LyrArc Article Gist
The Public-Private Investment Program of the U.S. Treasury Department has not had a good start. With most banks passing the U.S.government's stress tests and raising $50 billion in the markets, PPIP which was intended to to help resolve the situation of all the toxic securites siting on the bank's books, has gone the way of all the prior efforts to solve this problem. Simply postponed this time hoping that the housing market recovers. With the Rogoff-Reinhardt study showing that it takes about 6 years or longer before housing recovers from such aserious crisis as this one, it would be 2012, before one sees an improvement. See the link to the Business Week analysis that shows housing markets in the USA having some aspect of normalcy in 2012. Yet even this analysis is using an optimistic scenario, because it assumes Moodys Economy.com estimates of economic growth for GDP of 4-5% in 2011- 2012. This assumes the consumer debt that has reached over 100% of GDP will be reversed quickly in 2010, and the the factory capacity utilization currently at 68% and expected to drop further in 2009- with more automobile manufacturing capacity remaining to be scrapped -will recover quickly in 2010-2011. This is unrealistic considering the combination of factors at work. Here Devin Leonard talks to PIMCO chief Bill Gross, who with Warren Buffett and PIMCO CEO Mohammed El-Erian, are key proponents of the PPIP program. Both El-Erian and Warren Buffett say they conceived independently of such a program, in which toxic securties are taken off bank's books with government help. As PIMCO is one of the largest traders of mortgage bonds in the country and has years of successful experience in dealing with mortgage bonds, the New York Fed under Geithner turned to PIMCO for advice in 2008. By this time PIMCO was under ownership of Allianz, a German insurer, which bought PIMCO for $3.3 billion in 2000, with $233 million and a $40 million retention bonus going to Bill Gross. Bill Gross describes how the program would function. PIMCO puts up $500 million, and Treasury matches this with $500 million. Analysts estimate that this partnership would be able to attract as much as $ 4 billion in low interest financing from Treasury and the Fed. Gross says that some of these securities pay as much as 14% interest, and even with a 70% default rate, this partnership could make $250 million a year on the $5 billion partnership, or a 5% return, with PIMCO making a 25% return on its original investment. This isn't exactly pro bono work as Buffett had originally suggested to Bill Gross in the midst of the crisis. But a more fundamental concern is that no one really knows exactly how much of toxic securties the banks have on their books, even though estimates have been made. If this is closer to $1 trillion, PIMCO's expertise and efforts will simply fall short of dealing with a problem of this size, and the window dressing of a problem of this magnitude could only hurt efforts for the eventual resolution of this problem. If housing does not recover as is expected till 2012 at the earliest, and the economy continues to deteriorate in unemployment and factory utilization, then the toxic securities on the bank's balance sheets may pose a bigger problem that will require serious action....

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Applebaum talks to two researchers at the University of Chicago and Princeton, Prof. Sufi and Prof. Mian, on the record of U.S. president Obama and Fed chairman Bernanke in helping homeowners facing foreclosure and underwater borrowers, comparing that record with their record in helping the banks. The issue is relevant as the policy and handling of homeowners had to be part of an overall effective plan for recovery in the U.S. economy, because ultimately without the U.S. consumer any recovery would be weak in the long run- a situation the U.S. faces in early 2014. The response to the issue of irresponsible homeowners borrowing beyond the limit without an equally robust response to irresponsible bank management that allowed wildly excessive leveraging of assets, and successful aggressive lobbying by banks in a shortsighted policy of going through with a wave of foreclosures; besides creating questions of fairness and equitable handling of the problem, also had major ramifications for the future of the U.S. and global economic growth. Here Christina Romer and other administration advisors say Bernanke was right in tackling the problem from the perspective of the banks needing to be recapitalized. Thoughtful advisors looking at the entire problem, Martin Feldstein and Sheila Bair strongly pushed for providing the same help to homeowners without getting caught up in the issue of who was responsible home buyers or the banks, and looking at the interests of the U.S. economy and the U.S. people. Proposals by Feldstein and Bair were equally robust in helping banks as they were in helping homeowners, only the banks understood their interests narrowly and had more access to policymakers in the Bush, as well as the Obama administration, Paulson as well as Geithner. This leaves us with the ultimate irony of the Obama administration pushing for the minimum wage, even to the point of electoral posture, when lasting damage had been inflicted on homeowners from the weaker portions of America's middle class by a policy that went against what two respected financial and economic experts from the Reagan period, Sheila and Bair had strongly advocated. See links and groups on Feldstein and Bair. Applebaum has followed most aspects of this problem closely and continues to provide exceptional reporting including the piece on the thinking of new Fed chairman, Janet Yellen. Private enterprise rules that require management at banks just as for other companies to take responsibility for failures, and be replaced with new management, was largely avoided leading to a fundamental failure in how a free market economy such as the U.S. and western European economies are supposed to function. Rules aggressively pushed by Geithner's mentor Treasury Secretary Rubin for a vigorous cleanup at banks in South Korea during a similiar situation in 1997, were not followed in any way here, also setting wrong precedents for the long run. ...

LyrArc Article Gist
Professors Cole and Ohanian of the University of Pennsylvania and UCLA, provide a new interpretation of FDR's economic policies during the period 1932-1934 and the period 1937-1941, based on their research. This suggests conclusions different from that of Obama advisor, Christina Romer, and Fed chairman, Bernanke about that period. Changes in economic policies under the Roosevelt administration that helped bring wages in line with productivity, reduced strikes, and gradual elimination of the undistributed profits tax, improved incentives for business investment during 1938-1939. Cole and Ohanian, say that by 1941, before the U.S. entered the war, close to half of the increase in nonmilitary hours worked in the U.S. between 1939 and the peak of the war, had already been achieved. And this was primarily the result of the changes in FDR's policies in 1938. They say a similiar opportunity is presented by the proposals of the Bowles-Simpson commission on deficit reduction, by lowering the corporate income tax through simplification of the tax code and reducing or eliminating most tax expenditures. Improving the incentives for business to hire and invest through this and other steps is likely to do more for the economy than the steps tried so far since 2009....

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Frederick Harris of Columbia University says there is a price to be paid for a black president and it may just be too much for the average black person. There is a difference betwen symbols and substance, betwen a role model and accountability in a representative democracy, which is sadly lacking when the black elites, clergy and politicians fail to debate the issues about the problems facing the black community. Problems related to the increasing poverty among black Americans, and the 14% unemployment for black people. There is he says a strange reticience among the black elite to hold the president accountable on these issues just as they would have done for any Democratic president, even one who was as popular with blacks as Mr. Clinton. He says the experience with Obama is not even remotely comparable to the transformative nature of the work of Rev. Martin Luther King in the black community. It may stem from Obama's multiracial background, growing up in many countries, his elite education and being part of a liberal elite more than of the black community. The price is too high in economic and social terms for the poor or average black person and it has created a divide between the average black person and the black elite, with different concerns and different priorities. Harris points out that poor and poverty are words not mentioned often by Obama. Related to this is the foreclosure crisis in which ordinary black people were hardest hit with no effective help from the president to homeowners badly needing relief. Sheila Bair of the FDIC and Martin Feldstein advocated aggressive help for homeowners under water which did not come from the president. Showing not just the limits of a black presidency, but false hopes, inexperience and lack of leadership in issues that mattered to all Americans in the housing and foreclosure crisis. A populist from Kansas, as Sheila Bair describes herself, had the right instincts and courage of convictions which the president lacked and the entire country needed....

LyrArc Article Gist
The home ownership rate for the U.S. in March 2012, is 65.4%, the same rate as in 1997 before the housing bubble, according to the U.S. Census Bureau. The irony of this is that the housing bubble was inflated by politicians in Congress and mortgage lenders and purchasers of mortgage securities. Fannie Mae and Countryside worked together ostensibly to promote home ownership while pursuing profits. In the case of politicians they pursued goals of raising employment and growth without understanding the risks of artificially inflating home ownership, and without consideration for incomes of subprime borrowers. A less benign view of the interests and goals of politicians comes from reflections on the impact of political lobbying by Fannie Mae and other housing lenders in the U.S. Congress. The consequences in terms of foreclosures have been devastating for minorities as well as other middle class homeowners. It has also damaged the U.S. banking system, credit growth in the economy and prospects for recovery, which will take years to correct. The federal government is also saddled with large losses at Fannie Mae because of its quasi government agency role. That role led to inflation of the bubble. Most of the consequences will be borne by middle and lower income households in the U.S. The pass-through effects in a global economy affect Europe, and emerging market countries. ...