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With Brexit some of the banking community in London is expected to move to Frankfurt, the financial capital of Germany, and the location of the ECB. This article describes the attractions of Frankfurt, as compared to Cologne and Munich, other cities which attract more visitors. It is lower cost, with shorter distances within the city, a large community of foreigners of about one in three people that gives it international appeal, and easy access to the mountains for biking and hiking.

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Socialist candidate for president in France's runoff elections, Francois Hollande, says he will ask that the fiscal compact treaty completed in Dec. 2012 be renegotiated to include measures that promote growth in the eurozone. He praised ECB chairman, Mario Draghi's comments that uppermost in his mind was the need for a growth compact in the eurozone.

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Mario Draghi, former head of the European Central Bank, who ran ECB policy to rescue the Euro currency in 2012 is being asked to form a new government by the president. Mr. Conte's coalition failed to get the support of Matteo Renzi's left party in parliament leading to its collapse.  Italians are wary of the austerity policies of Mario Monti,  professor and EU bureaucrat appointed by premier Berlusconi to the EU Commission, who was appointed  during the eurozone financial crisis in November 2011 by the president.  At the time prime minister Berlusconi had lost the confidence of EU officials. Mario Draghi has a different history after his work at the European Central Bank counteracting the austerity approach of German finance ministry. He also steered the ECB policy at a difficult time for Italy with rising interest on debt. Today Italy has lost about 89,000 lives, and 8.8% of GDP was lost in 2020. Moderate factions of all parties right and left wing are expected to support Draghi. Draghi also has the advantage of 200 billion in euro funds coming from the EU for Italy's recovery in 2021. Germany today is not the austerity policy Germany of 2011, as it supports going big and spending for the recovery. ...

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ECB president Draghi tells the European parliament on Jan. 16, 2012: "I cannot underline these points enough. Only a well-coordinated, coherent and properly timed strategy will yield the desired results." He made his comments as head of the European Systemic Board, which oversees systemic risks to the banking system in Europe. Speaking after a series of downgrades by S&P, Draghi said there should be "much less mechanical reliance" on ratings agencies. On Greece's debt burden and servicing costs he pointed out that the evaluation of Greek debt made in October 2011 "needs to be clarified whether its realistic," given the deteriorating economic situation in Greece. On Greece's talks with bondholder Draghi wants to see new servicing of debt conditions make it possible for Greece to bring down its current debt level of 190% of GDP to 120% by 2020.

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ECB president, Mario Draghi, said on March 25, 2014, "we will do what is needed to maintain price stability." Annual inflation in the eurozone declined to 0.6% forecast for the eurozone, 0.9% for Germany, and a negative 0.2% in Spain, for Feb. 2014.

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Cochrane says the best option today is for Europe to accept a sovereign default for Greece. He says the European Central Bank which stands behind the euro, should not be used for buying bonds of troubled countries with shaky "collateral." This would only lead to a situation where EU countries would have to recapitalize the ECB. He emphasizes the fact that Greece will not pay back this debt. And the only way out is to have a situation similiar to Argentina where it needs to start over, and it would at some point be able to borrow again. Austerity is deeply unpopular in Greece and with higher unemployment Greece's financial situation is rapidly deteriorating. Making austerity something that was tried to buy time but will not work. Cochrane also makes the point that the euro itself acts like the euro bonds that EU countries are reluctant to support, it means the ECB backs the currency and supports it- which makes it vital to keep the ECB whole and prevent the dilution of its financial strength. Axel Weber, former head of the Bundesbank, resigned to express his opposition to the ECB buying the bonds of troubled eurozone countries, which he said was outside the ECB's mandate to conduct monetary policy....

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A surprise move that creates turmoil in financial markets and damages the reputation of the SNB as it failed to provide any communication to markets whatsoever. The SNB removed a cap on the Swiss Franc of 1.20 euros in a sudden move in Jan. 2015, seeing that its policy was increasingly untenable as the ECB prepared for massive monetary easing.

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Bondholders and the Greek government are stalled in talks and waiting for Germany and the IMF to come up with the 14.5 billion euros that is due on March 20, 2012. It may suit the bondholders holding out for a higher interest rate in the 4-5% range for the new bonds to be issued at 50% of face value with long term maturities, but is bad for Europe. This Journal editorial points out that this is bad for European taxpayers and points to other steps that can be taken which are being discussed in European circles. One step is for acollective action clause to be inserted for the existing Greek bonds under which all bondholders have to accept losses if two thirds of the bondholders agree to accept losses. To ensure the safety of the Greek banking system Greece would restructure the bonds held by Greek banks so that they continue to be acceptable as collateral with the ECB, and issue new bonds to the ECB with face values, interest rates and maturities matching existing holdings. The idea is to make it possible for Greece to reduce its total debt and its debt servicing costs- which is really the only way out of the crisis. The ECB and Greece would use the collective action clause to restructure the Greek debt to reduce interest and debt servicing costs on new bonds to be issued. The Journal editorial says it should also mean Greece and the ECB are not required to put up the 30 billion euros in up-front cash that was agreed to in a poorly devised agreement in 2011....

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Krugman on the ECB President Trichet's support for austerity programs in European countries facing debt crises, and the loan programs for Ireland, Portugal and Greece that require large cuts in spending. The austerity programs lead to lower growth in these countries, further reducing their ability to repay these loans. The reluctance of the German government and other European leaders to consider debt restructuring even though it appears Greece is unlikely to be ever able to repay the loans extended, shows that EU has not grasped the reality of the situation. ECB officials warned against any restructuring effort in late May 2011, saying that if a restructuring were to take place the ECB would not accept the Greek bonds as collateral for ECB loans. This leaves many to question the ECB's thinking. And to question the German government's resistance to provide aid for troubled European economies even though the current rescue programs were made to protect German banks from losses in loans made to these countries....

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The European Central Bank says it will no longer accept Greek bonds as collateral for loans. A similiar move preceded negotiations in 2012 for revisions to loan conditions from the ECB-EU and the IMF. Greece's banks will no longer have access to cheap loans at 0.05% from the ECB. The banks can still use the Emergency Liquidity Assistance facility for loans without which Greek banks would face serious problems. The ECB's reason for this action was that it no longer had confidence that Greece would comply with the bailout terms and could not conduct an ECB review in the current conditions. Both sides are staking out initial positions in the negotiations. Greece's prime minister Tsipras says he wants to work within the eurozone rules and at the same time respect the mandate from the Greek people for better terms on the loans. Tsipras met with the EU's Martin Schulz, and the ECB's Draghi, as the EU and ECB begin discussions.

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An account by Journal reporters based on over 25 interviews with eurozone policymakers shows how the central players in the eurozone drama acted to defend their national interests during the period April to July 2011. On one side France's president Sarkozy, Frenchman Claude Trichet at the European Central Bank, arguing in favor of the banks not to take bondholder losses or haircuts on loans made to Greece. On the other side the Bundesbanks Axel Weber, and Jens Weidman, Jurgen Stark and German Finance Minister Schauble. The Germans argued strongly for bondholder losses to take responsibility for bad loan decisions by French and German banks. French banks had committed more loans to Greece than German banks and had more at stake. German public opinion was strongly against German taxpayers paying for the losses, making German politicians insistent that European banks take losses on their bad loan decisions, or Germany would not support additional loans to Greece. Throughout April to July the two sides were locked in an impasse. The French feared losses for their banks and a Lehman Brothers bankruptcy style situation. The Germans at the Bundesbank and the Finance Ministry were equally insistent. A July 2011 summit meeting did not settle the issue. The events not covered here from the July to the December summit of eurozone leaders resulted in bondholders taking 50% haircut on loans to Greece, reducing the debt burden in Greece after austerity measures led to popular protests. The French pushed hard for the ECB or the EFSF to be allowed to make large purchases of bonds of troubled eurozone countries in an effort to protect Spain and Italy from contagion through higher bond yields. The Netherlands and Finland supported Germany's position. German bankers Weber, Weidman at the Bundesbank and Finance Minister Schauble opposed large scale buying by the ECB of Italy's and Spain's bonds and Chancellor Merkel said about a common eurobond that "this is not going to happen." Governments changed in Greece, Italy, and Spain by Dec. 2011, which committed to austerity programs and spending cuts. Italian Mario Draghi was appointed with German support as new head of the ECB. In late December 2011 Draghi launched the Long Term Financing Operation for lending unlimited amounts at 1% for three year loans to European banks and relaxing the terms to accept government bonds and other debt as collateral for loans. The effect of this was to provide a large infusion of liquidity into the banking system in Europe and drastically bring down the yields on bonds issued by Italy and Spain....

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Steinhauser, Walker and Stevis provide an exceptionally good account of the events leading to the March 25, 2013 EU 10 billion euro bailout of Cyprus, with the closing of one bank and the downsizing of another bank. The Cyprus government of president Anastasiades bluffed and lost. That Anastasiades and the Cyprus government would do this in serious negotiations with the finance ministers of Netherlands, Germany, France, the EU, ECB and the IMF at the headquarters in Brussels, in negotiations that ran to midnight on Sunday March 24, 2013, is simply astounding. Charles Dallara representing European bankers tried to do this with German chancellor Merkel at EU headquarters in Brussels during negotiations on Oct. 27, 2011, on an earlier confrontation over bondholder haircuts, bluffed to the last minute and lost. The way Cyprus handled the negotiations surpassed that. Right down to the last hours the Cyprus president waffled- backtracking on earlier agreement to close Cyprus Popular Bank. Calls were made by German finance minister Schauble to Merkel and by French finance minister Muscovici to French president Hollande to give a joint Franco-German response. Finally Anastasiades was told to pack up and leave on Sunday, March 24. The Cyprus government was not defending small depositors as its earlier plan was to tax all deposits at the two largest Cypriot banks 6.875%. Merkel saw this as an error as this would hurt small savers. The final agreement shut down Cyprus Popular Bank but protected insured deposits under 100,000 euros. Another disturbing sign for the ECB and the EU was Cyprus allowing several hundred million dollars to be wired out of the country even though banks were closed and an offical freeze on ouflows existed. A serious mistake in negotiations was when Cyprus finance minister kept EU finance ministers, the IMF and the ECB officials in the dark by not returning calls for 16 hours on Thursday March 25, 2013, while he tried to negotiate a deal in Moscow with Russia's Putin. This destroyed Cyprus's credibility leading to the ECB's warning to cut off liquidity to Cypriot banks which would put the banks into instant bankruptcy. By Friday morning, March 22, 2013, Merkel was angrily briefing her CDU party lawmakers on the negotiations, telling them the Cyprus government and Anastasiades did not get it, that the whole Cyprus model of outsized offshore banking sector- catering mainly to Russian investors - had collapsed. Cyprus unlike any other member of the EU was trying to face down Europe. Negotiations with Greece had been tough and street protests everpresent, yet negotiations went on in a responsible manner and in good faith, something missing here....

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Wall Street Journal reporters Walker in Berlin, Forelle in Brussels, and Meichtry in Rome, reconstruct the events during critical days after the indecision and failure to reach agreement during the July summit of eurozone countries. This took the form of intervews with leading players and over 25 policy makers. What emerges are accounts of how Germany's Angela Merkel, daughter of a Lutheran pastor, and protege of Eurozone founder, former German chancellor Helmut Kohl, handled the crisis. Merkel was widely criticized in the media for indecision. What emerges is an account of a leader who took decisive action at key moments in the crisis- leading to the formation of new governments in Greece and Italy taking action to improve finances, and negotiations with banks represented by the International Finance Corporation leading to acceptance by banks of a 50% loss on loans to Greece to reduce Greece's unsustainable debt burden. Merkel also worked with the European Central Bank's departing president Frenchman Claude Trichet and new president Italian Mario Draghi to resist French president Sarkozy's efforts to have the ECB assume responsibility for the crisis through large scale buying of Italian and Spanish bonds; which was opposed by German public opinion as a backdoor way of having German taxpayers assume responsibility for European debt. Shown are three critical moments when Merkel intervened. In October 2011, after Italian prime minister Berlusconi reneged on promises to make pension and other reforms to improve Italian finances because of political resistance. He survived a parliamentary no-confidence vote by one vote. Merkel took the lead on October 20, by directly calling Italian President Georgio Napolitano on the phone, to urge him to take action for forming a new government in Italy. The result was Napolitano talking with all political parties to form a new government, leading to the formation of a government by a non-political figure respected in Italy, former EU commissioner Mario Monti. A day earlier, on October 19, French President Sarkozy met ECB president, Trichet, at an event honoring him as departing ECB president in Frankfurt's Alte Oper concert hall. Trichet, Merkel and Sarkozy met in a side room. Sarkozy asked for decisive help from the ECB for large scale buying of Italian and Spanish bonds to lower yields, which had reached 7% on Italian bonds. Trichet responded that the ECB's charter did not allow it to finance governments, with the meeting ending in a shouting match between the two leaders. On October 21, EU and IMF inspectors warned that Greece's debt was reaching unsustainable proportions and austerity measures alone would not work, unless the bondholders, the European banks, took losses of 60% on their excessive lending to Greece. At this point France agreed to the German position arguing for this level of bondholder haircuts or losses, fearing the prospect of large future bailouts that would jeopardize France's triple AAA credit rating. The July 2011 summit accord had only provided for 10% in losses for bondholders. On October 27, at a meeting that went past midnight, Merkel and Sarkozy called IIF head Charles Dallara, who headed negotiating for the banks, to EU headquarters in Brussels. Merkel handed Dallara an agreement containing the 50% bondholder loss demand, and told Dallara- "This is the last offer." Merkel was saying banks would be left with nothing if they rejected it and Greece defaulted. Dallara called bankers and the IIF accepted Merkel's agreement. The final moment that October came on October 31, when Greece's prime minister Papandreou said he would call a referendum on the bailout provisions and austerity measures demanded by the IMF, the EU and the ECB. Bond markets reacted negatively to the announcement fearing a rejection and a Greek default. The Group of 20 leaders was meeting in Cannes, France on Nov. 2, 2011. Papandreou was asked to come to Cannes for a pre-summit meeting. Here Merkel told Papandreou- "the real question" for the referendum was, "Do you want to be in the euro, or not?" Days later Papandreou, lacking support in Greece from political parties and opposition inside his party, submitted his resignation. A non-political figure respected in Greece, former ECB vice president, Lucas Papademos, was appointed prime minister to head a Unity government. Polls after the appointment showed three fourths of Greeks said that this was "a positive step for Greece," with Papandreou's party getting only 11% support and the opposition led by Samaras about 20%. The criticism leveled at Merkel is that Germany should take responsibility for debt throughout the euro area through the issuance of eurozone bonds or the ECB buying large amount of bonds of Spain and Italy. Merkel faced strong opposition inside Germany and from the Bundesbank to this idea. The other criticism was based on austerity measures worsening the finances of Greece because of a lack of growth in the economy, which is true; yet Germany may see the situation in Greece as taking a long time to be resolved in any event because of excessive and faulty financial management. For Italy and Spain putting finances in order was a necessity, and austerity measures should lead to short term sacrifice but improve prospects for the long term by returning the economies to growth. Another criticism is the installation of governments that lack popular or electoral support. As the polls in Greece showed the Unity government there has far greater support and public opinion blames the politicians for the huge mess. In Italy, Berlusconi was widely seen as losing popular support when he resigned. And in Spain Mariano Rajoy, the newly elected prime minister, was elected with a huge majority in parliament following winning in local government elections. Merkel also held her own party, the Chrisitian Democrats together at the recent Leipzig convention. Mario Draghi, was elected with German support to head the European Central Bank. He has long argued for better management of Italian finances as head of Italy's central bank. Draghi was able to support Merkel with carefully planned and managed actions. First to reduce interest rates to support economic growth in a slowing eurozone. Following this with the ECB's Long Term Financing Operation in late December 2011, to provide unlimited loans to European banks at 1% interest for three years in exchange for a broadened list of collateral deposited at the ECB. In a final twist in this drama, Charles Dallara, who was a key negotiator for the U.S. Treasury in setting up the Brady Bonds- that converted bad Latin American government debt owed to U.S. banks in the 1980's into long term debt with large reductions in principal owed and lower interest rates. This was in exchange for guaranteed repayment with 30 year U.S. zero coupon bonds. Dallara was now a negotiator for the banks to reduce the chance of the very same bondholder haircuts that he had negotiated in an earlier period to solve the Latin American debt crisis. Other players in the drama were Axel Weber, head of the Bundesbank, Germany's central bank, who resigned after strong and outspoken opposition to the ECB's large scale purchase of bonds of Greece, Italy and Spain. Jens Weidmann, his protege, who replaced him. And Jurgen Stark, German representative at the ECB, who also resigned in opposition to Germany assuming responsibility for eurozone debt. ...

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The ECB and the Bank of England cut interest rates to near zero.

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Currency swings and the ECB President's view that they are "brutal" and unwelcome.

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Krugman is critical of ECB president Trichet's decision to raise interest rates in 2010, because of the way it affects Spain, Italy, and Portugal. Increase in interest rates by the ECB affect the entire eurozone and this means, he points out, that inflation in Germany would be extremely low -about 1% for the next five years- and the result being that inflation would be much lower in debtor countries like Spain. A decrease in interest rates with inflation at 3-4 % in Germany would be better for the debtor countries (Spain, Italy, Portugal, Ireland) as this would enable them to cut prices and costs relative to Germany and other creditor countries. The first step taken by the new ECB president, Mario Draghi, was a small increase in interest rates. Krugman asks if the private demand is affected negatively by the end of a debt financed boom in the debtor countries, and austerity programs reduce any growth in the public sector, then where are the new jobs supposed to come from? A policy that reduces the prices of the products of debtor countries relative to creditor countries like Germany- so that exports can generate necessary growth- is needed says Krugman. ...

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Efforts by Greece's government officials in October 2011 to meet demands from the IMF, The European Commission and the ECB- collectively referred to as the "troika" in Greece- for 30,000 public sector job cuts. The first step was putting together layoff lists, and effectively create a special labor pool at reduced pay for 12 months, after which those not finding new jobs would be layed off. There is considerable difficulty doing this, as heads of departments are reluctant to do this. There is a constitutional provision that protects public sector workers from layoff in Greece. The troika is insisting on the lists, or across the board cuts in the event lists are not prepared. The 30,000 job cuts are part of job cuts in the public sector which would be a total of 100,000 by 2015.

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A former vice president of the ECB, Lucas Papademos, heads a new Unity government in Greece in November 2011.