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Richard Portes of the London Business School provides two good reasons why the EU's decision to adopt the French Banking Federation's proposal for rollovers with 10% interest costs is a serious mistake. It doubles the interest costs from 4-6% to 10% with 2% Greek GDP growth and makes debt servicing untenable. Portes says the real Brady Plan from the 1980's included a 35-40% bondholders haircut. Deals of this type have a precedent- in Mexico in 1988 and in Argentina in 2001 such bond exchanges were soon followed by deals that placed bondholder haricuts on creditors. The lesson from Latin America in the 1980's, says Portes, is that the burdens of servicing a debt of such proportions under onerous conditions only extinguishes the enterprise, investment and productive capabilities of the particular country trying to service that debt, making the debt even less serviceable. See the Wall Street Journal's editorial on this deal which it calls "The French Deception." The terms sound like Greek to the editors leaving a sense that French banks are only saying "gimme." The only benefit achieved may be putting off the problem and avoiding contagion to Portugal and Spain. Yet this is not that much of a benefit when one realizes that the problem has not gone away, and is likely to look much worse six or nine months from now....

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The CDU convention in Leipzig, Germany passed a compromise resolution that lays the ground for a EU country to voluntarily leave the euro zone and still maintain membership in the European Union. The resolution called for changes to the Lisbon Treaty to allow a euro zone member that is "unable or unwilling to permanently obey the rules connected to the common currency... to voluntarily... leave the euro zone without leaving the European Union." Merkel told delegates that Europe must change the EU treaty to allow for strong automatic sanctions for violations of the monetary union treaty. "We need to send a clear signal. We don't whine; we don't complain. We know instead that we have a job to do." On the issue of voluntary withdrawal from the eurozone, the earlier decision by Merkel and President Sarkozy of France- when prime minister Papandreou of Greece decided to put the issue of membership to a referendum- was to tell Greece that leaving the eurozone would mean leaving the European Union. This CDU resolution provides a basis for Greece to resolve its debt problems outside the euro currency, as experts suggest....

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Criticism of the EU's handling of the Greece crisis by IMF officials in a report. The report says the actions taken for debt restructuring in 2012 should have come much earlier to reduce the debt burden and the size of austerity measures in Greece. Similiar criticism has been voiced by president Hollande of France and in editorials by the WSJ. President Samaras of Greece says the sharp cuts in spending reduced potential for growth in the economy.

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The logjam continues between the French and German banks- represented by the Institute of International Finance and its negotiator Charles Dallara- and the governments of Germany and Greece, supported by the IMF. The position of the Greek government is that the interest rate on new bonds stretching out over a long time period that woud be exchanged at 50% face value of existing bonds should be set at rates well below 4%, because Greece faces a growing deficit and rapidly worsening economy. The German government which is faced with the prospect of providing additional funds to Greece supports this. The IIF position is for an interest rate of between 4-5%.

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Simon Nixon says the main problem with the E.U. bank stress tests of 2011 is that it did not test for sovereign defaults. For example Greek debt that is trading at 50 cents on the euro, was marked down 15%. And the lack of urgency to raise fresh capital is another problem. He says the real value of the tests comes from the asset disclosures that accompanied the tests.

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Alexis Tsipras, leader of Syriza, Greece's second largest party, is interviewed by WSJ's Bret Stephens. Tsipras describes the problems inside Greece. He describes the bribery in healthcare, tax evasion, burden of taxes on the middle class and honest citizens, a large and inefficient bureaucracy. In its current state Greece would build up debt and deficits all over again if the debts were forgiven tomorrow, says Tsipras. He is for Greece remaining in the eurozone. Tsipras understands the problems Germans have with putting money into Greece with the current state of economic management and lack of conscience of its elite, and why they see this as not fair. He suggests as a model for solving the Greece debt crisis, the London Conference of 1953 forgiving half of Germany's debts and putting the rest on a 30 year scheduled repayment. This would have to come with results in cutting bureaucracy, reducing corruption, and efficient tax collection for Greece democracy to work.

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Anxiety in financial markets about exposure of French banks to Greece pulled down French bank stocks on August 10, 2011. Societe Generale shares were down 15%. A British tabloid the Daily Mail published an article on Societe Generale saying that it was in a perilous condition, and on the "brink of disaster." The Daily Mail later retracted its report. The rumors spread quickly in a jittery market, reminiscent of the rumors that affected Morgan Stanley at the height of the U.S. financial crisis in 2008. Sanford Bernstein analysts say in a report that the selloff in French banking stocks was based more on anxiety and the rising price of insurance of thinly traded credit default swaps, and not based on rational concerns about earnings and raising capital. Societe Generale says it has no exposure to Greek bonds maturing after 2020 on its books- to deflect fears of additional bank bondholder haircuts beyond 2020- and has taken a 395 million euro provision against losses on Greek sovereign bonds maturing upto 2020. The jittery condition of markets was also affected by rumors that France was about to be downgraded. Moody's, Fitch, and S&P reaffirmed that French credit ratings of triple A and stable outlook would not change....

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Austin Goolsbee says the overvalued currencies of Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal and the lack of growth under austerity plans proposed for these countries create impossible odds for resolution of the financial problems in these countries. The German position is that profligate spending and irresponsible accounting in Greece, and structural issues in Italy ranging from entitlement spending to tax evasion, need to be resolved.

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The new coalition government of prime minister, Antonis Samaras, will ask for a two year extension for meeting deficit targets from the March 2012 deal with the IMF, EC and ECB. The new coalition will also not make any large layoffs and only reduce the size of the public sector by attrition and retirements, a key condition of the Democratic Left partner in the coalition. This is one of the demands as part of the loan package to Greece. Since the beginning of the crisis the public sector has declined by 10% in Greece to 700,000. By 2015 the public sector is expected to lose another 150,000 workers by attrition.

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After the debt swap of old bonds for new bonds with private bondholders for an estimated 53% haircut, the IMF's March 2012 report on Greece says a lot remains unresolved. It predicts a "disorderly exit from the euro" without further help. The April 2012 elections may result in a dilution to committments to austerity policies in Greece, as these policies are highly unpopular in Greece. Greece is still "accident-prone." And competitiveness issues may take over a decade to resolve.

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Thomas Sargent of New York University, the 2012 Nobel prize winner in economics, says the EU leaders can learn from the way the federal government in the U.S. handled the issue of state's debt when it came up in the 1790's and in 1840. In 1790 the federal government- under the leadership of Washington and Hamilton- saw the need to honor state's debt because of the contribution made by states in the war of independence and the U.S. assumed state's debt. In 1840 the U.S. refused to assume state's debt and states went into default. The result was beneficial because state's passed balanced budget rules and restrained reckless spending. Another benefit was that this preserved state rights to manage their finances and the federal structure setup under the constitution.

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This editorial deserves an award for best editorial on international economic matters in 2011. The editorial, goes right to the point, when it says the French, the Germans, and the European Central Bank are deluding themselves if they call this weeks resolution of the Greece debt crisis a realistic solution. It is anything but a solution. The Journal calls it a French deception. It is unworkable because the main problem, the high ratio of Greek debt to GDP -which is now 155% and is expected to reach 170% by the end of 2011- is sure to get worse under the arrrangement designed in the interest of French and German banks. Under the arrangement French and German banks and other creditors will get to double their return from 4-5% today to an effective interest rate of 10% if Greece grows by 2% a year, on 49% of the bonds they hold. These bonds will be converted into 30 year bonds. This effectively doubles the interest cost for Greece in servicing this debt. On the other approximately 51% of the bonds the French and German banks would redeem the bonds for cash and a triple A, sovereign zero coupon bond. The Journal asks what is the point of making Greece's debt problem worse than it is now and calling it a solution. The austerity cuts are already expected to lead to a deep recession, something that is also happening in Portugal, leading to a worsening of the debt situation. Creditors are not sharing in the losses under this arrangement, as Germany and the Netherlands have insisted. As the Journal points out they are instead taking out half of their investment and doubling their return on the remainder. And the fears of contagion for Spain are not lessened, as financial markets can clearly see through this for what it is- unworkable and unrealistic. ...

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Higgins cites the IMF and other experts on Greece's debt being unsustainable. He includes a long discussion with Charles Dallara who negotiated in the Brady Plan restructurings for Latin American debt, and for the European banks in 2010-2012 with the EU. Dallara says the issue has become politicized with national parliaments involved making it difficult to tackle the issue of debt reduction. Dallara points out that the Brady plan restructurings were possible because national parliaments were not involved.

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IMF Managing Director, Christine Lagarde says Greece should have 2 more years to achieve the deficit targets. Speaking at a news conference during the annual meeting of the IMF in Tokyo in Oct 2012, Lagarde said: "it is sometimes better, given circumstances.. to have a bit more time... This is what we advocated for Portugal, it's what we advocated for Spain, and it's what we are advocating for Greece, where I have said repeatedly that an additional two years was necessary for the country to actually face the fiscal consolidation program that is considered." A two year extension would add an estimated 20 billion euros to the financing cost for Greece, at the same it improves the chances for growth and means having a program that is more likely to work.

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Problems with the July 2011 plan for Greece and other troubled eurozone economies include the lack of funding and powers for the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). The contagion effects to Italy and Spain will require larger funding and powers for the EFSF for it to be able to deal with future crises. The bondholder debt haircut for Portuguese and Irish bondholders, and the sense that the crisis in Greece may have to be revisted yet again, are other issues that remain unresolved. Analysts sense that the EU's governance mechanisms are always a step behind in dealing with the repeated crises and EU leaders are doing only enough to get to the next crisis moment.

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Landon Thomas looks at the European Financial Stability Facility, the organization that was formed in May 2010 to be the mechanism for raising and channeling funds to troubled eurozone economies Ireland, Greece and Portugal. He describes its evolution, its new responsibilities under the July 2011 eurozone agreement, and the difficulties it might face. The credibility of the EFSF is critical to the solution being worked out by eurozone leaders. The EFSF is based in Luxembourg and is headed by Klaus Regling, a German economist and a top official in the European Commisson's financial division. The EFSF raises funds in the financial markets. With Germany as the largest backer the EFSF is able to raise funds at low interest rates such as 3.3% for 10 years at one recent offering. The fund has a triple-A rating. In June and July the stability fund raised 8 billion euros in two auctions. It plans to come to the market four times during the rest of 2011 for funds to support Ireland and Portugal. The EFSF will need new powers and structure to meet its new role as the principal mechanism for solving the crisis. It is now given the role of the buyer of last resort for the bonds of troubled eurozone economies. This means national parliaments in the eurozone will have to approve these new powers and resources. One concern in financial markets is how the EFSF would deal with the needs of Italy or Spain if one of the two economies runs into trouble. Italy and Spain consitute 30% of the EFSF's backing, if they were to run into problems, would the burden fall disproportionately on France and Germany? And because France may have public finance problems of its own with declining competitiveness, does this mean Germany would be the real backer in that situation....

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Charles Dallara, managing director of the Institute of International Finance, which represents large global banks, describes the deal that was reached by eurozone leaders for restructuring Greece's debt in July 2011. He was one of the key negotiators. He says the agreement helps prevent contagion to Spain and Italy, and helps increase confidence in banks. By showing the losses are better understood and seen as manageable conveys a message that builds confidence for the banks and for the EU. And the effort to create the conditions for growth in Greece will make all the difference, he says. The Institute of International Finance estimates the deal will cost the banks and other investors $54 billion. Dallara says the turning point in the talks came in mid-July when European governments agreed to a plan for banks to swap Greek debt for new securities, backed by collateral.The focus then shifted to shaping the details. Josef Ackermann, chief executive of Deutsche Bank and chairman of the International Finance Institute, used his skills to pull the package together with European leaders. Dallara has experience going back to his days working on the negotiations for the Brady deal for Latin American debt in the 1980's. The Brady deal was also designed around banks swapping the old bonds for new ones with longer maturities and reduction of principal, and lower interest rates. In return the banks were given guarantees of repayment removing uncertainty- through 30 year U.S. zero coupon bonds- and making it possible for banks to start anew. The reduction of principal in the July 2011 eurozone agreement is around 20%, the Brady reduction was much larger, around 30%. This suggests eurozone governments are putting up more of the funds in this situation with the weaker condition of banks which may need to be recapitalized at some point, and the preservation of the euro itself at stake....