This article in the Economist magazine says the initial criteria for the euro currency were fudged to let southern European countries with weak finances into the euro region. The result was that Italy, Spain and Portugal were allowed in, followed later by Greece. This was a critical design defect for the euro currency. It says French president Mitterand accepted German unification and German president Kohl gave up the Deutsche Mark in exchange for the Euro, under the 1992 Maastricht Treaty that set up the euro currency. The other flaw was the lack of a bail out mechanism if governments needed help, the ECB not designed to tackle this, and the central banks of each country not capable of tackling this on their own. With the lack of devaluation option to address inflation, and drop in competitiveness of some countries, the mechanisms to address economic problems were not put in place- it says because political union was seen as happening earlier but never happened. The French are seen as more interested in pursuing closer economic integration, with Germany not as keen until budget discipline is established first. Germany also looks at immigration as a critical area in which agreement has to be reached. As a result the euro currency is likely to continue with some of its current problems, yet with improvements in many areas such as budget discipline and lessons learned from the eurozone crisis in Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal. ...
Original article 9 minutes, gist 1 minute