LyrArc Article Gist
At the height of the Eurozone crisis in December 2011, David Brooks points out that it is important not to forget what the Germans are saying in this crisis. They are arguing for truth in accounting, which the government in Greece failed to do, and which may have more to do with negative opinion in the media and with the public in Germany about Greece than any other factor. They are arguing against speculative excesses that enabled Greece to borrow recklessly. And they are making the argument that the only way to put the finances of the eurozone on a sound basis is to have the financial discipline that is necessary for a sound currency. Anthony Faiola pointed out recently that one estimate for tax evasion in Italy is $340 billion a year- Washington Post, 11/25/2011. Greece has a similiar problem, which needs to be addressed. This view has credibility and the backing of every principle of sound financial practices, irrespective of country or region. For ordinary Germans who have gone through years of wage restraint during the period of high unemployment, their attitude is captured in one German workers response to Greece's situation - when she said there are "poor children in Germany also." Years after reunification were a difficult experience for Germany, and left parts of the country still affected by the experience. The period of high unemployment is still a fresh memory, as the economic recovery is fairly recent. There is a feeling that the situation is precarious, depending on exports, as the 2009 downturn showed. These facts remain even when one considers the criticism levelled at Germany. Germany benefitted from the bubble in the economies of Southern Europe through surging exports- from a currency that was undervalued in relation to neighbors- because of the common currency. German banks lent heavily to Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, along with French and British banks, and bear responsibility for reckless lending and not doing due diligence for loans to Greece and other countries. Germany also carries the burden of memories of hyperinflation in the 1920's, and the sense along with France that partnership is necessary for peace in Europe. Germany's position on austerity measures also has one underlying weakness - if this leads to shrinking economies in southern Europe in the name of fianncial discipline, then the plan fails as tax revenues decline and budget deficits increase. Given this experience Germany faces the challenge of convincing neighbors of the need for good governance and sound spending practices for long term stability of the currency, even as it leads the effort for providing short term funding. In the short run this reaps criticism for Germany, including criticism for some members such as Greece having to leave the euro as a way to regain competitiveness and growth. Experts have suggested that this would be a better option for Greece than a shrinking economy after strong austerity measures, and the referendum proposed by former prime minister Papandreou on strict austerity measures is likely to have gone in this direction. ...

LyrArc Article Gist
After the debt swap of old bonds for new bonds with private bondholders for an estimated 53% haircut, the IMF's March 2012 report on Greece says a lot remains unresolved. It predicts a "disorderly exit from the euro" without further help. The April 2012 elections may result in a dilution to committments to austerity policies in Greece, as these policies are highly unpopular in Greece. Greece is still "accident-prone." And competitiveness issues may take over a decade to resolve.

LyrArc Article Gist
Individual investors reacted strongly to declining prospects for emerging markets with slowing growth, depreciating currencies, corruption and political uncertainty in 2013. As of the beginning of June, retail investors pulled $18.1 billion from emerging market bond funds, about one third of the amount that went in to emerging markets since the financial crisis in 2007, according to fund tracker EPFR Global. Institutional investors have pulled out less, about $9.3 billion, or 10% of their investments in emerging markets bonds since 2007. A similiar pattern is seen for investment in the stock markets of emerging market countries. The U.S. Federal Reserve's monetary expansion helped pull more money into emerging markets such as India, Indonesia, Brazil and Turkey. As the Fed shifts away from these policies in 2013 emerging market countries have large current account deficits and less money to finance imports and debt.

LyrArc Article Gist
Friedman compares the anti-corruption movements in India and the U.S., the world's two largest democracies. The Occupy Wall Street anti-corruption movement in the U.S. focusses on the excessive influence of banks on lawmakers, regulators, and the government, through the use of campaign money, revolving door for government officials and regulators to join banks, and intense lobbying. The anti-corruption movement focusses on corruption in government at higher levels, such as the handling of government licenses, and at the basic levels of needing to bribe officials for something as simple as getting a birth certificate or other government document. Both have pernicious effects, in the U.S. excesssive bank influence leads to taking excessive risk for higher bonuses, putting the entire financial system at risk and creating a crisis in housing that delays the economic recovery. And in India the corruption leads to retarded progress, as funds to invest in infrastructure and development are siphoned off, business and entrepreneurs are required to pay bribes at each step, and ordinary people face the need to pay bribes for the most routine interactions with government officials. In the process this creates more unequal societies by skewing the distribution of benefits from wealth created to groups that are better equipped to game the system. The economic system once distorted in these ways has tendencies to take talent away from productive activity and innovation which create wealth, and direct it towards speculative activities....

LyrArc Article Gist
An account by Journal reporters based on over 25 interviews with eurozone policymakers shows how the central players in the eurozone drama acted to defend their national interests during the period April to July 2011. On one side France's president Sarkozy, Frenchman Claude Trichet at the European Central Bank, arguing in favor of the banks not to take bondholder losses or haircuts on loans made to Greece. On the other side the Bundesbanks Axel Weber, and Jens Weidman, Jurgen Stark and German Finance Minister Schauble. The Germans argued strongly for bondholder losses to take responsibility for bad loan decisions by French and German banks. French banks had committed more loans to Greece than German banks and had more at stake. German public opinion was strongly against German taxpayers paying for the losses, making German politicians insistent that European banks take losses on their bad loan decisions, or Germany would not support additional loans to Greece. Throughout April to July the two sides were locked in an impasse. The French feared losses for their banks and a Lehman Brothers bankruptcy style situation. The Germans at the Bundesbank and the Finance Ministry were equally insistent. A July 2011 summit meeting did not settle the issue. The events not covered here from the July to the December summit of eurozone leaders resulted in bondholders taking 50% haircut on loans to Greece, reducing the debt burden in Greece after austerity measures led to popular protests. The French pushed hard for the ECB or the EFSF to be allowed to make large purchases of bonds of troubled eurozone countries in an effort to protect Spain and Italy from contagion through higher bond yields. The Netherlands and Finland supported Germany's position. German bankers Weber, Weidman at the Bundesbank and Finance Minister Schauble opposed large scale buying by the ECB of Italy's and Spain's bonds and Chancellor Merkel said about a common eurobond that "this is not going to happen." Governments changed in Greece, Italy, and Spain by Dec. 2011, which committed to austerity programs and spending cuts. Italian Mario Draghi was appointed with German support as new head of the ECB. In late December 2011 Draghi launched the Long Term Financing Operation for lending unlimited amounts at 1% for three year loans to European banks and relaxing the terms to accept government bonds and other debt as collateral for loans. The effect of this was to provide a large infusion of liquidity into the banking system in Europe and drastically bring down the yields on bonds issued by Italy and Spain....

LyrArc Article Gist
John Taylor looks one step ahead of the March 2012 Greece bailout and sets up the most plausible scenario for the future. He says the risks of contagion were always exaggerated from the beginning- a planned default or restructuring of debt such as happened in Argentina in 2001, does not have the contagion risks associated with a chaotic and unplanned default as in Russia in 1998. Predicability in policy makes a huge difference, says Taylor. The European banks which stood to lose from writedowns exaggerated the fears of contagion- a process that always occurs for people who are adversely affected by writedowns- resulting in top officials in the European Union delaying the unavoidable serious restructuring. It was not until Chancellor Merkel handed Charles Dallara, who negotiated for the European banks, a note stating a demand for 50% bondholder writedown, on October 27, 2011, at EU headquarters in Brussels, did any serious writedown of debt begin. Merkel told Dallara: "this is my last offer." The July 2011 summit by contrast had only a 10% bondholder writedown in the agreement, when insolvency not illiquidity was the real issue. Walker Forelle and Meichtry, give a detailed account of what happened in the Wall Street Journal, Dec. 30, 2011. The important thing for Greece, says Taylor, is for what the IMF calls "growth enhancing structural reforms" - greater reliance on private markets, incentives, rule of law. He says this bailout won't work because IMF growth forecasts do not reflect the rapid shrinking of the Greek economy. Antonis Samaras, leader of the major opposition party, is in favor of pro-growth measures and has stated his desire to change the agreement. The 130 billion euro bailout provides 90 billion euros for recapitalizing Greece's banks, and financing the budget. This puts Greece in a situation where the political leaders win voter support by discarding the conditions from the Northern EU nations and come with a plan that is better suited for Greece. The EU in this scenario would cut off further bailout funds to Greece. Taylor sees this as the better outcome for Greece than the current situation, which leaves Greece no hope for growth, and also for the EU by getting out of bailouts that have little prospect of working. It would be difficult but doable for Greece says Taylor, because interest payments would be low and Greek banks would be recapitalized after the current March 2012 bailout. ...