LyrArc Article Gist
Hardy and Merced take an inside look at what happened at Autonomy Inc that resulted in the charge of $8.8 billion by H-P in Nov. 2012. The problems start with the hiring of Lee Apotheker, a former CEO of German software maker SAP, as H-P's new CEO in the beginning of 2011. This comes after CEO Mark Hurd is fired over relations with a female employee. Apotheker starts out within months of joining H-P with some precipitious moves that raise questions about his decisions- he dumps the new H-P tablet within weeks of joining, and follows this with a move to shift H-P out of its PC business and focus on software. To do this he pays ten times revenue for Autonomy Inc., a British software maker which has grown through acquisitions and not invested enough in advancements for its software, according to a piece by Al Lewis in the WSJ in August 2011. Autonomy's business is software that analyzes and finds patterns in voluminious data like e-mails, online data, web surfing. The tech community and analysts sees this as a risky investment from the start with Apotheker overpaying for Autonomy. Apotheker has failed to look at H-P's record in acquisitions with the failed Palm acquisition costing H-P over a billion dollars. H-P has a poor record of integrating companies. This proves to be especially true with Autonomy with founder Mike Lynch keeping a distance from Palo Alto headquarters by staying mostly in his London office. Apotheker is fired by the H-P Board within months of taking office and the Autonomy managers including Lynch leave H-P in the following months. Alarmed by a falloff in Autonomy sales, H-P's new CEO Meg Whitman sent a team in May 2012 to review the books of Autonomy. This results in finding "serious accounting improprieties." The problems are caught when a senior finance official at the London Autonomy offices points them out. What Autonomy did before selling out to H-P is to sell low end hardware servers at a loss, and disguise the loss by inflating marketing expense, resulting in marketing expenses going up just as it was trying to sell the company as a pure software company. Middle men who sold the Autonomy software reported sales that were made up and licensing revenue was taken before it was received. Analysts at Forrester Research say Autonomy had not invested in R&D, and did not make regular software releases, had poor customer relations, no regular customer feedback, and lacked transparency on future product plans. The question goes back to how did Apotheker make such decisions without giving enough time, with the due diligence reported to the head of strategy Robison and not the CFO as is normal, and how did he fail to catch the obvious failure to invest in the company R&D? Apotheker described his approach in a February 18, 2011 interview with the WSJ's Ben Worthen. He told Worthen a joke about the Swedish parliament where members discuss a proposal to move driving from the left to driving on the right, by doing this gradually. Apotheker's analogy turns out to be misplaced, his approach brash and dangerous, and the H-P's Board's confidence in their new hire misplaced. It turns out that H-P's previous CEO Mark Hurd came in for criticism for not investing enough in R&D. The money wasted in these acquisitions leaves H-P at a severe disadvantage for increasing investments in R&D when margins and sales are declining in the printer and PC business. On Nov. 20, 2012, H-P share price dropped 12% to under $12. H-P reported a $6.9 billion loss in third quarter 2012. Revenue for the full fiscal year declined 5% to $120.4 billon, and earnings declined 23% to $8 billion.