Feldstein's thoughts in April 2009, on Treasury's Public-Private Investment Plan. First, he says this plan will only remove $500 billion of impaired assets. The banks he says now own $3 billion of residential mortgages, $1.5 trillion of corporate real-estate loans, and $1 trillion of consumer debt. Not all of this is impaired but the banks will have to sell much more than $500 billion to regain confidence in their solvency. And with one third of all residential mortgages exceeding the value of the houses, and thie many homeowners under water, likely to default, the negative feedback loop of foreclosures begetting falling prices begetting foreclosures, threatens the whole effort to shore up the defences. If no workable solution is executed quickly to prevent this then even larger pools of mortgage debt will be impaired irretrievably. Feldstein suggests that the Obama administration seriously look at his plan suggested in March 2008 to provide government loans at low rates of interest like 1- 2% for 20% of the principal amount of the mortgage and then reduce the mortgage principal by 20%, thus keeping millions of homeowners above water. But this needs to be done quickly. All voluntary efforts have failed and have become asmokescreen for banks and lobbying groups with support from Congress to make it appear that this problem is being addressed. Thirdly Feldstein says that if banks sell these impaired mortgage assets at a loss- say 40-60 cents on the dollar on the upside with government and the FDIC picking up alot of the risk and financing for private investors under the new plan- they will now have to show the loss whereas they could have previously shown these assets at unrealistic price levels but still not taking losses. This might push banks into insolvency, so banks will need more injection of capital by the government to make this possible. What are the risks in this situation? Without an effective plan to prevent the negative feedback loop of foreclosure waves and falling houseprices, the quantity of impaired assets will simply grow larger. In effect even if some private investors take out some of the impaired assets from the banking system, it is possible that a new set of assets equal to or larger than these assets that are taken out are added to impaired assets in the banking system as house prices fall steeply from new foreclosures. That only means the economy is in the same hole as before, or in a slightly larger one, even with all the well intentioned steps. At some point the private enterprise argument has to be seen in the correct light. It is not that there is any argument that private enterprise can function better or far superior, it is only that the banks as private enterprises are in such an enormously stressed situation that the bank executive's cannot execute a way out of this mess. ...