LyrArc Article Gist
Former German chancellor from the SPD party, Gerhard Schroeder, is interviewed by Rayond Zhong of the WSJ. Here he describes his views on the way Agenda 2010 was implemented in 2003 in Germany to gain public support for changes to Germany's welfare state. He also talks about the eurozone crisis and how Angela Merkel has handled the crisis, and the right approach for an Agenda 2020 for Europe. The interview was made at Schroeder's law office in Hannover, Germany. This is a detailed and exceptional interview by Zhong covering all facets of the eurozone crisis and Germany's response. Schroeder says it was right to give Greece more time to make the reforms, so that the Greek people could see that this path would help in a positive way. In doing this he cites his own experience when as the reforms for Agenda 2010 to make Germany more competitive were taking place- including cuts in spending and lower taxes- he turned down his finance minister Hans Eichel's proposal in 2003 for an additional 20 billion euros in cuts to put Germany in compliance with EU law....

LyrArc Article Gist
Germany went through a period of stagnant growth and persistently high unemployment leading to reforms of the welfare system and entitlements under the Schroeder administration. The reforms led to lower unemployment benefits and an effort to get the unemployed take up jobs. Instead of unemployment benefits that amounted to half the salary indefinitely, unemployment benefits ended in 12 months under the reforms, and workers were forced to take up jobs or dig into their savings. The cuts to benefits led to more of the unemployed taking jobs that were not their first choice with lower incomes. Unions agreed to defer wage demands and wages remained relatively flat for a long period. The "kurzarbeit" system of government subsidizing employers to retain workers during economic downturns, helped cushion the workforce from ups and downs in the economy. Unemployment which was in double digits a decade ago, is now 6.1%. The system still preserved some other aspects of generous benefits- parental leave of 14 months at two-thirds salary, vacation time and publicly sponsored health insurance. Recent changes include raising the retirement age to 67 from 65. The Organization of Economc Cooperation and Development estimates that the 200,000 jobs saved in Germany during the recession of 2008-2009 cost the government $7 billion. Government funds helped companies retain workers by paying a portion of worker salaries and averting layoffs.This comes to $35,000 per job. Compare this with the $38.9 billion allocated to a loan program at the Energy Department under the U.S. stimulus. 8050 jobs were created under this program according to the Washington Post- for the money spent so far in Sept 2011- 2 years into the loan program, of $19.3 billion. This comes to $2.4 million in government guaranteed loans per job. The Energy Department says that 33,000 jobs were saved under the $5.9 billion that was given to the auto industry under this program for investments in manufacturing to improve fuel efficiency. This comes to $178,000 per job. The Energy Department and Congress estimated a 5%-10% loss on the $38.6 billion loan program for loans that go sour, such as the Solyndra solar company $535 million loan. This comes to $1.9 billion at 5% loss and $3.8 billion for a 10% loss. The purpose of these figures is to show the cost of programs when the programs fail to achieve job goals or produce too little for the investment. The $3.8 billion loss under the program is over half the $7 billon Germany invested for the 200,000 jobs saved as estimated by the OECD. That ranks as a far superior investment than the Energy Department program. For the U.S. there are aspects of German reforms such as "kurzarbeit" that bear emulation, with serious questions about the effective use of the U.S. stimulus funds. For the rest of Europe the stingier unemployment benefits, raising the retirement age to 67, and other reforms send a different message. From the average German the message is: we made the tough changes, the rest of Europe cannot expect Germans to pay higher taxes while they put off similiar changes. Italy needs to change its retirement age, just as the Germans have done. As Chancellor Merkel puts it: "People in countries like Greece, Spain, Portugal shouldn't be able to retire earlier than in Germany. It's important for everybody to put in effort to make it roughly equal. Germany will only help when others really make an effort." Which is why Greece, Spain, Italy, even France are faced with making serious changes. This isn't stalling when it comes to euro bonds, from the German perspective. And it isn't about the lack of committment to the idea of a European Union, as all major political parties in Germany, the CDP, the SDP and the Greens, all strongly support the idea of a European Union. ...

LyrArc Article Gist
Wall Street Journal reporters Walker in Berlin, Forelle in Brussels, and Meichtry in Rome, reconstruct the events during critical days after the indecision and failure to reach agreement during the July summit of eurozone countries. This took the form of intervews with leading players and over 25 policy makers. What emerges are accounts of how Germany's Angela Merkel, daughter of a Lutheran pastor, and protege of Eurozone founder, former German chancellor Helmut Kohl, handled the crisis. Merkel was widely criticized in the media for indecision. What emerges is an account of a leader who took decisive action at key moments in the crisis- leading to the formation of new governments in Greece and Italy taking action to improve finances, and negotiations with banks represented by the International Finance Corporation leading to acceptance by banks of a 50% loss on loans to Greece to reduce Greece's unsustainable debt burden. Merkel also worked with the European Central Bank's departing president Frenchman Claude Trichet and new president Italian Mario Draghi to resist French president Sarkozy's efforts to have the ECB assume responsibility for the crisis through large scale buying of Italian and Spanish bonds; which was opposed by German public opinion as a backdoor way of having German taxpayers assume responsibility for European debt. Shown are three critical moments when Merkel intervened. In October 2011, after Italian prime minister Berlusconi reneged on promises to make pension and other reforms to improve Italian finances because of political resistance. He survived a parliamentary no-confidence vote by one vote. Merkel took the lead on October 20, by directly calling Italian President Georgio Napolitano on the phone, to urge him to take action for forming a new government in Italy. The result was Napolitano talking with all political parties to form a new government, leading to the formation of a government by a non-political figure respected in Italy, former EU commissioner Mario Monti. A day earlier, on October 19, French President Sarkozy met ECB president, Trichet, at an event honoring him as departing ECB president in Frankfurt's Alte Oper concert hall. Trichet, Merkel and Sarkozy met in a side room. Sarkozy asked for decisive help from the ECB for large scale buying of Italian and Spanish bonds to lower yields, which had reached 7% on Italian bonds. Trichet responded that the ECB's charter did not allow it to finance governments, with the meeting ending in a shouting match between the two leaders. On October 21, EU and IMF inspectors warned that Greece's debt was reaching unsustainable proportions and austerity measures alone would not work, unless the bondholders, the European banks, took losses of 60% on their excessive lending to Greece. At this point France agreed to the German position arguing for this level of bondholder haircuts or losses, fearing the prospect of large future bailouts that would jeopardize France's triple AAA credit rating. The July 2011 summit accord had only provided for 10% in losses for bondholders. On October 27, at a meeting that went past midnight, Merkel and Sarkozy called IIF head Charles Dallara, who headed negotiating for the banks, to EU headquarters in Brussels. Merkel handed Dallara an agreement containing the 50% bondholder loss demand, and told Dallara- "This is the last offer." Merkel was saying banks would be left with nothing if they rejected it and Greece defaulted. Dallara called bankers and the IIF accepted Merkel's agreement. The final moment that October came on October 31, when Greece's prime minister Papandreou said he would call a referendum on the bailout provisions and austerity measures demanded by the IMF, the EU and the ECB. Bond markets reacted negatively to the announcement fearing a rejection and a Greek default. The Group of 20 leaders was meeting in Cannes, France on Nov. 2, 2011. Papandreou was asked to come to Cannes for a pre-summit meeting. Here Merkel told Papandreou- "the real question" for the referendum was, "Do you want to be in the euro, or not?" Days later Papandreou, lacking support in Greece from political parties and opposition inside his party, submitted his resignation. A non-political figure respected in Greece, former ECB vice president, Lucas Papademos, was appointed prime minister to head a Unity government. Polls after the appointment showed three fourths of Greeks said that this was "a positive step for Greece," with Papandreou's party getting only 11% support and the opposition led by Samaras about 20%. The criticism leveled at Merkel is that Germany should take responsibility for debt throughout the euro area through the issuance of eurozone bonds or the ECB buying large amount of bonds of Spain and Italy. Merkel faced strong opposition inside Germany and from the Bundesbank to this idea. The other criticism was based on austerity measures worsening the finances of Greece because of a lack of growth in the economy, which is true; yet Germany may see the situation in Greece as taking a long time to be resolved in any event because of excessive and faulty financial management. For Italy and Spain putting finances in order was a necessity, and austerity measures should lead to short term sacrifice but improve prospects for the long term by returning the economies to growth. Another criticism is the installation of governments that lack popular or electoral support. As the polls in Greece showed the Unity government there has far greater support and public opinion blames the politicians for the huge mess. In Italy, Berlusconi was widely seen as losing popular support when he resigned. And in Spain Mariano Rajoy, the newly elected prime minister, was elected with a huge majority in parliament following winning in local government elections. Merkel also held her own party, the Chrisitian Democrats together at the recent Leipzig convention. Mario Draghi, was elected with German support to head the European Central Bank. He has long argued for better management of Italian finances as head of Italy's central bank. Draghi was able to support Merkel with carefully planned and managed actions. First to reduce interest rates to support economic growth in a slowing eurozone. Following this with the ECB's Long Term Financing Operation in late December 2011, to provide unlimited loans to European banks at 1% interest for three years in exchange for a broadened list of collateral deposited at the ECB. In a final twist in this drama, Charles Dallara, who was a key negotiator for the U.S. Treasury in setting up the Brady Bonds- that converted bad Latin American government debt owed to U.S. banks in the 1980's into long term debt with large reductions in principal owed and lower interest rates. This was in exchange for guaranteed repayment with 30 year U.S. zero coupon bonds. Dallara was now a negotiator for the banks to reduce the chance of the very same bondholder haircuts that he had negotiated in an earlier period to solve the Latin American debt crisis. Other players in the drama were Axel Weber, head of the Bundesbank, Germany's central bank, who resigned after strong and outspoken opposition to the ECB's large scale purchase of bonds of Greece, Italy and Spain. Jens Weidmann, his protege, who replaced him. And Jurgen Stark, German representative at the ECB, who also resigned in opposition to Germany assuming responsibility for eurozone debt. ...