LyrArc Article Gist
Recruiting in the Afghan army from predominantly Pastun areas in the south and southeast is way down, almost nonexistent. For Kandahar, Helmand, Oruzgan, Zabul, Paktika, and Ghazni provinves with largely Pashtun people, the numbers show they make up 17% of the population and contributed only 1.5% of new recruits to the army since 2009. Kandahar and Helmand with 2 millon people contributed about 1200 recruits, or less 1% of 173,000 new recrutis since 2009. The northern provinces make up a large number of the new recruits, with Kunduz having a population of 900,000 and contributing 16,500 recruits. There are about 42% Pastuns in the population and a similiar number of Pastuns in the Afghan army, but most are from the northern or northeastern provinces where the insurgency has been weaker. One third are from one northeastern province- Nangarhar. The reason for this is fear of the Taliban finding out that that a young man has enlisted in the south and retaliation against the enlistee or his family. The lack of a southern Pastun presence in the army makes the army more of a northern institution. With withdrawal of American and NATO forces by 2014, this leaves Afghanistan deeply divided between the northern and southern regions. The southern region Pastuns have a significant presence across the border in the northern part of Pakistan, and the southern Pastuns draw support and resources from this region. Removing the foreign presence shifts the balance towards the southern Pastuns and Pakistani Pastuns in the largely mountainous country of this region. This is why the project in Afghanistan requires the support of all factions and ethnic communities in the South Asian region to succeed, setting aside differences and animosities of the past. D. Mahmood Khan, a member of parliament in Kandahar says ordinary Afghans in Kandahar see the Afghan government of Karzai collapsing in a week or two without foreign support and sense a much stronger Taliban....

LyrArc Article Gist
The high risk of failure as the U.S. withdraws from Afghanistan in 2012-2013. The U.S. is handing over to an Afghan Army that faces a high desertion rate, high turnover, and uncertain loyalties. The turnover is so high that the Afghan Army has to replace a third of the 195,000 army every year. The problems from the corruption in the Karzai government, the flawed elections, and other issues have not been resolved, leaving a fragile government and a fragile army and police force as the U.S. withdraws. A decade of sacrifices in resources, lives and wounded, is at risk. A negotiated settlement in talks with the Taliban has not moved forward to create a post U.S. withdrawal Afghan government that brings in all parties. The untimely death of American diplomat Holbrooke who set up the accord that made peace in the Balkans, and the failure to get results at the talks only leaves the whole U.S. project at risk.

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Bruce Reidel, Obama administration advisor on the war in Afghanistan, conducted a policy review in 2009. He says a policy of engagement he advised in 2009 now needs reshaping. He points to recent events that show the Pakistani ISI and the military who run Pakistan are in direct conflict with U.S. policy in the region. Especially after the attacks on the U.S. embassy in Kabul and the killing of a former Afghan president who was expected to lead peace talks. Reidel says this requires a reshaping of U.S. policy and a policy of containment which would reduce military assistance to Pakistan, and at the same time shape policies that would help the people of Pakistan, such as reducing tariffs on textiles.

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Chandrasekeran looks back on the troop surge ordered by President Obama on the advice of General Petraeus and General McChrystal in Afghanistan, and the results in Afghanistan as the U.S. withdraws troops in 2012-2013.

LyrArc Article Gist
Michael Getler describes the missed opportunity under President Obama for using one of America's most talented diplomats to engineer a peace agreement between the warring factions in Afghanistan- the U.S., the Pakistan army, the ISI and its support in the army, the Taliban, and the other parties such as the Haqqani faction and the Afghan government of Karzai. Holbrooke had used his experience for another President, with the same force of his larger than life personality, when he helped bring about the Dayton Accords in a similiar area of stubborn ethnic strife. Could Obama have tapped Holbrooke's skills and set aside the distractions of his personality as coming from an American with unique gifts, talent and achievement, is the question Getler asks. And is this a comment on the nature of the Obama Presidency and America's poorly invested hopes.