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Michael Getler describes the missed opportunity under President Obama for using one of America's most talented diplomats to engineer a peace agreement between the warring factions in Afghanistan- the U.S., the Pakistan army, the ISI and its support in the army, the Taliban, and the other parties such as the Haqqani faction and the Afghan government of Karzai. Holbrooke had used his experience for another President, with the same force of his larger than life personality, when he helped bring about the Dayton Accords in a similiar area of stubborn ethnic strife. Could Obama have tapped Holbrooke's skills and set aside the distractions of his personality as coming from an American with unique gifts, talent and achievement, is the question Getler asks. And is this a comment on the nature of the Obama Presidency and America's poorly invested hopes.

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Ann Marlowe has completed her sixth embed with American troops. She is a visiting fellow of the Hudson Institute. Her views from the ground are that without good governance the American effort there seriously risks failing. She is very concerned that the current administration is not taking good governance seriously. There should be alternatives to the Taliban and to the Karzai government which has failed to win public support.

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A good sign that the Obama adminstration sees the importance of cutting civilan deaths from American airpower, is the effort by the American Ambassador to personally meet with the civilans affected and their families to express his pain at the tragedy. Without civilan support the Afghan war against the Taliban may well be lost in the vast mountainous country, a country and a people, like most countries and people, with an aversion for foreign troops.

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The new drug policy in Afghanistan will acknowledge the act that after continuous efforts only about 3% of the opium crop was eradicated through destruction of opium popy fields. The policy was difficult to execute because it was the livelihood of farmers and because of Taliban opposition. THe focus will now be says Holbrooke, on interdicting flow of opium, and providing alternative crops for farmers. Gernerally experts from the UN to Brookings welcome the shift.

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Kevin Maurer looks back at 15 years of covering Afghanistan since 2004, and asks was it worth it.  The conflict has cost 145,000 lives for the U.S. period of the war alone. Not counting the war in which the Russians were involved in the decade before the U.S. involvement. In fact the Russian involvement in Afghanistan was costly enough to hasten the collapse of the Soviet Union and bring Gorbachev to power to unwind the war and make the changes that led to the collapse of the Berlin Wall.  2400 U.S. servicemen dead and 20,000 Americans wounded. The cost to the U.S. is $737 billion for this war, according to a report in 2018 from Brown University's Costs of War Project. Just as the Soviet Union showed the damage from this war the U.S. has seen the cost of this war and foreign entanglement in another war that started accidentally with international interventions in the Iran-Iraq region as a cost that was borne with consequences. This includes the neglect of infrastructure and the damage to the middle class prosperity built up in the 1950's and 1960's after the Second World War. The U.S. got into this war with 9/11 attacks on New York City. By 2010 what began as a war fought by a few Special Operations teams turned into a war with troop levels reaching 100,000. Presidents Bush and Obama both failed to end the war by winning it. In 2014 finally combat operations stopped and American troops mainly conducted anti-terrorism operations and trained Afghan forces. In recent years the war has gradually disappeared from the national discussion in the U.S. and is barely talked about. President Trump wants to end the war even if it means talking to the Taliban and negotiations directly with the Taliban are ongoing.  One result of this war is the aversion to costly international entanglements and the highly unpopular nature of the conflicts. There are serious costs of the conflict in terms of neglected domestic priorities including infrastructure, loss of U.S. technological edge in key industries, and the competition from China, an the investments in health, education, services that were not made, the increase in inequalities and the diminishing of the middle class. The global financial crisis of 2008, the result of faulty banking, added an economic dimension through the loss of middle class savings in the U.S., worsening the financial situation of the middle class in the U.S.    ...

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Challenges facing McChrystal, his blunt assessment, who says his troops are in the situation of apowerful but stupid bull lunging after insurgents. More important to protect the Afghan population he says to his troops tna to kill insurgents. But do the people think this way or do they simply wnat to be left alone by both the Taliban and the American forces if they could speak their mind. See Intelilinks for ground reports including Kearns Goodwin.

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The current number of American soldiers in Afghanistan of 32,000 in May 2014 will be reduced to about 9,800 after 2014, which would be cut to about 5000 in 2015, an leave only a small force of specially trained forces to protect the embassy and for additional security. Residual forces will include trainers and Special Operations forces to keep a check on Quaeda loyalists in remote parts of Afghanistan and in the mountains. The drones have accomplished much of the work done in earlier phases of the war by ground troops. The Afghan war has also been all about Pakistan. The completion of a full term in office of a democratically elected government for the first time, and the election of the Sharif government, including the participation of tribal and other Muslim extremists in elections, have been the hidden face of the war changing its face in other ways. The beginning of a focus on development in Pakistan and India, and the election of a new government in Aghanistan, the peace talks with the Taliban, are other parts of the shift to winding down America's presence coming from changes in the region itself- by changing the very nature of the conflict itself and isolating the most extremist elements....

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Troops who served in Konar province near the Pakistan border saw some of the heaviest fighting in Afghanistan. Here they give their account of what they saw and why there is a big gap in what they saw and what military officers and President Obama are telling Americans. Fort Campbell is spread out over 100,000 acres on the Kentucky-Tennessee border. Tweny thousand troops from this base served in Afghanistan. Brigades of the 101st Airborne Division from Fort Campbell fought some of the toughest battles in the eastern part of Afghanistan even while the surge concentrated troops in the southern part near populated centers. What the troops remember is battles fought in remote valleys where troops came out of nowhere like "ghosts," in areas which were held only for a few months and abandoned with no idea what they had accomplished. This description also fits with the reality of the Taliban being both Pakistani and Afghan in the sense that the borders were defined by the British during colonial times, but the tribes of the Pashtun region are on both sides, in Pakistan and Afghanistan. To subdue the region would be to subdue the Pakistani side and the support they enjoy in large parts of Pakistan, with the large and mountainous terrain making movement difficult. Which is why these troops talk about "ghosts" turning up from nowhere and find the fighting to have lost meaning in terms of purposes it is supposed to accomplish and how this is to be done. The reality of the valleys and hills over a vast mountainous terrain of Afghanistan and Pakistan and the people and fighting there does not fit the speeches made by President Obama on Afghanistan, and say soldiers this gap is widening every day....

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Kristof reminds readers of the NYT that the more that the British acted to suppress the American insurgents, the more that fueled the insurgents fighting the British. After all the land they were on was theirs they felt and not Britain's. The same is true for the $0 million Pastuns on both sides of the border, the Afghan side and the Pakistan side. He says Americans are not sensitive enough to nationalism abroad. The war in Afghanistan is costing $60 billion ayear. Adding another 40,000 troops will cost $10 billion, enough to send 2 million disadvantaged children to a solid preschool, or could be as high as $40 billion extra, which over 10 years would pay for almost half of health care reform. Kristof doesn't see the 40,000 troops doing enough to change the picture much, except increasing support for Taliban as the American footprint grows as foreign occupiers. He mentions that standard counterinsurgency ratios of troops to civilians would require 650,000 troops including Afghans.

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The views being currently argued in meetings with the President about the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Vice President Biden's view: Completely change the goal and strategy. Scale down the military presence. Change the goal from protecting the people from the Taliban- and note that reports on the ground suggest that the people are indifferent and see the Americans and the Taliban as equally bad, with the Americans as foreigners far worse, see Doris Kearns others- to accelerated training of the Afghan forces to fight the Taliban. The focus of US interests would shift to Pakistan. Biden points to the disparity for every $1 spent in Pakistan $30 goes to Afghanistan, and the US real interests lie in Pakistan, not Afghanistan. The US would work with Pakistan to take out Al Quaeda in the border regions. And the proof is that this is working, as Al Quaeda figures have been taken out with Pakistan's help. Counterinsurgency would be replaced by counter terrorism so the US doesn't get bogged down in support of a failing government. The fraud in the recent elections and increasing isolation and loss of support for the Karzai government, supported by unofficial evidence from the ground, make this a serious option, especially as President Obama knows the Karzai government does not merit support and presents a losing proposition. The second view is that of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton- Ike Shelton of Missouri on the Armed Services Committee and Leslie Gelb (see links) share this view- who said in an interview on PBS, "Well Al Quaeda's no longer in Afghanistan. If Afghanistan were taken over by the Taliban, I can't tell you how fast Al Quaeda would be back in Afghanistan." The problem with this view is that the US has only a limited presence in a large mountainous country with the difficult terrain that Afghanistan has, and its not American ground troops that have done the damage in taking out Al Quaeda, its mostly high tech drones. WIth a wider engagement and expanded US ground troops in support of a failing government, that is alleged to have corrupt and narcoltics connections, the popular support would dwindle to the point that the extra troops would not be seen as protecting the population- because how do you protect a people who simply don't care or are suspicious of you? The solution requires some sort of settlement with the Taliban, which guarantees that it not serve as a haven for Al Quaeda. Progress with schools and modernization would have to be, at least in the short run, be given upon the basis of the U.S. coming to terms with what it can and cannot accomplish at an acceptable cost, and the idea of vital interests not lying in Afghanistan but Pakistan. The missing elements in this puzzle would help this strategy, bringing together key countries in South Asia, India and Pakistan, to assume greater joint responsibilities and abandon the entire postindependence. approach to relations. The third view is that presented by Bruce Reidel, who led the Obama administration's strategy review of Afghaistan and Pakistan earlier this year, and is based on pragmatic considerations and the unofficial information on the ground. Reidel puts it this way: "A counterinsurgency can only work if you have a credible and legitimate Afghan partner, and thats in doubt now." And he goes on to say "part of the reason you are seeing a hesitancy to jump deeper into the pool is that thay are looking to see if they can make lemonade out of the lemons we got from the Afghan election." For a complete change in policy and focus Obama would have to admit that he now has different information, and he is willing to admit to have misread the situation during the first 6 months and during the campaign. That is a test of leadership, being able to change after looking at the reality of the situation and digesting it fully. ...

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McChrystal as one of the five best generals in the army today according to one general who worked with him in Iraq, and the perfect man for th job. He was chief of staff for an army task force during operations to overthrow the Taliban in Afghnistan so his work with Afghanistan goes back many years. He is a field and hands on kind of guy, and at the same time has the intellect and listening ability to coordinate things with others, which may be badly needed here.

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Admiral Mullen chairma joint cheifs confirms most of what the British Ambassador in Afghanistan s saying about deteriorating prospects in the country. He understands the heroin growing issue brought up by US counter narcotics experts in the NYT recently, by saying "we've got to impact pretty significantly, pretty fast on the poppy issue". He is aware that poppy growing is abundant in the south and in Helmand province pours upwards of $100 million to finance the Taliban. General McKiernan who heads NATO forces there says that NATO forces would be authorized to attack narcotics bosses, their soldiers and infrastructure, if they are linked to movement of weapons, improvised explosives or foreign fighters in Afghanistan. Which is possibly a waiting mode till more troops are sent to Afghanistan as policing this rugged mountanous country with tribal regions and loyalties complicated by the narcotics layer and widespread corruption in the Karzai government and its loss of popular support requires many more troops than are now in the country and a sustained campaign. So far the US and European forces possibly outnumbered have resisted alienating the poppy farmers in the south through land based eradication. But with more troops Mullen's new approach and Petraeus's has to shift to something like that, at the same time as they follow Petraeus's new counterinsurgency doctrine in display in Iraq to draw down the Taliban strength to its core supporters by winning other tribal factions with no hardcore loyalties over to the American side....

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Map shows new troop deployments for tens of thousands of new troops (20 to 30 thousand) to be sent to Afghanistan under the new strategy to salvage the situation there. All of these new troops will go into the countryside and especially in the opium growing region in the south and Helmand valley region. And also on the border with Pakistan. This will effectively double the number of American troops in Afghanistan. The boom in growing opium in the south has increased the funding of Taliban insurgents to hire new trrops and to get new weapons.

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Richard Barrett, former head of overseas counter terrorism operations of Britain and now head of the UN AlQuaeda and Taliban monitoring group, in aspeech to the Washington Institute of Near East Policy, says Al Quaeda is a diminishing threat because a new generation of Muslims who have little recollection of the events and are less interested in religion. And CIA officials say they are having greater success penetrating Al Quaeda, because of vastly improved intelligence capabilities. In terms of intelligence and capabilities, the technical colllection, intercepts are much better, and overhead surveillance is much better. The human intelligence is much better and they have fewer competent people.

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Former prime minister Nawaz Sharif's PML-N party wins 125 of 269 seats in Pakistan's parliament. The Tehreek-e-Insaf party of Imran Khan won 31 seats and the PML-N party of the current president Asif Zardari won 32 seats mostly in Sindh province. Independents won 31 seats and some of these independents are likely to support Sharif in forming a new government. Election turnout of 60% showed a large degree of enthusiasm in this election and hopes for economic revival in Pakistan. The focus of Sharif will be on improving the economy, tackling electricity shortages, and building infrastructure. Sharif promised to pursue peaceful relations with India and Afghanistan, and keep the focus on the economy. Sharif and his advisers are bringing a new deftness in the dealings with the Army, the Pakistan Taliban, saying he would call for a halting of drone strikes, limiting the role the U.S. plays in the region, both positions popular in Pakistan, separating differences with former president Musharraf from the institutional role of the military. Small business owners and large business support Sharif's efforts to tackle electricity shortages, with an estimated loss of $12 billion in idled factories alone. The long period of political conflicts between the military, the judiciary and the political parties have led to neglect of Pakistan's economy, as neighboring countries in Asia surged ahead. The realization that popular pressure for improving standards of living and the economic opportunities are both huge has led to an extraordinary election, and put Sharif at the centre of an important new beginning for Pakistan. ...

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The 64 mile highway known as the Gardez-Khost Highway has cost $121 million upto this point. The final cost is expected to reach $176 million. At $2.8 million a mile the cost overruns on this projects are over 100%. Parts of the road run through Taliban territory and may never be completed. Security for the project has cost $43.5 million, according to USAID officials. This involves among other things payments to a local figure named Arafat. The road connects two provinces, Paktia and Khost, and runs through rugged mountain terrain at 9000 feet. At the original estimate of $69 million it was considered a good investment for linking these areas to Kabul.

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General McChrystal gets the support he is looking for against the Taliban in Afghanistan, as Gates, Obama and Clinton, make the decision to continue backing the Karzai government, even though it is very unpopular and the ground reports suggest that this would be amistake. It was NATO that announced the support because the Obama administration had deep concerns about the Karzai government. The US and the UN representative Kai Eide wanted to see arunoff for the elections but the "assumption" that he would be reelected suggests the Obama administration, the UN representative, and the UK and Canadian foreign ministers in ameeting have decided to continue the war in Afghanistan on Karzai's side.

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The former editor of Britain's Daily Telegraph says that there is no coherent political strategy in Afghanistan, and that Obama's support for troop "surge" in Afghanistan is more a gesture to the generals than a convicing path to success. He says the 30,000 troop surge makes headlnes but shrinks small in the vast mountainous terrain of Afghanistan. The Pakistani people are increasingly more so than 2001 and 2006, hostile to Americans in the region. And hard core security forces in Pakistan also are against increases in US troops. And because of the Karzai regime's failure the Taliban have real if limited support. And Britain he says is turning irrevocably against the war.