LyrArc Article Gist
Jon Huntsman, Republican candidate for President in 2012, calls for a fee on banks with a size that is above a certain percentage of the GDP. This would cover the cost banks impose on taxpayers when they are bailed out. It would eliminate the advantage banks gain from "too-big-to-fail," a subsidy Huntsman estimates to be one half percentage point in today's market. He points to efforts by the UK and Switzerland for more stringent financial standards than the U.S.

LyrArc Article Gist
This Wall Street Journal editorial calls for more transparency in disclosing bad debt problems at Spanish and other European banks. It faults recent and upcoming stress tests of EU banks for not being stringent enough and taking into account adverse scenarios. While Spain's central bank says only 20 billion euros are needed to recapitalize the cajas savings banks, other estimates are much higher. Moody's country report says Spain could need upto 120 billion euros to recapitalize its banks. A big problem is European banks exposure in Spain which is over 700 billion euros as of September 2010- Spanish banks have high exposure in Portugal and German banks have high exposure to Spain.

LyrArc Article Gist
THe Economist says that the efforts of banks like Chase JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs and Wells Fargo to rewrite history are wrong and dangerous. They are wrong because there was acomplete collapse of confidence by December 2009 and these banks benfitted from state guarantees and government efforts to help the banks without which Goldman, and Morgan Stanley and other banks would be in serious difficulty or in danger of collapsing. It is dangerous because it is being used to distort the process of putting in place the right compensation incentives to avoid overleveraging and risk taking, putting in place prudent regulation, and taking all the right steps to prevent a future banking crisis, with the argument that this should apply only to the weaker banks. It is dangerous on two other points. The banking regulations should apply to the entire banking industry, and especially on banks that are too big to fail. These banks now are content to leave the toxic assets on their books where they are and consider government efforts to purchase these toxic loans and securoities or otherwise resolve these assets in some kind of good bank-bad bank scheme, as unnecessary. All this is happening even as the banks themselves remain poorly capitalized, even after raising funds in the capital markets recently, and remain very dependent on the government. The danger is that this may make everyone complacent in the event of a developing new storm....

LyrArc Article Gist
A study by Chris Whalen, managing director of Institutional Risk Analytics, of 7000 regional and community banks from data presented for the second quarter to the FDIC, shows that the bank's financial picture is deteriorating. Institutional Analytics put afailing grade on 1,882 banks as of June 30, 2009, up 16.5% from the end of March 2009. He says even the best run banks are feeling the bad effects of declining employment and asluggish economy. Whalen says this calls into question whether the stress tests for the "big banks" by the Obama adminsitration are adequate to control the crisis. Whalen says the asummption in those stress tests was that thes big banks had tohave enough capital and earnings to withstand a 9% loss rate, but what he is seeing in the industry is that we are already at a 9% loss rate , and the cycle has not peaked yet. He says any reduction in loss rates as assumed by the government may be shortlived as he sees things worsening in the fourth quarter of 2009. What about the good news that the big banks have raised capital in 2009. He says banks face operational problems, in addition to loan losses and low recovery rates on unloading assets they face rising expenses to carry these properties that generate little revenue. This cuts into earnings and what they can allocate to reserves. In this period banks are setting aside only half of what they would normally put in reserves to offset expected losses....

LyrArc Article Gist
The British government's sale of 7.5% of the shares in Lloyd's Bank to institutional investors in March 2014 for $7 billion. This reduces its stake in Lloyds bank to 25%.

LyrArc Article Gist
It is a serious problem when big banks such as JP Morgan Chase offer 1-2% in interest on deposits when the Fed has increased market rates to above 5%. The average for all banks is only 0.73%. Consider that JP Morgan Chase made $14 billion in profit in 2022. This reduces the interest earned by the vast majority of average Americans who have savings at American banks and reduces their wealth further increasing inequality in the US.

LyrArc Article Gist
Glen Hubbard, who was Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors under President George W. Bush and is now Dean of Columbia University Business School, Hal Scott professor of International Fiancial Systems at Harvard Law School, and Luigi Zingales professor of finance at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, say a different plan of action is needed from what the Obama administration is doing to tackle the banking crisis. They are really skeptical about the the Public Private Investment Program and other plans put forth upto now for several reasons. First, in every case they say there is a lot of carrot but very little stick, and this won't work. TARP program was mostly carrot, with Treasury getting back securities worth $78 billion less than the $254 billion invested, as pointed out by the Congressional Oversight Panel.The FDIC's guarantee of short term debt was worth $100 billion just for the original nine TARP participating banks, and the mortgage related asset guarantees offered Citibank and Bank of America were worth tens of billions. They see anew round of TARP injections with the conversion of the government's preferred stock into equity after release of the stress test results. Then there is PPIP the Public Private Investment Program, and its plans to subsidize the purchase of bank's"toxic assets" by hedge funds and other investors. They estimate the government will spend $2 for every $1 the private sector puts up. And even with this subsidy their thinking is that the probability of succes is low for the same reason that has prevailed since the earlier efforts by Treasury Secretary Paulson- there is just too big a gap between the bid and ask prices on the toxic assets, and add to that the reluctance of investors to partner with the government. Its time for more stick say these experts as the problem of toxic assets, and of credit and lending in the economy, will hang like a large shadow over the economy, as long as these tough problems are not wrestled with. This is the Hubbard-Scott-Luigi Plan: 1) The FDIC should announce that its guarantees of short term debt set to expire in October will not be renewed. Insolvent banks, defined not by stress tests but as those that cannot fund themselves in the private market, will be taken over by the FDIC under aclear and credible action plan. 2) The FDIC lacks the resources to run several large and complex banks which may become insolvent. And waving the idea of nationalization the creditors may try to get the government to bail them out. The authors of this plan say the FDIC should solit each bank into a "bad bank" and a "good bank." The "bad bank" would carry all the residential and commercial real estate loans and securitized mortgages as assets, and all the long term debt as liabilities. THe "bad bank" would obtain along term laon from the good bank to fund the assets of the bad bank. Al the remaining assets including the derivative contracts and the loan to the bad bank would be assets of the good bank. It would also have all the insured deposits and the FDIC guaranteed short term debt as liabilities. With the split accomplished the good bank can be released from FDIC receivership. 3) The long term debt holders would be compensated by receiving all the equity of the good bank. The old shareholders would get the equity in the bad bank. And in any restructuring bondholders should do better than equity holders. If banks are not really insolvent as some say and just facing temporary dislocations, then the bad bank will eventually surge in value, and the equity holders will do alright, and if not they will receive nothing as they should. 4) For this to work legislation needs to take effect before October for FDIC procedures for handling failed banks to be also applicable to bank holding companies. And this new legislation puts no new cost on the taxpayer....

LyrArc Article Gist
Five rules the editors of the WSJ say should be followed when working on cleaning up the banking system. A clear no, as Krugman and other experts point out is for the government to make the rather imprudent move to take on all the debts of the banks as in Ireland. A second rule is not to underestimate the size of the problem and delay action till the problem gets much worse, when its harder to deal with. ECB president, Mario Draghi, pointed out the problem at Spain's handling of Bankia bank as a clear example, telling the European parliament recently: "There is a first assessment, then a second, a third, a fourth. This is the worst possible wayof doing things. Everyone ends up doing the right thing, but at the highest cost." A third rule is to set clear rules about banks, who gets rescued and who gets closed and why- so that its not left upto the discretion of officials. On this rule Spain's outgoing Zapatero administration gets good marks from WSJ for settting clear rules to the cajas svings banks. A fourth rule applicable to Europe is to first setup the expertise and conditions for a European banking regulator before setting up a banking union and direct injection of funds by the EFSF into banks of individual countries. A fifth rule is to avoid creating even larger mega banks by consolidating failing banks with large banks, and continuing the government's implicit guarantee of the bank because it is "too big to fail" and creates systemic risk- this is the situation after action by the U.S. Federal Reserve, regulators and the U.S. Treasury....

LyrArc Article Gist
Fears that the European banking sector is very weak and not enough has been done to fix the problems. KBC bank of Belgium has receivbed $41.5 billion in 3 separate rounds of government help. For abank with total assets of $425 billion this exceeds the bailout of the Royal Bank of Scotland. Moody's has issued awarning about credit risks at 30 Spanish banks and lowered its ratings of the Greek banking sector. Nonperforming loans at Russian banks compose 10% of the average bank's books and could rise to 25% by endo of 2009. Sweden has big problems for banks that laoned to the Baltic countries. A European bank analyst at Standard and Poors estimates a doubling in writeoffs for European banks in 2010.

LyrArc Article Gist
George Will describes the views of Richard Fisher, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas on "too-big-to-fail" risks in the U.S. banking system.

LyrArc Article Gist
Wessel summarizes the existing thinking of the administration and its critics on ways to prevent the next banking crisis. The Shultz-Mervyn King School which says breakup the largest banks into smaller banks so they are not too big to fail. The Volcker school which says separate utility banking from thre risk taking banking of the trading desks of investment banks. And the Geithner-Frank school of avoiding these tough choices in the face of intense lobbying by the banks by glossing over the problem, their latest proposal suggesting that Treasury collect the bill of abank bailout from the remaining weakened banks in afinancial crisis of the future. But the Geithner -Frank solution still has Treasury, meaning the government footing the bill, as collecting the bailout from remaining banks that are weak in such a financial crisis may not be feasible. and it would further worsen the government's finances, raising questions about these proposals which may amount to doing a little better than nothing. In effect avoiding the tough choices of breaking up the larger banks or separating utility banking from trading desks of investment banks....

LyrArc Article Gist
Similiarities with Japan are in the exploding monetary base growth by the Fed, just as bank lending is dropping. And as in post bubble Japan of the 1990's, all of the behaviour says Wood invites legitimate comparisons with Japan. The government has lent, spent or guaranteed about $11 trillion to the financial sector broadly defined, because of letting financial institutions remain "too big to fail," whether Fannie Mae, AIG or Citigroup. None of them have been broken up. And this is similiar to the lack of bank cleanup in Japan with regulatory forbearance for years after the bubble. He thinks there is evidence that America is already in a Japanese style "liquidity trap."

LyrArc Article Gist
The Fed gets tougher on "too big to fail" but how tough? Does it have the guts to go after this problem asks Peter Eavis. If he does Bernake would go down in history as a hero says Eavis. Meanwhile Fed Governor Tarullo clearly point to the utterly inconceivable fact that after a crisis of these proportions with large banks being bailed out, the remaining banks and financial institutions are larger than before the crisis. And the banking lobby has stalled regulation to control the problems in derivatives trading and other areas. Splitting up or downsizing the banks and separating their social function as deposit takers in the economy from their trading desks and investment activity, is being advocated by central bankers from Volcker to Mervyn King. See links.

LyrArc Article Gist
Prof. Cochrane of the University of Chicago goes over the Federal Reserve's new "Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation Requirements" for big banks. He finds serious shortcomings in the Fed's proposals to regulate the largest banks. He points to the proposal that puts less than one dollar at risk for every 10 borrowed dollars as ridiculously low, and says the Fed is admitting it really does not know how to correctly measure and regulate credit exposure in today's banking system. The Fed's remediation requirements are basically ways to get regulators to take action early with "triggers," because regulators were slow to act in the last crisis. This is down to regulating the Fed, not the banks. As stated in recent editorials in the Journal, and supported by Daniel Tarullo at the Fed, the best way to protect the financial system is in having capital reserve requirements that are high enough and reliable enough for a crisis.

LyrArc Article Gist
A worldwide trend to shorter term borrowing means that institutions and sovereign governments will compete in the capital markets, as they try to roll over existing borrowing by 2012. The US has $1.3 trillion to roll over by 2012. Worldwide about $5 trillion has to be rolled over, and of this $2.6 trillion is in Europe. With the European financial crisis which started in Greece it is becoming harder for sovereign governments to borrow in capital markets at favorable rates. A former economist of the Bank of England says this is of the highest importance for lending and for growth. The implications are reduced lending by banks to businesses and consumers, reducing output and growth, and limiting reductions in unemployment. It is a big issue say analysts, as debt needs to be rolled over over shorter periods. Moody's study shows new bond issues by banks during the last 5 years matured at an average 4.7 years. The stress say experts is likely to be on the less healthy banks like the savings banks in Spain, Landesbanks in Germany. Stress tests on European banks will be out July 23, 2010....

LyrArc Article Gist
Banking regulation in the U.S. after the Dodd-Frank legislation differs from banking regulation rules proposed by the Independent Commission on Banking in Britain. Britain has a much bigger financial sector relative to the size of its economy than the U.S., posing larger systemic risks. The commission in Britain is proposing structural changes that would separate investment banking from deposit taking at banks. Banks would have separate balance sheets for these two activities- and operate them as separate subsidiaries- even though they are part of one holding company. This means it would be harder to raise money cheaply for risktaking in investment banking. Under the Volcker Rule in the U.S., banks investment banking and deposit taking would not be separated in a structural separation- there would still be one balance sheet- only banks ability to trade with their own capital and run hedge funds would be constrained. Some banks have spun off trading operations in the U.S. and the the rules banks have to follow have not been clearly defined. Too big to fail is still a problem under current American regulation, though its effects are mitigated to some extent. As one expert puts it, its hard to regulate the banks because too much money is involved and the banks have the money and the lawyers to prevent or dilute new rules. The argument made by the banks in Britain is that universal international banking provides a public benefit and efficiencies. But John Vickers, the former chief economist of the Bank of England, and chairman of the Independent Commission on Banking, has a different view. He said recently, "it seems quite hard to identify and quantify real efficiencies as distinct from purely private gains."...

LyrArc Article Gist
Guerrera describes the vital role that FDIC chairman Gruenberg's plan for unwinding failing financial institutions will play in tackling the "too-big-to-fail" problem facing the U.S. He points to the increasing importance of this after the failure of risk management systems at JP Morgan Chase bank.

LyrArc Article Gist
Its now known that some of the money that the government used to bailout AIG is going to Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs, so that they can pay the hedge funds to whome they sold credit default swaps. The way it works is this. Hedge funds bet against the housing market that if mortgage defaults reach a certain level they would be paid a large amount. To do this they buy credit default swaps from banks like Deutsche Bank and Goldman. In turn Deutsch and Goldman go out and hedge the risks of selling these credit default swaps. Its hard to find someone to sell this insurance, but AIG becomes the dominant insurer for these credit default swaps. What does AIG get out of this. Only fractions of apenny for every dollar of insurance sold to the banks, less than $10 million for $1 billion of insurance. These swaps were sold in 2005, when some of these hedge funds saw risks in the housing markets excesses, and they were making the bets for an event that was a very plausible one, with very little risk to themselves. And the banks were passing on a lot of the risk for insurance on the cheap to AIG, which ends being the sucker holding a big part of the risk. What did have to gain from this, and why it agreed to sell this insurance is a mystery. Its this insurance that has caused AIG its biggest headache, to have to set aside money to pay the banks who in turn pay the hedge funds. When these pools of mortgage assets of companies like Countrywide Financial, which were created by Deutsche Bank and Goldman, called by names such as 'START' and 'ABACUS', went down in value AIG has to set aside money to pay the banks. As these assets fall in value from mid September to December 2008, AIG and by this the government which now owns 80% of AIG, paid $5.4 billion to Deutsche and $8.1 billion to Goldman under credit default swap contracts AIG has written. This adds up to $52 billion paid to all the banks that bought insurance for credit default swaps they sold and covered with AIG insurance. And this is a large part of the $170 billion of government money to AIG. Its for this kind of financial wizardry that makes little sense, and showed no sense of responsibility for the firm, that the Financial Products Group's 370 employees are to be rewarded with $400 million in bonuses, with binding contracts as reported in the Washington Post. The $165 million so widely reported in bonuses sent out recently, are only a part of the $400 million. While this is going on its surreal that on the other side Michigan is hurting , auto states in the midwest are hurting badly. And $17 billion barely makes it through in time to keep GM and Chrysler running in December 2008, and the money can be called in by the government in February 2009 leading to these companies ending up in bankruptcy. This puts the situation in new perspective, and Rattner who heads the group looking at the GM restructuring must be aware of this, when he said bankruptcy is not necessarily the best option and the loans would not be called in by the government. Its job losses in the economy, and the fragile nature of the economic outlook, and also the way in which money is being scandalously wasted in other places like AIG with no purpose, that Rattner must have in the back of his mind as he looks at money for GM restructuring and jobs for hurting workers. ...

LyrArc Article Gist
The New York Times reports from the comments of current and former members of the Chase Chief Investment Office (CIO), that risk officers at Chase were ignored when they raised issues about the complex trades made by trader Iksil. Iksil's trades had the support of his manager Mr. Macris, and Ms. Drew who was in charge of CIO. The comments also indicate that at one point Mr. Macris brought in a Risk Officer with whom he had worked closely for many years. Risk Officers are supposed to be independent and their concerns seriously heard, with the authority to halt trades that pose excessive risks. Which made this kind of cozy behaviour in the CIO trading offices in London cause for alarm. These reports also say Mr. Braunstein, the new CFO at JP Morgan Chase, did not strengthen controls after he assumed office in 2010. Bank officials disputed this. The New York offices did not fully grasp the complex trades being made in the CIO London offices, and upper management let the CIO operate pretty much on its own, especially with CEO Jamie Dimon's confidence in Ms. Drew's management of the CIO. This led to another gap in the process of risk management. Dimon had other priorities and distractions, from problem mortgages coming with the acquisition of Washington Mutual, pushing back aginst financial regulation after the 2008 crisis, stress tests and others. At the same time the U.S. Federal Reserve, regulators, and Treasury's coordinated effort to merge failing banks with other larger banks- because of the lack of the process of unwinding failed banks provided later under Dodd-Frank legislation- created mega financial banks. Unlike what the U.S. under Treasury Secretary Rubin pushed for in the case of S. Korea during a banking crisis in 1997, Treasury under Geithner and Fed officials did not push for unwinding of failed financial institutions such as Countrywide and Washington Mutual in 2008-2009 Chase's own portfolio of assets under the CIO, increased by an astounding amount from $76 billion in 2007 to $356 billion in 2011. Even if Ms Drew had managed CIO well before, managing a portfolio of this size is most likely to have presented a whole set of new challenges and problems for which the CIO office was not prepared. Similiar concerns were raised by other Fed officials such as Fed governors, Hoenig and Fisher, who raised the issue that such mega-banks posed unacceptable risks and were too big to manage. Pressures to increase investing profits, growing complacency, relaxing risk management controls, led to the situation where a single trader Mr. Iksil, who had only joined the bank in 2007 according to other reports, could create large losses. This follows a situation at UBSin 2011, where a novice trader made bets that resulted in large losses....

LyrArc Article Gist
In its May 2011 special report on international banking the Economist points out the need for banking regulators to take stronger action than they have so far. What it calls "pre-emptive insurance" it says is needed - stronger regulation, larger capital cushions, and some form of separation of different kinds of banking. Without this the dangers of excessive risk taking and banks that are "too big to fail" will continue to threaten the world's economy. Banks that are smaller and better capitalized says the Economist can fail more gracefully than the large mega banks that exist at this time. In fact the banks today in the U.S. are larger than at the time of the 2008 crisis. Other analysts also point to the lack of major changes in banking and financial structures today compared to the situation before the 2008 crisis, both in Europe and the U.S.