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Zweig points out that P/E multiples fall quickly in the midst of higher uncertainty. Benjamin Graham's "cyclically adjusted" P/E refined by Yale economist Robert Shiller smooths out the top and bottoms of the market by averaging the past 10 years of earnings and incorporating effects of inflation. This "cyclically adjusted" P/E for the U.S. market for the last 50 years is 19.5. The P/E for the market when the S&P 500 was at 1325 in late July 2011 was 22.9, and at the low in the first week of August 2011 of 1167 was 20.2. With the higher uncertainty- as for instance Bank of New York Mellon charging clients to hold cash- the P/E multiples are in a different territory. The P/E dropped to 13.3 in March 2009 after the financial crisis of 2008. Larger macroeconomic trends and uncertainty may have yet to play out and not registered fully in the market indexes. Jack Hough throws light on this from a different angle in the Wall Street Journal, August 5, 2011 comparing stagnant wages and its relationship with corporate earnings....

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The practices of Bain Capital under Mitt Romney, as it merged management consulting with private equity to take stake in companies that it would be asked to turnaround. The main focus for this type of investing was to harvest as much capital out of the acquired company as early as possible, leading to management decisions that were driven by this overriding aspect. This meant large layoffs to reduce costs, loading the company with debt which in many cases led the company to bankruptcy yet benefitting the investors. The practices were adverse to the accumulation of human talent.

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Simon Johnson and Peter Boone say not taking forceful action with the large banks- taking them through bankruptcy and restructuring procedures as advocated by senior Federal Reserve officials like Peter Hoenig- will only lead to irreversible damage. The current Geithner-Summers policy being followed by the Obama administration is simply to hope that by fiscal stimulus and economic recovery the banks may be brought to sustained profits and be able to muddle through their financial problems. This Johnson argues is not likely to happen and the cost will be higher debt levels for America, irreversible damage as America faces low debt and financially stronger countries in Asia and sees its position in the world weaken. The muddle through policies for banks of the Obama administration have little prospects in the face of an IMF estimated $275 billion shortfall in capital on balance sheets at large banks (from the IMF Global Financial stability Report). Without aggressive action on the banks America's recovery and renewal will only delayed....

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Neil Irwin of NYT provides some counter intuitive ideas on U.S. Fed interest rate policy. He says it can't be take as a given that the Fed will raise rates in 2017-2018. This depends on how much punch there is in the Trump economic policies for stimulus, and for infrastructure spending, tax cuts. He cites Senate Majority Leader McConnell who said he would like to keep "tax reform revenue neutral." Getting large spending and pushing up the deficit is likely to run up against Republicans in Congress who have for 8 years opposed large spending increases and large deficits. Trump has given few details about his stimulus or infrastructure spending plans. He says the scale of the spending might not match the talk. Irwin cites JP Morgan Chase economists who have kept their forecasts for GDP growth just under 2% for 2017 and 2018. And he points out that even Trump appointees at the Fed might act independently. The Fed might look at being cautious considering that increased trade tensions with China, and the unpredictability of a Trump administration could hurt growth. Irwin does not mention the uncertainty in other areas such as policy towards Russia on which the Republican party and Congress have very different views than Trump, tensions over Taiwan, that can also affect growth. ...

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With 40% of the unemployment shown as longterm unemployed, U.S. Federal Reserve policies are focussed on bringing down these levels, which pose a risk to the productive capacity in the U.S.

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The authors, Becker, Davis and Murphy, are from the University of Chicago. They point out that the uncertainty created by the Obama administration's programs including healthcare and social investments in education, energy conservation, and the desire to reduce carbon emissions, all tend to slow business expansion and investments to create jobs by putting additional costs on business. The expanding federal deficit and national debt also create additional uncertainty. Their point is that it was a mistake to start making major changes to transform the U.S. economy at this time, and that it would have been wiser to do these changes after the economy had recovered completely from the crisis. All efforts they say should have been concentrated on establishing conditions for a strong recovery. When combined with the lack of regulatory reforms to fix problems left behind from the crisis, and other failures, serious questions arise about how things will turn out in coming years. See Krugman- The Feeling of 1937, where Krugman takes this up from another angle, again with concerns about the future....

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Raghuram Rajan, Professor of Finance at the Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, was appointed chief economist at the IMF in 2003. He presented a paper, titled "Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier," at the annual Jackson Hole meeting of economists and central bankers for 2005. Rajan says he had planned to write about how financial developments during Greenspan's 18 year old tenure had made things safer, but the more he looked the more evidence came up that the risk reward relationships in a normal functioning financial market had been terribly distorted. Market participants were being rewarded for wins but were not being asked to take on commensurate risks and impacts on their bonuses and rewards. He also cautioned about the use of credit default swaps which acted as insurance against bond defaults, and said insurers were generating big returns on this but with the appearance of little risk- even though the pain could be immense in a default. Banks were carrying credit securties on their books that posed risks to the whole financial system if things went wrong with the credit securities. Reaction from the gathering was unfavorable. Lawrence Summers, a former Treasury Secretary said, "the basic, slightly lead eyed premise of the paper was misguided."...

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What happens to the 70,000 residents of Anacostia, near the Capitol in Washington DC where a third of the people live in poverty and there is a 40% dropout rate, and only 8% of all students there attend college. Vacant homes, drug use and crime sap the neighborhood here. Obama said he would bring 20 cities an antipoverty program successful in Harlem, New York that would include parenting and infant care classes, as well as early childhopod education and free medical care for children. An investment of $1 billion for 5 years for a transitional jobs program, to place the unemployed in temporary jobs. The Obama transition team did not return requests seeking comment on the 20 city plan or the $1 billion for transitional jobs, says the WSJ on January 20, 2008, the day of the inauguration. Its incredible that right in the nation's capital there exists another Washington DC of such neighborhood decline within sight of the Capitol.

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Prof. Calomiris of Columbia University, says the U.S. Federal Reserve should increase the cash reserve requirement for U.S. banks to prevent a surge in inflation. He points out that excesss reserves at banks stand at about $1.5 trillion. He suggests the Fed should take early action to prevent a jump in lending and credit creation- a pattern seen in the past after several years of dampened credit and lending.

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There is strong cirticism from many quarters about low interest rates as a prime culprit in causing the bubble in housing prices. In comments before the American Economic Association, America's Fed Chairman Bernanke defended his role as Fed governor in 2003 when he along with Greenspan was an advocate of the decision to cut the Fed's target interest rate to 1%, and to leave it here for a year and raise it only slowly. Bernanke says countries like Britain, New Zealand, and Sweden had tighter monetary policy but there home prices rose more, and monetary policy explains only 5% of the variation in home prices. Analysis has shown he says that capital inflows such as those the U.S. received from China and other Asian countries explains 31% of the variation in home prices, supporting a contrasting theory that that its these global imbalances that drove the crisis. He also placed the primary fault for the housing bubble on relaxed lending standards and views that housing prices would rise forever. Alongside these comments Fed chairman Bernanke also said that bank supervisors and other financial regulators of which the Fed was one, has a better ability to contain the excesses that led to the economic crisis including housing bubble and other excesses, than the Fed as a monetary policy maker. By saying this Bernanke is acknowledging that the failure of regulation was a key part of what happened in the economic crisis. The failure to fix the regulatory system even now leads Bernanke to say that he is open to using monetary policy as a supplementary tool for addressing risks should another bubble develop, if the regulatory system isn't reformed. Still Bernanke and Greenspan were quite complacent at the time of the low interest rates and did not point out the dangers of global capital imbalances which were evident at the time, preferring to say that the United States could benefit from the inflows of capital from overseas without serious risks. And the Fed did not exercize its role of vigilance in alerting the country to excesses in the way the housing industry operated and in exercizing its own powers to that effect. Instead the Fed as regulator and in role as asafeguard for serious risks let itself become part of the cheering section as the worst excesses in housing were being exposed....

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AIG's bad bets on housing were made right under the supervision of a "college' of global bureaucrats and regulators in the Office of Thrift Supervision, according to its acting director Polakoff, says the WSJ editorial.

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Alexis Tsipras, leader of Syriza, Greece's second largest party, is interviewed by WSJ's Bret Stephens. Tsipras describes the problems inside Greece. He describes the bribery in healthcare, tax evasion, burden of taxes on the middle class and honest citizens, a large and inefficient bureaucracy. In its current state Greece would build up debt and deficits all over again if the debts were forgiven tomorrow, says Tsipras. He is for Greece remaining in the eurozone. Tsipras understands the problems Germans have with putting money into Greece with the current state of economic management and lack of conscience of its elite, and why they see this as not fair. He suggests as a model for solving the Greece debt crisis, the London Conference of 1953 forgiving half of Germany's debts and putting the rest on a 30 year scheduled repayment. This would have to come with results in cutting bureaucracy, reducing corruption, and efficient tax collection for Greece democracy to work.

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The terms of the debt restructuring deal with the bond swap in Greece become clear on March 9, 2012. In the deal with private bondholders -using collective action clauses to force remaining bondholders into the deal- about 96% of the 206 billion euros of Greece's bonds will be exchanged. Private bondholders held out throughout most of 2011, delaying the inevitable as Greece's economic situation became increasingly hopeless. This created a logjam with the German government, which insisted on serious private sector participation and bondholder haircut as the cost of poor lending decisions of the French, German and other European banks that made loans to Greece out of proportion of the ability of Greece to payback loans. Charles Dallara of the Institute of International Finance, negotiating for European banks, offered a 10% average loss on the bonds in July 2009. It was not until German Chancellor Merkel told Dallara at a late night meeting on October 27, 2011: "this is my last offer," for a 50% loss on the face value of the bonds, was agreement reached. The Greek debt swap that now takes place will give private bondholders a loss of 53.5% from the face value of 200 billion euros of bonds that they hold. The new Greek bonds issued in place of the old bonds include short-term bonds issued by the eurozone rescue fund at 15% of the face value of the old bonds, and a series of Greek bonds with maturity ranging from 11-30 years valued at 31.5% of the face value of old bonds. That even this 53.5% bondholder loss will not be adequate, as Greece's economy looks irretrievably damaged as it spirals downwards, is shown by the value of these bonds already trading in a hypothetical "gray market." The new 30 year bond is quoted at 17 cents and the 11 year bond at 22 cents. The questions remain about the stalling by the banks in taking the losses earlier- was this the wisest move considering the losses beyond Greece as the eurozone economy as a whole has suffered from the prolonged negotiations stretching through 2011, lurching from one crisis to the next? Even if the stalling was designed to give time for banks to repair their balance sheets, was this the best strategy, considering the damage inflicted on European economic growth. John Taylor of Stanford points out that the European banks delayed the unavoidable serious debt restructuring for too long, when insolvency was the real issue not illiquidity, and exaggerated the effect of contagion from the beginning- in John Taylor, WSJ, 2/22/2012, A Better Grecian Bailout. And John Cochrane of the University of Chicago, points out that French and German governments if they bailout French and German banks should do so openly and frankly rather than cover this up as bailouts of countries, because this would lead to serious questions about the poor lending decisions of the European banks and government supervision of the banks- in Cochrane, WSJ, 12/2/2010, 'Contagion' and other Euro Myths. As early as Feb. 2010, Cochrane was suggesting the forced exchange of new bonds with long debt maturities for exisiting bonds with short debt maturities, as short term debt was the major issue here. ...

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The author Li Congjun, is head of the Xinhua News agency, official press agency of the People's Republic of China. He calls for rebalancing the global economy with China depending more on domestic consumption, efforts to restrain the excesses of property and asset price bubbles, and renewed focus on technology and investment.