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Richard Portes of the London Business School provides two good reasons why the EU's decision to adopt the French Banking Federation's proposal for rollovers with 10% interest costs is a serious mistake. It doubles the interest costs from 4-6% to 10% with 2% Greek GDP growth and makes debt servicing untenable. Portes says the real Brady Plan from the 1980's included a 35-40% bondholders haircut. Deals of this type have a precedent- in Mexico in 1988 and in Argentina in 2001 such bond exchanges were soon followed by deals that placed bondholder haricuts on creditors. The lesson from Latin America in the 1980's, says Portes, is that the burdens of servicing a debt of such proportions under onerous conditions only extinguishes the enterprise, investment and productive capabilities of the particular country trying to service that debt, making the debt even less serviceable. See the Wall Street Journal's editorial on this deal which it calls "The French Deception." The terms sound like Greek to the editors leaving a sense that French banks are only saying "gimme." The only benefit achieved may be putting off the problem and avoiding contagion to Portugal and Spain. Yet this is not that much of a benefit when one realizes that the problem has not gone away, and is likely to look much worse six or nine months from now....

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Hugo Dixon says the deal made by eurozone leaders for Greece in July 2011 favors private creditors. The bondholder haircut was much smaller, eurozone governments and taxpayers will make up the difference. This he says is like a cat in the bag presented to the receiver as a pig as long as he does not look inside, called a "poke." Dixon says that if Greece cannot implement austerity measures under a new government and the deal has to be renegotiated bondholders may face a larger haircut than the 20% under the current arrangement. It would have been better he says to do this now but the ECB's threats may have led to the German and French governments treating private creditors with kids gloves.

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This editorial deserves an award for best editorial on international economic matters in 2011. The editorial, goes right to the point, when it says the French, the Germans, and the European Central Bank are deluding themselves if they call this weeks resolution of the Greece debt crisis a realistic solution. It is anything but a solution. The Journal calls it a French deception. It is unworkable because the main problem, the high ratio of Greek debt to GDP -which is now 155% and is expected to reach 170% by the end of 2011- is sure to get worse under the arrrangement designed in the interest of French and German banks. Under the arrangement French and German banks and other creditors will get to double their return from 4-5% today to an effective interest rate of 10% if Greece grows by 2% a year, on 49% of the bonds they hold. These bonds will be converted into 30 year bonds. This effectively doubles the interest cost for Greece in servicing this debt. On the other approximately 51% of the bonds the French and German banks would redeem the bonds for cash and a triple A, sovereign zero coupon bond. The Journal asks what is the point of making Greece's debt problem worse than it is now and calling it a solution. The austerity cuts are already expected to lead to a deep recession, something that is also happening in Portugal, leading to a worsening of the debt situation. Creditors are not sharing in the losses under this arrangement, as Germany and the Netherlands have insisted. As the Journal points out they are instead taking out half of their investment and doubling their return on the remainder. And the fears of contagion for Spain are not lessened, as financial markets can clearly see through this for what it is- unworkable and unrealistic. ...

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Failure by EU leaders to take early and decisive action to reduce Greece's debt to sustainable levels in 2009. This was when the IMF report by Dutchman Bob Traa blew the cover off the Greek coverup of deteriorated finances. Policy missteps included ECB president Trichet and other EU leaders pushing austerity measures and not taking needed tough action on reducing the debt. By November 2011 a 50% reduction in debt with bondholders taking the losses is not enough to correct the situation. Greece's debt is discounted by 70% by Nov 2011. Analysts estimate an 85% reduction in Greek debt being necessary for Greece to pull through without a default.

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In an interview with the Wall Street Journal Deutschland, Hans Werner Sinn, head of the Ifo Institute in Germany, says Greece's bondholders are overly exaggerating the effects on the eurozone of an exit by Greece. He sees it in the best interests of Greece to improve its competitiveness and return to growth by going back to the drachma. Just to get to the level of Turkey Greece would need to reduce prices by 31%, which is impossible to do within the eurozone without risking a complete breakdown in civil order. The best way to use the 130 billion euro second bailout package is to use it to recapitalize its banking system, says Sinn. Sinn says Portugal's faces the risk of a debt crisis following the crisis in Greece.

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John Taylor looks one step ahead of the March 2012 Greece bailout and sets up the most plausible scenario for the future. He says the risks of contagion were always exaggerated from the beginning- a planned default or restructuring of debt such as happened in Argentina in 2001, does not have the contagion risks associated with a chaotic and unplanned default as in Russia in 1998. Predicability in policy makes a huge difference, says Taylor. The European banks which stood to lose from writedowns exaggerated the fears of contagion- a process that always occurs for people who are adversely affected by writedowns- resulting in top officials in the European Union delaying the unavoidable serious restructuring. It was not until Chancellor Merkel handed Charles Dallara, who negotiated for the European banks, a note stating a demand for 50% bondholder writedown, on October 27, 2011, at EU headquarters in Brussels, did any serious writedown of debt begin. Merkel told Dallara: "this is my last offer." The July 2011 summit by contrast had only a 10% bondholder writedown in the agreement, when insolvency not illiquidity was the real issue. Walker Forelle and Meichtry, give a detailed account of what happened in the Wall Street Journal, Dec. 30, 2011. The important thing for Greece, says Taylor, is for what the IMF calls "growth enhancing structural reforms" - greater reliance on private markets, incentives, rule of law. He says this bailout won't work because IMF growth forecasts do not reflect the rapid shrinking of the Greek economy. Antonis Samaras, leader of the major opposition party, is in favor of pro-growth measures and has stated his desire to change the agreement. The 130 billion euro bailout provides 90 billion euros for recapitalizing Greece's banks, and financing the budget. This puts Greece in a situation where the political leaders win voter support by discarding the conditions from the Northern EU nations and come with a plan that is better suited for Greece. The EU in this scenario would cut off further bailout funds to Greece. Taylor sees this as the better outcome for Greece than the current situation, which leaves Greece no hope for growth, and also for the EU by getting out of bailouts that have little prospect of working. It would be difficult but doable for Greece says Taylor, because interest payments would be low and Greek banks would be recapitalized after the current March 2012 bailout. ...

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The IMF's changing views on the value of fiscal austerity. In the current debate about the value of fiscal austerity, there is the IMF view, a German view based on its own experience, and the views of other countries in Europe. The IMF's view has shifted over time. The IMF World Economic Outlook 2010, describes its view of the effects of austerity measures in the form of spending cuts and tax increases- "Fiscal consolidation typically has a contractionary effect on output. A fiscal consolidation equal to 1% of GDP typically reduces GDP by about 0.5% within 2 years and raises the unemployment rate by about 0.3% percentage points." Over the longer term there are benefits as the private sector is not crowded out in the search for captal funding by the excessive government borrowing. The IMF's economic models suggest that it would take 5 years before reaching the breakeven point when the benefits of austerity measures exceed the effects of austerity. The German view held by German central bankers is that the actions stimulate growth in the short term. Manfred Neumann, professor emeritus at the Institute for Economic Policy at the University of Bonn, says this is called the "German hypothesis" as it reflects the experience of Germany from austerity actions taken by Germany. Laurence Ball, professor of Economics at John Hopkins University, is critical of the "German hypothesis" and its application across Europe in different situations. Germany is a large exporting nation and exports helped counterbalance the effects of austerity measures. Within the eurozone with fixed exchange rates the exports of less competitive countries cannot be boosted through devaluing the currency to gain price competitiveness. The other problem is that with interest rates close to zero in the euro zone the central banks cannot cut rates aggressively to counteract the effects of spending cuts. The problem gets compounded when a number of countries are taking austerity measures at the same time accentuating the downturn....

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Prof. Gorton and Prof. Metrick of the Yale School of Management review 16 scholarly studies and papers on the causes of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis in the current isue of the Journal of Economic Literature. Another article in the same journal reviews 21 books on the subject. Samuelson says the most cited causes- lax regulation and passive regulators, and the policy of home ownership that encourage the packaging and of securitization of mortgages to government sponsored agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac- are only the surface causes. If we are to explain how a whole society seemed to believe in the idea that somehow there was a way to maintain a rising tide continuously, with only small corrections over several decades, by the clever manipulation of monetary and fiscal policies; then one has to look to the hubris of economists who acted as if this was possible and the gullibility of business and a public that desperately wanted to believe as some have put it "that this time it was different," or that shrewd management of economic policy could actually bring about such a panacea. The abiding lesson is economic policies based on a better understanding of how modern industrial economies work are merely useful tools, no more no less, and there is no substitute for a good ethic, wise management and careful thinking on the part of the public, business and government, particularly for the people in leadership positions. ...

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Cochrane says the best option today is for Europe to accept a sovereign default for Greece. He says the European Central Bank which stands behind the euro, should not be used for buying bonds of troubled countries with shaky "collateral." This would only lead to a situation where EU countries would have to recapitalize the ECB. He emphasizes the fact that Greece will not pay back this debt. And the only way out is to have a situation similiar to Argentina where it needs to start over, and it would at some point be able to borrow again. Austerity is deeply unpopular in Greece and with higher unemployment Greece's financial situation is rapidly deteriorating. Making austerity something that was tried to buy time but will not work. Cochrane also makes the point that the euro itself acts like the euro bonds that EU countries are reluctant to support, it means the ECB backs the currency and supports it- which makes it vital to keep the ECB whole and prevent the dilution of its financial strength. Axel Weber, former head of the Bundesbank, resigned to express his opposition to the ECB buying the bonds of troubled eurozone countries, which he said was outside the ECB's mandate to conduct monetary policy....