LyrArc Article Gist
The story of Brazil's sugarcane plantation industry, and also of its ethanol producing region. A detailed account of the people who own these plantations and why they are reluctant to sell. The difficulties of getting into the sugarcane planation industry in brazil with its small owners and fragmented nature, and use of labor that violates Brazilian laws and international standards.
These sgar cane plantations are located next to the mills because of the available infrastructure, and family owned sometimes handed down for generations, even hundreds of years, as Brazil was once a portuguese colony and a
location for the slave trade which provided labor to the plantations. Note that most of the plantations use poorly paid labor and most of the work is done by hand, with the owners living in large ranchlike fazendas. Its probably another world for international investors not used to such a landscape. There are labor and environmental liabilities in owning some of these mills.
Then most of these mills do not keep reliable accounting books and have tax and debt issues which cannot be easily resolved in Brazil's slow legal system.
There are about 210 companies running 368 sugar and ethanol mills. The five largest companies generate only 17% os sales gives some idea of the fragmentation in the industry. There is also the perception that if large foreign companies like the ADM, Australia's CSR, Germany's Sudzucker AG, or even India's Bajaj Hindusthan, or others gain control over Brazil's ethanol industry Brazil's sugar producing regions would benefit less than if they get loans from large Brazilian or international banks and consolidate and modernize themselves, leading to political pressures in this direction. One such example is given here, one valuable sugar mill Vale de Rosario has been pursued by Bunge with an offer of $640 million for outright ownership, but Vale de rosario's board rejected the offer. Cargill looked at the possiblilty of owning 30% but was also turned away. Attempts at consolidation by Cosan, Brazil's largest sugar manufacturer, which made agreements with relatives owning 50.2 % of the shares in the company which has about a 100 relative clan with shares in the company over generations, also failed. The Biagi and Franco families which run the company made use of a defense under the cooperative's bylaws which allows the smallest shareholder to have 30 days to equal any takeover offer. The Biagis offered their own Santa Elisa mill to secure a $675 million credit line from Brazil's largest private bank Bradesco which was then used to buy out relatives who wanted the money. Now the Vale de Rosario and Santa Elisa mills have merged and are looking for international financing for the new company Santelisa Vale, which becomes the second largest after Cosan. Goldman Sachs plans to invest 200 million in Santelisa Vale.What this shows is the extraordinary lengths these family owned mills would go to to preserve their independent ways of operating and hand over to the next generation. Another difficulty is that industry experts are hard to recruit from these family owned companies as they have spent alifetime working there and remain loyal.
With allthese obstacles the logic that the foreign companies can use Brazil to supply the world with ethanol from sugarcane does not take hold. Some of the attraction of sugarcane is that it contributes less to global warming than corn as a source for ethanol because sugarcane absorbs some of the CO2 when it is replanted. With a 51 cent per gallon tax credit subsidy on USA corn based ethanol and a 50 cent tariff on Brazilian ethanol imported into the USA, corn based ethanol can sustain in the US especially with the current high price of gasoline. Brazillian ethanol is more efficient to make from sugarcane and can be made to compete with gasoline even if gasoline prices drop.
Instead there may be more years of unstable supply of ethanol from Brazil ahead which is what the Japanese in their negotiations for a supply of ethanol from Brazil have discovered since seeking such an agreeement since 2001. In the 1980's Brazilian sugar producers chasing high sugar prices lowered production of ethanol and left drivers without ethanol at the pumps.
One company that is looking at another solution is Brenco, Brazilian Renewable Energy Company, a startup company backed by Ron Burkle and Vinod Khosla. It plans to put up its own green field sugar cane fields away from Sao Paulo state where the Brazilian sugar cane industry is presently concentrated. But this will take six year before the fields are ready for ethanol production. Henri Reichstul, a former head of Petroleo brasileiro, Brazil's national oil company, now leads Brenco.
...
