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Sheila Bair releases her new book in Sept 2012 on the financial crisis of 2008-2009 and the efforts to introduce financial reforms for a safer financial system: "Bull By the Horns: Fighting to Save Main Street from Wall Street and Wall Street from Itself." She is particularly critical of U.S. Treasury Secretary, and former head of the New York Federal Reserve, Timothy Geithner, as protecting the interests of Citigroup and Wall Street in his position as Treasury Secretary of the U.S. government. She describes in detail the situations in which Geithner tried to water down essential reforms to the financial system to make it safer, including the Volcker Rule. Of particular concern is the revolving door by which banking regulators or government officials join banks after service in the government which leads to weakening of regulatory and government oversight and systemic risks as in 2008-2009. Sheila Bair is widely respected for her efforts during the financial crisis from 2008 to 2011, when she headed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the FDIC. Her active involvement in defending reforms and setting up the system by which financially failing banks could be taken over and unwound without risks to the U.S. financial system are lasting contributions. She also succeeded as a manager by setting up an experienced and effective successor in Martin Gruenberg as head of the FDIC, to continue this work. A former Congresswoman, she describes herself as a Republican populist from Kansas. Her current role is as senior advisor to the Pew Charitable Trusts, which itself is a rare phenomenon today for a senior government official leaving government....

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Transcripts from U.S. Federal Reserve meetings in 2006 that show Bernanke, as Fed chairman, and Geithner, as head of the New York Fed, ignored the risks of a collapsing bubble in housing and mortgages.

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John Taylor on the dangers of a loose U.S. monetary policy and the effects this had in fueling a housing bubble in Spain, Ireland and other EU countries. Taylor points to the bubble ocurring in emerging market economies from low interest rates. Taylor says the ECB's interest rate moves in 2003-2005 were affected by the Fed's low interest rates. He estimates the ECB set rates about two percentage points too low leading to housing bubbles in EU countries. A similiar process is taking place today with the Fed's near zero interest rate policy. Taylor points to interest rates in a group of 18 emerging market economies- including Brazil, China, India, Mexico and Turkey, which have held interest rates on average about 5 percentage points below widely used benchmarks fueling a doubling of global commodity prices between 2009-2011. The U.S. Fed's policies make it harder for central banks in emerging market economies to take aggresssive action against bubbles developing in these countries. Taylor says his does not mean that the Fed should not pay attention to the U.S. unemployment rate and long term unemployed, but should keep in mind the negative effects of slowing demand in emerging market economies and in the EU as a result of its monetary policy of keeping rates at near zero for long periods of time. This feeds back to the U.S. economy at a critical time....

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David Leonhardt on the policy errors of the Obama administration in managing the economy. Why he asks did the Obama administration not take the risks it took for "undeserving" recipients in the auto industry to provide significant help to GM and Chrysler and at the same not provide large scale and situation changing help to millions of mortgage holders who were under water? The housing crisis with millons of foreclosures depressing home prices has played a significant part in the lagging economic recovery. He points out that Obama economic advisors had read Rogoff and Reinhart's book "This Time Its Different," about the longer times it takes for a economic recovery after a housing bubble, and still made the mistake of believing economists who suggested that the stimulus by itself would be sufficient and that recovery was underway in 2010. Others in the Democratic party had pointed to the lack of focus on unemployment by the Obama administration. Why were such voices not heard?

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There is strong cirticism from many quarters about low interest rates as a prime culprit in causing the bubble in housing prices. In comments before the American Economic Association, America's Fed Chairman Bernanke defended his role as Fed governor in 2003 when he along with Greenspan was an advocate of the decision to cut the Fed's target interest rate to 1%, and to leave it here for a year and raise it only slowly. Bernanke says countries like Britain, New Zealand, and Sweden had tighter monetary policy but there home prices rose more, and monetary policy explains only 5% of the variation in home prices. Analysis has shown he says that capital inflows such as those the U.S. received from China and other Asian countries explains 31% of the variation in home prices, supporting a contrasting theory that that its these global imbalances that drove the crisis. He also placed the primary fault for the housing bubble on relaxed lending standards and views that housing prices would rise forever. Alongside these comments Fed chairman Bernanke also said that bank supervisors and other financial regulators of which the Fed was one, has a better ability to contain the excesses that led to the economic crisis including housing bubble and other excesses, than the Fed as a monetary policy maker. By saying this Bernanke is acknowledging that the failure of regulation was a key part of what happened in the economic crisis. The failure to fix the regulatory system even now leads Bernanke to say that he is open to using monetary policy as a supplementary tool for addressing risks should another bubble develop, if the regulatory system isn't reformed. Still Bernanke and Greenspan were quite complacent at the time of the low interest rates and did not point out the dangers of global capital imbalances which were evident at the time, preferring to say that the United States could benefit from the inflows of capital from overseas without serious risks. And the Fed did not exercize its role of vigilance in alerting the country to excesses in the way the housing industry operated and in exercizing its own powers to that effect. Instead the Fed as regulator and in role as asafeguard for serious risks let itself become part of the cheering section as the worst excesses in housing were being exposed....

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Applebaum talks to two researchers at the University of Chicago and Princeton, Prof. Sufi and Prof. Mian, on the record of U.S. president Obama and Fed chairman Bernanke in helping homeowners facing foreclosure and underwater borrowers, comparing that record with their record in helping the banks. The issue is relevant as the policy and handling of homeowners had to be part of an overall effective plan for recovery in the U.S. economy, because ultimately without the U.S. consumer any recovery would be weak in the long run- a situation the U.S. faces in early 2014. The response to the issue of irresponsible homeowners borrowing beyond the limit without an equally robust response to irresponsible bank management that allowed wildly excessive leveraging of assets, and successful aggressive lobbying by banks in a shortsighted policy of going through with a wave of foreclosures; besides creating questions of fairness and equitable handling of the problem, also had major ramifications for the future of the U.S. and global economic growth. Here Christina Romer and other administration advisors say Bernanke was right in tackling the problem from the perspective of the banks needing to be recapitalized. Thoughtful advisors looking at the entire problem, Martin Feldstein and Sheila Bair strongly pushed for providing the same help to homeowners without getting caught up in the issue of who was responsible home buyers or the banks, and looking at the interests of the U.S. economy and the U.S. people. Proposals by Feldstein and Bair were equally robust in helping banks as they were in helping homeowners, only the banks understood their interests narrowly and had more access to policymakers in the Bush, as well as the Obama administration, Paulson as well as Geithner. This leaves us with the ultimate irony of the Obama administration pushing for the minimum wage, even to the point of electoral posture, when lasting damage had been inflicted on homeowners from the weaker portions of America's middle class by a policy that went against what two respected financial and economic experts from the Reagan period, Sheila and Bair had strongly advocated. See links and groups on Feldstein and Bair. Applebaum has followed most aspects of this problem closely and continues to provide exceptional reporting including the piece on the thinking of new Fed chairman, Janet Yellen. Private enterprise rules that require management at banks just as for other companies to take responsibility for failures, and be replaced with new management, was largely avoided leading to a fundamental failure in how a free market economy such as the U.S. and western European economies are supposed to function. Rules aggressively pushed by Geithner's mentor Treasury Secretary Rubin for a vigorous cleanup at banks in South Korea during a similiar situation in 1997, were not followed in any way here, also setting wrong precedents for the long run. ...

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U.S. Federal Reserve chairman Bernanke, says the Fed will keep interest rates low till unemployment reaches 6.5%, as long as inflation remains at about 2%. If unemployment reaches 6.5%, and this is because more people are dropping out of the labor market, he will take this into account. If unemployment stays high the Fed indicated in its statement that it would tolerate a higher inflation of 2.5%, as long as the longer term outlook was for inflation to be at 2%. Bernanke said this doesn't mean monetary policy is on autopilot, because the Fed will watch conditions carefully and will leave room for flexibility- keeping an eye out for new asset bubbles that could develop, and monitoring labor market conditions and inflationary pressures and inflation expectations. If inflation falls well below 2%, or unemployment rate falls mainly because of people dropping out of the labor market, the Fed may continue to keep interest rates low. This policy was announced as U.S. fiscal cliff deficit negotiations continued in Dec. 2012 with one scenario being considered by both political parties being going over the Jan. 1 deadline before coming to an agreement. Bernanke pointed to this, saying "this is a major risk factor right now." The Fed's activist policy in economic policy has given financial markets and business a measure of stability not provided by government and Congress. Fed policy is to buy $40 billion of mortgage securities, and $45 billion of long term Treasury securities for each month in 2013. It will fund the purchases by adding reserves to the banking system, which is to say that it will print money to buy more bonds. This is a major decision by the Fed in that the Fed has shied away from unemployment targets in the past. Bernanke described this action as a new"automatic stabilizer" in the U.S. financial system- if unemployment rises investors know this pushes the Fed's interest rate increases further down the road and would drive interest rates down, if unemployment drops sooner than expected, investors anticipating Fed's rate increases would drive long term interest rates up, to keep stable growth....

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Raghuram Rajan, Professor of Finance at the Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, was appointed chief economist at the IMF in 2003. He presented a paper, titled "Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier," at the annual Jackson Hole meeting of economists and central bankers for 2005. Rajan says he had planned to write about how financial developments during Greenspan's 18 year old tenure had made things safer, but the more he looked the more evidence came up that the risk reward relationships in a normal functioning financial market had been terribly distorted. Market participants were being rewarded for wins but were not being asked to take on commensurate risks and impacts on their bonuses and rewards. He also cautioned about the use of credit default swaps which acted as insurance against bond defaults, and said insurers were generating big returns on this but with the appearance of little risk- even though the pain could be immense in a default. Banks were carrying credit securties on their books that posed risks to the whole financial system if things went wrong with the credit securities. Reaction from the gathering was unfavorable. Lawrence Summers, a former Treasury Secretary said, "the basic, slightly lead eyed premise of the paper was misguided."...