to the formation of a government by a non-political figure respected in Italy, former EU commissioner Mario Monti. A day earlier, on October 19, French President Sarkozy met ECB president, Trichet, at an event honoring him as departing ECB president in Frankfurt's Alte Oper concert hall. Trichet, Merkel and Sarkozy met in a side room. Sarkozy asked for decisive help from the ECB for large scale buying of Italian and Spanish bonds to lower yields, which had reached 7% on Italian bonds. Trichet responded that the ECB's charter did not allow it to finance governments, with the meeting ending in a shouting match between the two leaders. On October 21, EU and IMF inspectors warned that Greece's debt was reaching unsustainable proportions and austerity measures alone would not work, unless the bondholders, the European banks, took losses of 60% on their excessive lending to Greece. At this point France agreed to the German position arguing for this level of bondholder haircuts or losses, fearing the prospect of large future bailouts that would jeopardize France's triple AAA credit rating. The July 2011 summit accord had only provided for 10% in losses for bondholders. On October 27, at a meeting that went past midnight, Merkel and Sarkozy called IIF head Charles Dallara, who headed negotiating for the banks, to EU headquarters in Brussels. Merkel handed Dallara an agreement containing the 50% bondholder loss demand, and told Dallara- "This is the last offer." Merkel was saying banks would be left with nothing if they rejected it and Greece defaulted. Dallara called bankers and the IIF accepted Merkel's agreement. The final moment that October came on October 31, when Greece's prime minister Papandreou said he would call a referendum on the bailout provisions and austerity measures demanded by the IMF, the EU and the ECB. Bond markets reacted negatively to the announcement fearing a rejection and a Greek default. The Group of 20 leaders was meeting in Cannes, France on Nov. 2, 2011. Papandreou was asked to come to Cannes for a pre-summit meeting. Here Merkel told Papandreou- "the real question" for the referendum was, "Do you want to be in the euro, or not?" Days later Papandreou, lacking support in Greece from political parties and opposition inside his party, submitted his resignation. A non-political figure respected in Greece, former ECB vice president, Lucas Papademos, was appointed prime minister to head a Unity government. Polls after the appointment showed three fourths of Greeks said that this was "a positive step for Greece," with Papandreou's party getting only 11% support and the opposition led by Samaras about 20%. The criticism leveled at Merkel is that Germany should take responsibility for debt throughout the euro area through the issuance of eurozone bonds or the ECB buying large amount of bonds of Spain and Italy. Merkel faced strong opposition inside Germany and from the Bundesbank to this idea. The other criticism was based on austerity measures worsening the finances of Greece because of a lack of growth in the economy, which is true; yet Germany may see the situation in Greece as taking a long time to be resolved in any event because of excessive and faulty financial management. For Italy and Spain putting finances in order was a necessity, and austerity measures should lead to short term sacrifice but improve prospects for the long term by returning the economies to growth. Another criticism is the installation of governments that lack popular or electoral support. As the polls in Greece showed the Unity government there has far greater support and public opinion blames the politicians for the huge mess. In Italy, Berlusconi was widely seen as losing popular support when he resigned. And in Spain Mariano Rajoy, the newly elected prime minister, was elected with a huge majority in parliament following winning in local government elections. Merkel also held her own party, the Chrisitian Democrats together at the recent Leipzig convention. Mario Draghi, was elected with German support to head the European Central Bank. He has long argued for better management of Italian finances as head of Italy's central bank. Draghi was able to support Merkel with carefully planned and managed actions. First to reduce interest rates to support economic growth in a slowing eurozone. Following this with the ECB's Long Term Financing Operation in late December 2011, to provide unlimited loans to European banks at 1% interest for three years in exchange for a broadened list of collateral deposited at the ECB. In a final twist in this drama, Charles Dallara, who was a key negotiator for the U.S. Treasury in setting up the Brady Bonds- that converted bad Latin American government debt owed to U.S. banks in the 1980's into long term debt with large reductions in principal owed and lower interest rates. This was in exchange for guaranteed repayment with 30 year U.S. zero coupon bonds. Dallara was now a negotiator for the banks to reduce the chance of the very same bondholder haircuts that he had negotiated in an earlier period to solve the Latin American debt crisis. Other players in the drama were Axel Weber, head of the Bundesbank, Germany's central bank, who resigned after strong and outspoken opposition to the ECB's large scale purchase of bonds of Greece, Italy and Spain. Jens Weidmann, his protege, who replaced him. And Jurgen Stark, German representative at the ECB, who also resigned in opposition to Germany assuming responsibility for eurozone debt. ...