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An account by Journal reporters based on over 25 interviews with eurozone policymakers shows how the central players in the eurozone drama acted to defend their national interests during the period April to July 2011. On one side France's president Sarkozy, Frenchman Claude Trichet at the European Central Bank, arguing in favor of the banks not to take bondholder losses or haircuts on loans made to Greece. On the other side the Bundesbanks Axel Weber, and Jens Weidman, Jurgen Stark and German Finance Minister Schauble. The Germans argued strongly for bondholder losses to take responsibility for bad loan decisions by French and German banks. French banks had committed more loans to Greece than German banks and had more at stake. German public opinion was strongly against German taxpayers paying for the losses, making German politicians insistent that European banks take losses on their bad loan decisions, or Germany would not support additional loans to Greece. Throughout April to July the two sides were locked in an impasse. The French feared losses for their banks and a Lehman Brothers bankruptcy style situation. The Germans at the Bundesbank and the Finance Ministry were equally insistent. A July 2011 summit meeting did not settle the issue. The events not covered here from the July to the December summit of eurozone leaders resulted in bondholders taking 50% haircut on loans to Greece, reducing the debt burden in Greece after austerity measures led to popular protests. The French pushed hard for the ECB or the EFSF to be allowed to make large purchases of bonds of troubled eurozone countries in an effort to protect Spain and Italy from contagion through higher bond yields. The Netherlands and Finland supported Germany's position. German bankers Weber, Weidman at the Bundesbank and Finance Minister Schauble opposed large scale buying by the ECB of Italy's and Spain's bonds and Chancellor Merkel said about a common eurobond that "this is not going to happen." Governments changed in Greece, Italy, and Spain by Dec. 2011, which committed to austerity programs and spending cuts. Italian Mario Draghi was appointed with German support as new head of the ECB. In late December 2011 Draghi launched the Long Term Financing Operation for lending unlimited amounts at 1% for three year loans to European banks and relaxing the terms to accept government bonds and other debt as collateral for loans. The effect of this was to provide a large infusion of liquidity into the banking system in Europe and drastically bring down the yields on bonds issued by Italy and Spain....

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Philipp Rosler, head of the FDP party and Germany's Economy minister, says he opposes further involvement by German taxpayers or the ECB in the debt restructuring for Greece. He pointed out that the current negotiations between Greece and the bondholders (mostly French and German banks) were about private sector involvement. Tax payers of Germany and other European countries are already making a contribution he said. The IMF is pushing for the ECB to take a haircut or writedown on the $40 billion of Greek bonds it holds to supplement the haircut taken by bondholders of over 50%. Rosler said in an interview with the Journal that Athens should keep its side of the bargain by implementing reforms and not letting them just be on paper. On Germany or the EU directly taking responsibility over the Greek budget, Rosler said this should be the responsibility of the Greek parliament. At the same time he pointed out that its important to have a specific and rigorous montiroing process just to be fair to taxpayers in the EU....

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Austin Goolsbee says the overvalued currencies of Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal and the lack of growth under austerity plans proposed for these countries create impossible odds for resolution of the financial problems in these countries. The German position is that profligate spending and irresponsible accounting in Greece, and structural issues in Italy ranging from entitlement spending to tax evasion, need to be resolved.

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China limits the activities of the Carter Center. Contacts for village democracy are discontinued. Xi Jinping, China's president tells former U.S. president Carter to limit activities to U.S.-China relations.

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Wall Street Journal reporters Walker in Berlin, Forelle in Brussels, and Meichtry in Rome, reconstruct the events during critical days after the indecision and failure to reach agreement during the July summit of eurozone countries. This took the form of intervews with leading players and over 25 policy makers. What emerges are accounts of how Germany's Angela Merkel, daughter of a Lutheran pastor, and protege of Eurozone founder, former German chancellor Helmut Kohl, handled the crisis. Merkel was widely criticized in the media for indecision. What emerges is an account of a leader who took decisive action at key moments in the crisis- leading to the formation of new governments in Greece and Italy taking action to improve finances, and negotiations with banks represented by the International Finance Corporation leading to acceptance by banks of a 50% loss on loans to Greece to reduce Greece's unsustainable debt burden. Merkel also worked with the European Central Bank's departing president Frenchman Claude Trichet and new president Italian Mario Draghi to resist French president Sarkozy's efforts to have the ECB assume responsibility for the crisis through large scale buying of Italian and Spanish bonds; which was opposed by German public opinion as a backdoor way of having German taxpayers assume responsibility for European debt. Shown are three critical moments when Merkel intervened. In October 2011, after Italian prime minister Berlusconi reneged on promises to make pension and other reforms to improve Italian finances because of political resistance. He survived a parliamentary no-confidence vote by one vote. Merkel took the lead on October 20, by directly calling Italian President Georgio Napolitano on the phone, to urge him to take action for forming a new government in Italy. The result was Napolitano talking with all political parties to form a new government, leading to the formation of a government by a non-political figure respected in Italy, former EU commissioner Mario Monti. A day earlier, on October 19, French President Sarkozy met ECB president, Trichet, at an event honoring him as departing ECB president in Frankfurt's Alte Oper concert hall. Trichet, Merkel and Sarkozy met in a side room. Sarkozy asked for decisive help from the ECB for large scale buying of Italian and Spanish bonds to lower yields, which had reached 7% on Italian bonds. Trichet responded that the ECB's charter did not allow it to finance governments, with the meeting ending in a shouting match between the two leaders. On October 21, EU and IMF inspectors warned that Greece's debt was reaching unsustainable proportions and austerity measures alone would not work, unless the bondholders, the European banks, took losses of 60% on their excessive lending to Greece. At this point France agreed to the German position arguing for this level of bondholder haircuts or losses, fearing the prospect of large future bailouts that would jeopardize France's triple AAA credit rating. The July 2011 summit accord had only provided for 10% in losses for bondholders. On October 27, at a meeting that went past midnight, Merkel and Sarkozy called IIF head Charles Dallara, who headed negotiating for the banks, to EU headquarters in Brussels. Merkel handed Dallara an agreement containing the 50% bondholder loss demand, and told Dallara- "This is the last offer." Merkel was saying banks would be left with nothing if they rejected it and Greece defaulted. Dallara called bankers and the IIF accepted Merkel's agreement. The final moment that October came on October 31, when Greece's prime minister Papandreou said he would call a referendum on the bailout provisions and austerity measures demanded by the IMF, the EU and the ECB. Bond markets reacted negatively to the announcement fearing a rejection and a Greek default. The Group of 20 leaders was meeting in Cannes, France on Nov. 2, 2011. Papandreou was asked to come to Cannes for a pre-summit meeting. Here Merkel told Papandreou- "the real question" for the referendum was, "Do you want to be in the euro, or not?" Days later Papandreou, lacking support in Greece from political parties and opposition inside his party, submitted his resignation. A non-political figure respected in Greece, former ECB vice president, Lucas Papademos, was appointed prime minister to head a Unity government. Polls after the appointment showed three fourths of Greeks said that this was "a positive step for Greece," with Papandreou's party getting only 11% support and the opposition led by Samaras about 20%. The criticism leveled at Merkel is that Germany should take responsibility for debt throughout the euro area through the issuance of eurozone bonds or the ECB buying large amount of bonds of Spain and Italy. Merkel faced strong opposition inside Germany and from the Bundesbank to this idea. The other criticism was based on austerity measures worsening the finances of Greece because of a lack of growth in the economy, which is true; yet Germany may see the situation in Greece as taking a long time to be resolved in any event because of excessive and faulty financial management. For Italy and Spain putting finances in order was a necessity, and austerity measures should lead to short term sacrifice but improve prospects for the long term by returning the economies to growth. Another criticism is the installation of governments that lack popular or electoral support. As the polls in Greece showed the Unity government there has far greater support and public opinion blames the politicians for the huge mess. In Italy, Berlusconi was widely seen as losing popular support when he resigned. And in Spain Mariano Rajoy, the newly elected prime minister, was elected with a huge majority in parliament following winning in local government elections. Merkel also held her own party, the Chrisitian Democrats together at the recent Leipzig convention. Mario Draghi, was elected with German support to head the European Central Bank. He has long argued for better management of Italian finances as head of Italy's central bank. Draghi was able to support Merkel with carefully planned and managed actions. First to reduce interest rates to support economic growth in a slowing eurozone. Following this with the ECB's Long Term Financing Operation in late December 2011, to provide unlimited loans to European banks at 1% interest for three years in exchange for a broadened list of collateral deposited at the ECB. In a final twist in this drama, Charles Dallara, who was a key negotiator for the U.S. Treasury in setting up the Brady Bonds- that converted bad Latin American government debt owed to U.S. banks in the 1980's into long term debt with large reductions in principal owed and lower interest rates. This was in exchange for guaranteed repayment with 30 year U.S. zero coupon bonds. Dallara was now a negotiator for the banks to reduce the chance of the very same bondholder haircuts that he had negotiated in an earlier period to solve the Latin American debt crisis. Other players in the drama were Axel Weber, head of the Bundesbank, Germany's central bank, who resigned after strong and outspoken opposition to the ECB's large scale purchase of bonds of Greece, Italy and Spain. Jens Weidmann, his protege, who replaced him. And Jurgen Stark, German representative at the ECB, who also resigned in opposition to Germany assuming responsibility for eurozone debt. ...

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The constructive contribution made by the G-20 meetings of leaders towards building agreement on economic and other policies for peace and progress in the global economy. The meetings were especially useful for coordinating policy and addressing issues arising in the global economy after the 2008 financial crisis. Here Li Baodong, China's vice minister for international organizations and conferences, international economic affairs, describes the path ahead: IMF reforms implementation, better coordination of macroeconomic policies, pursuing the anti-protectionist and free trade policies with further support to the WTO and ministerial MC9 meeting in Bali in Dec. 2013, and infrastructure financing proposals for developing countries on the agenda at the St Petersburg, Russia, G-2- meeting in Sept. 2013. Baodong says the mechanism called the Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth as part of the G-20 meetings is a major achievement. Each G-20 economy submits it macroeconomic policy plan for a Mutual Assessment Process under this arrangement. The progress from the Bretton Woods financial architecture to the new arrangement- from the G-6 to the G-20 to include developing countries from India to Mexico and Brazil- is another major achievement, not fully recognized by the public, says Baodong. Interestingly Baodong makes particular mention to global rebalancing, rather than pushing what he calls the impossible task of increasing demand to get growth. This is a realization coming to China's economic policymakers under the new Jinping-Keqiang administration after the overly aggressive effort to stimulate demand in the 2009-2011 Stimulus, and the ensuing financial problems in the banking and credit system. It is indicative of the policy shift and its implementation underway in China in 2013-2015....

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The lack of economic opportunities for an increasingly urbanized African younger generation is a major challenge. The median age of 19 makes Africa the world's youngest continent. Megacities are growing up in places such as Lagos and Kinshasha as millions leave subsistence farming to go to cities. Unlike Asia and Latin American countries men and women are coming to shantytowns in cities at a time when Africa is much poorer for a similar level of urbanization that Asian and Latin American nations reached decades earlier. In 1993 this WSJ analysis and graphs show the Asian emerging economies and sub Saharan Africa had similar GDP per capita of $2415, by 2019 this was $4000 for Africa and $12,000 for Asian emerging economies. Latin America was at $10,000 in 1993 and in 2019 was at about $15,000. The gap widened considerably between Asia and African countries. Asian emerging economies increased GDP to 5 time from the same starting point as Africa in 1993, Africa doubled GDP over the period of 25 years to 2019. Latin America started from a much higher point and increased GDP by only 50% over 25 years. Asian economies that performed better over this period did better because of stable even entrenched governments such as in Singapore with Le Kuan Yew and in China with stable successive governments under CPC leadership of prime minister Deng. The difference in Asia was a commitment across all classes and groups to development, a sense of development as a way to make up for the years lost under colonialism of foreign powers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. A sense of correcting historical injustice and wrongs. This is a missing ingredient in the processes unfolding in Latin America and Africa in the last 25 years. ...

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Thomas Sargent of New York University, the 2012 Nobel prize winner in economics, says the EU leaders can learn from the way the federal government in the U.S. handled the issue of state's debt when it came up in the 1790's and in 1840. In 1790 the federal government- under the leadership of Washington and Hamilton- saw the need to honor state's debt because of the contribution made by states in the war of independence and the U.S. assumed state's debt. In 1840 the U.S. refused to assume state's debt and states went into default. The result was beneficial because state's passed balanced budget rules and restrained reckless spending. Another benefit was that this preserved state rights to manage their finances and the federal structure setup under the constitution.

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Dart Management, a vulture fund based in the Cayman Islands, received 90% of the 436 million euros bond payment by Greece on May 15, 2012. Dart is one of the holdout investors who did not participate in the Greek debt restructuring deal. It planned to sue the Greek government. This has implications for the other holdout investors with about 6-7 billion euros of Greek bonds. The reason given by the Greek government was that this caught Greece at a bad time- suing Greece could have tied up European bailout funds that Greece needs to make interest payments on its debt. The timing is bad from another standpoint, as it will further exacerbate voter discontent with the parties associated with the government just before the second Greek elections in June 2012.

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ECB study put out in April 2013 shows household wealth and income in eurozone countries based on 2009-2010 data for 60,000 households throughout the eurozone. The household wealth in southern European countries is higher than that in Germany. The study shows why ordinary Germans oppose bailouts for banks, Greece, and eurozone countries that experienced a boom in the 2000-2010 period, a period in which German workers took small pay raises to improve German competitiveness. Germans also see Portugal and Ireland in a different light compared to Greece, Cyprus, Italy and Spain where real estate speculation, lax accounting, tax evasion and favored treatment of certain groups, has created or aggravated the debt problems. Wealth is defined as total assets, including real estate, vehicles, bank deposits, investments and pensions, minus liabilities for mortgages, credit card debt and loans. By this measure German households had an average of 200,000 euros in wealth, and lower than this in Finland and Netherlands. At the median or midpoint German households had 50,000 euros, the lowest in the eurozone, for Greece the median was 102,000 euros. The impact of home ownership is significant in the report, as home ownership is lower in Germany than in Southern European countries, and mortgage interest is not considered favorably in German tax laws. The decline in value of homes after 2010 is also not reflected. Another indicator for comparitive wellbeing is income, and this is shown in figures released in March 2013 from the European Statistics Agency for GDP per capita. For Germany per capita GDP was 29,000 euros in 2010. The average GDP per capita for the eurozone is about 24,000 euros. By this measure Greece is at 21,000 euros, 24,000 euros for Italy and for Spain. Germany being 18-19% above Spain and Italy. If Germans, Dutch, Finns and Austrians are less well off then the argument favors having the banks, creditors, and including depositors, in a burdensharing arrangement for bailout of troubled eurozone economies. ...

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Krugman says voters in France, Greece, the UK and other countries are protesting against austerity measures imposed in the EU countries. The policies were based on the assumption made by the Chrisitian Democrats in Germany that the German model if applied in other countries would generate the kind of recovery Germany made in the last decade from the high unemployment under chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. German wage restraint agreement between unions, industry and government made this possible under the Hartz reforms, and France is already embarking on wage restraint, with the two major parties, unions and industry backing the plan. But for this to work France and other countries such as Spain and Italy have to be able to export to Germany or other countries. German workers are suffering from stagnant wages for many years, stemming from concessions made to reduce unemployment. Allowing wages to rise in Germany when there is a shortage of workers in industry, would benefit workers in Germany and help France and other EU countries increase exports. German industry is failing to make this normal adjustment in markets by insisting on smaller concessions, even though there is support within the government for higher wages. German growth was possible because of demand outside for its exporters. The "austerity measures" Germany supports would depress demand inside the domestic economies of France, Spain, Italy and other EU countries, and without the wage and inflation adjustments with Germany leave demand weak outside. Without needed demand output falls, unemployment rises and tax revenues decline, leaving deficits worse than before, and a dangerous downward spiral. Better management of finances as Germany has insisted has ceased to become the issue, as both Hollande in France and Rajoy in Spain, and Monti in Italy, are keen on getting control of finances, especially regional spending in Spain....

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Bondholders and the Greek government are stalled in talks and waiting for Germany and the IMF to come up with the 14.5 billion euros that is due on March 20, 2012. It may suit the bondholders holding out for a higher interest rate in the 4-5% range for the new bonds to be issued at 50% of face value with long term maturities, but is bad for Europe. This Journal editorial points out that this is bad for European taxpayers and points to other steps that can be taken which are being discussed in European circles. One step is for acollective action clause to be inserted for the existing Greek bonds under which all bondholders have to accept losses if two thirds of the bondholders agree to accept losses. To ensure the safety of the Greek banking system Greece would restructure the bonds held by Greek banks so that they continue to be acceptable as collateral with the ECB, and issue new bonds to the ECB with face values, interest rates and maturities matching existing holdings. The idea is to make it possible for Greece to reduce its total debt and its debt servicing costs- which is really the only way out of the crisis. The ECB and Greece would use the collective action clause to restructure the Greek debt to reduce interest and debt servicing costs on new bonds to be issued. The Journal editorial says it should also mean Greece and the ECB are not required to put up the 30 billion euros in up-front cash that was agreed to in a poorly devised agreement in 2011....

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After the debt swap of old bonds for new bonds with private bondholders for an estimated 53% haircut, the IMF's March 2012 report on Greece says a lot remains unresolved. It predicts a "disorderly exit from the euro" without further help. The April 2012 elections may result in a dilution to committments to austerity policies in Greece, as these policies are highly unpopular in Greece. Greece is still "accident-prone." And competitiveness issues may take over a decade to resolve.

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The logjam continues between the French and German banks- represented by the Institute of International Finance and its negotiator Charles Dallara- and the governments of Germany and Greece, supported by the IMF. The position of the Greek government is that the interest rate on new bonds stretching out over a long time period that woud be exchanged at 50% face value of existing bonds should be set at rates well below 4%, because Greece faces a growing deficit and rapidly worsening economy. The German government which is faced with the prospect of providing additional funds to Greece supports this. The IIF position is for an interest rate of between 4-5%.

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Systemic risks from "too big to fail" and the pushback on capital reserve requirements that leave banks with lower reserves. Ewing describes the role of the president of the Swiss Central Bank, Mr Hildebrand, in setting rules for higher capital reserves for Swiss banks than that of other countries and the pushback from the banks resisting the new regulations. "He will never find another job in Switzerland," a Swiss newspaper Der Sonntag quoted one banker saying this about Mr. Hildebrand. Losses at Swiss bank UBS during the financial crisis and the $2 billion loss at a UBS trading desk in 2011 have created a new awareness of systemic risk at banks. During the financial crisis banks used an optimistic estimate of "risk weighted assets" which led to insufficient capital reserves in a crisis even as the banks were shown to be well capitalized. A sense that banks in Europe and the U.S. will continue to have insufficient capital reserves at 3-4% of assets under new rules and with the longer phase in times for the new Basel III regulations of reserves at 7% of assets to after 2016....

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Failure of U.S. regulatory agencies to implement an important provision of the Dodd-Frank legislation- instructing regulators to find all references to ratings agencies in their rules, and then replace them with better standards for judging credit risk. Treasury's Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, is one of the agencies trying to gut this reform, says this Wall Steet Journal editorial. The S.E.C. voted unanimously in March and April to propose rules eliminating credit agencies in their regulations on money funds and stock brokerages. As the comment periods have ended, the Journal calls for the rules to be immediately made final. Officials from FDIC and OCC are dragging their feet on this. One problem they face is their assumption that the Dodd-Frank law requires them to come up with the perfect rule for measuring credit risk. This is not what the change is intended to do. It is enough says the Journal to return the responsibility for the right metrics and the hard work of analyzing a security back to where it belongs- to people who manage these assets and institutional managers. Even if they made some mistakes it would be far less than the systemic risk posed by having all major institutions making the same mistake at the same time and the entire system following flawed ratings by the big three credit ratings agencies. This happened in the 2008 mortgage securities financial crisis. S&P has stated that it does not support the old system. And new alternatives are appearing for ratings- CreditSights, Rapid Ratings, Kroll Bond Ratings which got S.E.C.' support, and other alternatives still to come....

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Lawyers Buchheit and and Gulati help Greece design a legal agreement that writes in a new collective action clause. The collective action clause ensures a 95% participation for the bond restructuring deal Greece is doing in March 2012 to cut its debt to sustainable levels. A similiar deal could be designed for Portugal says Mitu Gulati, a law professor at Duke University. Because Greece's bonds are written under Greek law, writing in a new collective action clause is a legal mechanism for achieving a meaningful debt reduction and bond restructuring deal- this is something Gulati and Buchheit figured out because of their expertise in this field. A joint paper by Buchheit and Gulati in 2010, first explored the way in which private bondholders of Greek bonds who reject a bond debt restructuring could be forced to accept the same losses as other investors who accepted the deal. They are now advisors to the government of Greece. In early 2011 there was serious discussion that the Brady Bonds debt restructuring for Latin American debt of Argentina, Mexico and Brazil of the 1980's, under which private investors traded in their old bonds for new bonds with longer duration at reduced interest rates and lower value- reflecting voluntary losses accepted by bondholders- was the approach needed for Greece, Portugal, Ireland and other eurozone countries. Then U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady took the lead- in Landon Thomas Jr., NYT, 11/30/2010. Bondholders held out throughout this period, with Charles Dallara, one of the architects of the Brady bonds restructuring, hired by European banks to negotiate on their behalf. It was only when German Chancellor Merkel delivered an ultimatum by telling Dallara "this is the last offer," during a late night meeting on Oct. 27, 2011, at EU headquarters in Brussels, was an agreement reached on serious debt reduction- in Walker, Forelle, Meichtry, WSJ, 12/30/2011. The long delay meant a worsening crisis in Greece and the rest of the eurozone. ...

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John Taylor looks one step ahead of the March 2012 Greece bailout and sets up the most plausible scenario for the future. He says the risks of contagion were always exaggerated from the beginning- a planned default or restructuring of debt such as happened in Argentina in 2001, does not have the contagion risks associated with a chaotic and unplanned default as in Russia in 1998. Predicability in policy makes a huge difference, says Taylor. The European banks which stood to lose from writedowns exaggerated the fears of contagion- a process that always occurs for people who are adversely affected by writedowns- resulting in top officials in the European Union delaying the unavoidable serious restructuring. It was not until Chancellor Merkel handed Charles Dallara, who negotiated for the European banks, a note stating a demand for 50% bondholder writedown, on October 27, 2011, at EU headquarters in Brussels, did any serious writedown of debt begin. Merkel told Dallara: "this is my last offer." The July 2011 summit by contrast had only a 10% bondholder writedown in the agreement, when insolvency not illiquidity was the real issue. Walker Forelle and Meichtry, give a detailed account of what happened in the Wall Street Journal, Dec. 30, 2011. The important thing for Greece, says Taylor, is for what the IMF calls "growth enhancing structural reforms" - greater reliance on private markets, incentives, rule of law. He says this bailout won't work because IMF growth forecasts do not reflect the rapid shrinking of the Greek economy. Antonis Samaras, leader of the major opposition party, is in favor of pro-growth measures and has stated his desire to change the agreement. The 130 billion euro bailout provides 90 billion euros for recapitalizing Greece's banks, and financing the budget. This puts Greece in a situation where the political leaders win voter support by discarding the conditions from the Northern EU nations and come with a plan that is better suited for Greece. The EU in this scenario would cut off further bailout funds to Greece. Taylor sees this as the better outcome for Greece than the current situation, which leaves Greece no hope for growth, and also for the EU by getting out of bailouts that have little prospect of working. It would be difficult but doable for Greece says Taylor, because interest payments would be low and Greek banks would be recapitalized after the current March 2012 bailout. ...

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The warning light is again on for Greece in the beginning of 2012, as the rapidly deteriorating economy makes a 50% loss by private creditors insufficient to help it meet repayment or refinancing of bonds coming due in 2012. Additional funds will be needed from EU countries unwilling to do this. 14.5 billion euros in Greek bonds come due on March 20, 2012. Greece also faces a public increasingly resistant to austerity cuts. A vountary exchage of existing Greek bonds by private creditors for new bonds at 50% face value and maturing over a longer period will be done under English law. This will be harder to change in the future. Most of the existing bonds were issued under Greek law which can be altered by Greece's parliament.

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A 3 page July 14, 2015 update on the IMF's July 2015 debt sustainability analysis paper on Greece, points to severe damage to the Greek economy in the last year, especially under the uncertainty and closing of the banking system, making debt unsustainable without haircuts or extension of maturities and grace periods. About 85 billion euros is the additional financing needed as a result of the mismanagement under the Syriza government and closing of the banking system. It draws the conclusion that "haircuts could be avoided if instead there was a significant further extension of the maturities of the entire stock of European debt (GLF, EFSF) , in the form of doubling of grace and repayment periods, with similiar concessional terms on new financing." The paper adds that the maturity extension would have to be "very dramatic extension with grace periods of say, 30 years on the entire stock of European debt, including new assistance." One shocking part of the analysis is that within the space of one year from July 2014 to July 2015 the Greek economy went from reaching Debt to GDP ratio of 105% in 2022, to 170% after the closing of the banking system by July 12, 2015, according to the IMF. In 2014 it was at 177% of GDP....