LyrArc Article Gist
The WSJ's Laurence Norman talks to Yukiya Amano, head of the UN agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which has the responsibility of verification and inspection of Iran's nuclear development and facilities. Amano describes the issues raised by a 2011 report which outlined 12 sets of concerns to which Iran has to explain, a condition included in the final nuclear agreement. Iran has to respond by mid-August, IAEA then responds, and does work in Sept and Oct, and submits its report by Dec. 2015. Yamano says he has to fill in all the missing pieces in this jigsaw puzzle to get a full picture of Iran's nuclear development. Iran has denied access to military sites and Mr. Amano couldn't say if he has access to the Parchin military site. A concession that was made in the agreement is the long interval of three weeks before access to a particular site that arouses suspicions-the agreement gives Iran the right to appeal an IAEA request to visit such a site to a special commission. The U.S. and its European allies have a majority on the commission yet three weeks are allowed in which Iran could move material to some other location. For critics the question will be why such a concession was needed if Iran truly has decided not to develop nuclear weapons technologies. The U.S. president's response at a news conference on July 15, 2015, was that with the laws of physics the U.S. monitoring tools would detect nuclear activity at that site. The agreement also gives Iran an earlier than planned lifting of a ban on sales of arms and missiles and missile parts if the IAEA says Iran's nuclear activities are peaceful. Iran could conceivably wait till the ban is lifted and its economy in a much stronger position to withstand any future limited sanctions to pursue nuclear weapons development. This would have delayed development for a few years during which time the hope is that Iran has changed into a more peaceful nation pursuing economic development in its region, yet even if this is the case as as happened with India and Pakistan it could still pursue nuclear weapons development. The alternative is a status quo till a better agreement is reached with the leverage of tight economic sanctions and continuing dialogue during which time Iran continues to get closer to a nuclear weapon, or the use of force to prevent this. Iran added the arms embargo issue during the last weeks of the negotiation in June, a controversial move on Iran's part, as this may have complicated the picture with ballistic missiles technology exports to Iran approved after 8 years in the final agreement, compared to the agreement reached in April 2015 which made no mention of the lifting of the arms embargo. Iran played on the notion that if Zarif returned to Iran without an agreement hardliners including Khamanei would veto any agreement, yet this could just be the Iranian negotiating strategy. U.S. president Obama stated at the July 15, 2015 news conference that it would be hard to hold sanctions for longer. Critics might argue that China was already benefitting from the small easing of sanctions by increasing Iranian oil imports by 30% in 2014, and would have less incentive to withdraw from sanctions, as it is dependent on the U.S. and the EU, major markets for its exports and access to technologies. A WSJ/NBC poll in July shows almost half of the people polled in the U.S. saying they do not know enough to express an opinion, a steady 36% support an agreement, showing that the public has not been educated and taken along during the different steps in the largely secret negotiations....
The WSJ's Laurence Norman talks to Yukiya Amano, head of the UN agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which has the responsibility of verification and inspection of Iran's nuclear development and facilities. Amano describes the issues raised by a 2011 report which outlined 12 sets of concerns to which Iran has to explain, a condition included in the final nuclear agreement. Iran has to respond by mid-August, IAEA then responds, and does work in Sept and Oct, and submits its report by Dec. 2015. Yamano says he has to fill in all the missing pieces in this jigsaw puzzle to get a full picture of Iran's nuclear development. Iran has denied access to military sites and Mr. Amano couldn't say if he has access to the Parchin military site. A concession that was made in the agreement is the long interval of three weeks before access to a particular site that arouses suspicions-the agreement gives Iran the right to appeal an IAEA request to visit such a site to a special commission. The U.S. and its European allies have a majority on the commission yet three weeks are allowed in which Iran could move material to some other location. For critics the question will be why such a concession was needed if Iran truly has decided not to develop nuclear weapons technologies. The U.S. president's response at a news conference on July 15, 2015, was that with the laws of physics the U.S. monitoring tools would detect nuclear activity at that site. The agreement also gives Iran an earlier than planned lifting of a ban on sales of arms and missiles and missile parts if the IAEA says Iran's nuclear activities are peaceful. Iran could conceivably wait till the ban is lifted and its economy in a much stronger position to withstand any future limited sanctions to pursue nuclear weapons development. This would have delayed development for a few years during which time the hope is that Iran has changed into a more peaceful nation pursuing economic development in its region, yet even if this is the case as as happened with India and Pakistan it could still pursue nuclear weapons development. The alternative is a status quo till a better agreement is reached with the leverage of tight economic sanctions and continuing dialogue during which time Iran continues to get closer to a nuclear weapon, or the use of force to prevent this. Iran added the arms embargo issue during the last weeks of the negotiation in June, a controversial move on Iran's part, as this may have complicated the picture with ballistic missiles technology exports to Iran approved after 8 years in the final agreement, compared to the agreement reached in April 2015 which made no mention of the lifting of the arms embargo. Iran played on the notion that if Zarif returned to Iran without an agreement hardliners including Khamanei would veto any agreement, yet this could just be the Iranian negotiating strategy. U.S. president Obama stated at the July 15, 2015 news conference that it would be hard to hold sanctions for longer. Critics might argue that China was already benefitting from the small easing of sanctions by increasing Iranian oil imports by 30% in 2014, and would have less incentive to withdraw from sanctions, as it is dependent on the U.S. and the EU, major markets for its exports and access to technologies. A WSJ/NBC poll in July shows almost half of the people polled in the U.S. saying they do not know enough to express an opinion, a steady 36% support an agreement, showing that the public has not been educated and taken along during the different steps in the largely secret negotiations....
