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Hugo Dixon says the deal made by eurozone leaders for Greece in July 2011 favors private creditors. The bondholder haircut was much smaller, eurozone governments and taxpayers will make up the difference. This he says is like a cat in the bag presented to the receiver as a pig as long as he does not look inside, called a "poke." Dixon says that if Greece cannot implement austerity measures under a new government and the deal has to be renegotiated bondholders may face a larger haircut than the 20% under the current arrangement. It would have been better he says to do this now but the ECB's threats may have led to the German and French governments treating private creditors with kids gloves.

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Italy's new prime minister Mario Monti, was frank in his views about depending on austerity alone to meet the debt crisis, views also shared by President Sarkozy of France. Monti told an interviewer from the German newspaper Die Welt, before meeting German chancellor Merkel in Berlin: In the absence of specific help "a protest against Europe will develop in Italy, also against Germany, which is viewed as the ringleader of E.U. intolerance, and against the European Central Bank." He went on to say-"I cannot have success with my policies if the E.U.'s policies don't change." He pointed out that economic difficulties could drive Italy to "flee into the arms of populists."

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Infratest Dimap polling institute is commissioned by DW.com to find out what Germans think of the refugee policy of chancellor Merkel one year later. In summer 2015 Merkel said on Aug 31, "We can do it." Costs related to the refugees are about $17 billion, do Germans think services are overstretched for education, healthcare housing and other services. On the other side German society is aging and for every 100 unemployed people there are 200 open positions for skilled personnel. But the refugees who are accepted do not have the skills required and have to acquire the skills or given training and education. On this issue DW.com asked the question whether it will strengthen the German economy. About 51% agree and 45% disagree on this question, and about the same number agree and disagree on the question that Germany will be overstretched providing the services for housing, education, healthcare and other services. The higher educated and young are more favorable to accepting refugees, with those over 50 and basic schooling unfavorable. On the AfD side most people are unfavorable, and in the Greens party most are favorable. On terrorist incidents probability, over 58% think this is more likely, 38% disagree. On the question of whether this will make Germany more diverse 56% agree, 40% disagree. Overall the situation appears to be balanced, with a range of views expressed, and the positive and negative sentiment "evenly balanced", says DW.com.  ...

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An account by Journal reporters based on over 25 interviews with eurozone policymakers shows how the central players in the eurozone drama acted to defend their national interests during the period April to July 2011. On one side France's president Sarkozy, Frenchman Claude Trichet at the European Central Bank, arguing in favor of the banks not to take bondholder losses or haircuts on loans made to Greece. On the other side the Bundesbanks Axel Weber, and Jens Weidman, Jurgen Stark and German Finance Minister Schauble. The Germans argued strongly for bondholder losses to take responsibility for bad loan decisions by French and German banks. French banks had committed more loans to Greece than German banks and had more at stake. German public opinion was strongly against German taxpayers paying for the losses, making German politicians insistent that European banks take losses on their bad loan decisions, or Germany would not support additional loans to Greece. Throughout April to July the two sides were locked in an impasse. The French feared losses for their banks and a Lehman Brothers bankruptcy style situation. The Germans at the Bundesbank and the Finance Ministry were equally insistent. A July 2011 summit meeting did not settle the issue. The events not covered here from the July to the December summit of eurozone leaders resulted in bondholders taking 50% haircut on loans to Greece, reducing the debt burden in Greece after austerity measures led to popular protests. The French pushed hard for the ECB or the EFSF to be allowed to make large purchases of bonds of troubled eurozone countries in an effort to protect Spain and Italy from contagion through higher bond yields. The Netherlands and Finland supported Germany's position. German bankers Weber, Weidman at the Bundesbank and Finance Minister Schauble opposed large scale buying by the ECB of Italy's and Spain's bonds and Chancellor Merkel said about a common eurobond that "this is not going to happen." Governments changed in Greece, Italy, and Spain by Dec. 2011, which committed to austerity programs and spending cuts. Italian Mario Draghi was appointed with German support as new head of the ECB. In late December 2011 Draghi launched the Long Term Financing Operation for lending unlimited amounts at 1% for three year loans to European banks and relaxing the terms to accept government bonds and other debt as collateral for loans. The effect of this was to provide a large infusion of liquidity into the banking system in Europe and drastically bring down the yields on bonds issued by Italy and Spain....

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Walter Mead describes the roots of the refugee crisis in 2015, as millions of refugees flee Syria, Iraq, and other countries in the Middle East, lying in the failure of governments throughout the Middle East to accomodate modernity, women's rights and technological progress into the old Islamic thinking. He says he sees this in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Tunisia, and other countries in the Middle East. The Arab Spring which aroused so much hope for the people of the region has floudered in the failure of both the Islamic leaders, the military elite, and civil society to come up with a consensus rooted in what a modern Islamic society that accomodates modernity, women's rights, the participation of people in their government, technological progress should look like. The Western nations of Europe and the U.S. also underwent soul searching to come up with a modern Christian society through its own struggles, which the Islamic societies have failed to do; and as a result floundered and broken up by sectarian, religious and military conflicts. Mead takes the long view, yet falls short when it comes to how European leaders and societies face individual challenges to bring their own Christian faith and ideals into the real world, in the way chancellor Merkel has responded in Germany. Europeans have had their own period of conflicts and civil wars, the refugee crisis and refugees in chancellor Merkel's words who "have gone through the hell of a civil war" are very real, and how each European responds defines who he is and how far Europe has come from its own dark days....

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The logjam continues between the French and German banks- represented by the Institute of International Finance and its negotiator Charles Dallara- and the governments of Germany and Greece, supported by the IMF. The position of the Greek government is that the interest rate on new bonds stretching out over a long time period that woud be exchanged at 50% face value of existing bonds should be set at rates well below 4%, because Greece faces a growing deficit and rapidly worsening economy. The German government which is faced with the prospect of providing additional funds to Greece supports this. The IIF position is for an interest rate of between 4-5%.

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The terms of the debt restructuring deal with the bond swap in Greece become clear on March 9, 2012. In the deal with private bondholders -using collective action clauses to force remaining bondholders into the deal- about 96% of the 206 billion euros of Greece's bonds will be exchanged. Private bondholders held out throughout most of 2011, delaying the inevitable as Greece's economic situation became increasingly hopeless. This created a logjam with the German government, which insisted on serious private sector participation and bondholder haircut as the cost of poor lending decisions of the French, German and other European banks that made loans to Greece out of proportion of the ability of Greece to payback loans. Charles Dallara of the Institute of International Finance, negotiating for European banks, offered a 10% average loss on the bonds in July 2009. It was not until German Chancellor Merkel told Dallara at a late night meeting on October 27, 2011: "this is my last offer," for a 50% loss on the face value of the bonds, was agreement reached. The Greek debt swap that now takes place will give private bondholders a loss of 53.5% from the face value of 200 billion euros of bonds that they hold. The new Greek bonds issued in place of the old bonds include short-term bonds issued by the eurozone rescue fund at 15% of the face value of the old bonds, and a series of Greek bonds with maturity ranging from 11-30 years valued at 31.5% of the face value of old bonds. That even this 53.5% bondholder loss will not be adequate, as Greece's economy looks irretrievably damaged as it spirals downwards, is shown by the value of these bonds already trading in a hypothetical "gray market." The new 30 year bond is quoted at 17 cents and the 11 year bond at 22 cents. The questions remain about the stalling by the banks in taking the losses earlier- was this the wisest move considering the losses beyond Greece as the eurozone economy as a whole has suffered from the prolonged negotiations stretching through 2011, lurching from one crisis to the next? Even if the stalling was designed to give time for banks to repair their balance sheets, was this the best strategy, considering the damage inflicted on European economic growth. John Taylor of Stanford points out that the European banks delayed the unavoidable serious debt restructuring for too long, when insolvency was the real issue not illiquidity, and exaggerated the effect of contagion from the beginning- in John Taylor, WSJ, 2/22/2012, A Better Grecian Bailout. And John Cochrane of the University of Chicago, points out that French and German governments if they bailout French and German banks should do so openly and frankly rather than cover this up as bailouts of countries, because this would lead to serious questions about the poor lending decisions of the European banks and government supervision of the banks- in Cochrane, WSJ, 12/2/2010, 'Contagion' and other Euro Myths. As early as Feb. 2010, Cochrane was suggesting the forced exchange of new bonds with long debt maturities for exisiting bonds with short debt maturities, as short term debt was the major issue here. ...

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In a shift from statements at earlier summits which focussed on fiscal restraint, the Camp David summit continued the "firm committment to fiscal consolidation," yet emphasized jobs and economic growth as "imperative." There is new flexibility to address needs for economic growth and no specific timetables for fiscal balance as in previous summits. Obama had many one to one encounters with the other leaders. He discussed the euro crisis with Cameron while working out on a treadmill, and watched the Champions League soccer final between Chelsea and Bayern Munich with Merkel and Cameron. Each leader of the G-8, Harper of Canada, Monti of Italy, Hollande of France, Medvedev of Russia, Cameron of Britain, Noda of Japan, Merkel of Germany, was assigned a cabin in the rustic wooded setting of Camp David's mountains. A special effort was made to see that Germany's Merkel did not feel isolated in the setting because of the growing sentiment that austerity policies pushed by Germany are not working. On Iran, Obama stated that he was "hopeful that we can resolve this issue in a peaceful fashion that recognizes their sovereignty, but also recognizes their responsibilities."...

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Krugman questions whether the assumptions behind the austerity policies are true- that they would inspire confidence in economic recovery, or that in the absence of austerity policies borrowing costs would go through the roof. The recent events in Holland with the collapse of the government in the Netherlands- when a party leader supporting the government said he did not want to hurt pensioners in the Netherlands just to satisfy German opinion- and the mood in France with economic anxiety vote going to Marie Le Pen and Francois Hollande in the first round of presidential elections, shows that very little confidence has been created. High unemployment and economic anxiety are leading to a reappraisal of austerity cuts that depress the economy and reduce tax revenues, but Krugman says no changes are taking place to correct these policies. This is true for Spain with its high unemployment, and Britain which now has two quarters of negative growth.

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Krugman says voters in France, Greece, the UK and other countries are protesting against austerity measures imposed in the EU countries. The policies were based on the assumption made by the Chrisitian Democrats in Germany that the German model if applied in other countries would generate the kind of recovery Germany made in the last decade from the high unemployment under chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. German wage restraint agreement between unions, industry and government made this possible under the Hartz reforms, and France is already embarking on wage restraint, with the two major parties, unions and industry backing the plan. But for this to work France and other countries such as Spain and Italy have to be able to export to Germany or other countries. German workers are suffering from stagnant wages for many years, stemming from concessions made to reduce unemployment. Allowing wages to rise in Germany when there is a shortage of workers in industry, would benefit workers in Germany and help France and other EU countries increase exports. German industry is failing to make this normal adjustment in markets by insisting on smaller concessions, even though there is support within the government for higher wages. German growth was possible because of demand outside for its exporters. The "austerity measures" Germany supports would depress demand inside the domestic economies of France, Spain, Italy and other EU countries, and without the wage and inflation adjustments with Germany leave demand weak outside. Without needed demand output falls, unemployment rises and tax revenues decline, leaving deficits worse than before, and a dangerous downward spiral. Better management of finances as Germany has insisted has ceased to become the issue, as both Hollande in France and Rajoy in Spain, and Monti in Italy, are keen on getting control of finances, especially regional spending in Spain....

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The ECB's annual report for 2012 and the role the ECB under Mario Draghi played in the eurozone crisis in 2011-2012. The gains made in eurozone financial architecture, especially the agreement for the ECB as financial supervisor for European banks. The ECB sees itself as the supervisor for all European banks- the French position in the discussions in Brussels. The agreement of Dec. 12, 2012 only says banks with assets over 30 billion euros, or 20% of GDP of countries, or operations in two or more countries will come under supervision by the ECB.

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The IMF's changing views on the value of fiscal austerity. In the current debate about the value of fiscal austerity, there is the IMF view, a German view based on its own experience, and the views of other countries in Europe. The IMF's view has shifted over time. The IMF World Economic Outlook 2010, describes its view of the effects of austerity measures in the form of spending cuts and tax increases- "Fiscal consolidation typically has a contractionary effect on output. A fiscal consolidation equal to 1% of GDP typically reduces GDP by about 0.5% within 2 years and raises the unemployment rate by about 0.3% percentage points." Over the longer term there are benefits as the private sector is not crowded out in the search for captal funding by the excessive government borrowing. The IMF's economic models suggest that it would take 5 years before reaching the breakeven point when the benefits of austerity measures exceed the effects of austerity. The German view held by German central bankers is that the actions stimulate growth in the short term. Manfred Neumann, professor emeritus at the Institute for Economic Policy at the University of Bonn, says this is called the "German hypothesis" as it reflects the experience of Germany from austerity actions taken by Germany. Laurence Ball, professor of Economics at John Hopkins University, is critical of the "German hypothesis" and its application across Europe in different situations. Germany is a large exporting nation and exports helped counterbalance the effects of austerity measures. Within the eurozone with fixed exchange rates the exports of less competitive countries cannot be boosted through devaluing the currency to gain price competitiveness. The other problem is that with interest rates close to zero in the euro zone the central banks cannot cut rates aggressively to counteract the effects of spending cuts. The problem gets compounded when a number of countries are taking austerity measures at the same time accentuating the downturn....