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Krugman says austerity measures alone won't work as the economies in the eurozone shrink in 2012.

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Krugman is critical of ECB president Trichet's decision to raise interest rates in 2010, because of the way it affects Spain, Italy, and Portugal. Increase in interest rates by the ECB affect the entire eurozone and this means, he points out, that inflation in Germany would be extremely low -about 1% for the next five years- and the result being that inflation would be much lower in debtor countries like Spain. A decrease in interest rates with inflation at 3-4 % in Germany would be better for the debtor countries (Spain, Italy, Portugal, Ireland) as this would enable them to cut prices and costs relative to Germany and other creditor countries. The first step taken by the new ECB president, Mario Draghi, was a small increase in interest rates. Krugman asks if the private demand is affected negatively by the end of a debt financed boom in the debtor countries, and austerity programs reduce any growth in the public sector, then where are the new jobs supposed to come from? A policy that reduces the prices of the products of debtor countries relative to creditor countries like Germany- so that exports can generate necessary growth- is needed says Krugman. ...

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After the debt swap of old bonds for new bonds with private bondholders for an estimated 53% haircut, the IMF's March 2012 report on Greece says a lot remains unresolved. It predicts a "disorderly exit from the euro" without further help. The April 2012 elections may result in a dilution to committments to austerity policies in Greece, as these policies are highly unpopular in Greece. Greece is still "accident-prone." And competitiveness issues may take over a decade to resolve.

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Krugman says voters in France, Greece, the UK and other countries are protesting against austerity measures imposed in the EU countries. The policies were based on the assumption made by the Chrisitian Democrats in Germany that the German model if applied in other countries would generate the kind of recovery Germany made in the last decade from the high unemployment under chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. German wage restraint agreement between unions, industry and government made this possible under the Hartz reforms, and France is already embarking on wage restraint, with the two major parties, unions and industry backing the plan. But for this to work France and other countries such as Spain and Italy have to be able to export to Germany or other countries. German workers are suffering from stagnant wages for many years, stemming from concessions made to reduce unemployment. Allowing wages to rise in Germany when there is a shortage of workers in industry, would benefit workers in Germany and help France and other EU countries increase exports. German industry is failing to make this normal adjustment in markets by insisting on smaller concessions, even though there is support within the government for higher wages. German growth was possible because of demand outside for its exporters. The "austerity measures" Germany supports would depress demand inside the domestic economies of France, Spain, Italy and other EU countries, and without the wage and inflation adjustments with Germany leave demand weak outside. Without needed demand output falls, unemployment rises and tax revenues decline, leaving deficits worse than before, and a dangerous downward spiral. Better management of finances as Germany has insisted has ceased to become the issue, as both Hollande in France and Rajoy in Spain, and Monti in Italy, are keen on getting control of finances, especially regional spending in Spain....

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Amar Bhide touches on the unpredictable consequences of devaluations while commenting on the supposed benefit of a country having its own currency vs a currency such as the euro. The euro takes away the advatantage of devaluing the national currency as a way to regain competitiveness. Bhide points out that devaluations hurt the elderly on fixed incomes and low wage workers. Protections have to be put in place for the sections of the population that are badly affected. Large union negotiated wage increases can also reduce the benefits of devaluation in terms of regaining competitiveness.

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Richard Portes of the London Business School provides two good reasons why the EU's decision to adopt the French Banking Federation's proposal for rollovers with 10% interest costs is a serious mistake. It doubles the interest costs from 4-6% to 10% with 2% Greek GDP growth and makes debt servicing untenable. Portes says the real Brady Plan from the 1980's included a 35-40% bondholders haircut. Deals of this type have a precedent- in Mexico in 1988 and in Argentina in 2001 such bond exchanges were soon followed by deals that placed bondholder haricuts on creditors. The lesson from Latin America in the 1980's, says Portes, is that the burdens of servicing a debt of such proportions under onerous conditions only extinguishes the enterprise, investment and productive capabilities of the particular country trying to service that debt, making the debt even less serviceable. See the Wall Street Journal's editorial on this deal which it calls "The French Deception." The terms sound like Greek to the editors leaving a sense that French banks are only saying "gimme." The only benefit achieved may be putting off the problem and avoiding contagion to Portugal and Spain. Yet this is not that much of a benefit when one realizes that the problem has not gone away, and is likely to look much worse six or nine months from now....

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John Taylor looks one step ahead of the March 2012 Greece bailout and sets up the most plausible scenario for the future. He says the risks of contagion were always exaggerated from the beginning- a planned default or restructuring of debt such as happened in Argentina in 2001, does not have the contagion risks associated with a chaotic and unplanned default as in Russia in 1998. Predicability in policy makes a huge difference, says Taylor. The European banks which stood to lose from writedowns exaggerated the fears of contagion- a process that always occurs for people who are adversely affected by writedowns- resulting in top officials in the European Union delaying the unavoidable serious restructuring. It was not until Chancellor Merkel handed Charles Dallara, who negotiated for the European banks, a note stating a demand for 50% bondholder writedown, on October 27, 2011, at EU headquarters in Brussels, did any serious writedown of debt begin. Merkel told Dallara: "this is my last offer." The July 2011 summit by contrast had only a 10% bondholder writedown in the agreement, when insolvency not illiquidity was the real issue. Walker Forelle and Meichtry, give a detailed account of what happened in the Wall Street Journal, Dec. 30, 2011. The important thing for Greece, says Taylor, is for what the IMF calls "growth enhancing structural reforms" - greater reliance on private markets, incentives, rule of law. He says this bailout won't work because IMF growth forecasts do not reflect the rapid shrinking of the Greek economy. Antonis Samaras, leader of the major opposition party, is in favor of pro-growth measures and has stated his desire to change the agreement. The 130 billion euro bailout provides 90 billion euros for recapitalizing Greece's banks, and financing the budget. This puts Greece in a situation where the political leaders win voter support by discarding the conditions from the Northern EU nations and come with a plan that is better suited for Greece. The EU in this scenario would cut off further bailout funds to Greece. Taylor sees this as the better outcome for Greece than the current situation, which leaves Greece no hope for growth, and also for the EU by getting out of bailouts that have little prospect of working. It would be difficult but doable for Greece says Taylor, because interest payments would be low and Greek banks would be recapitalized after the current March 2012 bailout. ...

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The IMF's changing views on the value of fiscal austerity. In the current debate about the value of fiscal austerity, there is the IMF view, a German view based on its own experience, and the views of other countries in Europe. The IMF's view has shifted over time. The IMF World Economic Outlook 2010, describes its view of the effects of austerity measures in the form of spending cuts and tax increases- "Fiscal consolidation typically has a contractionary effect on output. A fiscal consolidation equal to 1% of GDP typically reduces GDP by about 0.5% within 2 years and raises the unemployment rate by about 0.3% percentage points." Over the longer term there are benefits as the private sector is not crowded out in the search for captal funding by the excessive government borrowing. The IMF's economic models suggest that it would take 5 years before reaching the breakeven point when the benefits of austerity measures exceed the effects of austerity. The German view held by German central bankers is that the actions stimulate growth in the short term. Manfred Neumann, professor emeritus at the Institute for Economic Policy at the University of Bonn, says this is called the "German hypothesis" as it reflects the experience of Germany from austerity actions taken by Germany. Laurence Ball, professor of Economics at John Hopkins University, is critical of the "German hypothesis" and its application across Europe in different situations. Germany is a large exporting nation and exports helped counterbalance the effects of austerity measures. Within the eurozone with fixed exchange rates the exports of less competitive countries cannot be boosted through devaluing the currency to gain price competitiveness. The other problem is that with interest rates close to zero in the euro zone the central banks cannot cut rates aggressively to counteract the effects of spending cuts. The problem gets compounded when a number of countries are taking austerity measures at the same time accentuating the downturn....