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Portugal in 2012-2013 stands as a good case study of what is good and what is bad about austerity measures, about what makes sense and is needed and what does not make sense and is bad both in a fiscal sense and for growth. Patricia Knowsmann does a good job of bringing this out, from the hundreds of stories written about austerity vs growth in the media. During 2011-2012, the elected government of Passos Coelho has supported an EU-IMF-ECB program that reduced wages, raised taxes, privatized state owned companies and changed labor laws that reduced hiring by businesses. During this time the Portuguese have patiently accepted the program compared to other countries and the budget deficit is shrinking from 9.8% in 2010 to an expected 5% in 2012. The unemployment rate has gone up to 15%. Now a new plan by prime minister Coelho in September has created an uproar and sparked popular opposition to the austerity measures threatening what has been achieved in deficit reduction, including the credibility of the austerity program. The plan is to reduce the portion of salaries that employers contribute to the social security system from 23.5% to 18%, in the hope that employers would increase hiring. At the same time it increases the portion of salaries employees pay from 11% to 18%. Coelho was looking at Germany and Slovenia where employees pay more than 20% of salaries to Social Security. What he failed to look at was the situation in Portugal where workers and pensioners have lost about 24% of their income through wage cuts and tax increases. The new plan would reduce incomes even further. Portugal's small business owners expressed strong disapproval for the plan because it would mean a drastic drop in consumer spending. The president of a Portuguese shoe maker, Kyaia, with 600 employees, says it makes no sense to reduce companies contribution if the company can't sell enough shoes to keep its workers. Kyaia has already experienced a 25% decline in demand and its CEO Fortunato Frederico, says he cannot understand how a company can hire workers if demand declines. This impact on consumer demand and sentiment is a fact that policymakers cannot ignore throughout the eurozone as austerity measures are implemented, especially when demand has already declined to an unacceptable point. The move by Coelho ignored a study by Portugal's finance ministry and central bank that showed export businesses may be induced to hire from the savings in contributions, but the businesses serving the domestic market would simply take in the savings. The EU-IMF-ECB recognized this and suggested increasing taxes to pay for the reduction in employer contributions, which would also depress demand by reducing incomes further. Portugal's economy and business is not focussed on exports, small business makes up 97% of Portugal's companies and most of them do not export. The introduction of such a plan gives credibility to the idea that there is a transfer of wealth from workers to business under the austerity programs, which affects the credibility of the entire deficit reduction and competitiveness improvement programs. For Coelho it also means the strong opposition of a minority party in his coalition government and from members of his Social Democratic Party. Large demonstrations were held on Sept 15 in 40 cities in Portugal in the first large scale opposition to further austerity measures and the Coelho social security contribution plan. Capital markets in Europe also see a problem with such plans because it removes the essential element of popular acceptance of deficit reduction plans jeopardizing the entire program. After the failure to win popular acceptance in Greece capital markets see additional risks and failures as one too many for the eurozone. ...

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NYT's Landon Thomas gives this exceptional report on how Deutsche Bank changed from a lender to the German auto industry and safe banking practices to enter the derivatives business and other opaque financial products that led to taking on huge risks. Deutsche Bank has agreed on Dec. 22, 2016 to settle with the U.S. Justice Department paying a fine of $7.2 billion for practices relating to faulty mortgage securities. This report says the problems started in 1995 with Deutsche Bank's leadership hiring Edson Mitchell of Merrill Lynch to promote the investment banking business at Deutsche Bank. Mitchell hired two derivatives traders Broeksmit and Anshu Jain. Mr. Mitchell died in plane crash in 2000 when he was 47 years age, Mr. Broeksmit committed suicide in 2014, 58 years in age, Mr. Anshu Jain, 53 years old, is the only surviving person of the three. Under Mr. Jain Deutsche Bank assumed more and more risk, and was involved in complex and opaque financial products leading to the toxic mortgage crisis, and manipulation of the lending rate for London banks.  It also lent $300 million to Donald Trump's businesses. Most of the profits generated from this venture have evaporated, with analysts estimating $15 billion in fines and penalties owed of the $20 billion that these ventures generated. Not counting the serious damage to the bank's reputation in Germany and the U.S. This report points out the role played by the CEO from 2002 to 2012 of Deutsche Bank, Josef Ackermann, in encouraging these ventures converting the bank from its original loan as a contintental lender to business to a bank selling opaque financial products for most of its profits. Landon Thomas also describes the events and days leading up to the suicide by Broeksmit, including a visit to a psychiatrist and Broeksmit's facing enormous stress about the investigations underway in Germany and the U.S. looking into the opaque financial products and practices of Deutsche Bank. This is also a cautionary tale about what happened in banking from the late 1990's leading to the collapse in 2008, leading to the problems of today- the need to rescue the economy in 2008-2009 and the low rate world that ensued damaging the savings of ordinary people, the infrastructure that was never built, the parallel crisis of the hollowing out in manufacturing as a false prosperity boomed in banking and finance. In a sense it is also a story of everyday lives that were damaged in the high flying boardrooms of finance in New York, London and Frankfurt. The revolving door between regulators and the banks made it harder to monitor and control banking risk letting this story unfold over decades, damaging the credibility of governments and the established political parties without clear alternatives from outside; as the dominance of Wall Street executives in the new outsider Trump administration shows.  ...

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Criticism of the EU's handling of the Greece crisis by IMF officials in a report. The report says the actions taken for debt restructuring in 2012 should have come much earlier to reduce the debt burden and the size of austerity measures in Greece. Similiar criticism has been voiced by president Hollande of France and in editorials by the WSJ. President Samaras of Greece says the sharp cuts in spending reduced potential for growth in the economy.

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Wall Street Journal reporters Walker in Berlin, Forelle in Brussels, and Meichtry in Rome, reconstruct the events during critical days after the indecision and failure to reach agreement during the July summit of eurozone countries. This took the form of intervews with leading players and over 25 policy makers. What emerges are accounts of how Germany's Angela Merkel, daughter of a Lutheran pastor, and protege of Eurozone founder, former German chancellor Helmut Kohl, handled the crisis. Merkel was widely criticized in the media for indecision. What emerges is an account of a leader who took decisive action at key moments in the crisis- leading to the formation of new governments in Greece and Italy taking action to improve finances, and negotiations with banks represented by the International Finance Corporation leading to acceptance by banks of a 50% loss on loans to Greece to reduce Greece's unsustainable debt burden. Merkel also worked with the European Central Bank's departing president Frenchman Claude Trichet and new president Italian Mario Draghi to resist French president Sarkozy's efforts to have the ECB assume responsibility for the crisis through large scale buying of Italian and Spanish bonds; which was opposed by German public opinion as a backdoor way of having German taxpayers assume responsibility for European debt. Shown are three critical moments when Merkel intervened. In October 2011, after Italian prime minister Berlusconi reneged on promises to make pension and other reforms to improve Italian finances because of political resistance. He survived a parliamentary no-confidence vote by one vote. Merkel took the lead on October 20, by directly calling Italian President Georgio Napolitano on the phone, to urge him to take action for forming a new government in Italy. The result was Napolitano talking with all political parties to form a new government, leading to the formation of a government by a non-political figure respected in Italy, former EU commissioner Mario Monti. A day earlier, on October 19, French President Sarkozy met ECB president, Trichet, at an event honoring him as departing ECB president in Frankfurt's Alte Oper concert hall. Trichet, Merkel and Sarkozy met in a side room. Sarkozy asked for decisive help from the ECB for large scale buying of Italian and Spanish bonds to lower yields, which had reached 7% on Italian bonds. Trichet responded that the ECB's charter did not allow it to finance governments, with the meeting ending in a shouting match between the two leaders. On October 21, EU and IMF inspectors warned that Greece's debt was reaching unsustainable proportions and austerity measures alone would not work, unless the bondholders, the European banks, took losses of 60% on their excessive lending to Greece. At this point France agreed to the German position arguing for this level of bondholder haircuts or losses, fearing the prospect of large future bailouts that would jeopardize France's triple AAA credit rating. The July 2011 summit accord had only provided for 10% in losses for bondholders. On October 27, at a meeting that went past midnight, Merkel and Sarkozy called IIF head Charles Dallara, who headed negotiating for the banks, to EU headquarters in Brussels. Merkel handed Dallara an agreement containing the 50% bondholder loss demand, and told Dallara- "This is the last offer." Merkel was saying banks would be left with nothing if they rejected it and Greece defaulted. Dallara called bankers and the IIF accepted Merkel's agreement. The final moment that October came on October 31, when Greece's prime minister Papandreou said he would call a referendum on the bailout provisions and austerity measures demanded by the IMF, the EU and the ECB. Bond markets reacted negatively to the announcement fearing a rejection and a Greek default. The Group of 20 leaders was meeting in Cannes, France on Nov. 2, 2011. Papandreou was asked to come to Cannes for a pre-summit meeting. Here Merkel told Papandreou- "the real question" for the referendum was, "Do you want to be in the euro, or not?" Days later Papandreou, lacking support in Greece from political parties and opposition inside his party, submitted his resignation. A non-political figure respected in Greece, former ECB vice president, Lucas Papademos, was appointed prime minister to head a Unity government. Polls after the appointment showed three fourths of Greeks said that this was "a positive step for Greece," with Papandreou's party getting only 11% support and the opposition led by Samaras about 20%. The criticism leveled at Merkel is that Germany should take responsibility for debt throughout the euro area through the issuance of eurozone bonds or the ECB buying large amount of bonds of Spain and Italy. Merkel faced strong opposition inside Germany and from the Bundesbank to this idea. The other criticism was based on austerity measures worsening the finances of Greece because of a lack of growth in the economy, which is true; yet Germany may see the situation in Greece as taking a long time to be resolved in any event because of excessive and faulty financial management. For Italy and Spain putting finances in order was a necessity, and austerity measures should lead to short term sacrifice but improve prospects for the long term by returning the economies to growth. Another criticism is the installation of governments that lack popular or electoral support. As the polls in Greece showed the Unity government there has far greater support and public opinion blames the politicians for the huge mess. In Italy, Berlusconi was widely seen as losing popular support when he resigned. And in Spain Mariano Rajoy, the newly elected prime minister, was elected with a huge majority in parliament following winning in local government elections. Merkel also held her own party, the Chrisitian Democrats together at the recent Leipzig convention. Mario Draghi, was elected with German support to head the European Central Bank. He has long argued for better management of Italian finances as head of Italy's central bank. Draghi was able to support Merkel with carefully planned and managed actions. First to reduce interest rates to support economic growth in a slowing eurozone. Following this with the ECB's Long Term Financing Operation in late December 2011, to provide unlimited loans to European banks at 1% interest for three years in exchange for a broadened list of collateral deposited at the ECB. In a final twist in this drama, Charles Dallara, who was a key negotiator for the U.S. Treasury in setting up the Brady Bonds- that converted bad Latin American government debt owed to U.S. banks in the 1980's into long term debt with large reductions in principal owed and lower interest rates. This was in exchange for guaranteed repayment with 30 year U.S. zero coupon bonds. Dallara was now a negotiator for the banks to reduce the chance of the very same bondholder haircuts that he had negotiated in an earlier period to solve the Latin American debt crisis. Other players in the drama were Axel Weber, head of the Bundesbank, Germany's central bank, who resigned after strong and outspoken opposition to the ECB's large scale purchase of bonds of Greece, Italy and Spain. Jens Weidmann, his protege, who replaced him. And Jurgen Stark, German representative at the ECB, who also resigned in opposition to Germany assuming responsibility for eurozone debt. ...

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ECB study put out in April 2013 shows household wealth and income in eurozone countries based on 2009-2010 data for 60,000 households throughout the eurozone. The household wealth in southern European countries is higher than that in Germany. The study shows why ordinary Germans oppose bailouts for banks, Greece, and eurozone countries that experienced a boom in the 2000-2010 period, a period in which German workers took small pay raises to improve German competitiveness. Germans also see Portugal and Ireland in a different light compared to Greece, Cyprus, Italy and Spain where real estate speculation, lax accounting, tax evasion and favored treatment of certain groups, has created or aggravated the debt problems. Wealth is defined as total assets, including real estate, vehicles, bank deposits, investments and pensions, minus liabilities for mortgages, credit card debt and loans. By this measure German households had an average of 200,000 euros in wealth, and lower than this in Finland and Netherlands. At the median or midpoint German households had 50,000 euros, the lowest in the eurozone, for Greece the median was 102,000 euros. The impact of home ownership is significant in the report, as home ownership is lower in Germany than in Southern European countries, and mortgage interest is not considered favorably in German tax laws. The decline in value of homes after 2010 is also not reflected. Another indicator for comparitive wellbeing is income, and this is shown in figures released in March 2013 from the European Statistics Agency for GDP per capita. For Germany per capita GDP was 29,000 euros in 2010. The average GDP per capita for the eurozone is about 24,000 euros. By this measure Greece is at 21,000 euros, 24,000 euros for Italy and for Spain. Germany being 18-19% above Spain and Italy. If Germans, Dutch, Finns and Austrians are less well off then the argument favors having the banks, creditors, and including depositors, in a burdensharing arrangement for bailout of troubled eurozone economies. ...

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Failure by EU leaders to take early and decisive action to reduce Greece's debt to sustainable levels in 2009. This was when the IMF report by Dutchman Bob Traa blew the cover off the Greek coverup of deteriorated finances. Policy missteps included ECB president Trichet and other EU leaders pushing austerity measures and not taking needed tough action on reducing the debt. By November 2011 a 50% reduction in debt with bondholders taking the losses is not enough to correct the situation. Greece's debt is discounted by 70% by Nov 2011. Analysts estimate an 85% reduction in Greek debt being necessary for Greece to pull through without a default.

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John Taylor looks one step ahead of the March 2012 Greece bailout and sets up the most plausible scenario for the future. He says the risks of contagion were always exaggerated from the beginning- a planned default or restructuring of debt such as happened in Argentina in 2001, does not have the contagion risks associated with a chaotic and unplanned default as in Russia in 1998. Predicability in policy makes a huge difference, says Taylor. The European banks which stood to lose from writedowns exaggerated the fears of contagion- a process that always occurs for people who are adversely affected by writedowns- resulting in top officials in the European Union delaying the unavoidable serious restructuring. It was not until Chancellor Merkel handed Charles Dallara, who negotiated for the European banks, a note stating a demand for 50% bondholder writedown, on October 27, 2011, at EU headquarters in Brussels, did any serious writedown of debt begin. Merkel told Dallara: "this is my last offer." The July 2011 summit by contrast had only a 10% bondholder writedown in the agreement, when insolvency not illiquidity was the real issue. Walker Forelle and Meichtry, give a detailed account of what happened in the Wall Street Journal, Dec. 30, 2011. The important thing for Greece, says Taylor, is for what the IMF calls "growth enhancing structural reforms" - greater reliance on private markets, incentives, rule of law. He says this bailout won't work because IMF growth forecasts do not reflect the rapid shrinking of the Greek economy. Antonis Samaras, leader of the major opposition party, is in favor of pro-growth measures and has stated his desire to change the agreement. The 130 billion euro bailout provides 90 billion euros for recapitalizing Greece's banks, and financing the budget. This puts Greece in a situation where the political leaders win voter support by discarding the conditions from the Northern EU nations and come with a plan that is better suited for Greece. The EU in this scenario would cut off further bailout funds to Greece. Taylor sees this as the better outcome for Greece than the current situation, which leaves Greece no hope for growth, and also for the EU by getting out of bailouts that have little prospect of working. It would be difficult but doable for Greece says Taylor, because interest payments would be low and Greek banks would be recapitalized after the current March 2012 bailout. ...

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After the debt swap of old bonds for new bonds with private bondholders for an estimated 53% haircut, the IMF's March 2012 report on Greece says a lot remains unresolved. It predicts a "disorderly exit from the euro" without further help. The April 2012 elections may result in a dilution to committments to austerity policies in Greece, as these policies are highly unpopular in Greece. Greece is still "accident-prone." And competitiveness issues may take over a decade to resolve.

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This Wall Street Journal editorial comes out in favor of higher capital reserve requirements similiar to that suggested by Federal Reserve Board governor Daniel Tarullo. The Journal says that if regulators are serious in the U.S. about controlling systemic risk, then the 14% rule or a 15% rule for assets held in reserve by banks should be adopted. Daniel Tarullo had suggested a 14% capital reserve requirement. These requirements would be phased in gradually over several years. Basel III requirements require only a 7% requirement and is phased in over many years. Capital standards are likely to be gamed. For this reason the requirement for only Tier 1 capital to be eligible is essential. What about the Basel III standards and the European banks? Would this put them in a better position to earn higher returns. This should be a problem left for European taxpayers to tackle says the Journal. As long as U.S. taxpayers are supporting U.S. banks with an implicit subsidy to take on larger amounts of risk -because they will be saved in a crisis with taxpayer dollars- the Journal says it makes sense to require 10-14% in capital reserves. It cites the Japanese banks which were highly overleveraged with lower capital reserves compared to American banks, and fared poorly. The Dodd-Frank bill imposes a complicated set of regulatory requirements with regulators required to write new sets of rules. The editorial concludes that it is far better to tackle the problems in the banking system with a sufficiently high requirement for capital reserves to manage risks than to have the detailed rule making on every subject that Dodd-Frank suggests....