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"The best port in the storm," is how officials in Brussels described Greek prime minister Samaras in October 2012, as Samaras negotiated terms with the EU/ECB/IMF team for the next instalment of funds from the EU.

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Yannis Stournaras, macroeconomics professor at the University of Athens, takes over as finance minister in Greece in June 2012 in the new administration of Antonis Samaras. He brings vast expertise and fresh ideas.

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Greece shows the first sign of returning to positive economic growth after years of decline leading to a drop in GDP of about 25% since 2008. The Greek economy contracted by 2.6% in the 4th quarter of 2013 compared to the 3rd quarter, according to Hellenic Statistical Authority. For 2013 the economy contraced by 3.7% instead of an estimated 4%. Growth is expected to be flat in 2014 or growth of 0.6%. For the first time manufacturing and retail sales are showing signs of growing and new car registrations increased in Jan. 2014. Finance ministry data show Greece's budget with a surplus of 691 million euros in 2013, compared with a deficit of 3.46 billion euros in 2012, before debt payments. The figure is higher at 812 million euros when money from the EU coming in for public works is added. Unemployment remains high at 28%.

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Lawyers Buchheit and and Gulati help Greece design a legal agreement that writes in a new collective action clause. The collective action clause ensures a 95% participation for the bond restructuring deal Greece is doing in March 2012 to cut its debt to sustainable levels. A similiar deal could be designed for Portugal says Mitu Gulati, a law professor at Duke University. Because Greece's bonds are written under Greek law, writing in a new collective action clause is a legal mechanism for achieving a meaningful debt reduction and bond restructuring deal- this is something Gulati and Buchheit figured out because of their expertise in this field. A joint paper by Buchheit and Gulati in 2010, first explored the way in which private bondholders of Greek bonds who reject a bond debt restructuring could be forced to accept the same losses as other investors who accepted the deal. They are now advisors to the government of Greece. In early 2011 there was serious discussion that the Brady Bonds debt restructuring for Latin American debt of Argentina, Mexico and Brazil of the 1980's, under which private investors traded in their old bonds for new bonds with longer duration at reduced interest rates and lower value- reflecting voluntary losses accepted by bondholders- was the approach needed for Greece, Portugal, Ireland and other eurozone countries. Then U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady took the lead- in Landon Thomas Jr., NYT, 11/30/2010. Bondholders held out throughout this period, with Charles Dallara, one of the architects of the Brady bonds restructuring, hired by European banks to negotiate on their behalf. It was only when German Chancellor Merkel delivered an ultimatum by telling Dallara "this is the last offer," during a late night meeting on Oct. 27, 2011, at EU headquarters in Brussels, was an agreement reached on serious debt reduction- in Walker, Forelle, Meichtry, WSJ, 12/30/2011. The long delay meant a worsening crisis in Greece and the rest of the eurozone. ...

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An account by Journal reporters based on over 25 interviews with eurozone policymakers shows how the central players in the eurozone drama acted to defend their national interests during the period April to July 2011. On one side France's president Sarkozy, Frenchman Claude Trichet at the European Central Bank, arguing in favor of the banks not to take bondholder losses or haircuts on loans made to Greece. On the other side the Bundesbanks Axel Weber, and Jens Weidman, Jurgen Stark and German Finance Minister Schauble. The Germans argued strongly for bondholder losses to take responsibility for bad loan decisions by French and German banks. French banks had committed more loans to Greece than German banks and had more at stake. German public opinion was strongly against German taxpayers paying for the losses, making German politicians insistent that European banks take losses on their bad loan decisions, or Germany would not support additional loans to Greece. Throughout April to July the two sides were locked in an impasse. The French feared losses for their banks and a Lehman Brothers bankruptcy style situation. The Germans at the Bundesbank and the Finance Ministry were equally insistent. A July 2011 summit meeting did not settle the issue. The events not covered here from the July to the December summit of eurozone leaders resulted in bondholders taking 50% haircut on loans to Greece, reducing the debt burden in Greece after austerity measures led to popular protests. The French pushed hard for the ECB or the EFSF to be allowed to make large purchases of bonds of troubled eurozone countries in an effort to protect Spain and Italy from contagion through higher bond yields. The Netherlands and Finland supported Germany's position. German bankers Weber, Weidman at the Bundesbank and Finance Minister Schauble opposed large scale buying by the ECB of Italy's and Spain's bonds and Chancellor Merkel said about a common eurobond that "this is not going to happen." Governments changed in Greece, Italy, and Spain by Dec. 2011, which committed to austerity programs and spending cuts. Italian Mario Draghi was appointed with German support as new head of the ECB. In late December 2011 Draghi launched the Long Term Financing Operation for lending unlimited amounts at 1% for three year loans to European banks and relaxing the terms to accept government bonds and other debt as collateral for loans. The effect of this was to provide a large infusion of liquidity into the banking system in Europe and drastically bring down the yields on bonds issued by Italy and Spain....

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Credit default swaps on the $70 billion in CDS on Greece for different parties were activated in March 2012, resulting in payouts of $3.2 billion. This editorial points out that this happened without causing any tremors. Jean Claude Trichet as president of the ECB insisted in 2010-2011 that a default in Greece would result in systemic risks caused by the swaps and derivatives issued and in the contagion effects. The result was a delay in cuttting Greece's debt to sustainable levels with a private bondholder haircut that would have come much earlier. The delay and the burden of correction falling on austerity measures alone means Greece's economy is in much worse shape and debt still is not sustainable with Greece's rapidly declining economy.

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Antonis Samaras visits Bavaria and meets with Christian Social Union leader Horst Seehofer, who offers his support to Greece's recovery efforts and plans a return visit to Greece. After the meeting, Seehofer said "today, we've turned over a new leaf," and Samaras said "I've received a lot of appreciation for our efforts."

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Ariana Huffington of the Huffington Post recalls her days growing up in Athens. She says from her own personal experience that the children should not be penalized for the mistakes of their parents, that the next generation should not have to live desperate lives for the next decade under ECB policies that leave no room for growth. She adds her voice to voices in France, Spain, and other countries in the eurozone about the impact of current EU and ECB policies on Europe, and says exiting the eurozone is a difficult option, but like the Argentine example offers more hope for growth for the young generation in Greece.

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President Obama's call for boosting the minimum wage from $7.25 to $9.00 in his 2013 State of the Union address designed to lift millions out of poverty.

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Yannis Stournaras, economcs professor at the University of Athens becomes the finance minister in the new administration of prime minister Antonis Samaras. He holds a doctorate from Oxford University in economic theory and policy, lectured at St. Catherine's College, Oxford and at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. He was special advisor on monetary policy to the finance minstry and Greece's central bank. His public official positions include vice chairman of the Greek natural gas company and board member of the public debt management agency. He is well qualified to lead the effort for Greece to remain in the European Union with modified terms that extend the achievement of deficit targets by 2 years to 2016, and offer tax cuts and other growth oriented measures to get the Greek economy back on the path to recovery and growth after 4 years of declining GDP. He also brings a sense of committment to the EU, because he was chief economic advisor to Greece's Finance Ministry in 1994-2000 and took part in the negotiations that led to Greece's joining the eurozone in 2001. His strong views about changes needed to Greece's overregulated economy which favors special interests also coincide with the moves for labor and other reforms taken by the Monti and Rajoy governments in Italy and Spain. ...

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Mistakes French bank Societe Generale made with acquiring a controlling stake in Greek bank Geniki. Credit Agricole bank had a similiar experience with its stake in Greek bank Emporiki. In 2010 Societe Generale was forced to set aside 400 million euros for bad loans. Credit Agricole had to remove the CEO and higher executives in 2009 before introducing good loan criteria at Emporiki. Today Emporiki has loan loss provisions of 12.5% of gross loans, and Geniki has 21%, according to analysts. Dirk Hoffmann-Becking, analyst at Bernstein Research, estimates that a default that took out 30% from the value of these Greek banks loan book and 70% from Greek government bonds would result in a loss of 3 quarters of earnings for Credit Agricole and for Societe Generale 1.5 quarters of earnings. This would mean that the French banks would take 3 quarters longer to get their capital reserve ratios to 9% for new Basel III regulations.

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Greece is estimated to lose $30 billion in uncollected taxes each year. In an effort to make the wealthy pay their fair share in deficit reduction and austerity measures the Greek government is going after tax havens in London of Greeks shifting money abroad. This includes important members of parliament including the president of the Greek parliament.

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The IMF's changing views on the value of fiscal austerity. In the current debate about the value of fiscal austerity, there is the IMF view, a German view based on its own experience, and the views of other countries in Europe. The IMF's view has shifted over time. The IMF World Economic Outlook 2010, describes its view of the effects of austerity measures in the form of spending cuts and tax increases- "Fiscal consolidation typically has a contractionary effect on output. A fiscal consolidation equal to 1% of GDP typically reduces GDP by about 0.5% within 2 years and raises the unemployment rate by about 0.3% percentage points." Over the longer term there are benefits as the private sector is not crowded out in the search for captal funding by the excessive government borrowing. The IMF's economic models suggest that it would take 5 years before reaching the breakeven point when the benefits of austerity measures exceed the effects of austerity. The German view held by German central bankers is that the actions stimulate growth in the short term. Manfred Neumann, professor emeritus at the Institute for Economic Policy at the University of Bonn, says this is called the "German hypothesis" as it reflects the experience of Germany from austerity actions taken by Germany. Laurence Ball, professor of Economics at John Hopkins University, is critical of the "German hypothesis" and its application across Europe in different situations. Germany is a large exporting nation and exports helped counterbalance the effects of austerity measures. Within the eurozone with fixed exchange rates the exports of less competitive countries cannot be boosted through devaluing the currency to gain price competitiveness. The other problem is that with interest rates close to zero in the euro zone the central banks cannot cut rates aggressively to counteract the effects of spending cuts. The problem gets compounded when a number of countries are taking austerity measures at the same time accentuating the downturn....

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A 3 page July 14, 2015 update on the IMF's July 2015 debt sustainability analysis paper on Greece, points to severe damage to the Greek economy in the last year, especially under the uncertainty and closing of the banking system, making debt unsustainable without haircuts or extension of maturities and grace periods. About 85 billion euros is the additional financing needed as a result of the mismanagement under the Syriza government and closing of the banking system. It draws the conclusion that "haircuts could be avoided if instead there was a significant further extension of the maturities of the entire stock of European debt (GLF, EFSF) , in the form of doubling of grace and repayment periods, with similiar concessional terms on new financing." The paper adds that the maturity extension would have to be "very dramatic extension with grace periods of say, 30 years on the entire stock of European debt, including new assistance." One shocking part of the analysis is that within the space of one year from July 2014 to July 2015 the Greek economy went from reaching Debt to GDP ratio of 105% in 2022, to 170% after the closing of the banking system by July 12, 2015, according to the IMF. In 2014 it was at 177% of GDP....