LyrArc Article Gist
Alexandra Stevenson provides this exceptional account summarizing the reasoning in the minds of Argentine negotiators and holdout bondholders over a debt dispute remaining from the 2001 Argentine debt crisis and default. Over a decade later the repercussions of Argentina's 2001 debt crisis and default are still taking new twists ant turns. Holdout bondholders won in U.S. courts and Judge Griesa ordered Argentina to make full payment demanded by holdout bondholders. Argentina responded by depositing $539 million in Bank of New York Mellon as instalment payment to exchange bondholders. Judge Griesa responded by ruling that if Bank of New York Mellon made the payment it would be in contempt of court. Griesa also called for court mediated negotiations between Argentina and the holdout bondholders to come up with an agreement. Argentina and hedge fund holdouts negotiated in July 2014 but talks faltered. Legal experts say that if Argentina makes an agreement with holdout bondholders led by NML Capital which is asking for $1.5 billion, the risk is that the exchange bondholders could also ask for better terms. After the 2001 crisis following which Argentina defaulted on its debt, agreements were reached for bondholders to be paid about 25 cents on the dollar. Not all bondholders agreed, the bondholders who agreed are called the exhange bondholders, and the ones holding out holdout bondholders. From the Argentine government's point of view the risk of reaching agreement with the holdouts suing Argentina is that the other holdout bondholders not represented in the lawsuit could also ask for the same terms, and Argentina would have to pay all the holdouts costing it $15 billion. Risks if Argentina allows it to go into default are that exchange bondholders would come together to pressure the Argentine government to make a full payment of their discounted bonds quickly. This would cost Argentina payment of as much as $28.7 billion, according to JPMorgan estimates, under the right to "accelerate" payment if Argentina is considered as having missed a July 30, 2014 payment deadline. Legal experts say Argentina has to weigh this risk, which may or may not occur depending on the exchange bondholders taking such action, against the risk of having to pay out $15 billion to all the holdouts. Paying all holdouts would be politically very unpopular in Argentina, posing political risks for the socialist Peronist Kirchner government, already facing difficulties with the trade unions and the stronger opposition from centrist parties in Buenos Aires province. Default would affect Argentine access to capital markets, which is already highly restricted. Yet because Argentina has made the payment to Bank of New York Mellon, blocked by Judge Griesa, the nature of this default would be different. A worse case scenario for Argentina's Kirchner government is reopening negotiations with exchange bondholders for higher payment on debt than the 25 cents on the dollar already agreed to. Argentina faces an acute cash shortage with international reserves of only about $29.5 billion in May 2014, and a slowing agricultural export dependent economy. This is why the prospect of a technical default is being treated with relative calm in Buenos Aires.