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Spain's central bank was lauded for macroprudential supervision before the housing bubble burst. Will China's central bank and financial authorites which have managed the housing bubble upto this point face similiar problems? Can China be the sole exception even as housing bubbles burst with wide repercussions in the U.S., UK and Spain? Nicholas Lardy, of the Peterson Institute of international Economics, says urban housing stock makes up 41% of Chinese household wealth in 2011. The same figure for the U.S. is 26%. Chinese buyers invest in homes because low interest rates on savings accounts cannot keep up with inflation. Real estate investment was 13% of GDP in 2011. Home ownership is a recent development in China, only since 1990, Chinese have never experienced large price declines. Household debt as a percentage of disposable income has increased significantly in recent years, up to 53.6% in 2011 from 31.3% in 2008, according to Lardy.

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John Taylor looks one step ahead of the March 2012 Greece bailout and sets up the most plausible scenario for the future. He says the risks of contagion were always exaggerated from the beginning- a planned default or restructuring of debt such as happened in Argentina in 2001, does not have the contagion risks associated with a chaotic and unplanned default as in Russia in 1998. Predicability in policy makes a huge difference, says Taylor. The European banks which stood to lose from writedowns exaggerated the fears of contagion- a process that always occurs for people who are adversely affected by writedowns- resulting in top officials in the European Union delaying the unavoidable serious restructuring. It was not until Chancellor Merkel handed Charles Dallara, who negotiated for the European banks, a note stating a demand for 50% bondholder writedown, on October 27, 2011, at EU headquarters in Brussels, did any serious writedown of debt begin. Merkel told Dallara: "this is my last offer." The July 2011 summit by contrast had only a 10% bondholder writedown in the agreement, when insolvency not illiquidity was the real issue. Walker Forelle and Meichtry, give a detailed account of what happened in the Wall Street Journal, Dec. 30, 2011. The important thing for Greece, says Taylor, is for what the IMF calls "growth enhancing structural reforms" - greater reliance on private markets, incentives, rule of law. He says this bailout won't work because IMF growth forecasts do not reflect the rapid shrinking of the Greek economy. Antonis Samaras, leader of the major opposition party, is in favor of pro-growth measures and has stated his desire to change the agreement. The 130 billion euro bailout provides 90 billion euros for recapitalizing Greece's banks, and financing the budget. This puts Greece in a situation where the political leaders win voter support by discarding the conditions from the Northern EU nations and come with a plan that is better suited for Greece. The EU in this scenario would cut off further bailout funds to Greece. Taylor sees this as the better outcome for Greece than the current situation, which leaves Greece no hope for growth, and also for the EU by getting out of bailouts that have little prospect of working. It would be difficult but doable for Greece says Taylor, because interest payments would be low and Greek banks would be recapitalized after the current March 2012 bailout. ...

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The IMF's changing views on the value of fiscal austerity. In the current debate about the value of fiscal austerity, there is the IMF view, a German view based on its own experience, and the views of other countries in Europe. The IMF's view has shifted over time. The IMF World Economic Outlook 2010, describes its view of the effects of austerity measures in the form of spending cuts and tax increases- "Fiscal consolidation typically has a contractionary effect on output. A fiscal consolidation equal to 1% of GDP typically reduces GDP by about 0.5% within 2 years and raises the unemployment rate by about 0.3% percentage points." Over the longer term there are benefits as the private sector is not crowded out in the search for captal funding by the excessive government borrowing. The IMF's economic models suggest that it would take 5 years before reaching the breakeven point when the benefits of austerity measures exceed the effects of austerity. The German view held by German central bankers is that the actions stimulate growth in the short term. Manfred Neumann, professor emeritus at the Institute for Economic Policy at the University of Bonn, says this is called the "German hypothesis" as it reflects the experience of Germany from austerity actions taken by Germany. Laurence Ball, professor of Economics at John Hopkins University, is critical of the "German hypothesis" and its application across Europe in different situations. Germany is a large exporting nation and exports helped counterbalance the effects of austerity measures. Within the eurozone with fixed exchange rates the exports of less competitive countries cannot be boosted through devaluing the currency to gain price competitiveness. The other problem is that with interest rates close to zero in the euro zone the central banks cannot cut rates aggressively to counteract the effects of spending cuts. The problem gets compounded when a number of countries are taking austerity measures at the same time accentuating the downturn....

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Richard Portes of the London Business School provides two good reasons why the EU's decision to adopt the French Banking Federation's proposal for rollovers with 10% interest costs is a serious mistake. It doubles the interest costs from 4-6% to 10% with 2% Greek GDP growth and makes debt servicing untenable. Portes says the real Brady Plan from the 1980's included a 35-40% bondholders haircut. Deals of this type have a precedent- in Mexico in 1988 and in Argentina in 2001 such bond exchanges were soon followed by deals that placed bondholder haricuts on creditors. The lesson from Latin America in the 1980's, says Portes, is that the burdens of servicing a debt of such proportions under onerous conditions only extinguishes the enterprise, investment and productive capabilities of the particular country trying to service that debt, making the debt even less serviceable. See the Wall Street Journal's editorial on this deal which it calls "The French Deception." The terms sound like Greek to the editors leaving a sense that French banks are only saying "gimme." The only benefit achieved may be putting off the problem and avoiding contagion to Portugal and Spain. Yet this is not that much of a benefit when one realizes that the problem has not gone away, and is likely to look much worse six or nine months from now....

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Speaking at a banking conference, advisors including the head of Russia's largest retail bank Sberbank, German Gref, minister of the economy, Aleksei Ulyukayev, and head of the central bank , Elvira Nabiullina, express deep concern about the economic prospects in 2015. Foreign investment is down from about $90 billion in the 1st quarter of 2013 to a negligible amount in the 3rd quarter of 2014. Capital outflows following the Ukraine crisis are estimated at about $110 billion by former finance minister Alexsei Kudrin. The ruble dropped to its lowest level against the dollar since the 1990's. And the sharp decline in oil prices with Brent crude at about $90 is another risk factor as 50% of the budget comes from oil and gas revenues and 60% of exports are still oil and gas, with no serious or effective effort to diversify under the Putin adminstration. Putin told the banking conference that a deficit free budget and reserves of $460 billion are "fundamental factors supporting stability." Advisors and leading bankers remain unconvinced. The problem is that even at the beginning of 2014 before the Ukraine crisis foreign investment had slowed to a trickle, similiar to what India experienced in 2013. The central bank head says her effort to open up the bond markets in Russia to foreign investors is now in vain because there are few foreign investors. Instead of reversing the situation as is happening in India with the new Modi administration, policy under Putin and the Ukraine conflict may have scared investors away with the increasing western sanctions and stagflation (estimated 8% inflation and about 0.5% growth in 2014). The head of Sberbank Mr. Gref told the banking conference- "The Soviet Union broke apart because of the mind boggling incompetence of the Soviet leadership. They did not respect the laws of economic development." The problem with sovereign reserves is that it can protect a sovereign currency such the Russian ruble or the Brazilian cruzeiro to some extent, but today's vibrant economies need foreign investment and foreign technology for growth. Even a country such as China with a trillion dollars in reserves needs the reserves in its special case because of its billion plus aging population, and is no exception to these laws of economic development about the need for foreign technology and foreign investment. ...