LyrArc Article Gist
Some insights into the thinking of Robert Rubin from an interview by Ken Brown and David Enrich with the former Treasury Secretary in the Clinton administration about the 2008 financial crisis. As Justice John Paul Stevens. the longest serving Supreme Court justice on the bench once said, those who administer the judicial system form the backbone of the law. In a like manner those who administer the financial and economic system form its backbone, which is why Rubin faces some tough questions in this interview. At the time he was Treasury Secretary, the NYT magazine ran a story on Robert Rubin, as the kind of person who liked to put things down rationally on a note pad, and think things through on the basis of this rational analysis. This is how he approached the Mexican financial crisis of 1994 and the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Here is some of that note pad Rubin, in the context of CDO's and risk taking, with something gone awry. Risks that according to this NYT report Rubin encouraged at Citigroup in 2004 and 2005, on the basis of the idea that Citi's competitors were taking on more risk and making bigger profits. His note pad approach appears to have led to conclusions by Rubin that considering the additional profits that could be made by Citi by ramping up the risk taking in 2004 and 2005 and afterwards like its competitors, it could lead to losses if things went wrong, but these losses would'nt come close to wiping out the profits made during the good times. The cyclical downturn he expected to see in 2004 and 2005 when he is reported to have added his voice to others that the bank take on more risk, was a cyclical downturn of the type he had seen during the 1994 Mexican devaluation and the 1997 Asian financial crisis. He had no idea that it would be a cyclical undervaluing of risk added on to a housing bubble, and to a triple A ratings issuance that was misguided. Rubin says here that there was hardly anyone who saw that low-probability event as a possibility. Was the housing bubble a low probability event, and were the issuance of ratings by the credit ratings agencies compromised by the drive for more business a normal pattern, or would some digging up of facts and some innate skepticism of the prevailing current in favor of one's own instincts that something was overdone missed in the notepad analysis of a supposedly rational approach? Or was there a feeling that somehow the U.S. with its long tradition of technology, its work ethic and sophisticated financial system was somehow immune to something as severe as what the Asian countries were experiencing in 1997, or what happened in the 1930's. Asked about his view of what happened Rubin says that looking back there was an enormous amount that needs to be learned. Rubin is also in a quandary when he has to respond to the public concerns about excessive executive compensation. Rubin made $115 million in pay since 1999, excluding stock options, while under his purview as the highest ranking board member Citigroup let some of the problems that it faces now accumulate. As Citigroup faces $20 billion in losses in 2008, a bear raid on its stock by short sellers who ironically were able to do this because of some of the lax regulation set in motion in the Rubin Greenspan years leading to the suspension of the Uptick rule, and the $45 billion government bailout last week. Rubin may have helped Citi but in a different sort of way. He was able to persuade Treasury- Treasury Secretary Paulson was a fellow executive at former employer Goldman Sachs- through the days before the bailout, ensuring government help was on its way. Citigroup shares had dropped to $3.77 a share in the third week of November 2008, losing 50% of their value in one week, as the discussions took place.