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523 European banks borrowed 489 billion euros from the European Central Bank on Dec. 21, 2011, under the newly created Long Term Financing Operation of the ECB. This is designed to meet the financing needs of European banks which are shutoff from normal financing of selling unsecured bonds to private investors because of market anxiety. Much of this is for replacing other outstanding ECB loans, with analysts estimating about 190 billion euros of new liquidity being injected into the banking system. This also has the effect of reducing the borrowing rates for government bonds. In Spain the government sold 5.6 billion euros of government bonds at an auction on Dec. 20, 2011, with the interest rates dropping from 5.7% a month earlier to 1.7%. Small and midsize banks in Spain helped surging demand by buying the bonds to use as collateral for three year loans from the ECB at 1%.

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Hugo Dixon says the deal made by eurozone leaders for Greece in July 2011 favors private creditors. The bondholder haircut was much smaller, eurozone governments and taxpayers will make up the difference. This he says is like a cat in the bag presented to the receiver as a pig as long as he does not look inside, called a "poke." Dixon says that if Greece cannot implement austerity measures under a new government and the deal has to be renegotiated bondholders may face a larger haircut than the 20% under the current arrangement. It would have been better he says to do this now but the ECB's threats may have led to the German and French governments treating private creditors with kids gloves.

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Nikos Voutsis, Greece's interior minister, says Greece lacks the money to make debt repayments of 1.6 billion euros to the IMF in June 2015. A proposal by the Left Platform, a faction within Syriza party led by energy minister Lafazanis, which has support of 30 of the 149 Syriza representatives in the Greek parliament, calls for not making debt repayments and looking for an alternate plan. It was defeated by the central committee of the Syriza party on May 24, 2015, with the vote 95 to 75 showing intense opposition within Syriza. Instead Syriza voted for a proposal to call for mutually beneficial negotiations and a deal that would preserve its core goals- a low target for the primary budget surplus, avoid more cuts to pensions, and restructuring Greece's debt to include an investment plan for economic recovery. Both sides in the negotiations, the EU/IMF and Syriza government in Greece, reached an impasse as the negotiating tactics of finance minister Varoufakis led to German finance minister Schauble also taking a tougher stance, saying he could not rule out Greece defaulting on its debt. ...

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A review of the aid program for Greece done for European leaders meeting in Brussels on October 23, 2011, shows that most of the money sent to Greece has gone to pay off bondholders (mostly European banks that lent to Greece). For the initial bailout program of the European Union and the IMF in May 2010, international loans amount to $91 billion. Of this $52 billion has gone to repay bonds that came due between May 2010 and September 2011, according to this review. The report was prepared by the European Commission in coordination with the IMF and the ECB. Greece owes over $300 billion dollars and Greece's borrowing extends far beyond the country's size and ability to repay, creating extraordinary risks to the financial system in Europe. The initial bailout program based its lending on little or no haircuts for the bondholders, who are mainly the European banks (mostly French and German banks) that loaned the money, which creates another set of risks, and a logjam, because taxpayers in the stronger financial countries such as Germany are equally adamant on not paying for the excess lending of the French and German banks. The financial leaders in Germany, Finance Minister Schauble, Axel Weber, the former head of the Bundesbank, and other prominent financial experts have also adamantly insisted on following prudent financial practices, and are opposed to using the European Central Bank to buy the sovereign bonds of France, Italy and Spain....

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Prime minister Monti of Italy played a key role in getting Germany to accept short term measures for the eurozone crisis. This includes having the European Financial Stability Facility, the eurozone's bailout fund, buying govenment bonds of Spain and Italy directly in private markets to reduce the unsustainably high yields on these bonds. The plans proposed by the EU include setting up a European banking regulator.

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Paul de Grauwe, a economist at the London School of Economics points to two problems with the June 28, 2012 EU deal that allows the EU rescue fund to buy Spanish and Italian bonds and provide capital aid directly to Spanish banks. One is the limited funds of the rescue fund, European Financial Stability Facility or by its other name European Stability Mechanism. The EFSF or ESM lacks credibility because it lacks resources, it has only 248 billion euros, and has to first raise money in the bond markets. A better approach would be for the ECB to buy Spanish and Italian bonds aggressively, allowing a smaller spread between these bonds and the German bonds, says Grauewe. Germany is the largest shareholder at the ECB and opposes this move as a form of mutualizing of debt in the EU. Grauwe's recent paper shows that the depressed bond conditions for Spain and Italy are driven largely by a psychology of fear and not hard true economic numbers. Christopher Marks, global head of debt capital markets at BNP Paribas, says it is important to create the confidence to get longer term core investors such as pension funds, sovereign wealth funds and insurance companies back into this market for Spanish and Italian bonds by reducing volatility and yield. These longer term investors have left the market creating a severe problem. The shorter term investors, who came into this market in the last 1-2 years, are now the loudest voice saying Spain and Italy are likely to fail. These shorter term investors are either selling these bonds short or getting credit default swaps. A big problem coming out of the June 28, 2012 agreement, is that it is short on details. The details of how the rescue fund will operate, its funding, and the conditions for making making direct loans for stakes in banks or buying government bonds are still to be clarified. Germany's Constitutional Court also will rule on how this would be conducted and the Merkel government would continue tough negotiations on the details creating added uncertainty. ...

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Krugman says voters in France, Greece, the UK and other countries are protesting against austerity measures imposed in the EU countries. The policies were based on the assumption made by the Chrisitian Democrats in Germany that the German model if applied in other countries would generate the kind of recovery Germany made in the last decade from the high unemployment under chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. German wage restraint agreement between unions, industry and government made this possible under the Hartz reforms, and France is already embarking on wage restraint, with the two major parties, unions and industry backing the plan. But for this to work France and other countries such as Spain and Italy have to be able to export to Germany or other countries. German workers are suffering from stagnant wages for many years, stemming from concessions made to reduce unemployment. Allowing wages to rise in Germany when there is a shortage of workers in industry, would benefit workers in Germany and help France and other EU countries increase exports. German industry is failing to make this normal adjustment in markets by insisting on smaller concessions, even though there is support within the government for higher wages. German growth was possible because of demand outside for its exporters. The "austerity measures" Germany supports would depress demand inside the domestic economies of France, Spain, Italy and other EU countries, and without the wage and inflation adjustments with Germany leave demand weak outside. Without needed demand output falls, unemployment rises and tax revenues decline, leaving deficits worse than before, and a dangerous downward spiral. Better management of finances as Germany has insisted has ceased to become the issue, as both Hollande in France and Rajoy in Spain, and Monti in Italy, are keen on getting control of finances, especially regional spending in Spain....

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Mario Monti, prime minster of Italy, defends his labor reforms in Italy, in a letter to the Journal.

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Wall Street Journal reporters Walker in Berlin, Forelle in Brussels, and Meichtry in Rome, reconstruct the events during critical days after the indecision and failure to reach agreement during the July summit of eurozone countries. This took the form of intervews with leading players and over 25 policy makers. What emerges are accounts of how Germany's Angela Merkel, daughter of a Lutheran pastor, and protege of Eurozone founder, former German chancellor Helmut Kohl, handled the crisis. Merkel was widely criticized in the media for indecision. What emerges is an account of a leader who took decisive action at key moments in the crisis- leading to the formation of new governments in Greece and Italy taking action to improve finances, and negotiations with banks represented by the International Finance Corporation leading to acceptance by banks of a 50% loss on loans to Greece to reduce Greece's unsustainable debt burden. Merkel also worked with the European Central Bank's departing president Frenchman Claude Trichet and new president Italian Mario Draghi to resist French president Sarkozy's efforts to have the ECB assume responsibility for the crisis through large scale buying of Italian and Spanish bonds; which was opposed by German public opinion as a backdoor way of having German taxpayers assume responsibility for European debt. Shown are three critical moments when Merkel intervened. In October 2011, after Italian prime minister Berlusconi reneged on promises to make pension and other reforms to improve Italian finances because of political resistance. He survived a parliamentary no-confidence vote by one vote. Merkel took the lead on October 20, by directly calling Italian President Georgio Napolitano on the phone, to urge him to take action for forming a new government in Italy. The result was Napolitano talking with all political parties to form a new government, leading to the formation of a government by a non-political figure respected in Italy, former EU commissioner Mario Monti. A day earlier, on October 19, French President Sarkozy met ECB president, Trichet, at an event honoring him as departing ECB president in Frankfurt's Alte Oper concert hall. Trichet, Merkel and Sarkozy met in a side room. Sarkozy asked for decisive help from the ECB for large scale buying of Italian and Spanish bonds to lower yields, which had reached 7% on Italian bonds. Trichet responded that the ECB's charter did not allow it to finance governments, with the meeting ending in a shouting match between the two leaders. On October 21, EU and IMF inspectors warned that Greece's debt was reaching unsustainable proportions and austerity measures alone would not work, unless the bondholders, the European banks, took losses of 60% on their excessive lending to Greece. At this point France agreed to the German position arguing for this level of bondholder haircuts or losses, fearing the prospect of large future bailouts that would jeopardize France's triple AAA credit rating. The July 2011 summit accord had only provided for 10% in losses for bondholders. On October 27, at a meeting that went past midnight, Merkel and Sarkozy called IIF head Charles Dallara, who headed negotiating for the banks, to EU headquarters in Brussels. Merkel handed Dallara an agreement containing the 50% bondholder loss demand, and told Dallara- "This is the last offer." Merkel was saying banks would be left with nothing if they rejected it and Greece defaulted. Dallara called bankers and the IIF accepted Merkel's agreement. The final moment that October came on October 31, when Greece's prime minister Papandreou said he would call a referendum on the bailout provisions and austerity measures demanded by the IMF, the EU and the ECB. Bond markets reacted negatively to the announcement fearing a rejection and a Greek default. The Group of 20 leaders was meeting in Cannes, France on Nov. 2, 2011. Papandreou was asked to come to Cannes for a pre-summit meeting. Here Merkel told Papandreou- "the real question" for the referendum was, "Do you want to be in the euro, or not?" Days later Papandreou, lacking support in Greece from political parties and opposition inside his party, submitted his resignation. A non-political figure respected in Greece, former ECB vice president, Lucas Papademos, was appointed prime minister to head a Unity government. Polls after the appointment showed three fourths of Greeks said that this was "a positive step for Greece," with Papandreou's party getting only 11% support and the opposition led by Samaras about 20%. The criticism leveled at Merkel is that Germany should take responsibility for debt throughout the euro area through the issuance of eurozone bonds or the ECB buying large amount of bonds of Spain and Italy. Merkel faced strong opposition inside Germany and from the Bundesbank to this idea. The other criticism was based on austerity measures worsening the finances of Greece because of a lack of growth in the economy, which is true; yet Germany may see the situation in Greece as taking a long time to be resolved in any event because of excessive and faulty financial management. For Italy and Spain putting finances in order was a necessity, and austerity measures should lead to short term sacrifice but improve prospects for the long term by returning the economies to growth. Another criticism is the installation of governments that lack popular or electoral support. As the polls in Greece showed the Unity government there has far greater support and public opinion blames the politicians for the huge mess. In Italy, Berlusconi was widely seen as losing popular support when he resigned. And in Spain Mariano Rajoy, the newly elected prime minister, was elected with a huge majority in parliament following winning in local government elections. Merkel also held her own party, the Chrisitian Democrats together at the recent Leipzig convention. Mario Draghi, was elected with German support to head the European Central Bank. He has long argued for better management of Italian finances as head of Italy's central bank. Draghi was able to support Merkel with carefully planned and managed actions. First to reduce interest rates to support economic growth in a slowing eurozone. Following this with the ECB's Long Term Financing Operation in late December 2011, to provide unlimited loans to European banks at 1% interest for three years in exchange for a broadened list of collateral deposited at the ECB. In a final twist in this drama, Charles Dallara, who was a key negotiator for the U.S. Treasury in setting up the Brady Bonds- that converted bad Latin American government debt owed to U.S. banks in the 1980's into long term debt with large reductions in principal owed and lower interest rates. This was in exchange for guaranteed repayment with 30 year U.S. zero coupon bonds. Dallara was now a negotiator for the banks to reduce the chance of the very same bondholder haircuts that he had negotiated in an earlier period to solve the Latin American debt crisis. Other players in the drama were Axel Weber, head of the Bundesbank, Germany's central bank, who resigned after strong and outspoken opposition to the ECB's large scale purchase of bonds of Greece, Italy and Spain. Jens Weidmann, his protege, who replaced him. And Jurgen Stark, German representative at the ECB, who also resigned in opposition to Germany assuming responsibility for eurozone debt. ...

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Speaking at the annual meeting of Italy's banking association on July 11, 2012, prime minister Mario Monti calls the struggle he is leading to change the economic performance of Italy, and especially against structural vices in the economy, "a very tough war." He added that the plan to reduce Italy's borrowing rates with the agreement to use the ESM or EFSF, the EU's rescue fund, "must be consolidated both in its substance and the way it is communicated." Bank of Italy governor, Ignazio Visco, said the spread between Italian and German bonds and the borrowing rates approaching 7% for Italy compared to about zero for Germany and France, were "far above what would be justified by the fundamentals of our economy." Deputy finance minister, Vittorio Grilli, is taking over the role of finance minister which Monti had assumed earlier. Monti will lead a new economic and financial policy committee which includes Mr. Grilli and development minister Corrado Passera.

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Zarkadakis points to modern Greece's burden of history since the struggle for freedom from the Turks in 1821. The resurgence of European interest in ancient Greece, he says, burdened modern Greece with a narrative of their identity based on romantic and idealistic notions of Europeans in other nations. It also burdened ordinary Greek people with learning three Greek languages, including the language of the ancient Greeks. Failure to live up to the expectations of the intellectual classes of Europe from their perceptions of a distant past led them to look down on the people of Greece- as evident in perceptions in the German media about Greeks as lazy (the Mediterrranean peoples and lifestyles not as hardworking as the Germans) and liars (the national accounts being largely fudged till a Dutchman at the IMF presented the correct picture in 2009), and cheats (extensive tax evasion). He says this ignores the national traits of Christian Orthodox (which would suggest "mercy" or significant forgiveness of debt when debt reaches a point of becoming uncollectable) the economic history of successive defaults in 1893 and 1932 (lack of economic maturity), a strong cultural trend that tends to circumvent the governing authority. The desire to modernize Greece of the intellectual classes and governing politicians in Greece, and the dependence on the European Union as the sole guarantor of such modernization, has he points out led to a sort of arrogance that ignores the anxieties and fears of the ordinary people of Greece. This was evident in the way efforts to get a referendum on the austerity plans imposed on Greece were quashed by EU officials and the Greek politicians. ...

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Julie Creswell and Graham Bowley look at the history of setting ratings for Greece at Moody's credit rating agency. Greece always had a history of problems with its credit standing including two defaults in its history. In 2004 Greece admitted to providing false statistics to enter the eurozone, saying that it had run deficits for each year since 1997. Before joining the eurozone Greece was assessed an interest rate of 15% on Greek bonds, after joining the eurozone borrowing rates dropped to 5%. Was such a large differential justified purely on the basis of the assumption that the eurozone would back Greece. Moody's held onto its A rating on Greek debt right upto December 2009, two years before the country faced certain default. Pierre Cailletau, Moody's head of sovereign debt ratings till the spring of 2010 admits that Moody's assessment was "mediocre" and that this is a very, very steep fall to see in a ratings- something had gone very, very wrong. The ratings agencies say bankers were selling the idea that the Greek growth story was real. This suggests bankers did not read Greece's financial history of defaults, did not understand the lessons of the recurring Latin American debt crises that countries such as Argentina could only absorb capital upto the point of productive capabilities. And the euro currency founders had left a weak gap - the perception through an implied guarantee that the whole eurozone would ante up the money for the failings of individual countries- into which bankers and Greece's political class rushed in. ...

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Viviane Reding, vice president of the European Commission, provides a five point proposal to strengthen the European Union and take the steps to a closer political union. She says the Maastricht Treaty does not provide the strong foundation the European Union needs and the steps are already underway to change this. The fiscal compact for financial discipline in the eurozone that all members of the eurozone agreed to is one such step. Other steps remain for a closer union and she suggests the time is now for an open debate inside the EU countries about what people want to see the EU become by 2020. As a timetable a treaty on political union could be ratified between 2016 and 2019, with it going into effect once two thirds of the countries have approved it with referendums. Countries would have the opton of political union or staying in a close form of association but not union.

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The facts that guide one's understanding of what is happening in Greece relate to the size of the public sector for a small country like Greece, and the failure of people from all classes of society from cab drivers and civil servants to small business and the shipping industry, to pay taxes. These two twin facts and a splurge of spending during and after the 2004 Olympics without proper and correct account keeping, has brought Greece to its present situation. One estimate is that every Greek person would owe 27,000 dollars, that is how much the national debt has swollen to- a massive 300 billion euros debt for a small country. This is 115% of its GDP. And the public sector spending simply went unchecked by different governments trying to win votes. Estimates are that the public sector makes up 40% of Greece's GDP, and government workers are 15% of the active workforce. Not paying taxes has become a societal trait in Greece, as a result the government does not collect an estimated 25 billion euros a year in taxes each year. And this does not include the taxes that would be paid if owners in the Greek shipping industry were to not take advantage of an exemption from paying taxes granted by the government. The result- Greece's socialist government of Prime Minister Papandreou has accepted a $110 billion euro bailout from the European Union and the IMF which comes with cuts in public spending and austerity measures designed to reduce the deficit form 13.6% of GDP to 3% in 3 years. Its important to understand what is happening in Greece, because from Prime Minister Cameron in Britain (with his cuts in government department spending of 25% over 5 years), to Prime Minister Naoto Kan of Japan (with a planned doubling of the sales tax), the mood in Europe and Japan is shifting to austerity measures that would correct excessive government spending. In Greece Papandreou and his ministers are making serious efforts to change a culture of not paying taxes. See the groups and links for Papandreou and Greece....

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Palaiologos of the Kathimerini newspaper in Athens, Greece, says the early euphoria of support for Tsipras is fading, as the negotiations with the EU require Tsipras to go back on his election pledges and require difficult choices. He points to a poll from the University of Macedonia putting government support of its negotiating strategy in April 2015 at 45.5%, down from 72% in February 2015. He says the Syriza government has conveyed different and contradictory messages, wasting a lot of the goodwill in Europe for Greece's position, and by backtracking on agreements put Greece back into recession. Greece needs to take responsibility for how deep the crisis is compared to a country like Ireland or Portugal, because of dysfunctional public administration and political systems, says Palaiologos. The EU and Greece need to make a fresh start after all the false starts of the early part of 2015.