The Economist points out that China's total debt of government, corporate and households has grown by about 100% of GDP since 2008. The 2009 crisis led to rapid increase in debt. It is now about 250% of GDP, according to the Economist. Slower growth of below 7% risks reducing China's ability to service this debt. About half of this debt is owed by state owned companies and property developers. China can use its sovereign reserves to continue supporting bank and state owned companies. Investor's are pricing bank shares to reflect about 10% of this debt as bad debt even though government estimates are much lower. The reserves provided China time to fix the banking system since 2008, yet the debt keeps growing and China has failed to take strong action in the last 6 years. Complacency is a problem, and the incentives for local governments to continue prior practices that increase debt continue. As Krugman and other experts have pointed out at some point the rules of finance will apply to China as they have for other countries that faced a debt crisis- Japan in the late 1980's, South Korea and other Aisan countries in 1997, and the U.S. in 2008. Even without a crisis through deft managemen and use of reserves China risks zombifying the economy as old loans are backed up by new loans, with the further risk of misallocation of capital or poor use of capital. This lowers productivity of capital and hurts development. With poor statistics such as the figure of 1% of debt being bad debt cited here, the problems of complacency can be magnified, as there is less reason for a strong response....
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