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John Taylor looks one step ahead of the March 2012 Greece bailout and sets up the most plausible scenario for the future. He says the risks of contagion were always exaggerated from the beginning- a planned default or restructuring of debt such as happened in Argentina in 2001, does not have the contagion risks associated with a chaotic and unplanned default as in Russia in 1998. Predicability in policy makes a huge difference, says Taylor. The European banks which stood to lose from writedowns exaggerated the fears of contagion- a process that always occurs for people who are adversely affected by writedowns- resulting in top officials in the European Union delaying the unavoidable serious restructuring. It was not until Chancellor Merkel handed Charles Dallara, who negotiated for the European banks, a note stating a demand for 50% bondholder writedown, on October 27, 2011, at EU headquarters in Brussels, did any serious writedown of debt begin. Merkel told Dallara: "this is my last offer." The July 2011 summit by contrast had only a 10% bondholder writedown in the agreement, when insolvency not illiquidity was the real issue. Walker Forelle and Meichtry, give a detailed account of what happened in the Wall Street Journal, Dec. 30, 2011. The important thing for Greece, says Taylor, is for what the IMF calls "growth enhancing structural reforms" - greater reliance on private markets, incentives, rule of law. He says this bailout won't work because IMF growth forecasts do not reflect the rapid shrinking of the Greek economy. Antonis Samaras, leader of the major opposition party, is in favor of pro-growth measures and has stated his desire to change the agreement. The 130 billion euro bailout provides 90 billion euros for recapitalizing Greece's banks, and financing the budget. This puts Greece in a situation where the political leaders win voter support by discarding the conditions from the Northern EU nations and come with a plan that is better suited for Greece. The EU in this scenario would cut off further bailout funds to Greece. Taylor sees this as the better outcome for Greece than the current situation, which leaves Greece no hope for growth, and also for the EU by getting out of bailouts that have little prospect of working. It would be difficult but doable for Greece says Taylor, because interest payments would be low and Greek banks would be recapitalized after the current March 2012 bailout. ...

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Moody's Investor's Service downgrades China's credit rating to A1 from Aa3. Moody's predicts a slowdown in growth for China. GDP growth for 1st quarter 2017 was 6.9%. Total debt has grown from 149% of gross domestic product in 2008, to 213% in 2013, and is now 253%, according to JP Morgan. The problem is that ever higher levels of credit have supported growth and more of this is coming from the shadow banking sector. Higher levels of debt in future years from the already high levels will weigh heavily on growth, leading to an eventual slowdown in the economy's growth rate.

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Stevenson and Caselli describe the mood in Buenos Aires as negotiations with hedge fund holdout bondholders fail in July 2014.

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Criticism of the EU's handling of the Greece crisis by IMF officials in a report. The report says the actions taken for debt restructuring in 2012 should have come much earlier to reduce the debt burden and the size of austerity measures in Greece. Similiar criticism has been voiced by president Hollande of France and in editorials by the WSJ. President Samaras of Greece says the sharp cuts in spending reduced potential for growth in the economy.

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Kenneth Rogoff of Harvard University, expert on debt crises, and author of "This Time is Different," says China is one of the best examples of the idea that this time is different, with the idea created that somehow China was impervious to the massive build up of debt. The debt is now over 250% of GDP, and this was possible for so long because of the high savings rate of 30% of disposable income and the millions of young migrants moving to cities to work in manufacturing. The growth of shadow banking, opaqueness in decisionmaking, unreliable data, use of local government financing vehicles, the bubble in housing with a large portion of loans tied to the real estate market, all combine to create serious problems that will take a long time to sort out. Rogoff says the crisis in Tianjin with the deadly explosions in the port area, and the government's inability to provide answers to questions from a alarmed public, only added to the uncertainty and loss of credibility. Rogoff says he hopes the trillions of dollars in reserves will provide China with the tools adequate to tackle the debt problems before they spread to other countries....

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"China's Superbank," by Henry Sanderson and Michael Forsythe looks at the rise of China Development Bank to provide insights into the two decade real estate boom in China, and the trillions of dollars in loans made by state owned banks to finance China's state owned industries and infrastructure development. The authors say these loans based on land owned by the state, improved with roads and other infrastructure and then sold to industry, have helped finance China's urbanization and industrial development. But it has also created problems including eviction of farmers from the land by local government authorites increasing inequality, led to misallocation of capital on bad projects, and an unsustainable model of development focussed on state owned companies. A major side effect of this is not covered in the book. This is the impact of crowding out of credit for private industry in China, with privately owned business having to pay higher rates in the underground loan market or lacking financing. A major focus of the report "China: 2030" by the World Bank and China's official think tank Development Research Center is on reversing this development to come up with a sustainable development model. The report was supported by World Bank chief Zoellick and China's new prime minister Li Keqiang. "The Great Rebalancing," by Pettis, a finance professor at Beijing University, looks at the other side of the financing of China's boom- the low interest rates on savings for China's consumer. This reduces household incomes and reduces purchasing power as the interest rates are lower than the rate of inflation. Lower value of China's currency also reduces the purchasing power for China's consumers. Estimates show the low interest rates cost China's workers and consumers somewhere in the range of 3 to 8% of GDP annually in bank deposit income. This money is funnelled through the banking system to make more loans for infrastructure and growth at the state owned companies, concentrating exraordinary level of financing in one direction. As a result the consumption share of GDP in China has actually fallen in the two decades of hyper development. This is about 34% compared to 50-55% for other Asian economies....

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Prof. Gorton and Prof. Metrick of the Yale School of Management review 16 scholarly studies and papers on the causes of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis in the current isue of the Journal of Economic Literature. Another article in the same journal reviews 21 books on the subject. Samuelson says the most cited causes- lax regulation and passive regulators, and the policy of home ownership that encourage the packaging and of securitization of mortgages to government sponsored agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac- are only the surface causes. If we are to explain how a whole society seemed to believe in the idea that somehow there was a way to maintain a rising tide continuously, with only small corrections over several decades, by the clever manipulation of monetary and fiscal policies; then one has to look to the hubris of economists who acted as if this was possible and the gullibility of business and a public that desperately wanted to believe as some have put it "that this time it was different," or that shrewd management of economic policy could actually bring about such a panacea. The abiding lesson is economic policies based on a better understanding of how modern industrial economies work are merely useful tools, no more no less, and there is no substitute for a good ethic, wise management and careful thinking on the part of the public, business and government, particularly for the people in leadership positions. ...

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The Bank of Cyprus and the Cyprus Popular Bank (Laiki Bank), passed stress tests given by the EU in 2010 and 2011. By the end of 2010- even as other banks such as Barclays were cutting their Greece government bonds by over 50%- the two banks held 5.8 billion euros of Greece bonds, over $1 billion euros larger exposure to Greece than nine months earlier, according to European regulators. Regulatory supervision failed to alert the banks and the banks risk management failed to see the warning signs in Greece. The Laiki Bank Risk Officer went in the opposite direction actually increasing exposure to Greece, saying in a conference call in August 2010, that he had used the bank's capital position "to deepen selectively some highly profitable client relationships." What went wrong with the stress tests by the EU regulators in July 2010 of these two banks, was that the tests looked at what would happen if economic conditions deteriorated, but did not consider the possibility that government bonds could produce losses. The two banks suffered total booked losses of 4.3 billion euros in 2013 from holdings of Greece bonds. The EU stress tests of July 2010 showed the two banks having total of 572 million in surplus capital. The two banks then went on to issue dividends in 2010-2011 totalling 141 million euros. By March 2013 the Laiki Bank was "on respirator" for a few months, according to the Central Bank of Cyprus, until the 10 billion euro EU bailout in March 2013 with the closing of Laiki Bank and the sharp downsizing of Bank of Cyprus....

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Spain's central bank was lauded for macroprudential supervision before the housing bubble burst. Will China's central bank and financial authorites which have managed the housing bubble upto this point face similiar problems? Can China be the sole exception even as housing bubbles burst with wide repercussions in the U.S., UK and Spain? Nicholas Lardy, of the Peterson Institute of international Economics, says urban housing stock makes up 41% of Chinese household wealth in 2011. The same figure for the U.S. is 26%. Chinese buyers invest in homes because low interest rates on savings accounts cannot keep up with inflation. Real estate investment was 13% of GDP in 2011. Home ownership is a recent development in China, only since 1990, Chinese have never experienced large price declines. Household debt as a percentage of disposable income has increased significantly in recent years, up to 53.6% in 2011 from 31.3% in 2008, according to Lardy.