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Wall Street Journal Original article ›
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Zhou Xiaochuan, is head of the People's Bank of China since 2002. For a long time Zhou has tried to convince party leaders in China to make financial sector changes. The new leadership of Jinping-Li Keqiang has now adopted most of the road map and priorities drawn up by Xiaochuan. The first is bank deposit insurance, which would especially protect small depositors and provide a basis for new private banks to compete with large state owned banks, creating competition in the financial sector. By supporting creation of privately owned banks impetus could be given to loans to the private sector to rebalance the economy away from state owned banks and state owned enterprises. This is a key goal in the road map drawn up by the think tank Development Research Center (DRC) which has the backing of premier Li Keqiang. Competition from new private banks would let banks compete to offer higher rates to depositors, another goal. In a September article for the Communist Party Seeking Truth magazine, Zhou pointed out the pressing need for " supporting private capital to set up private banks and guide them to position themselves in serving small and micro companies." These new companies especially in tech and information technology fields can be the new drivers for growth in the future as the burst of infrastructure building generated growth slows down. The one area Zhou faces resistance is his idea of opening up China to foreign capital inflows and outflows. Here critics,including younger economists, say this protected China in the Asian financial markets crisis of 1997, and would protect China in the event it faces outflows of the type that are happening in India in 2013 after the U.S. Fed's plan to withdraw from its quantitative easing. Xiaochuan sees the flow of foreign capital as another way for capital to flow to new private companies and balance away from the state owned enterprises, and for China's savers to be able to obtain more attractive returns. Zhou says his plan would include the option for China to reintroduce capial controls in a crisis. As China's debt to GDP ratio is set on a trajectory to approach the levels reached in Japan before its banking crisis there is greater awareness from party leaders about the need for prudence. Xiaochuan has worked with party leader Jinping's key economic advisor Liu He for years, and has the support of He and Jinping for introducing deposit insurance as a top priority. President Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang see the need for Xiaochuan's experience and foresight "as a talent who can be counted on," as the sense of importance of changing the economic structure has deepened in 2013. Mandatory retirement for Xiaochuan at 65 was set aside to give him a third five year term, and his road map long ignored by former premier Wen Biao, is now at the top of China's agenda. ...
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
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Moody's senior analyst based in Beijing, Yvonne Zhang, says China's National Audit Office's estimate of the banks loans as part of China's total local government debt of 10.7 trillion yuan ($1.65 trillion) is understated. The Audit Office estimated bank loans to be 8.5 trillion yuan. Moody's says this is understated by 3.5 trillion yuan or about $540 billion. Moody's sees the delinquency ratio of these loans between 50 and 75%. With these figures it sees 8-12% of bank loans in China's banking system as non-performing loans.
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
New York Times Original article ›
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Economist John Spence on advice to the Chinese government to tackle problems of shifting from an export based economy to one more dependent on domestic spending. And managing the shift upscale to sophisticated technologies from basic consumer goods.
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
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Orlik reports that the link between China's GDP growth and lending has broken down as credit expansion is accompanied by slowing growth. Slowing credit growth and lowering GDP growth even further is the price China's ecnomic planners are willing to take to forge a new path of sustainable growth, increasing efficiency of investment and increasing domestic consumption. The ratio of China's credit outstanding to GDP has jumped to about 180% in 2012 from 123% in 2008. Rapid expansion of credit is one of the danger signals before a crisis according to the IMF. Turkey and China are facing danger signals according to this IMF danger indicator.
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
BusinessWeek Original article ›
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Patrick Chovanec of Tsinghua University, says the loan target for 2011, though smaller than 2010, will still be over one and a half times the money lent in 2008. Stephen Green, head of research for Standard Chartered, says if anyone is printing money, it appears to be China's central bank, not the US. During a meeting of the Central Economic Work Conference in Beijing goals are being set for the next 12 months. One expert predicts the governmet may set official targets of 4% inflation (it is running at about 4.7% at this time) and 6.5 trillion yuan of lending in new loans in 2011, compared to 7.5 trillion in 2010. Questions remain whether China can manage a soft landing after the huge surge in lending and the continued asset bubble.
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
Adding in local government debt to central government debt, railways, asset management companies and state owned banks, gives a better picture of total debt for China. This is an estimated $3.55 trillion or close to 59% of GDP compared to 93% for the U.S. The problem is no one really knows how much debt there is in the local government in China. Analysts say this understates nonperforming loans from China's lending binge after the 2008 financial crisis. Stephen Green of Standard Chartered Bank estimates China's total debt, including contingent liabilities, to be 77% of GDP. Arthur Kroeber of Dragonomics estimates it at 75%. China's Banking Regulatory Commission estimates that investment vehicles that have local government guarantees borrowed $1.17 trillion in 2009 and the first half of 2010. Century Weekly, a leading financial magazine, estimates this to be $1.52 trillion at the end of 2010. The large local government debt limits the ability of China's central bank to raise rates to control inflation, as every increase in rates increases the local government debt. For the U.S., excluding debt owed by one part of the government to another, such as Social Security, would bring U.S. debt to 62.2%. This would'nt include the debts of local and state governments, overhaul of Fannie and Freddie, or liabilities to pay future retirement and health benefits....
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
WSJ reporter Bob Davis writes this report on the end of the China economic miracle in 2014 as he completes a 4 year assignment covering China. He says China's economy is slowing rapidly and he is pessimistic abou the future. Construction cranes visible across China's skyline says Davis, can no longer be interpreted as growth inducing. With rows upon rows of empty flats in third and fourth tier cities which account for the bulk of the increase in housing construction, the consequences of a debt fueled construction boom are easy to see. Davis cites the IMF on the dangers of credit fueled growth in China- only 4 countries have experienced as rapid an increase in credit to GDP ratio in 5 years. Each of the 4 countries Brazil, Ireland, Spain and Sweden experienced a sharp decline in GDP growth and banking crises following the credit bubble. Estimates of debt to GDP are as high as 250% for China. Krugman, Roubini and other economists have warned about the credit bubble, saying China is no exception to the rule for the risks posed by such a bubble. ...
New York Times Original article ›
Economist Original article ›
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The Economist points out that China's total debt of government, corporate and households has grown by about 100% of GDP since 2008. The 2009 crisis led to rapid increase in debt. It is now about 250% of GDP, according to the Economist. Slower growth of below 7% risks reducing China's ability to service this debt. About half of this debt is owed by state owned companies and property developers. China can use its sovereign reserves to continue supporting bank and state owned companies. Investor's are pricing bank shares to reflect about 10% of this debt as bad debt even though government estimates are much lower. The reserves provided China time to fix the banking system since 2008, yet the debt keeps growing and China has failed to take strong action in the last 6 years. Complacency is a problem, and the incentives for local governments to continue prior practices that increase debt continue. As Krugman and other experts have pointed out at some point the rules of finance will apply to China as they have for other countries that faced a debt crisis- Japan in the late 1980's, South Korea and other Aisan countries in 1997, and the U.S. in 2008. Even without a crisis through deft managemen and use of reserves China risks zombifying the economy as old loans are backed up by new loans, with the further risk of misallocation of capital or poor use of capital. This lowers productivity of capital and hurts development. With poor statistics such as the figure of 1% of debt being bad debt cited here, the problems of complacency can be magnified, as there is less reason for a strong response....
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
In China's state banking system larger banks will get more state support than the smaller banks. Smaller banks such as Everbright Bank and Bank of Nanjing have 20% of loans made to local government financing vehicles, this compares with 6-7% for larger banks such as ICBC, Bank of China, China Construction Bank, and Agricultural Bank of China. Because of the poor asset quality and high risk of such loans the smaller banks are likely to be the first to face trouble in a financial crisis.
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
The dangers to China's economy and banking system from the large number of bad loans at the local level. Difficulties of absorbing bad loan losses by the central government as new loan losses are piled on top of previous loan losses from earlier efforts to tide over bad loans. Considering all nonperforming loans that may end up as sovereign debt China's national debt is upwards of 80% of GDP, say Walter and Howie. The lack of any serious change in policies, inability to control lending for state enterprises and local governments, the tax on savings with low interest rates which keeps down domestic consumption, and the absence of a serious discussion on these issues leaves China exposed to higher systemic risk from excessive financial leverage.
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
After overly aggressive bank lending following the financial crisis of 2008 China is now badly overextended. China has also learned from the U.S. experience about the risks inherent in growth generated from a credit boom. In 2009-2010 China was also getting less bang for the buck in terms of the increase in lending needed to generate growth compared to earlier periods. Orlik says don't expect China to help the global economy the way it did in 2009-2011, and that there is no Plan B for China.
Economist Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
The Economist points to a second hit from bad debt in the post 2008 stimulus binge of spending in China. This is after an earlier hit, that was absorbed as a result of high growth rates and high savings. About $420 billion was injected into 5 state owned banks since 1998, according to one estimate, as a result of the first hit to China's banks from bad debt. In this second round of bad debt, covered in more detail by David Barboza in the New York Times, and merely alluded to here, many bad loans to infrastructure projects were rushed through by local governments. The Economist considers this one of the successes of the state directed banking system, that loans were quickly made and projects started in the post 2008 crisis period; and expresses the view that this hit will be absorbed just like the last hit. However the more detailed account by David Barboza and in Business Week, points to the working of a system of incentives gone astray in a capitalist system without the necessary controls or regulation. Local governments used investment companies to take on loans, which were then used to prepare properties to be auctioned off at a profit and speculative prices to state owned companies in different industrial sectors. This is part of rampant speculation in China in real estate markets. Can China with its high savings and growth absorb a second hit? This depends on the magnitude of the hit and the size of the bad debt, which depends on how long this speculative market continues to operate, and how bad debt is hidden in the books. The difference this time is that large state owned companies in different industrial sectors are engaged in this speculation. The other difference is that the high growth rates in China depend on continued large trade deficits with the USA and Western Europe, something which is not likely to continue for long, as consumers in Europe and the USA with high debt are becoming cautious spenders. This suggests that China, like the US with the mortgage crisis, faces the same effects of unregulated or uncontrolled speculative behaviours, that can endanger the banking system....
Wall Street Journal Original article ›

Can China Cool Its Economy?

BusinessWeek Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
Difficulties facing China from an overheating economy, a property bubble in many cities,, and a 22.5% jump in March in the broadest measure of money supply being the latest signs of trouble. The government announcement will show the economy growth at 12% rate in the 1st quarter of 2010 vs. 8.7% in 2009. The problem is that China may have acted too aggressively when the central bank increased money supply and state-owned banks in China's centralized banking system were ordered to jack up the lending. The $586 billion stimulus sent even more money to construction and energy companies. Without effective steps and fast the Chinese economy could run into serious problems.
The New York Times Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
China's GDP growth accelerated slightly to 6.9 percent in the 1st quarter of 2017, after five consecutive quarters of GDP growth at 6.7-6.8%, according to government data. This reflected larger use of steel in the construction industry and more mortgages issued by the state controlled banking sector. Government officials say productivity is improving helping GDP growth, with closing of less efficient manufacturing plants. Industrial production increased 7.6% in March 2017, according to the National Bureau of Statistics. The government is trying to control higher lending and reduce the backlog of bad loans at banks. Higher growth helps to reduce the bad loans at banks from the earlier period after 2008 financial crisis, improving financial stability.

Wall Street Journal Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
The constructive contribution made by the G-20 meetings of leaders towards building agreement on economic and other policies for peace and progress in the global economy. The meetings were especially useful for coordinating policy and addressing issues arising in the global economy after the 2008 financial crisis. Here Li Baodong, China's vice minister for international organizations and conferences, international economic affairs, describes the path ahead: IMF reforms implementation, better coordination of macroeconomic policies, pursuing the anti-protectionist and free trade policies with further support to the WTO and ministerial MC9 meeting in Bali in Dec. 2013, and infrastructure financing proposals for developing countries on the agenda at the St Petersburg, Russia, G-2- meeting in Sept. 2013. Baodong says the mechanism called the Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth as part of the G-20 meetings is a major achievement. Each G-20 economy submits it macroeconomic policy plan for a Mutual Assessment Process under this arrangement. The progress from the Bretton Woods financial architecture to the new arrangement- from the G-6 to the G-20 to include developing countries from India to Mexico and Brazil- is another major achievement, not fully recognized by the public, says Baodong. Interestingly Baodong makes particular mention to global rebalancing, rather than pushing what he calls the impossible task of increasing demand to get growth. This is a realization coming to China's economic policymakers under the new Jinping-Keqiang administration after the overly aggressive effort to stimulate demand in the 2009-2011 Stimulus, and the ensuing financial problems in the banking and credit system. It is indicative of the policy shift and its implementation underway in China in 2013-2015....
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
Browne describes the excessive focus on "hard" GDP targets in China and the results in wasteful spending and neglect of other vital indicators of development such as healthcare, education, environment.
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
Research firm Dragonomics says real estate prices fell 4.9% in April from the prior year for nine cities in China. In 2010 prices in these nine cities went up by 21.5%, the increase in 2009 was 10%. Standard Chartered estimates China's second tier cities, such as Dalian and Tianjin, could have 20 months of housing inventory by the end of 2011. Standard Chartered says price declines of 10-20% can be expected. Government data understates the extent of the bubble and the drop in prices say analysts. Beijing real estate consultant, Soufun, confirms the slowdown in price increases, saying its data show average property prices went up by 5.1% in May over the prior year, compared to the jump in prices in 2009 and 2010. Prices of copper and steel are coming down after rapid increases. The price increases in the Chinese real estate market have put housing out of the reach of ordinary couples. In 2006 an average price of a new apartment in Beijing cost $100,000, by 2011 this had gone up to $250,000. It woud take 57 years of saving for an average person to buy the apartment at todays cost. The government's response has been to boost down payments on mortgages for second homes to 60% from 40%, prohibiting state owned enterprises outside the real estate sector from investing in real estate, and raising the reserve requirements of banks....
Wall Street Journal Original article ›

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