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The European Recovery Fund package finally gets settled after long negotiations over the weekend. It is settled by lowering the nonrepayable direct aid to countries hardest hit by the pandemic of 500 billion euros the initial target to 390 billion euros. The change was made to meet Dutch demands that are based on right wing parties in Netherlands critical of the deal and upcoming elections in the country. Mr. Rutte of the Netherlands held on to the end. He has been in power for about ten years by following the Dutch mood carefully. This time both Merkel and Macron, both France and Germany supported the 500 billion euro plan for nonrepayable aid to countries particularly in southern Europe that took the brunt of the pandemic- Spain, Italy and Greece. The EU's executive branch will now for first time issue debt on a large scale to fund this nonrepayable aid and additional loans of 360 billion euros. There is also a multiyear EU budget of 1 trillion euros for 2021 to 2027 designed to meet the goals of European recovery. The way the EU is setup a lone holdout or a small country like the Netherlands with the help of two other small countries Denmark and Sweden could hold up the agreement against the interests of the larger nations Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal. Poland and Hungary also strongly supported the 500 billion euro target for nonrepayable aid. The combined population of these countries is about 314 million compared to just 17 million for Netherlands, 10 million for Sweden, and 6 million for Denmark. In addition Merkel has recovered her footing in Germany after the pandemic and most right wing parties in Europe have lost ground during the pandemic. That Mr. Rutte could push this far in the face of the need to show solidarity at a time like this shows weakness in the fabric and structure of the EU, and its rules and organizing charter. Normally a blocking minority would need 4 countries and 35% of the population to block EU proposals supported by the majority. This could be used if the blocking is seen as not in the common interest. In recent years most decision are made with unanimity, but this is one in which solidarity needed to be shown without the long negotiations taking some of the spirit and vigour behind the earlier plan. ...

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President Macron calls it "the moment of truth" for Europe. The European Recovery Fund includes $500 billion in nonrepayable money to be handed out to countries hit hardest by the pandemic as a show of solidarity and support for the European community. Only one lone holdout are the Dutch, who have not earlier and today show little solidarity with the European community. It is supported by Merkel and the CDU, Macron, EU president Leyen, the head of the European Central Bank's Lagarde. This report in BBNC shows how the funds would be distributed- Italy 81 billion euros Spain  77 billion euros France   39 billion euros Poland 38 billion euros Greece  32 billion euros Germany 30 billion euros Portugal 17 billion euros France plans to put the 39 billion euros towards its own 100 billion euros recovery plan. 20 billion euros of this will go to insulating buildings and for bicycle lanes in cities in France.   ...

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The German French plan for 500 billion euro of outright aid as non repayable subsidies is supported fully by Merkel as she calls for massive amounts of aid to help the EU recover from th pandemic. Asd the pandemic was exceptional so must the aid be exceptional says Merkel.  The Bavarian state premier Soder supports it, so does the FDP's Lindner.  This report looks at why Merkel has pushed forward with this plan after supporting a decade of austerity in Europe following the Greek loan bailouts. Merkel sees aid that is repayable worsening the debt ratios of countries like Italy to the point that this would be stones not bread. This would strangle Italy's and other economies such as Spain and Portugal. It is not in Germany's interest, it is best to make partners. Only Austria, Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark oppose this. Yet this is shortsighted. Most of these northern tier countries have pursued their own self oriented interests not that of a European community of nations in crisis. ...

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Martin Feldstein says the eurozone summit of Dec. 9, 2011, was a failure because the plan for closer economic integration and financial discipline does not address the immediate problems of increasing bond yields for Italy and Spain. The summit concluded with decisions to set up a constitutional rule for each euro-zone country to balance its budget, take corrective action if the "structural" deficit exceeds 0.5% of GDP, and impose penalties if the actual deficit is larger than 3% of GDP. German chancellor Merkel wanted to have these rules put in a revised version of the EU Treaty, enforceable by the European Commission through the European Court of Justice. With Britain not agreeing to accept the plan without safeguards it requested, the new rules apply to the eurozone only, are not part of a revised Treaty and are not enforceable by EU institutions. Feldstein says it is wrong to have a common solution for Italy and Greece. For Greece the best option is to go back to the drachma, because of its shrinking economy and high debt load, and the need for a competitive currency. Italy, he says has a good chance of convincing investors to lower yields by taking strong steps. Italy's fiscal deficit is 4% of GDP, and the IMF projected Italy would have a balanced budget in 2013. How should Italy plan for the 300 billion euros of Italian bonds that need to be sold in the next 12 months? Feldstein says only 40 billion euros are needed to finance the projected budget deficit and for the rest is for existing bonds to be rolled over when they are due. Italy can repay the maturing debt with new bonds and not cash. And Italy can get the help of the IMF for some of the funds needed. On the issue of the ECB engaging in large scale buying of Italian and Spanish government bonds, Feldstein says Mario Draghi is doing the right thing by rejecting French proposals to do this, because this would be against ECB rules in the Maastricht Treaty to bailout governments and would reduce the incentive to make changes in Italy and Spain for lower deficits. ...

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John Taylor looks one step ahead of the March 2012 Greece bailout and sets up the most plausible scenario for the future. He says the risks of contagion were always exaggerated from the beginning- a planned default or restructuring of debt such as happened in Argentina in 2001, does not have the contagion risks associated with a chaotic and unplanned default as in Russia in 1998. Predicability in policy makes a huge difference, says Taylor. The European banks which stood to lose from writedowns exaggerated the fears of contagion- a process that always occurs for people who are adversely affected by writedowns- resulting in top officials in the European Union delaying the unavoidable serious restructuring. It was not until Chancellor Merkel handed Charles Dallara, who negotiated for the European banks, a note stating a demand for 50% bondholder writedown, on October 27, 2011, at EU headquarters in Brussels, did any serious writedown of debt begin. Merkel told Dallara: "this is my last offer." The July 2011 summit by contrast had only a 10% bondholder writedown in the agreement, when insolvency not illiquidity was the real issue. Walker Forelle and Meichtry, give a detailed account of what happened in the Wall Street Journal, Dec. 30, 2011. The important thing for Greece, says Taylor, is for what the IMF calls "growth enhancing structural reforms" - greater reliance on private markets, incentives, rule of law. He says this bailout won't work because IMF growth forecasts do not reflect the rapid shrinking of the Greek economy. Antonis Samaras, leader of the major opposition party, is in favor of pro-growth measures and has stated his desire to change the agreement. The 130 billion euro bailout provides 90 billion euros for recapitalizing Greece's banks, and financing the budget. This puts Greece in a situation where the political leaders win voter support by discarding the conditions from the Northern EU nations and come with a plan that is better suited for Greece. The EU in this scenario would cut off further bailout funds to Greece. Taylor sees this as the better outcome for Greece than the current situation, which leaves Greece no hope for growth, and also for the EU by getting out of bailouts that have little prospect of working. It would be difficult but doable for Greece says Taylor, because interest payments would be low and Greek banks would be recapitalized after the current March 2012 bailout. ...

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The EU has pushed the date for France to reduce its deficit to 3% once before -to 2015 giving France 2 more years. French president Hollande faced with unemployment at 11% in March 2014, has set the task of convincing Brussels to allow more time after losing badly in local elections and facing opposition to continued austerity in his own party. France is expected to come up with a plan to present to the EU for cutting public spending by 50 billion euros over 3 years 2015-2017. In the televised address on March 31, Hollande put the priority on growth, saying "Its not a question of cutting spending for the sake of it." After election in May 2012, Hollande and prime minister Rajoy of Spain went to Brussels together to push for a growth oriented policy in the eurozone. This time he has support from Socialist Party leader in Italy, Matteo Renzi, who is also introducing growth oriented policies to reduce unemployment and boost the economy. The two leaders faceoff with Angela Merkel on the need to relax austerity policies in the eurozone....

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Germany's export oriented economy and its export oriented companies are struggling in 2021 with broken supply chains and high energy prices. This report in the WSJ looks at how Germany needs to rebuild its economy in a different way. German industrial output was 9% below its 2015 level in August, compared to 2% for the eurozone as a whole, according to EU's statistics agency. Italy's growth was 5% over the same period. There is a redirection underway to bring more production back home after years of outsourcing and outshoring. Other changes taking place are the policies being put in place for net zero emissions by 2050, and the targets for 2030 that would make this possible. This also changes prospects for Germany's large auto industry. By 2030 30-50% of all cars will have to be electric cars. About 30% of Germany's industrial output and exports are tied to overseas demand, 4 times that in the US. From 2003 when competitive overhauls took place under chancellors including Mr. Schroeder, German industrial growth was sustained by demand from China. Now with China looking to internal demand following global tensions on trade, sales of some companies are looking flat instead of sustained year over year growth. What will happen now? Here is what the likely new chancellor from the Social Democrats has to say about the overhaul of the German economy and industry- "It will be the biggest industrial modernization project that Germany has carried out probably for over 100 years, and it will really help our economy." The SDP and Greens that together share the same ideas for rebuilding Germany around infrastructure and climate change and upward mobility, badly neglected in the Merkel years, plan big investments. Big investments are to be made in climate protection, high speed internet, education, research and infrastructure. Germany's net investment rate has been around 0.5% of economic output since 2000, compared to 1% for Italy and 1.5% for the US, according to the World Bank. This WSJ report even says net public investment has fallen below zero as existing assets depreciate. To achieve this transition Germany has identified several problems. One is the delays in investment projects that cost German companies 55 billion euros a year, about half the money invested in research and development, according to Germany's statistics agency. Germany was thought to be an industrial powerhouse but the quality of work in projects and delays so apparent in the Berlin Brandenburg airport infrastructure project clearly shows a decline over the past two decades. This will need to be fixed. Other problems are in getting more workers as Germany faces a shortage of workers for factories to 2030.     ...

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The IMF, ECB, and the EU, are requiring Greece to make cuts to private sector salaries by a reported 25% to bring Greece's wages more in line with a country like Portugal, because of the lower productivity of Greek workers and a way to make Greek goods more competitive. This is one way to accomplish what a devaluation of the drachma would have done when Greece was outside the eurozone. Greece's minimum wage is about $1000 a month- officials from the troika want to see this go down about $750 a month. The difficulty is that consumer prices are higher in Greece, with gasoline at $8 a gallon and other prices higher due to cartels that control the distribution of consumer goods in Greece. Other austerity measures required by the troika as a condition for further aid to Greece are pension cuts and higher taxes on businesses. Labor unions and business leaders pointed out other factors affecting Greece's competitiveness in a letter to prime minister Papademos as they opposed drastic wage cuts- the letter said " competitiveness is affected more by factors like bureaucracy- which is fed by complex regulation, state intervention, the tax system, corruption and antibusiness mentality rather than wage costs."...

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The Ifo Institute's Hans-Werner Sinn presents the German view on bailouts for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy. He says that socializing of debt was proved to be a bad idea even in the U.S. experience when eight states and territories were allowed to go bankrupt in the 1830's and 1840's, and even though California is close to being bankrupt no one suggests socializing the debt. The European Economic Advisory Group has favored short term assistance and liquidity assistance but not aid for insolvency. Bundesbank assistance for international shift of refinancing credit, also called Target credit, is estimated at $874 billion, since 2007. Greece and Portugal current account deficits were financed using this. ECB purchase of government bonds $250 billion, and $500 billion in rescue programs from the IMF, and additional help from the European rescue funds such as EFSF. Sinn says Germany would lose $1.35 trillion if the euro fails. If Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain go bankrupt and repay nothing, and the euro survived, Germany would have lost $899 billion by his estimates. He responds to critics by saying that the Marshall Plan gave Germany 0.5% of GDP for 4 years, or 2% in total, or about $5 billion today if taken as 2% of Greek GDP....

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At the height of the Eurozone crisis in December 2011, David Brooks points out that it is important not to forget what the Germans are saying in this crisis. They are arguing for truth in accounting, which the government in Greece failed to do, and which may have more to do with negative opinion in the media and with the public in Germany about Greece than any other factor. They are arguing against speculative excesses that enabled Greece to borrow recklessly. And they are making the argument that the only way to put the finances of the eurozone on a sound basis is to have the financial discipline that is necessary for a sound currency. Anthony Faiola pointed out recently that one estimate for tax evasion in Italy is $340 billion a year- Washington Post, 11/25/2011. Greece has a similiar problem, which needs to be addressed. This view has credibility and the backing of every principle of sound financial practices, irrespective of country or region. For ordinary Germans who have gone through years of wage restraint during the period of high unemployment, their attitude is captured in one German workers response to Greece's situation - when she said there are "poor children in Germany also." Years after reunification were a difficult experience for Germany, and left parts of the country still affected by the experience. The period of high unemployment is still a fresh memory, as the economic recovery is fairly recent. There is a feeling that the situation is precarious, depending on exports, as the 2009 downturn showed. These facts remain even when one considers the criticism levelled at Germany. Germany benefitted from the bubble in the economies of Southern Europe through surging exports- from a currency that was undervalued in relation to neighbors- because of the common currency. German banks lent heavily to Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, along with French and British banks, and bear responsibility for reckless lending and not doing due diligence for loans to Greece and other countries. Germany also carries the burden of memories of hyperinflation in the 1920's, and the sense along with France that partnership is necessary for peace in Europe. Germany's position on austerity measures also has one underlying weakness - if this leads to shrinking economies in southern Europe in the name of fianncial discipline, then the plan fails as tax revenues decline and budget deficits increase. Given this experience Germany faces the challenge of convincing neighbors of the need for good governance and sound spending practices for long term stability of the currency, even as it leads the effort for providing short term funding. In the short run this reaps criticism for Germany, including criticism for some members such as Greece having to leave the euro as a way to regain competitiveness and growth. Experts have suggested that this would be a better option for Greece than a shrinking economy after strong austerity measures, and the referendum proposed by former prime minister Papandreou on strict austerity measures is likely to have gone in this direction. ...

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The CDU convention in Leipzig, Germany passed a compromise resolution that lays the ground for a EU country to voluntarily leave the euro zone and still maintain membership in the European Union. The resolution called for changes to the Lisbon Treaty to allow a euro zone member that is "unable or unwilling to permanently obey the rules connected to the common currency... to voluntarily... leave the euro zone without leaving the European Union." Merkel told delegates that Europe must change the EU treaty to allow for strong automatic sanctions for violations of the monetary union treaty. "We need to send a clear signal. We don't whine; we don't complain. We know instead that we have a job to do." On the issue of voluntary withdrawal from the eurozone, the earlier decision by Merkel and President Sarkozy of France- when prime minister Papandreou of Greece decided to put the issue of membership to a referendum- was to tell Greece that leaving the eurozone would mean leaving the European Union. This CDU resolution provides a basis for Greece to resolve its debt problems outside the euro currency, as experts suggest....

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An account by Journal reporters based on over 25 interviews with eurozone policymakers shows how the central players in the eurozone drama acted to defend their national interests during the period April to July 2011. On one side France's president Sarkozy, Frenchman Claude Trichet at the European Central Bank, arguing in favor of the banks not to take bondholder losses or haircuts on loans made to Greece. On the other side the Bundesbanks Axel Weber, and Jens Weidman, Jurgen Stark and German Finance Minister Schauble. The Germans argued strongly for bondholder losses to take responsibility for bad loan decisions by French and German banks. French banks had committed more loans to Greece than German banks and had more at stake. German public opinion was strongly against German taxpayers paying for the losses, making German politicians insistent that European banks take losses on their bad loan decisions, or Germany would not support additional loans to Greece. Throughout April to July the two sides were locked in an impasse. The French feared losses for their banks and a Lehman Brothers bankruptcy style situation. The Germans at the Bundesbank and the Finance Ministry were equally insistent. A July 2011 summit meeting did not settle the issue. The events not covered here from the July to the December summit of eurozone leaders resulted in bondholders taking 50% haircut on loans to Greece, reducing the debt burden in Greece after austerity measures led to popular protests. The French pushed hard for the ECB or the EFSF to be allowed to make large purchases of bonds of troubled eurozone countries in an effort to protect Spain and Italy from contagion through higher bond yields. The Netherlands and Finland supported Germany's position. German bankers Weber, Weidman at the Bundesbank and Finance Minister Schauble opposed large scale buying by the ECB of Italy's and Spain's bonds and Chancellor Merkel said about a common eurobond that "this is not going to happen." Governments changed in Greece, Italy, and Spain by Dec. 2011, which committed to austerity programs and spending cuts. Italian Mario Draghi was appointed with German support as new head of the ECB. In late December 2011 Draghi launched the Long Term Financing Operation for lending unlimited amounts at 1% for three year loans to European banks and relaxing the terms to accept government bonds and other debt as collateral for loans. The effect of this was to provide a large infusion of liquidity into the banking system in Europe and drastically bring down the yields on bonds issued by Italy and Spain....

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Efforts by BNP Paribas to get bondholders to take a 50% loss on Greek bonds, and exchange their old bonds for new ones that mature in 50 years. BNP Paribas is working for the Greek government to get other banks and bondholders to accept this exchange so that Greece can tackle its debt load and interest payments on debt. Some arm twisting by BNP Paribas to get bondholders who have insurance through CDS to accept the exchange. This is being done on the grounds that the I.S.D.A. committe would declare the restructuring in Greece as being "voluntary" and not a default, so that bondholders who do not accept this deal would not get paid through CDS insurance.

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German chancellor Angela Merkel arrived for a meeting of eurozone leaders in Brussels on October 23, 2011. She said: "I believe that now we have reached a more realistic view of the situation in Greece and that we will provide the necessary means to be able to protect the euro." Germany has insisted that bondholders take writeoffs of between 50-60% of Greek debt so that Greece would have sustainable debt. A review of Greece's debt by the European Commission in coordination with the ECB and the IMF shows that Greece's debt situation is totally unsustainable and will require a bondholder writeoff of around 60%. according to that report a 60% writeoff for bondholders would be required to bring Greece's debt below 110 percent of GDP by 2020. This has supported the German "realistic" view and Jean-Claude Juncker of Luxembourg, who heads the euro group of finance ministers stated that "we agreed yesterday (Friday, Oct. 21) that we have to have a significant increase in the banks' contribution." France also backed away from the plan it was supporting for the European Financial Stability Facility (the fund established to lend to troubled countries) to borrow from the European Central Bank, something Germany opposes. French finance minister Francois Baroin, said the issue was "not a definitive point of discussion for us,... what matters is what works." The Dutch support the Germans on these issues and Dutch finance minister, Jan Kees de Jager, said the use of the European central bank was "no longer an option." Options being considered are for the European Financial Stability Facility to offer insurance against a portion of losses on Italian and Spanish bonds....

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Zeit Online shows in this article the continued efforts of the Russian government of president Putin to discredit Chancellor Merkel, following efforts to do this for Hillary Clinton in the U.S. presidential election.  During the Ukraine crisis and the settlement accords of 2014 Germany was seen as a partner by Russia, following sanctions, and renewal of these sanctions Russia no longer sees Germany as a partner. This report shows Russian efforts to discredit chancellor Merkel and the use of RT German channel, WikiLeaks reports of Chancellor Merkel and the TTIP agreement, for the same purpose. The refugee crisis following what is happening in Syria with Russian involvement, terrorism, financial crisis aftermath from 2008, are being used  says Zeit Online to support a movement for "order" as the state ideology now put forward from the Russian government. This could be an early indicator for the 2017 German federal elections, says Zeit Online. Merkel has said that she supports continuation of western sanctions on Russia. It is hard to see what Russia has gained in improving its economy and the standard of living of the people from this type of political action. Putin was able to achieve economic goals during 2005-2010 using good Germany- Russian relations as shown in LyrArc. This was the earlier period of Putin's terms in office, with a broad group of advisors, including finance minister Kudrin, who set forward a prudent economic course for Russia including foreign investment. The world and Russia are poorer from the departure from this earlier set of policies which would have enhanced Russia's economic growth. Kudrin was fired in September 2011, and the economic course has gradually drifted away from what is most prudent for the Russian economy and growth, and for the global economy. Nationalism was part of an earlier period before 1950, that led to frequent wars and economic catastrophes. A new course has been set since then, especially by American presidents Truman and Eisenhower, and people in India, China, the developing world, in Europe and in the U.S., would see little to gain from the politics of that earlier period in world relations.  ...

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A review of the aid program for Greece done for European leaders meeting in Brussels on October 23, 2011, shows that most of the money sent to Greece has gone to pay off bondholders (mostly European banks that lent to Greece). For the initial bailout program of the European Union and the IMF in May 2010, international loans amount to $91 billion. Of this $52 billion has gone to repay bonds that came due between May 2010 and September 2011, according to this review. The report was prepared by the European Commission in coordination with the IMF and the ECB. Greece owes over $300 billion dollars and Greece's borrowing extends far beyond the country's size and ability to repay, creating extraordinary risks to the financial system in Europe. The initial bailout program based its lending on little or no haircuts for the bondholders, who are mainly the European banks (mostly French and German banks) that loaned the money, which creates another set of risks, and a logjam, because taxpayers in the stronger financial countries such as Germany are equally adamant on not paying for the excess lending of the French and German banks. The financial leaders in Germany, Finance Minister Schauble, Axel Weber, the former head of the Bundesbank, and other prominent financial experts have also adamantly insisted on following prudent financial practices, and are opposed to using the European Central Bank to buy the sovereign bonds of France, Italy and Spain....

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Wall Street Journal reporters Walker in Berlin, Forelle in Brussels, and Meichtry in Rome, reconstruct the events during critical days after the indecision and failure to reach agreement during the July summit of eurozone countries. This took the form of intervews with leading players and over 25 policy makers. What emerges are accounts of how Germany's Angela Merkel, daughter of a Lutheran pastor, and protege of Eurozone founder, former German chancellor Helmut Kohl, handled the crisis. Merkel was widely criticized in the media for indecision. What emerges is an account of a leader who took decisive action at key moments in the crisis- leading to the formation of new governments in Greece and Italy taking action to improve finances, and negotiations with banks represented by the International Finance Corporation leading to acceptance by banks of a 50% loss on loans to Greece to reduce Greece's unsustainable debt burden. Merkel also worked with the European Central Bank's departing president Frenchman Claude Trichet and new president Italian Mario Draghi to resist French president Sarkozy's efforts to have the ECB assume responsibility for the crisis through large scale buying of Italian and Spanish bonds; which was opposed by German public opinion as a backdoor way of having German taxpayers assume responsibility for European debt. Shown are three critical moments when Merkel intervened. In October 2011, after Italian prime minister Berlusconi reneged on promises to make pension and other reforms to improve Italian finances because of political resistance. He survived a parliamentary no-confidence vote by one vote. Merkel took the lead on October 20, by directly calling Italian President Georgio Napolitano on the phone, to urge him to take action for forming a new government in Italy. The result was Napolitano talking with all political parties to form a new government, leading to the formation of a government by a non-political figure respected in Italy, former EU commissioner Mario Monti. A day earlier, on October 19, French President Sarkozy met ECB president, Trichet, at an event honoring him as departing ECB president in Frankfurt's Alte Oper concert hall. Trichet, Merkel and Sarkozy met in a side room. Sarkozy asked for decisive help from the ECB for large scale buying of Italian and Spanish bonds to lower yields, which had reached 7% on Italian bonds. Trichet responded that the ECB's charter did not allow it to finance governments, with the meeting ending in a shouting match between the two leaders. On October 21, EU and IMF inspectors warned that Greece's debt was reaching unsustainable proportions and austerity measures alone would not work, unless the bondholders, the European banks, took losses of 60% on their excessive lending to Greece. At this point France agreed to the German position arguing for this level of bondholder haircuts or losses, fearing the prospect of large future bailouts that would jeopardize France's triple AAA credit rating. The July 2011 summit accord had only provided for 10% in losses for bondholders. On October 27, at a meeting that went past midnight, Merkel and Sarkozy called IIF head Charles Dallara, who headed negotiating for the banks, to EU headquarters in Brussels. Merkel handed Dallara an agreement containing the 50% bondholder loss demand, and told Dallara- "This is the last offer." Merkel was saying banks would be left with nothing if they rejected it and Greece defaulted. Dallara called bankers and the IIF accepted Merkel's agreement. The final moment that October came on October 31, when Greece's prime minister Papandreou said he would call a referendum on the bailout provisions and austerity measures demanded by the IMF, the EU and the ECB. Bond markets reacted negatively to the announcement fearing a rejection and a Greek default. The Group of 20 leaders was meeting in Cannes, France on Nov. 2, 2011. Papandreou was asked to come to Cannes for a pre-summit meeting. Here Merkel told Papandreou- "the real question" for the referendum was, "Do you want to be in the euro, or not?" Days later Papandreou, lacking support in Greece from political parties and opposition inside his party, submitted his resignation. A non-political figure respected in Greece, former ECB vice president, Lucas Papademos, was appointed prime minister to head a Unity government. Polls after the appointment showed three fourths of Greeks said that this was "a positive step for Greece," with Papandreou's party getting only 11% support and the opposition led by Samaras about 20%. The criticism leveled at Merkel is that Germany should take responsibility for debt throughout the euro area through the issuance of eurozone bonds or the ECB buying large amount of bonds of Spain and Italy. Merkel faced strong opposition inside Germany and from the Bundesbank to this idea. The other criticism was based on austerity measures worsening the finances of Greece because of a lack of growth in the economy, which is true; yet Germany may see the situation in Greece as taking a long time to be resolved in any event because of excessive and faulty financial management. For Italy and Spain putting finances in order was a necessity, and austerity measures should lead to short term sacrifice but improve prospects for the long term by returning the economies to growth. Another criticism is the installation of governments that lack popular or electoral support. As the polls in Greece showed the Unity government there has far greater support and public opinion blames the politicians for the huge mess. In Italy, Berlusconi was widely seen as losing popular support when he resigned. And in Spain Mariano Rajoy, the newly elected prime minister, was elected with a huge majority in parliament following winning in local government elections. Merkel also held her own party, the Chrisitian Democrats together at the recent Leipzig convention. Mario Draghi, was elected with German support to head the European Central Bank. He has long argued for better management of Italian finances as head of Italy's central bank. Draghi was able to support Merkel with carefully planned and managed actions. First to reduce interest rates to support economic growth in a slowing eurozone. Following this with the ECB's Long Term Financing Operation in late December 2011, to provide unlimited loans to European banks at 1% interest for three years in exchange for a broadened list of collateral deposited at the ECB. In a final twist in this drama, Charles Dallara, who was a key negotiator for the U.S. Treasury in setting up the Brady Bonds- that converted bad Latin American government debt owed to U.S. banks in the 1980's into long term debt with large reductions in principal owed and lower interest rates. This was in exchange for guaranteed repayment with 30 year U.S. zero coupon bonds. Dallara was now a negotiator for the banks to reduce the chance of the very same bondholder haircuts that he had negotiated in an earlier period to solve the Latin American debt crisis. Other players in the drama were Axel Weber, head of the Bundesbank, Germany's central bank, who resigned after strong and outspoken opposition to the ECB's large scale purchase of bonds of Greece, Italy and Spain. Jens Weidmann, his protege, who replaced him. And Jurgen Stark, German representative at the ECB, who also resigned in opposition to Germany assuming responsibility for eurozone debt. ...

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Criticism of the EU's handling of the Greece crisis by IMF officials in a report. The report says the actions taken for debt restructuring in 2012 should have come much earlier to reduce the debt burden and the size of austerity measures in Greece. Similiar criticism has been voiced by president Hollande of France and in editorials by the WSJ. President Samaras of Greece says the sharp cuts in spending reduced potential for growth in the economy.

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This Wall Street Journal editorial calls for more transparency in disclosing bad debt problems at Spanish and other European banks. It faults recent and upcoming stress tests of EU banks for not being stringent enough and taking into account adverse scenarios. While Spain's central bank says only 20 billion euros are needed to recapitalize the cajas savings banks, other estimates are much higher. Moody's country report says Spain could need upto 120 billion euros to recapitalize its banks. A big problem is European banks exposure in Spain which is over 700 billion euros as of September 2010- Spanish banks have high exposure in Portugal and German banks have high exposure to Spain.

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The ECB's executive board's proposal is for 50 billion euros ($58 billion) in bond buying each month for the next 12 months. The ECB's executive board meets on Jan 20, 2015, to discuss the proposal.

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The terms of the debt restructuring deal with the bond swap in Greece become clear on March 9, 2012. In the deal with private bondholders -using collective action clauses to force remaining bondholders into the deal- about 96% of the 206 billion euros of Greece's bonds will be exchanged. Private bondholders held out throughout most of 2011, delaying the inevitable as Greece's economic situation became increasingly hopeless. This created a logjam with the German government, which insisted on serious private sector participation and bondholder haircut as the cost of poor lending decisions of the French, German and other European banks that made loans to Greece out of proportion of the ability of Greece to payback loans. Charles Dallara of the Institute of International Finance, negotiating for European banks, offered a 10% average loss on the bonds in July 2009. It was not until German Chancellor Merkel told Dallara at a late night meeting on October 27, 2011: "this is my last offer," for a 50% loss on the face value of the bonds, was agreement reached. The Greek debt swap that now takes place will give private bondholders a loss of 53.5% from the face value of 200 billion euros of bonds that they hold. The new Greek bonds issued in place of the old bonds include short-term bonds issued by the eurozone rescue fund at 15% of the face value of the old bonds, and a series of Greek bonds with maturity ranging from 11-30 years valued at 31.5% of the face value of old bonds. That even this 53.5% bondholder loss will not be adequate, as Greece's economy looks irretrievably damaged as it spirals downwards, is shown by the value of these bonds already trading in a hypothetical "gray market." The new 30 year bond is quoted at 17 cents and the 11 year bond at 22 cents. The questions remain about the stalling by the banks in taking the losses earlier- was this the wisest move considering the losses beyond Greece as the eurozone economy as a whole has suffered from the prolonged negotiations stretching through 2011, lurching from one crisis to the next? Even if the stalling was designed to give time for banks to repair their balance sheets, was this the best strategy, considering the damage inflicted on European economic growth. John Taylor of Stanford points out that the European banks delayed the unavoidable serious debt restructuring for too long, when insolvency was the real issue not illiquidity, and exaggerated the effect of contagion from the beginning- in John Taylor, WSJ, 2/22/2012, A Better Grecian Bailout. And John Cochrane of the University of Chicago, points out that French and German governments if they bailout French and German banks should do so openly and frankly rather than cover this up as bailouts of countries, because this would lead to serious questions about the poor lending decisions of the European banks and government supervision of the banks- in Cochrane, WSJ, 12/2/2010, 'Contagion' and other Euro Myths. As early as Feb. 2010, Cochrane was suggesting the forced exchange of new bonds with long debt maturities for exisiting bonds with short debt maturities, as short term debt was the major issue here. ...