LyrArc Article Gist
The NYT editorial says the negative feedback loop of foreclosures begetting falling house prices, which beget more foreclosures, and further weaken banks, is well under way. One way to have broken this, was to enable good types of loan modifications, which reduce the principal for homeowners and reduce payments significantly. Sheila Bair at FDIC says 32% of prior payments is about the right amount. The bad types of loan modifications that lead to no reduction in principal, and put homeowners back in redefault because of large payments that homeowners "under water" or a lost job cannot afford, have so far been the dominant kind of loan modification. At present 14 million homeowners are "under water," in that their homes are worth less than what is owed on the mortgage. One of the crucial measures which would have enabled this, has not been pushed by the Obama administration through Congress. This was to pass an amendment that allowed bankruptcy judges to modify troubled mortgages. Banks which have taken billions of dollars in loans from the federal government were allowed to lobby aggressively to kill this amendment, and the Obama administration did little to push this amendment in Congress. 12 Senate Democrats joined 39 Senate Republicans to block a vote on the amendment. Says the NYT editorial "when the time came to stand up to the banking lobbies and cajole yes votes from reluctant senators-the White House did'nt. When the measure failed there wasn't even a statement of regret." This could turn out to be a major mistake, because as the NYT points out voluntary loan modifications have shown poor results. The administration's plan to provide incentives for loan modification is untried and tested, and may not produce significant results. With 14 million homeowners under water, and spiralling foreclosures, the situation may get out of control and seriously damage the economy. After the moratorium in home foreclosures ended there is expected to be a big surge in foreclosures, with estimates of 290,000 to 341,000 foreclosures in March, 2009. If this is allowed to continue it will undo all the good work in other areas, the stimulus spending, rebuilding the auto industry and other steps. It will also be more difficult to reverse as valuable time passes and the cost of the crisis escalates. A consensus among many experts was that stronger action in connection with the banks was required, and Martin Feldstein has warned about the danger posed by foreclosures since early 2008, see links....

LyrArc Article Gist
Applebaum talks to two researchers at the University of Chicago and Princeton, Prof. Sufi and Prof. Mian, on the record of U.S. president Obama and Fed chairman Bernanke in helping homeowners facing foreclosure and underwater borrowers, comparing that record with their record in helping the banks. The issue is relevant as the policy and handling of homeowners had to be part of an overall effective plan for recovery in the U.S. economy, because ultimately without the U.S. consumer any recovery would be weak in the long run- a situation the U.S. faces in early 2014. The response to the issue of irresponsible homeowners borrowing beyond the limit without an equally robust response to irresponsible bank management that allowed wildly excessive leveraging of assets, and successful aggressive lobbying by banks in a shortsighted policy of going through with a wave of foreclosures; besides creating questions of fairness and equitable handling of the problem, also had major ramifications for the future of the U.S. and global economic growth. Here Christina Romer and other administration advisors say Bernanke was right in tackling the problem from the perspective of the banks needing to be recapitalized. Thoughtful advisors looking at the entire problem, Martin Feldstein and Sheila Bair strongly pushed for providing the same help to homeowners without getting caught up in the issue of who was responsible home buyers or the banks, and looking at the interests of the U.S. economy and the U.S. people. Proposals by Feldstein and Bair were equally robust in helping banks as they were in helping homeowners, only the banks understood their interests narrowly and had more access to policymakers in the Bush, as well as the Obama administration, Paulson as well as Geithner. This leaves us with the ultimate irony of the Obama administration pushing for the minimum wage, even to the point of electoral posture, when lasting damage had been inflicted on homeowners from the weaker portions of America's middle class by a policy that went against what two respected financial and economic experts from the Reagan period, Sheila and Bair had strongly advocated. See links and groups on Feldstein and Bair. Applebaum has followed most aspects of this problem closely and continues to provide exceptional reporting including the piece on the thinking of new Fed chairman, Janet Yellen. Private enterprise rules that require management at banks just as for other companies to take responsibility for failures, and be replaced with new management, was largely avoided leading to a fundamental failure in how a free market economy such as the U.S. and western European economies are supposed to function. Rules aggressively pushed by Geithner's mentor Treasury Secretary Rubin for a vigorous cleanup at banks in South Korea during a similiar situation in 1997, were not followed in any way here, also setting wrong precedents for the long run. ...

LyrArc Article Gist
The IMF's changing views on the value of fiscal austerity. In the current debate about the value of fiscal austerity, there is the IMF view, a German view based on its own experience, and the views of other countries in Europe. The IMF's view has shifted over time. The IMF World Economic Outlook 2010, describes its view of the effects of austerity measures in the form of spending cuts and tax increases- "Fiscal consolidation typically has a contractionary effect on output. A fiscal consolidation equal to 1% of GDP typically reduces GDP by about 0.5% within 2 years and raises the unemployment rate by about 0.3% percentage points." Over the longer term there are benefits as the private sector is not crowded out in the search for captal funding by the excessive government borrowing. The IMF's economic models suggest that it would take 5 years before reaching the breakeven point when the benefits of austerity measures exceed the effects of austerity. The German view held by German central bankers is that the actions stimulate growth in the short term. Manfred Neumann, professor emeritus at the Institute for Economic Policy at the University of Bonn, says this is called the "German hypothesis" as it reflects the experience of Germany from austerity actions taken by Germany. Laurence Ball, professor of Economics at John Hopkins University, is critical of the "German hypothesis" and its application across Europe in different situations. Germany is a large exporting nation and exports helped counterbalance the effects of austerity measures. Within the eurozone with fixed exchange rates the exports of less competitive countries cannot be boosted through devaluing the currency to gain price competitiveness. The other problem is that with interest rates close to zero in the euro zone the central banks cannot cut rates aggressively to counteract the effects of spending cuts. The problem gets compounded when a number of countries are taking austerity measures at the same time accentuating the downturn....