LyrArc Article Gist
The WSJ's Laurence Norman talks to Yukiya Amano, head of the UN agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which has the responsibility of verification and inspection of Iran's nuclear development and facilities. Amano describes the issues raised by a 2011 report which outlined 12 sets of concerns to which Iran has to explain, a condition included in the final nuclear agreement. Iran has to respond by mid-August, IAEA then responds, and does work in Sept and Oct, and submits its report by Dec. 2015. Yamano says he has to fill in all the missing pieces in this jigsaw puzzle to get a full picture of Iran's nuclear development. Iran has denied access to military sites and Mr. Amano couldn't say if he has access to the Parchin military site. A concession that was made in the agreement is the long interval of three weeks before access to a particular site that arouses suspicions-the agreement gives Iran the right to appeal an IAEA request to visit such a site to a special commission. The U.S. and its European allies have a majority on the commission yet three weeks are allowed in which Iran could move material to some other location. For critics the question will be why such a concession was needed if Iran truly has decided not to develop nuclear weapons technologies. The U.S. president's response at a news conference on July 15, 2015, was that with the laws of physics the U.S. monitoring tools would detect nuclear activity at that site. The agreement also gives Iran an earlier than planned lifting of a ban on sales of arms and missiles and missile parts if the IAEA says Iran's nuclear activities are peaceful. Iran could conceivably wait till the ban is lifted and its economy in a much stronger position to withstand any future limited sanctions to pursue nuclear weapons development. This would have delayed development for a few years during which time the hope is that Iran has changed into a more peaceful nation pursuing economic development in its region, yet even if this is the case as as happened with India and Pakistan it could still pursue nuclear weapons development. The alternative is a status quo till a better agreement is reached with the leverage of tight economic sanctions and continuing dialogue during which time Iran continues to get closer to a nuclear weapon, or the use of force to prevent this. Iran added the arms embargo issue during the last weeks of the negotiation in June, a controversial move on Iran's part, as this may have complicated the picture with ballistic missiles technology exports to Iran approved after 8 years in the final agreement, compared to the agreement reached in April 2015 which made no mention of the lifting of the arms embargo. Iran played on the notion that if Zarif returned to Iran without an agreement hardliners including Khamanei would veto any agreement, yet this could just be the Iranian negotiating strategy. U.S. president Obama stated at the July 15, 2015 news conference that it would be hard to hold sanctions for longer. Critics might argue that China was already benefitting from the small easing of sanctions by increasing Iranian oil imports by 30% in 2014, and would have less incentive to withdraw from sanctions, as it is dependent on the U.S. and the EU, major markets for its exports and access to technologies. A WSJ/NBC poll in July shows almost half of the people polled in the U.S. saying they do not know enough to express an opinion, a steady 36% support an agreement, showing that the public has not been educated and taken along during the different steps in the largely secret negotiations....

LyrArc Article Gist
Wall Street Journal reporters Walker in Berlin, Forelle in Brussels, and Meichtry in Rome, reconstruct the events during critical days after the indecision and failure to reach agreement during the July summit of eurozone countries. This took the form of intervews with leading players and over 25 policy makers. What emerges are accounts of how Germany's Angela Merkel, daughter of a Lutheran pastor, and protege of Eurozone founder, former German chancellor Helmut Kohl, handled the crisis. Merkel was widely criticized in the media for indecision. What emerges is an account of a leader who took decisive action at key moments in the crisis- leading to the formation of new governments in Greece and Italy taking action to improve finances, and negotiations with banks represented by the International Finance Corporation leading to acceptance by banks of a 50% loss on loans to Greece to reduce Greece's unsustainable debt burden. Merkel also worked with the European Central Bank's departing president Frenchman Claude Trichet and new president Italian Mario Draghi to resist French president Sarkozy's efforts to have the ECB assume responsibility for the crisis through large scale buying of Italian and Spanish bonds; which was opposed by German public opinion as a backdoor way of having German taxpayers assume responsibility for European debt. Shown are three critical moments when Merkel intervened. In October 2011, after Italian prime minister Berlusconi reneged on promises to make pension and other reforms to improve Italian finances because of political resistance. He survived a parliamentary no-confidence vote by one vote. Merkel took the lead on October 20, by directly calling Italian President Georgio Napolitano on the phone, to urge him to take action for forming a new government in Italy. The result was Napolitano talking with all political parties to form a new government, leading to the formation of a government by a non-political figure respected in Italy, former EU commissioner Mario Monti. A day earlier, on October 19, French President Sarkozy met ECB president, Trichet, at an event honoring him as departing ECB president in Frankfurt's Alte Oper concert hall. Trichet, Merkel and Sarkozy met in a side room. Sarkozy asked for decisive help from the ECB for large scale buying of Italian and Spanish bonds to lower yields, which had reached 7% on Italian bonds. Trichet responded that the ECB's charter did not allow it to finance governments, with the meeting ending in a shouting match between the two leaders. On October 21, EU and IMF inspectors warned that Greece's debt was reaching unsustainable proportions and austerity measures alone would not work, unless the bondholders, the European banks, took losses of 60% on their excessive lending to Greece. At this point France agreed to the German position arguing for this level of bondholder haircuts or losses, fearing the prospect of large future bailouts that would jeopardize France's triple AAA credit rating. The July 2011 summit accord had only provided for 10% in losses for bondholders. On October 27, at a meeting that went past midnight, Merkel and Sarkozy called IIF head Charles Dallara, who headed negotiating for the banks, to EU headquarters in Brussels. Merkel handed Dallara an agreement containing the 50% bondholder loss demand, and told Dallara- "This is the last offer." Merkel was saying banks would be left with nothing if they rejected it and Greece defaulted. Dallara called bankers and the IIF accepted Merkel's agreement. The final moment that October came on October 31, when Greece's prime minister Papandreou said he would call a referendum on the bailout provisions and austerity measures demanded by the IMF, the EU and the ECB. Bond markets reacted negatively to the announcement fearing a rejection and a Greek default. The Group of 20 leaders was meeting in Cannes, France on Nov. 2, 2011. Papandreou was asked to come to Cannes for a pre-summit meeting. Here Merkel told Papandreou- "the real question" for the referendum was, "Do you want to be in the euro, or not?" Days later Papandreou, lacking support in Greece from political parties and opposition inside his party, submitted his resignation. A non-political figure respected in Greece, former ECB vice president, Lucas Papademos, was appointed prime minister to head a Unity government. Polls after the appointment showed three fourths of Greeks said that this was "a positive step for Greece," with Papandreou's party getting only 11% support and the opposition led by Samaras about 20%. The criticism leveled at Merkel is that Germany should take responsibility for debt throughout the euro area through the issuance of eurozone bonds or the ECB buying large amount of bonds of Spain and Italy. Merkel faced strong opposition inside Germany and from the Bundesbank to this idea. The other criticism was based on austerity measures worsening the finances of Greece because of a lack of growth in the economy, which is true; yet Germany may see the situation in Greece as taking a long time to be resolved in any event because of excessive and faulty financial management. For Italy and Spain putting finances in order was a necessity, and austerity measures should lead to short term sacrifice but improve prospects for the long term by returning the economies to growth. Another criticism is the installation of governments that lack popular or electoral support. As the polls in Greece showed the Unity government there has far greater support and public opinion blames the politicians for the huge mess. In Italy, Berlusconi was widely seen as losing popular support when he resigned. And in Spain Mariano Rajoy, the newly elected prime minister, was elected with a huge majority in parliament following winning in local government elections. Merkel also held her own party, the Chrisitian Democrats together at the recent Leipzig convention. Mario Draghi, was elected with German support to head the European Central Bank. He has long argued for better management of Italian finances as head of Italy's central bank. Draghi was able to support Merkel with carefully planned and managed actions. First to reduce interest rates to support economic growth in a slowing eurozone. Following this with the ECB's Long Term Financing Operation in late December 2011, to provide unlimited loans to European banks at 1% interest for three years in exchange for a broadened list of collateral deposited at the ECB. In a final twist in this drama, Charles Dallara, who was a key negotiator for the U.S. Treasury in setting up the Brady Bonds- that converted bad Latin American government debt owed to U.S. banks in the 1980's into long term debt with large reductions in principal owed and lower interest rates. This was in exchange for guaranteed repayment with 30 year U.S. zero coupon bonds. Dallara was now a negotiator for the banks to reduce the chance of the very same bondholder haircuts that he had negotiated in an earlier period to solve the Latin American debt crisis. Other players in the drama were Axel Weber, head of the Bundesbank, Germany's central bank, who resigned after strong and outspoken opposition to the ECB's large scale purchase of bonds of Greece, Italy and Spain. Jens Weidmann, his protege, who replaced him. And Jurgen Stark, German representative at the ECB, who also resigned in opposition to Germany assuming responsibility for eurozone debt. ...