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Spain provides 14 public holidays that are mostly Catholic holidays, and an additional 22 vacation days, which is similiar to the the EU average. Unlike the practice in the U.S. and Britain to have these holidays fall mostly on Fridays and Mondays, in Spain many of these holidays fall in the middle of the week. This disrupts productivity as Spaniards use bridge days or puentes to create long weekends during which many offices and factories are empty, disrupting productivity. Most companies cannot plan for meetings and work because counterparts may be using the bridge days during these holidays, and working with international clients is difficult and hard to explain. Spain's new prime minister is determined to increase Spain's competitiveness, and bring Spain to the level of competitiveness of countries that do well in this measure, including other European and Asian economies. He describes this in his book "En confianza. Mi vida y mi proyecto de cambio para Espana." ("In confidence. My life and project of change for Spain") In his inauguration address he said Spain should correct "the work calendar to make the rights of workers compatible with the competitiveness of our companies." Vacations are a sensitive issue in Spain because tourism generates 10% of GDP and employs 10% of the workers. Alberto Nadal, who addresses labor issues at the main business association in Spain, says a change of mentality is needed in Spain, and doing away with bridges shows Spain is grasping the idea that things should be done differently for the eurozone community of nations. This also shows some of the differences in the Iberian peninsula countries of Spain and Portugal, where the countries are embracing the change and there is less unrest even with high unemployment, as compared to Greece. In Greece the changes are being resisted by politically connected groups, where political parties enjoy little support and there is much unrest, making the project difficult. Mariana Rajoy, Sarkozy and Merkel are from centre right parties in Spain, France and Germany, and have had a close association for years before Rajoy was elected- during EU meetings of centre right parties, as is evident in Rajoy's book. They also share a similiar business and political orientation. ...

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Malaysia's debt to GDP ratio increased to 242% in mid-2012 from 192% in 2008 according to McKinsey. As export growth has slowed the Malaysian government is relying on credit expansion to consumers and large capital projects such as the planned subway project in Kuala Lumpur to sustain growth. Similiar credit expansion is seen in other Asian countries- Thailand, Vietnam, Singapore, Hong Kong. The period 2008 to 2013 has seen a rapid acceleration in credit expansion in these countries and especially in China. China's debt to GDP ratio increased to 183% in mid 2012 from 153% in 2008, according to McKinsey. Nomura Holding's economist Zhiwei Zhang, and other economists say it is above 200% when government data on "shadow banking" lending institutions such as trust companies is included. IMF economist Giovanni Dell'Ariccia has studied of debt expansion and credit booms since the 1970's. He and other economists at the IMF have found that credit booms- the rapid increase in credit to GDP ratios- end up in crises one third of the time, result in below par growth in another third of the time, and only in one third of the time does growth continue at the high pace. Alex Frangos talks to government officials in Kuala Lumpur who do not take seriously the high vacancy rate for office buildings in the capital of about 20% even as new office towers are being built. Bob Davis gives the example of government owned Hunan Expressway company in China which has a huge road building program and doubled its 2009 debt levels. Another state owned company in shipping China Cosco Holdings increased total debt from 85 billion yuan in 2009 to 123 billion yuan in 2012. As export growth slowed in China in 2009 credit expansion is driving growth. The normal restraints of the market are absent in China's state owned companies. Charlene Chu, senior director of Fitch Ratings Inc in Beijing, says 2012 demonstrated that the Chinese government cannot slow credit growth without risking a decline in growth. China's GDP growth in the 1st quarter of 2013 slowed to 7.7% from 7.9% in the 4th quarter of 2012. This poses a serious problem for China. China has never experienced the kinds of problems seen in Asia after the 1997 banking crisis, in the eurozone today, and in the U.S. following the financial crisis of 2008, making government officials prone to complacency about the risks....

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The warning light is again on for Greece in the beginning of 2012, as the rapidly deteriorating economy makes a 50% loss by private creditors insufficient to help it meet repayment or refinancing of bonds coming due in 2012. Additional funds will be needed from EU countries unwilling to do this. 14.5 billion euros in Greek bonds come due on March 20, 2012. Greece also faces a public increasingly resistant to austerity cuts. A vountary exchage of existing Greek bonds by private creditors for new bonds at 50% face value and maturing over a longer period will be done under English law. This will be harder to change in the future. Most of the existing bonds were issued under Greek law which can be altered by Greece's parliament.

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The approach of the new Jinping-Keqiang administration to tackle the problem of surging credit growth, with poor quality lending in China's shadow banking system leading to problems of hidden debt and unknown quantity of loans in default. The central bank tightens credit in June 2013 sending a signal to lenders including small and medium sized banks and Trust companies in the shadow banking system that the government will let them default- that they are essentally on their own if they do not follow prudent financial practices.

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After the debt swap of old bonds for new bonds with private bondholders for an estimated 53% haircut, the IMF's March 2012 report on Greece says a lot remains unresolved. It predicts a "disorderly exit from the euro" without further help. The April 2012 elections may result in a dilution to committments to austerity policies in Greece, as these policies are highly unpopular in Greece. Greece is still "accident-prone." And competitiveness issues may take over a decade to resolve.

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The London based think tank Open Europe says the exposure from Greece puts the ECB's balance sheet at risk. A small 4.25% drop in the value of the ECB's asset holdings could wipe out the whole capital base of the ECB, according to Open Europe. The ECB holds at present 75 billion euros of Portuguese, Greek and Irish bonds on its balance sheet. In the last 12 months the ECB has increased its capital base to 10 billion euros. The decision to buy Spanish and Italian bonds increases the risk. The ECB loses money if the borrowing bank goes bankrupt or the collateral of the borrowing bank loses value. During the negotiations for the eurozone debt deal in July 2011, the ECB obtained guarantees from eurozone governments for the collateral it holds from Greece. This increases the need for the European Financial Stability Facility to take on the role of buying bonds of troubled eurozone countries.

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Independent audit by the consulting firm Oliver Wyman of 14 Spanish banks.

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Efforts by BNP Paribas to get bondholders to take a 50% loss on Greek bonds, and exchange their old bonds for new ones that mature in 50 years. BNP Paribas is working for the Greek government to get other banks and bondholders to accept this exchange so that Greece can tackle its debt load and interest payments on debt. Some arm twisting by BNP Paribas to get bondholders who have insurance through CDS to accept the exchange. This is being done on the grounds that the I.S.D.A. committe would declare the restructuring in Greece as being "voluntary" and not a default, so that bondholders who do not accept this deal would not get paid through CDS insurance.

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Germany benefits from the lower value of the euro in relation to other currencies. Germany's exports to the eurozone as a percentage of all exports increased from 38.4% in 2009 to 41.7% in 2011, according to the Germany Federal Statistical Office and the German Chambers of Industry and Commerce. Exports to China increased from 4.64% to 6.11%, and to Asia from 11.8% to 13.73%, and to the U.S. from 6.77% to 6.95%. This increases the gap between Germany and other eurozone countries with smaller exports. Ireland with its large export base and foreign investment is likely to benefit from the lower euro. German companies VW, BMW, Mercedes, Heidelberg Cement and EADS also benefit from the weaker euro. France's Peugeot with sales concentrated in Europe does not benefit from the weaker euro compared to German auto companies with higher sales overseas, especially in China.

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Eurozone finance ministers meeting in Brussels give Spain one more year to meet deficit targets because of a slumping economy and lower tax receipts after raising taxes. Spain now has till 2014 instead of 2013 to meet the EU's 3% deficit target. Spain can now run a deficit of 6.3% in 2012, down from 8.9% in 2011, without risking EU penalties. The 2013 deficit target is 4.5% of GDP and the 2014 target is 2.8%. Spain can also have $30 billion by the end of July in the event that a Spanish bank needs to be recapitalized quickly.

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The IMF's managing director, Christine Lagarde, pointed to the urgent need to recapitalize European banks in September 2011. European banks face potential losses of 120 billion euros for Belgium, Spain and Italy, 60 billion euros for Greece, 20 billion euros for Ireland and Portugal, and 100 billion euros for other banking exposure, for a total of 300 billion euros, according to the International Monetary Fund. In the absence of recapitalization there could be further damage to EU economies from restricted lending by banks. IMF estimates show that deteriorating credit conditions could damage growth in the eurozone countries by 3.5 percentage points, and in the U.S. by 2.2 percentage points, creating another recession.

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Julie Creswell and Graham Bowley look at the history of setting ratings for Greece at Moody's credit rating agency. Greece always had a history of problems with its credit standing including two defaults in its history. In 2004 Greece admitted to providing false statistics to enter the eurozone, saying that it had run deficits for each year since 1997. Before joining the eurozone Greece was assessed an interest rate of 15% on Greek bonds, after joining the eurozone borrowing rates dropped to 5%. Was such a large differential justified purely on the basis of the assumption that the eurozone would back Greece. Moody's held onto its A rating on Greek debt right upto December 2009, two years before the country faced certain default. Pierre Cailletau, Moody's head of sovereign debt ratings till the spring of 2010 admits that Moody's assessment was "mediocre" and that this is a very, very steep fall to see in a ratings- something had gone very, very wrong. The ratings agencies say bankers were selling the idea that the Greek growth story was real. This suggests bankers did not read Greece's financial history of defaults, did not understand the lessons of the recurring Latin American debt crises that countries such as Argentina could only absorb capital upto the point of productive capabilities. And the euro currency founders had left a weak gap - the perception through an implied guarantee that the whole eurozone would ante up the money for the failings of individual countries- into which bankers and Greece's political class rushed in. ...

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Italy's prime minister, Mario Monti put it best when he said in a speech in Brussels in April 2012: "If a country becomes more productive and competitive, but there is no demand for its products domestically or around it, growth will not materialize." There is a new shift in opinion towards a balance of fiscal discipline with growth measures to get Europe back on track. The feeling in different parts of Europe is that the German view of austerity alone will not work for Europe. And the view is coming from the far right to the far left, from Marie Le Pen, far right presidential candidate in France, to the far right leader whose move to withdraw support to the government in Netherlands on the issue of austerity measures led to its collapse. Geert Wilders, leader of the Freedom Party in the Netherlands, said: "we don't want our pensioners to bleed just to meet the dictates from Brussels." The IMF has put out research that questions what is now called "the German hypothesis." The "German hypothesis," is based on the unique experience of Germany with the Hartz reforms under chancellor Schroeder which were based on wage restraint by workers, the German "kurzarbeit" program of government support for retaining workers with lower pay during cyclical downturns, improving competitiveness of German companies, and conservative budget practices. There appear to be two exceptions to this. One is that demand has to be strong outside or domestically for a country to reduce unemployment and improve productive capacity utlilization as it increases competitiveness. This was the case as Germany made the Hartz reforms under Schroeder. Wage restraint acts as a form of devaluing currency for reducing the cost of its products to improve exports. All leading parties and the unions are now in favor of wage restraint and lowering wages to preserve jobs to improve France's competitive position. Germany had the benefit of a decade to implement these reforms to reduce unemployment, because demand was not declining domestically or around it during its reforms. The situation is different in Spain where in all likelihood demand would shrink further with unemployment rising from 25% to higher levels, and higher sales taxes. This is why Francois Heisbourg, special advisor at the Paris based Foundation for Strategic Research, says about the current situation in Europe, that destroyiing Greece with strict austerity alone wasn't something the EU can look back at with the sense of having done the right thing, for Spain it appears misguided and lacking careful thought. The editors of the Wall Street Journal expressed the same sense when they described the March 2012 bailout of Greece as a tragic sideshow, because the main purpose was to buy time and insulate the other larger economies in the EU by giving the French, Spanish and German banks time to improve their financial position. The Journal called it bad for Greece leaving it with debt at 120% of GDP till 2020 and no economic growth, and bad for democracy as it was done against overwhelming Greek public opinion- The Tragic Greek Sideshow, Feb. 22, 2012. Volker Perthes, director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, a Berlin think tank, says the Germans have always viewed German leadership in Europe with discomfort, and would prefer a leadership where several states, France, Italy, Spain, and other countries in the EU coalesce around consensus positions. This is historically true for the German position since chancellor Adenauer. With the Free Democrats in decline, and the Social Democrats and the Pirate party doing well in recent German elections and favoring consensus in Europe, Merkel's Christian Democrats need to rethink their policy to give greater weight to economic growth for a consensus position in Europe. ...

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The terms of the debt restructuring deal with the bond swap in Greece become clear on March 9, 2012. In the deal with private bondholders -using collective action clauses to force remaining bondholders into the deal- about 96% of the 206 billion euros of Greece's bonds will be exchanged. Private bondholders held out throughout most of 2011, delaying the inevitable as Greece's economic situation became increasingly hopeless. This created a logjam with the German government, which insisted on serious private sector participation and bondholder haircut as the cost of poor lending decisions of the French, German and other European banks that made loans to Greece out of proportion of the ability of Greece to payback loans. Charles Dallara of the Institute of International Finance, negotiating for European banks, offered a 10% average loss on the bonds in July 2009. It was not until German Chancellor Merkel told Dallara at a late night meeting on October 27, 2011: "this is my last offer," for a 50% loss on the face value of the bonds, was agreement reached. The Greek debt swap that now takes place will give private bondholders a loss of 53.5% from the face value of 200 billion euros of bonds that they hold. The new Greek bonds issued in place of the old bonds include short-term bonds issued by the eurozone rescue fund at 15% of the face value of the old bonds, and a series of Greek bonds with maturity ranging from 11-30 years valued at 31.5% of the face value of old bonds. That even this 53.5% bondholder loss will not be adequate, as Greece's economy looks irretrievably damaged as it spirals downwards, is shown by the value of these bonds already trading in a hypothetical "gray market." The new 30 year bond is quoted at 17 cents and the 11 year bond at 22 cents. The questions remain about the stalling by the banks in taking the losses earlier- was this the wisest move considering the losses beyond Greece as the eurozone economy as a whole has suffered from the prolonged negotiations stretching through 2011, lurching from one crisis to the next? Even if the stalling was designed to give time for banks to repair their balance sheets, was this the best strategy, considering the damage inflicted on European economic growth. John Taylor of Stanford points out that the European banks delayed the unavoidable serious debt restructuring for too long, when insolvency was the real issue not illiquidity, and exaggerated the effect of contagion from the beginning- in John Taylor, WSJ, 2/22/2012, A Better Grecian Bailout. And John Cochrane of the University of Chicago, points out that French and German governments if they bailout French and German banks should do so openly and frankly rather than cover this up as bailouts of countries, because this would lead to serious questions about the poor lending decisions of the European banks and government supervision of the banks- in Cochrane, WSJ, 12/2/2010, 'Contagion' and other Euro Myths. As early as Feb. 2010, Cochrane was suggesting the forced exchange of new bonds with long debt maturities for exisiting bonds with short debt maturities, as short term debt was the major issue here. ...