LyrArc Article Gist
The views being currently argued in meetings with the President about the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Vice President Biden's view: Completely change the goal and strategy. Scale down the military presence. Change the goal from protecting the people from the Taliban- and note that reports on the ground suggest that the people are indifferent and see the Americans and the Taliban as equally bad, with the Americans as foreigners far worse, see Doris Kearns others- to accelerated training of the Afghan forces to fight the Taliban. The focus of US interests would shift to Pakistan. Biden points to the disparity for every $1 spent in Pakistan $30 goes to Afghanistan, and the US real interests lie in Pakistan, not Afghanistan. The US would work with Pakistan to take out Al Quaeda in the border regions. And the proof is that this is working, as Al Quaeda figures have been taken out with Pakistan's help. Counterinsurgency would be replaced by counter terrorism so the US doesn't get bogged down in support of a failing government. The fraud in the recent elections and increasing isolation and loss of support for the Karzai government, supported by unofficial evidence from the ground, make this a serious option, especially as President Obama knows the Karzai government does not merit support and presents a losing proposition. The second view is that of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton- Ike Shelton of Missouri on the Armed Services Committee and Leslie Gelb (see links) share this view- who said in an interview on PBS, "Well Al Quaeda's no longer in Afghanistan. If Afghanistan were taken over by the Taliban, I can't tell you how fast Al Quaeda would be back in Afghanistan." The problem with this view is that the US has only a limited presence in a large mountainous country with the difficult terrain that Afghanistan has, and its not American ground troops that have done the damage in taking out Al Quaeda, its mostly high tech drones. WIth a wider engagement and expanded US ground troops in support of a failing government, that is alleged to have corrupt and narcoltics connections, the popular support would dwindle to the point that the extra troops would not be seen as protecting the population- because how do you protect a people who simply don't care or are suspicious of you? The solution requires some sort of settlement with the Taliban, which guarantees that it not serve as a haven for Al Quaeda. Progress with schools and modernization would have to be, at least in the short run, be given upon the basis of the U.S. coming to terms with what it can and cannot accomplish at an acceptable cost, and the idea of vital interests not lying in Afghanistan but Pakistan. The missing elements in this puzzle would help this strategy, bringing together key countries in South Asia, India and Pakistan, to assume greater joint responsibilities and abandon the entire postindependence. approach to relations. The third view is that presented by Bruce Reidel, who led the Obama administration's strategy review of Afghaistan and Pakistan earlier this year, and is based on pragmatic considerations and the unofficial information on the ground. Reidel puts it this way: "A counterinsurgency can only work if you have a credible and legitimate Afghan partner, and thats in doubt now." And he goes on to say "part of the reason you are seeing a hesitancy to jump deeper into the pool is that thay are looking to see if they can make lemonade out of the lemons we got from the Afghan election." For a complete change in policy and focus Obama would have to admit that he now has different information, and he is willing to admit to have misread the situation during the first 6 months and during the campaign. That is a test of leadership, being able to change after looking at the reality of the situation and digesting it fully.