LyrArc Article Gist
An account by Journal reporters based on over 25 interviews with eurozone policymakers shows how the central players in the eurozone drama acted to defend their national interests during the period April to July 2011. On one side France's president Sarkozy, Frenchman Claude Trichet at the European Central Bank, arguing in favor of the banks not to take bondholder losses or haircuts on loans made to Greece. On the other side the Bundesbanks Axel Weber, and Jens Weidman, Jurgen Stark and German Finance Minister Schauble. The Germans argued strongly for bondholder losses to take responsibility for bad loan decisions by French and German banks. French banks had committed more loans to Greece than German banks and had more at stake. German public opinion was strongly against German taxpayers paying for the losses, making German politicians insistent that European banks take losses on their bad loan decisions, or Germany would not support additional loans to Greece. Throughout April to July the two sides were locked in an impasse. The French feared losses for their banks and a Lehman Brothers bankruptcy style situation. The Germans at the Bundesbank and the Finance Ministry were equally insistent. A July 2011 summit meeting did not settle the issue. The events not covered here from the July to the December summit of eurozone leaders resulted in bondholders taking 50% haircut on loans to Greece, reducing the debt burden in Greece after austerity measures led to popular protests. The French pushed hard for the ECB or the EFSF to be allowed to make large purchases of bonds of troubled eurozone countries in an effort to protect Spain and Italy from contagion through higher bond yields. The Netherlands and Finland supported Germany's position. German bankers Weber, Weidman at the Bundesbank and Finance Minister Schauble opposed large scale buying by the ECB of Italy's and Spain's bonds and Chancellor Merkel said about a common eurobond that "this is not going to happen." Governments changed in Greece, Italy, and Spain by Dec. 2011, which committed to austerity programs and spending cuts. Italian Mario Draghi was appointed with German support as new head of the ECB. In late December 2011 Draghi launched the Long Term Financing Operation for lending unlimited amounts at 1% for three year loans to European banks and relaxing the terms to accept government bonds and other debt as collateral for loans. The effect of this was to provide a large infusion of liquidity into the banking system in Europe and drastically bring down the yields on bonds issued by Italy and Spain....

LyrArc Article Gist
John Taylor looks one step ahead of the March 2012 Greece bailout and sets up the most plausible scenario for the future. He says the risks of contagion were always exaggerated from the beginning- a planned default or restructuring of debt such as happened in Argentina in 2001, does not have the contagion risks associated with a chaotic and unplanned default as in Russia in 1998. Predicability in policy makes a huge difference, says Taylor. The European banks which stood to lose from writedowns exaggerated the fears of contagion- a process that always occurs for people who are adversely affected by writedowns- resulting in top officials in the European Union delaying the unavoidable serious restructuring. It was not until Chancellor Merkel handed Charles Dallara, who negotiated for the European banks, a note stating a demand for 50% bondholder writedown, on October 27, 2011, at EU headquarters in Brussels, did any serious writedown of debt begin. Merkel told Dallara: "this is my last offer." The July 2011 summit by contrast had only a 10% bondholder writedown in the agreement, when insolvency not illiquidity was the real issue. Walker Forelle and Meichtry, give a detailed account of what happened in the Wall Street Journal, Dec. 30, 2011. The important thing for Greece, says Taylor, is for what the IMF calls "growth enhancing structural reforms" - greater reliance on private markets, incentives, rule of law. He says this bailout won't work because IMF growth forecasts do not reflect the rapid shrinking of the Greek economy. Antonis Samaras, leader of the major opposition party, is in favor of pro-growth measures and has stated his desire to change the agreement. The 130 billion euro bailout provides 90 billion euros for recapitalizing Greece's banks, and financing the budget. This puts Greece in a situation where the political leaders win voter support by discarding the conditions from the Northern EU nations and come with a plan that is better suited for Greece. The EU in this scenario would cut off further bailout funds to Greece. Taylor sees this as the better outcome for Greece than the current situation, which leaves Greece no hope for growth, and also for the EU by getting out of bailouts that have little prospect of working. It would be difficult but doable for Greece says Taylor, because interest payments would be low and Greek banks would be recapitalized after the current March 2012 bailout. ...

LyrArc Article Gist
Applebaum talks to two researchers at the University of Chicago and Princeton, Prof. Sufi and Prof. Mian, on the record of U.S. president Obama and Fed chairman Bernanke in helping homeowners facing foreclosure and underwater borrowers, comparing that record with their record in helping the banks. The issue is relevant as the policy and handling of homeowners had to be part of an overall effective plan for recovery in the U.S. economy, because ultimately without the U.S. consumer any recovery would be weak in the long run- a situation the U.S. faces in early 2014. The response to the issue of irresponsible homeowners borrowing beyond the limit without an equally robust response to irresponsible bank management that allowed wildly excessive leveraging of assets, and successful aggressive lobbying by banks in a shortsighted policy of going through with a wave of foreclosures; besides creating questions of fairness and equitable handling of the problem, also had major ramifications for the future of the U.S. and global economic growth. Here Christina Romer and other administration advisors say Bernanke was right in tackling the problem from the perspective of the banks needing to be recapitalized. Thoughtful advisors looking at the entire problem, Martin Feldstein and Sheila Bair strongly pushed for providing the same help to homeowners without getting caught up in the issue of who was responsible home buyers or the banks, and looking at the interests of the U.S. economy and the U.S. people. Proposals by Feldstein and Bair were equally robust in helping banks as they were in helping homeowners, only the banks understood their interests narrowly and had more access to policymakers in the Bush, as well as the Obama administration, Paulson as well as Geithner. This leaves us with the ultimate irony of the Obama administration pushing for the minimum wage, even to the point of electoral posture, when lasting damage had been inflicted on homeowners from the weaker portions of America's middle class by a policy that went against what two respected financial and economic experts from the Reagan period, Sheila and Bair had strongly advocated. See links and groups on Feldstein and Bair. Applebaum has followed most aspects of this problem closely and continues to provide exceptional reporting including the piece on the thinking of new Fed chairman, Janet Yellen. Private enterprise rules that require management at banks just as for other companies to take responsibility for failures, and be replaced with new management, was largely avoided leading to a fundamental failure in how a free market economy such as the U.S. and western European economies are supposed to function. Rules aggressively pushed by Geithner's mentor Treasury Secretary Rubin for a vigorous cleanup at banks in South Korea during a similiar situation in 1997, were not followed in any way here, also setting wrong precedents for the long run. ...