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Friedman compares the anti-corruption movements in India and the U.S., the world's two largest democracies. The Occupy Wall Street anti-corruption movement in the U.S. focusses on the excessive influence of banks on lawmakers, regulators, and the government, through the use of campaign money, revolving door for government officials and regulators to join banks, and intense lobbying. The anti-corruption movement focusses on corruption in government at higher levels, such as the handling of government licenses, and at the basic levels of needing to bribe officials for something as simple as getting a birth certificate or other government document. Both have pernicious effects, in the U.S. excesssive bank influence leads to taking excessive risk for higher bonuses, putting the entire financial system at risk and creating a crisis in housing that delays the economic recovery. And in India the corruption leads to retarded progress, as funds to invest in infrastructure and development are siphoned off, business and entrepreneurs are required to pay bribes at each step, and ordinary people face the need to pay bribes for the most routine interactions with government officials. In the process this creates more unequal societies by skewing the distribution of benefits from wealth created to groups that are better equipped to game the system. The economic system once distorted in these ways has tendencies to take talent away from productive activity and innovation which create wealth, and direct it towards speculative activities....

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This Wall Street Journal editorial calls for more transparency in disclosing bad debt problems at Spanish and other European banks. It faults recent and upcoming stress tests of EU banks for not being stringent enough and taking into account adverse scenarios. While Spain's central bank says only 20 billion euros are needed to recapitalize the cajas savings banks, other estimates are much higher. Moody's country report says Spain could need upto 120 billion euros to recapitalize its banks. A big problem is European banks exposure in Spain which is over 700 billion euros as of September 2010- Spanish banks have high exposure in Portugal and German banks have high exposure to Spain.

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Friedman says Obama's 2012 presidential campaign lacks bold vision, a failure to articulate tangible achievements, and owes too much to campaign consultants. He describes it as being developed in test tube fashion. The failure to embrace and strongly advocate his own presidential commission's Simpson-Bowles deficit reduction plan, which could be coupled with long term investment in the productive potential of the U.S. economy, shows the lack of courage to prepare a plan going forward. It is likely to cost support of independent, center and center-right voters in the 2012 U.S. presidential election.

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Germany went through a period of stagnant growth and persistently high unemployment leading to reforms of the welfare system and entitlements under the Schroeder administration. The reforms led to lower unemployment benefits and an effort to get the unemployed take up jobs. Instead of unemployment benefits that amounted to half the salary indefinitely, unemployment benefits ended in 12 months under the reforms, and workers were forced to take up jobs or dig into their savings. The cuts to benefits led to more of the unemployed taking jobs that were not their first choice with lower incomes. Unions agreed to defer wage demands and wages remained relatively flat for a long period. The "kurzarbeit" system of government subsidizing employers to retain workers during economic downturns, helped cushion the workforce from ups and downs in the economy. Unemployment which was in double digits a decade ago, is now 6.1%. The system still preserved some other aspects of generous benefits- parental leave of 14 months at two-thirds salary, vacation time and publicly sponsored health insurance. Recent changes include raising the retirement age to 67 from 65. The Organization of Economc Cooperation and Development estimates that the 200,000 jobs saved in Germany during the recession of 2008-2009 cost the government $7 billion. Government funds helped companies retain workers by paying a portion of worker salaries and averting layoffs.This comes to $35,000 per job. Compare this with the $38.9 billion allocated to a loan program at the Energy Department under the U.S. stimulus. 8050 jobs were created under this program according to the Washington Post- for the money spent so far in Sept 2011- 2 years into the loan program, of $19.3 billion. This comes to $2.4 million in government guaranteed loans per job. The Energy Department says that 33,000 jobs were saved under the $5.9 billion that was given to the auto industry under this program for investments in manufacturing to improve fuel efficiency. This comes to $178,000 per job. The Energy Department and Congress estimated a 5%-10% loss on the $38.6 billion loan program for loans that go sour, such as the Solyndra solar company $535 million loan. This comes to $1.9 billion at 5% loss and $3.8 billion for a 10% loss. The purpose of these figures is to show the cost of programs when the programs fail to achieve job goals or produce too little for the investment. The $3.8 billion loss under the program is over half the $7 billon Germany invested for the 200,000 jobs saved as estimated by the OECD. That ranks as a far superior investment than the Energy Department program. For the U.S. there are aspects of German reforms such as "kurzarbeit" that bear emulation, with serious questions about the effective use of the U.S. stimulus funds. For the rest of Europe the stingier unemployment benefits, raising the retirement age to 67, and other reforms send a different message. From the average German the message is: we made the tough changes, the rest of Europe cannot expect Germans to pay higher taxes while they put off similiar changes. Italy needs to change its retirement age, just as the Germans have done. As Chancellor Merkel puts it: "People in countries like Greece, Spain, Portugal shouldn't be able to retire earlier than in Germany. It's important for everybody to put in effort to make it roughly equal. Germany will only help when others really make an effort." Which is why Greece, Spain, Italy, even France are faced with making serious changes. This isn't stalling when it comes to euro bonds, from the German perspective. And it isn't about the lack of committment to the idea of a European Union, as all major political parties in Germany, the CDP, the SDP and the Greens, all strongly support the idea of a European Union. ...

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The IMF's changing views on the value of fiscal austerity. In the current debate about the value of fiscal austerity, there is the IMF view, a German view based on its own experience, and the views of other countries in Europe. The IMF's view has shifted over time. The IMF World Economic Outlook 2010, describes its view of the effects of austerity measures in the form of spending cuts and tax increases- "Fiscal consolidation typically has a contractionary effect on output. A fiscal consolidation equal to 1% of GDP typically reduces GDP by about 0.5% within 2 years and raises the unemployment rate by about 0.3% percentage points." Over the longer term there are benefits as the private sector is not crowded out in the search for captal funding by the excessive government borrowing. The IMF's economic models suggest that it would take 5 years before reaching the breakeven point when the benefits of austerity measures exceed the effects of austerity. The German view held by German central bankers is that the actions stimulate growth in the short term. Manfred Neumann, professor emeritus at the Institute for Economic Policy at the University of Bonn, says this is called the "German hypothesis" as it reflects the experience of Germany from austerity actions taken by Germany. Laurence Ball, professor of Economics at John Hopkins University, is critical of the "German hypothesis" and its application across Europe in different situations. Germany is a large exporting nation and exports helped counterbalance the effects of austerity measures. Within the eurozone with fixed exchange rates the exports of less competitive countries cannot be boosted through devaluing the currency to gain price competitiveness. The other problem is that with interest rates close to zero in the euro zone the central banks cannot cut rates aggressively to counteract the effects of spending cuts. The problem gets compounded when a number of countries are taking austerity measures at the same time accentuating the downturn....

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An account by Journal reporters based on over 25 interviews with eurozone policymakers shows how the central players in the eurozone drama acted to defend their national interests during the period April to July 2011. On one side France's president Sarkozy, Frenchman Claude Trichet at the European Central Bank, arguing in favor of the banks not to take bondholder losses or haircuts on loans made to Greece. On the other side the Bundesbanks Axel Weber, and Jens Weidman, Jurgen Stark and German Finance Minister Schauble. The Germans argued strongly for bondholder losses to take responsibility for bad loan decisions by French and German banks. French banks had committed more loans to Greece than German banks and had more at stake. German public opinion was strongly against German taxpayers paying for the losses, making German politicians insistent that European banks take losses on their bad loan decisions, or Germany would not support additional loans to Greece. Throughout April to July the two sides were locked in an impasse. The French feared losses for their banks and a Lehman Brothers bankruptcy style situation. The Germans at the Bundesbank and the Finance Ministry were equally insistent. A July 2011 summit meeting did not settle the issue. The events not covered here from the July to the December summit of eurozone leaders resulted in bondholders taking 50% haircut on loans to Greece, reducing the debt burden in Greece after austerity measures led to popular protests. The French pushed hard for the ECB or the EFSF to be allowed to make large purchases of bonds of troubled eurozone countries in an effort to protect Spain and Italy from contagion through higher bond yields. The Netherlands and Finland supported Germany's position. German bankers Weber, Weidman at the Bundesbank and Finance Minister Schauble opposed large scale buying by the ECB of Italy's and Spain's bonds and Chancellor Merkel said about a common eurobond that "this is not going to happen." Governments changed in Greece, Italy, and Spain by Dec. 2011, which committed to austerity programs and spending cuts. Italian Mario Draghi was appointed with German support as new head of the ECB. In late December 2011 Draghi launched the Long Term Financing Operation for lending unlimited amounts at 1% for three year loans to European banks and relaxing the terms to accept government bonds and other debt as collateral for loans. The effect of this was to provide a large infusion of liquidity into the banking system in Europe and drastically bring down the yields on bonds issued by Italy and Spain....

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John Taylor looks one step ahead of the March 2012 Greece bailout and sets up the most plausible scenario for the future. He says the risks of contagion were always exaggerated from the beginning- a planned default or restructuring of debt such as happened in Argentina in 2001, does not have the contagion risks associated with a chaotic and unplanned default as in Russia in 1998. Predicability in policy makes a huge difference, says Taylor. The European banks which stood to lose from writedowns exaggerated the fears of contagion- a process that always occurs for people who are adversely affected by writedowns- resulting in top officials in the European Union delaying the unavoidable serious restructuring. It was not until Chancellor Merkel handed Charles Dallara, who negotiated for the European banks, a note stating a demand for 50% bondholder writedown, on October 27, 2011, at EU headquarters in Brussels, did any serious writedown of debt begin. Merkel told Dallara: "this is my last offer." The July 2011 summit by contrast had only a 10% bondholder writedown in the agreement, when insolvency not illiquidity was the real issue. Walker Forelle and Meichtry, give a detailed account of what happened in the Wall Street Journal, Dec. 30, 2011. The important thing for Greece, says Taylor, is for what the IMF calls "growth enhancing structural reforms" - greater reliance on private markets, incentives, rule of law. He says this bailout won't work because IMF growth forecasts do not reflect the rapid shrinking of the Greek economy. Antonis Samaras, leader of the major opposition party, is in favor of pro-growth measures and has stated his desire to change the agreement. The 130 billion euro bailout provides 90 billion euros for recapitalizing Greece's banks, and financing the budget. This puts Greece in a situation where the political leaders win voter support by discarding the conditions from the Northern EU nations and come with a plan that is better suited for Greece. The EU in this scenario would cut off further bailout funds to Greece. Taylor sees this as the better outcome for Greece than the current situation, which leaves Greece no hope for growth, and also for the EU by getting out of bailouts that have little prospect of working. It would be difficult but doable for Greece says Taylor, because interest payments would be low and Greek banks would be recapitalized after the current March 2012 bailout. ...

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Applebaum talks to two researchers at the University of Chicago and Princeton, Prof. Sufi and Prof. Mian, on the record of U.S. president Obama and Fed chairman Bernanke in helping homeowners facing foreclosure and underwater borrowers, comparing that record with their record in helping the banks. The issue is relevant as the policy and handling of homeowners had to be part of an overall effective plan for recovery in the U.S. economy, because ultimately without the U.S. consumer any recovery would be weak in the long run- a situation the U.S. faces in early 2014. The response to the issue of irresponsible homeowners borrowing beyond the limit without an equally robust response to irresponsible bank management that allowed wildly excessive leveraging of assets, and successful aggressive lobbying by banks in a shortsighted policy of going through with a wave of foreclosures; besides creating questions of fairness and equitable handling of the problem, also had major ramifications for the future of the U.S. and global economic growth. Here Christina Romer and other administration advisors say Bernanke was right in tackling the problem from the perspective of the banks needing to be recapitalized. Thoughtful advisors looking at the entire problem, Martin Feldstein and Sheila Bair strongly pushed for providing the same help to homeowners without getting caught up in the issue of who was responsible home buyers or the banks, and looking at the interests of the U.S. economy and the U.S. people. Proposals by Feldstein and Bair were equally robust in helping banks as they were in helping homeowners, only the banks understood their interests narrowly and had more access to policymakers in the Bush, as well as the Obama administration, Paulson as well as Geithner. This leaves us with the ultimate irony of the Obama administration pushing for the minimum wage, even to the point of electoral posture, when lasting damage had been inflicted on homeowners from the weaker portions of America's middle class by a policy that went against what two respected financial and economic experts from the Reagan period, Sheila and Bair had strongly advocated. See links and groups on Feldstein and Bair. Applebaum has followed most aspects of this problem closely and continues to provide exceptional reporting including the piece on the thinking of new Fed chairman, Janet Yellen. Private enterprise rules that require management at banks just as for other companies to take responsibility for failures, and be replaced with new management, was largely avoided leading to a fundamental failure in how a free market economy such as the U.S. and western European economies are supposed to function. Rules aggressively pushed by Geithner's mentor Treasury Secretary Rubin for a vigorous cleanup at banks in South Korea during a similiar situation in 1997, were not followed in any way here, also setting wrong precedents for the long run. ...