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Michael Getler describes the missed opportunity under President Obama for using one of America's most talented diplomats to engineer a peace agreement between the warring factions in Afghanistan- the U.S., the Pakistan army, the ISI and its support in the army, the Taliban, and the other parties such as the Haqqani faction and the Afghan government of Karzai. Holbrooke had used his experience for another President, with the same force of his larger than life personality, when he helped bring about the Dayton Accords in a similiar area of stubborn ethnic strife. Could Obama have tapped Holbrooke's skills and set aside the distractions of his personality as coming from an American with unique gifts, talent and achievement, is the question Getler asks. And is this a comment on the nature of the Obama Presidency and America's poorly invested hopes.

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This writer appeals to old Cold War views and even before that the views of Russia from the 19th century when it was seen as a threat to the British Empire and Turkey, when he says the conflict in Georgia threatens American interests in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. The mountains of Afghanistan make it appear remote even from India much more from Georgia but in the grand strategy view all this is of no importance. And the conflict in Afghanistan has religious overtones with Islamic militants and involves Pakistan and other tribal and communal interests and now has become intertwined with the opium farming in the south. Besides America has no other interests in Afghanistan except it being used by elements like the Taliban and Islamic terrorist groups and has after the Soviet withdrawal left Afghanistan to itself, and the situation in Afghanistan is more a result of a conflict between India and Pakistan and of communal conflicts and creation of Taliban by support from Pakistan at that time....

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Problems that may be unfixable for the Afghan national army, and for which no increase in foreign trainers could make a difference. About 3% of the army recruits are from the Pushtun south, the main part of the country, where the Taliban are strongest. Officers from the northern areas have to use translators in the Pushtun south, a bad sign. And there is a shortage of officer talent. Gereral Caldwell who is working on training the army, says he was appalled at the emphasis on quantity not quality- the Afghan army has reached 134,000 in numbers. The ratio of instructors to recruits ranges from 1 to 80 to 1 to 466. It will cost $11 billion to maintain compared to an estimated $1 million per American soldier each year. Even if training problems are fixed, having 3% of recruits from the major Pushtun part of the country where the fighting is being done, simply makes the overall problem unfixable. See the group - Defense Department biannual report on Afghanistan, for related insight.

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The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 was a point at which the country could have made a search for peace iwth the help of foreign powers India, Pakistan, U.S. which supported the mujhadeen and Russia. The missed opportunity under Reagan led to 40 years of uninterrupted war at immense human cost to the people of Afghanistan, and financial and human cost to the U.S. with its involvement in the country's wars. A lecturer at the University of Amsterdam looks at the missed opportunities from the past for a peaceful settlement with the help of foreign powers. This happens as the Taliban meet in Moscow with other parties in the dispute.  A missed perspective relates to the origins of the problem in the India- Pakistan conflict and the history of Afghanistan in the colonial period. Afghanistan was seen as a buffer by Pakistan after the 1971 war with India that created Bangladesh from the former Eastern part of Pakistan. As a result both the Russians and the Americans were embroiled in wars and passions that had little to do with ideologies and  more with feudalism, factions and religious conflicts. Much national treasure in human life and lost opportunities for development at home on the side of foreign powers was the cost of the involvement.      ...

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Kristof reminds readers of the NYT that the more that the British acted to suppress the American insurgents, the more that fueled the insurgents fighting the British. After all the land they were on was theirs they felt and not Britain's. The same is true for the $0 million Pastuns on both sides of the border, the Afghan side and the Pakistan side. He says Americans are not sensitive enough to nationalism abroad. The war in Afghanistan is costing $60 billion ayear. Adding another 40,000 troops will cost $10 billion, enough to send 2 million disadvantaged children to a solid preschool, or could be as high as $40 billion extra, which over 10 years would pay for almost half of health care reform. Kristof doesn't see the 40,000 troops doing enough to change the picture much, except increasing support for Taliban as the American footprint grows as foreign occupiers. He mentions that standard counterinsurgency ratios of troops to civilians would require 650,000 troops including Afghans.

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The views being currently argued in meetings with the President about the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Vice President Biden's view: Completely change the goal and strategy. Scale down the military presence. Change the goal from protecting the people from the Taliban- and note that reports on the ground suggest that the people are indifferent and see the Americans and the Taliban as equally bad, with the Americans as foreigners far worse, see Doris Kearns others- to accelerated training of the Afghan forces to fight the Taliban. The focus of US interests would shift to Pakistan. Biden points to the disparity for every $1 spent in Pakistan $30 goes to Afghanistan, and the US real interests lie in Pakistan, not Afghanistan. The US would work with Pakistan to take out Al Quaeda in the border regions. And the proof is that this is working, as Al Quaeda figures have been taken out with Pakistan's help. Counterinsurgency would be replaced by counter terrorism so the US doesn't get bogged down in support of a failing government. The fraud in the recent elections and increasing isolation and loss of support for the Karzai government, supported by unofficial evidence from the ground, make this a serious option, especially as President Obama knows the Karzai government does not merit support and presents a losing proposition. The second view is that of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton- Ike Shelton of Missouri on the Armed Services Committee and Leslie Gelb (see links) share this view- who said in an interview on PBS, "Well Al Quaeda's no longer in Afghanistan. If Afghanistan were taken over by the Taliban, I can't tell you how fast Al Quaeda would be back in Afghanistan." The problem with this view is that the US has only a limited presence in a large mountainous country with the difficult terrain that Afghanistan has, and its not American ground troops that have done the damage in taking out Al Quaeda, its mostly high tech drones. WIth a wider engagement and expanded US ground troops in support of a failing government, that is alleged to have corrupt and narcoltics connections, the popular support would dwindle to the point that the extra troops would not be seen as protecting the population- because how do you protect a people who simply don't care or are suspicious of you? The solution requires some sort of settlement with the Taliban, which guarantees that it not serve as a haven for Al Quaeda. Progress with schools and modernization would have to be, at least in the short run, be given upon the basis of the U.S. coming to terms with what it can and cannot accomplish at an acceptable cost, and the idea of vital interests not lying in Afghanistan but Pakistan. The missing elements in this puzzle would help this strategy, bringing together key countries in South Asia, India and Pakistan, to assume greater joint responsibilities and abandon the entire postindependence. approach to relations. The third view is that presented by Bruce Reidel, who led the Obama administration's strategy review of Afghaistan and Pakistan earlier this year, and is based on pragmatic considerations and the unofficial information on the ground. Reidel puts it this way: "A counterinsurgency can only work if you have a credible and legitimate Afghan partner, and thats in doubt now." And he goes on to say "part of the reason you are seeing a hesitancy to jump deeper into the pool is that thay are looking to see if they can make lemonade out of the lemons we got from the Afghan election." For a complete change in policy and focus Obama would have to admit that he now has different information, and he is willing to admit to have misread the situation during the first 6 months and during the campaign. That is a test of leadership, being able to change after looking at the reality of the situation and digesting it fully. ...

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US differences with Pakistan are based on two different perspectves that are not reconcilable. Recent events and the relationship between the US and Pakistan's army chief have confirmed that this is not going to change. US sees militants and Taliban inside Pakistan as havens for the short term as the US disengages from Afghanistan, whereas Pakistan's army sees them as useful elements in Pakistan's security interests in relation to India for the long term. Whe Kayani met with Obama in Washington, he handed Obama a 13 page document showing Pakistan's strategic perspective and emphasizing the gap between short term US interests and Pakistan's long term interests. The Wikileaks cables show Kayani discussing with US officials a possible removal of President Zardari and his preferred replacement. This made Kayani, normally reticent, to rant for hours on the irreconciliable differences between the US and Pakistan with a group of Pakistani journalists. He described Pakistan as the US's "most bullied ally," and said the frames of reference of the US and Pakistan regarding regional ssecurity "can never be the same," according to news accounts. And added that "the real aim of US strategy is to de-nuclearize Pakistan." Holbrooke and Admiral Mullen had hoped to reverse "a trust deficit" between the two sides. But this has not happened. General Petraeus is taking a tougher attitude and patience is thin on both sides. According to a Kayani friend, air marshal Chaudhry, Kayani is always asking Petraeus what the strategic objectives are in Afghanistan. US officials say they have given up on changing Kayani's thinking and that Kayani has told them: "I don't trust you." Kayani's position makes sense when one looks at the strongly anti-American public in Pakistan. Pakistani military and intelligence officials say a campaign against militants inside Pakistan incites domestic terrorism and uproots local communities. And by following Pakistan's own interests and frames of reference Kayani sends signals that win esteem among the Pakistani public. Opinion polls now show the military held in higher esteem than the Zardari administration. This puts the US in a no-win situation in Afghanistan with no clear objectives for the long term. This leaves the US in a time of tight budgets stretched thin to meet the needs in other defence areas that need attention, such as modernization of forces, trouble spots such as Korea, Iran and elsewhere, and resources needed for modernization of US infrastructure and supporting new technologies and industries. The lasting solutions that will take time, careful thought and preparation would be to integrate South Asia as a whole into an economic zone, extensive infrastructure building, and bring India and Pakistan closer through diplomacy and negotiations. See the articles by Richard Haas and others on the need to redirect resources. ...

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Richard Haas, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, points to the need to reallocate the resources that are tied down in Afghanistan, to other needs in the area of national security. This especially true he says, considering the limited US interests in Afghanistan and the other threats in national security that the US needs to address around the world. He points to the grave threat to national security arising from the US deficit and the country's finances, with the $125 billion allocated to Afghanistan being a significant contributor to this. Savings in Afghanistan can be used to strengthen defense needs in other areas such as North Korea and Iran , modernization, and for reducing the deficit. He sees the resources spent in Afghnistan being a strategic distraction when other threats are building with nuclear developments in Iran and N. Korea. He cites the intelligence findings that the situation in Afghanistan will not improve with the Taliban connections in Pakistan, and the lack of a good partner in the government there. As for Pakistan, Haas says that the situation there is not to be understood through Afghanistan. The threats there are not external, they come from deep divisions within Pakistani society, and poor governance for most of the period since independence in 1947. The US should scale down to counter terrorism operations with a smaller force closer to the troops before the surge of 30,000, and not engage in the state-building that it is currently doing. On the efforts by Gen. Petraeus to get more resources, Haas says Petraeus is looking at the situation from the area of operations in Afghanistan, whereas the President has a different role. The President has to address all the challenges the US is facing now and will face in the near and medium term future, and he has to do this with the limited resources available for national security....

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The situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating. It's worsening compared to Iraq. More deaths in roadside bombings than Iraq in recent months, and rural areas in the south and east no longer in the control of the Karzai government. And opium crops not under any control and growing substantially in 2007. The US Defense department is conducting a thorough review of the situation in Afghanistan. The ceasefire between militants in Pakistan's border areas and the Pakistan army also has led to increased activity along the Pakistan border as Pakistan militants cross the border into Afghanistan, and the Pakistan tribal border areas acting as sanctuary for the Taliban militants. Meanwhile Obama and McCain see the situation differently. McCain sees Iraq as important and Obama would withdraw from Iraq and concentrate on Afghanistan and send 8000 more troops to Afghanistan, something that may happen if he is elected and the situation in Afghanistan deteriorates further.

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The former editor of Britain's Daily Telegraph says that there is no coherent political strategy in Afghanistan, and that Obama's support for troop "surge" in Afghanistan is more a gesture to the generals than a convicing path to success. He says the 30,000 troop surge makes headlnes but shrinks small in the vast mountainous terrain of Afghanistan. The Pakistani people are increasingly more so than 2001 and 2006, hostile to Americans in the region. And hard core security forces in Pakistan also are against increases in US troops. And because of the Karzai regime's failure the Taliban have real if limited support. And Britain he says is turning irrevocably against the war.

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Map shows new troop deployments for tens of thousands of new troops (20 to 30 thousand) to be sent to Afghanistan under the new strategy to salvage the situation there. All of these new troops will go into the countryside and especially in the opium growing region in the south and Helmand valley region. And also on the border with Pakistan. This will effectively double the number of American troops in Afghanistan. The boom in growing opium in the south has increased the funding of Taliban insurgents to hire new trrops and to get new weapons.

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Zardari is asking for $100 billion when Pakistan has in its central bank enough foreign currency reserves for 2 months of imports of oil and food. He also wants to defeat the Taliban and militants and find those responsible for the death of Benazir Bhutto. This interview with Bret Stephens who gives an account of it and his own comments, ends with some remarks by Zardari about wanting to defeat the militant elements that killed Mrs Bhutto in a manner where "not letting them get away with it" referring to those responsible, is something he wishes to do before his own life ends. It suggests that this war is likely to take a new turn as the military in Pakistan takes on the militants and Taliban and as General Petraeus looks for a way to reverse Taliban gains in southern Afghanistan and other parts of the country.

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Admiral Mullen chairma joint cheifs confirms most of what the British Ambassador in Afghanistan s saying about deteriorating prospects in the country. He understands the heroin growing issue brought up by US counter narcotics experts in the NYT recently, by saying "we've got to impact pretty significantly, pretty fast on the poppy issue". He is aware that poppy growing is abundant in the south and in Helmand province pours upwards of $100 million to finance the Taliban. General McKiernan who heads NATO forces there says that NATO forces would be authorized to attack narcotics bosses, their soldiers and infrastructure, if they are linked to movement of weapons, improvised explosives or foreign fighters in Afghanistan. Which is possibly a waiting mode till more troops are sent to Afghanistan as policing this rugged mountanous country with tribal regions and loyalties complicated by the narcotics layer and widespread corruption in the Karzai government and its loss of popular support requires many more troops than are now in the country and a sustained campaign. So far the US and European forces possibly outnumbered have resisted alienating the poppy farmers in the south through land based eradication. But with more troops Mullen's new approach and Petraeus's has to shift to something like that, at the same time as they follow Petraeus's new counterinsurgency doctrine in display in Iraq to draw down the Taliban strength to its core supporters by winning other tribal factions with no hardcore loyalties over to the American side....

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General McChrystal gets the support he is looking for against the Taliban in Afghanistan, as Gates, Obama and Clinton, make the decision to continue backing the Karzai government, even though it is very unpopular and the ground reports suggest that this would be amistake. It was NATO that announced the support because the Obama administration had deep concerns about the Karzai government. The US and the UN representative Kai Eide wanted to see arunoff for the elections but the "assumption" that he would be reelected suggests the Obama administration, the UN representative, and the UK and Canadian foreign ministers in ameeting have decided to continue the war in Afghanistan on Karzai's side.

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The new drug policy in Afghanistan will acknowledge the act that after continuous efforts only about 3% of the opium crop was eradicated through destruction of opium popy fields. The policy was difficult to execute because it was the livelihood of farmers and because of Taliban opposition. THe focus will now be says Holbrooke, on interdicting flow of opium, and providing alternative crops for farmers. Gernerally experts from the UN to Brookings welcome the shift.

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Kevin Maurer looks back at 15 years of covering Afghanistan since 2004, and asks was it worth it.  The conflict has cost 145,000 lives for the U.S. period of the war alone. Not counting the war in which the Russians were involved in the decade before the U.S. involvement. In fact the Russian involvement in Afghanistan was costly enough to hasten the collapse of the Soviet Union and bring Gorbachev to power to unwind the war and make the changes that led to the collapse of the Berlin Wall.  2400 U.S. servicemen dead and 20,000 Americans wounded. The cost to the U.S. is $737 billion for this war, according to a report in 2018 from Brown University's Costs of War Project. Just as the Soviet Union showed the damage from this war the U.S. has seen the cost of this war and foreign entanglement in another war that started accidentally with international interventions in the Iran-Iraq region as a cost that was borne with consequences. This includes the neglect of infrastructure and the damage to the middle class prosperity built up in the 1950's and 1960's after the Second World War. The U.S. got into this war with 9/11 attacks on New York City. By 2010 what began as a war fought by a few Special Operations teams turned into a war with troop levels reaching 100,000. Presidents Bush and Obama both failed to end the war by winning it. In 2014 finally combat operations stopped and American troops mainly conducted anti-terrorism operations and trained Afghan forces. In recent years the war has gradually disappeared from the national discussion in the U.S. and is barely talked about. President Trump wants to end the war even if it means talking to the Taliban and negotiations directly with the Taliban are ongoing.  One result of this war is the aversion to costly international entanglements and the highly unpopular nature of the conflicts. There are serious costs of the conflict in terms of neglected domestic priorities including infrastructure, loss of U.S. technological edge in key industries, and the competition from China, an the investments in health, education, services that were not made, the increase in inequalities and the diminishing of the middle class. The global financial crisis of 2008, the result of faulty banking, added an economic dimension through the loss of middle class savings in the U.S., worsening the financial situation of the middle class in the U.S.    ...

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Gretchen Peters, a journalist who has followed the drug trade in Afghanistan and visited some of the locations where drug smullgling is taking place from Afghanistan to the southern coastline of Pakistan to be shipped to Europe and the USA. HE says its not enough to go after the poppy farms, its important to go after the whole network from drug refineries, drug storage places, and drug convoys that take the drugs into Pakistan to be shipped. Its important to catch drug smugglers like Mr Khan who is in jail in NEw York for running alarge smuggling operation. Only in this way can they interrupt and stop the flow of some $400 million that is going from the drug trade into Taliban hands.

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The resignation of U.S. Defense Secretary Mattis comes as a result of Mattis being unable to change plans by president Trump for a withdrawal from both Afghanistan and Syria. WSJ discloses that at a meeting on December 18 at the Pentagon, with John Bolton, White House National Security Advisor, Mike Pompeo, Secretary of State, and John Dunford, chairman Jt. Chiefs of Staff, Mattis could not temper the president's plans. On Thursday December 20th Mr. Mattis decided to resign. He then met Mr. Pompeo and onto the White House to meet president Trump. He and Mr. Trump discussed their contrasting world views in a 45 minute meeting, and Mr. Mattis handed over his resignation letter to Mr. Trump. Military officials were particularrly blindsided by the withdrawal from Syria. U.S. policy has vacillated back and forth in the intervention in Syria with president Obama also hesitant to commit troops in Syria. In the meeting Mattis understood that even a minimal presence in Syria was unacceptable to president Trump who ordered the removal of the 2000 troops there. The withdrawal from Afghanistan was also a result of limited patience with the war there in the 18th year and no sign that the Taliban influence had diminished since the war began- after Trump added 3000 troops to the 14,000 stationed in Afghanistan. The U.S. has 5500 troops in Iraq and there is talk about drawing this number down. The concern for the defense department is that how U.S. allies will see the withdrawal, and their perception of how reliable the U.S. is as a partner. For president Trump the cost is measured in terms of the long period the U.S. was engaged in the region without any tangible results, and U.S. not allies bearing most of the cost.      ...

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The decision to replace Gen. McKiernan with Gen. McChrystal and to have Lt. Gen David Rodriguez as his deputy, was made by Defense Secretary Gates and Jt Chiefs chairman Mullen, after thinking about this during the transition to the new Obama administration. The failing war effort in Afghanistan with the Karzai government controlling only pockets of Afghanistan and Kabul and leaving the countryside to the Taliban has alot to do with this. Gates feeling is "we can and must do better." That it took so long, with the Taliban only 50 miles from Islamabad, Pakistan, and the question of Paksitan's nuclear weapons falling into thier hands vexing the adminstration, shows that things slowed down with the transition and the economic crisis. The decision was not adifficult one considering that McKiernan had little to show for his efforts, and the rapidly deteriorating situation by all accounts. McKiernan was a senior officer who spent his entire military career commanding conventional forces, serving in the Balkans and the Iraq war in 2003, and has the wrong midset and background for counterinsurgency warfare. McChrystal has experiences suited to counterinsurgency warfare, having commanded commando teams that took out leading insurgents. He is also director of the Joint chiefs of staff, so known to Mullen for his abilities. Rodriguez commanded the 82nd Airborne Division in eastern Afghanistan, is seen as aleading expert in counterinsurgency warfare. He is also Gates's senior military advisor so known to Gates for his abilities. The new strategy is to go with counterinsurgency warfare to turn this thing around. This puts 2 commanders with this kind of experience in Kabul, and close communication with Gates and Mullen because they worked together before. With additional troops, and shift in resource acquisition at the Pentagon that Gates is trying to secure for this kind of warfare, this creates the kind of combination that could help the US in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and achieve more modest goals. See the links to Gates's and Petraeus's more modest goals....

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During the election campaign Obama talked about sending at least 2 more combat brigades to Afghanistan. The Defense Department is already planning to send 20,000 additional troops in response to a request of General David McKiernan, top commander in Afghanistan,including 4 combat brigades and an aviation brigade with helicopters, increasing the American troop levels to 58,000, with an additional 30,000 NATO troops already there from other countries. The timeline for this is 12-18 months but with the escalating insurgent attacks in Afghanistan this will probably be done more quickly. Obama and some Democrats talked about Afghanistan as somehow being the good war and he vowed to defeat the Taliban and militants in Afghanistan. But Afghanistan is a different place and most military experts are suggesting that a good strategy will be needed, for example winning over the tribals and some of the militants, and not trying to win militarily. However with the deteriorating situation there the only way to win over tribals and militants may be to get the situation to where the NATO and US forces are in a strong situation. The two big handicaps in this are first history, where the terrain and rural distribution of the people make it difficult to exercize any control over the vast region of mountains and deserts. So throughout history no one has controlled this region and there is no history of centralized government, with different tribes controlling their regions. The other is the problem created by the corruption and lack of any popular support for the Karzai government, which is made worse by the involvement of its officials in the opium trade with opium growing booming in the southern part of Afghanistan. How does the US and NATO create an effective Afghan army and police under a state that does not enjoy any popular support. And yet the strategy that Gates. Petraeus and McKiernan are pursuing involves preparing the Afghan army and police for the task of controlling the vast mountainous region against a rural insurgency that knows its way in the mountains enjoys rural support because of the independent spirit of the Afghan people who find it easy to see the NATO forces as white foreigners in their country. The Afghan army is small for such a vast mountainous region, only 70,000 in a nation of 32 million people, and the police forces of 80,000 mostly corrupt and ineffectual. The present plan is to build the Afgan army to 134,000 still small for such a large region. The other problems stem from the Pushtun population in Pakistan that supports the rural insurgency in Afghanistan and the support of tribal people in the border areas of Pakistan. The picture tells the story, a small number of NATO soldiers in a remote ridge in Afghanistan. And the problems actually are across the whole of the far northern region of what was once British India, of Afghanistan and Pakistan, as the Pakistan government is quite fragile, having an army that operates as a power center of its own with little accountability to the central government. And years of war during the previous military government of Pakistan under Zia Ul Haq, in which Zia with the support of the Reagan administration supported another rural insurgency in Afghanistan that drove the soviets out of Afghanistan, and the subsequent sponsorship of the Taliban movement by the Pakistan military in Afghanistan, has created a situation in Pakistan where militants now operate freely and with impunity in Pakistan itself, disregarding both the Pakistan military and the Pakistan elected government's power structures....

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Former prime minister Nawaz Sharif's PML-N party wins 125 of 269 seats in Pakistan's parliament. The Tehreek-e-Insaf party of Imran Khan won 31 seats and the PML-N party of the current president Asif Zardari won 32 seats mostly in Sindh province. Independents won 31 seats and some of these independents are likely to support Sharif in forming a new government. Election turnout of 60% showed a large degree of enthusiasm in this election and hopes for economic revival in Pakistan. The focus of Sharif will be on improving the economy, tackling electricity shortages, and building infrastructure. Sharif promised to pursue peaceful relations with India and Afghanistan, and keep the focus on the economy. Sharif and his advisers are bringing a new deftness in the dealings with the Army, the Pakistan Taliban, saying he would call for a halting of drone strikes, limiting the role the U.S. plays in the region, both positions popular in Pakistan, separating differences with former president Musharraf from the institutional role of the military. Small business owners and large business support Sharif's efforts to tackle electricity shortages, with an estimated loss of $12 billion in idled factories alone. The long period of political conflicts between the military, the judiciary and the political parties have led to neglect of Pakistan's economy, as neighboring countries in Asia surged ahead. The realization that popular pressure for improving standards of living and the economic opportunities are both huge has led to an extraordinary election, and put Sharif at the centre of an important new beginning for Pakistan. ...

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A detailed account by Thomas Schweich, a senior official and deputy in the law enforcement bureau to Anne Patterson, Assistant secretary of State for international narcotics and law enforcement affairs. He talks about how the Pentagon and the UK military have thwarted efforts for aerial eradication of poppy fields which has worked in other countries like Columbia. In fact Anne Patterson was an Ambassador to Columbia and knows about this first hand. He also talks about how through their efforts northern Afghanistan was cleared of poppy fields but how the cultivation has shifted to the south to Helmand and Kandahar provinces. The government officials in these provinces are actively involved in the poppy farms that are being setup there and support Karzai and help him organize the Pashtun vote for coming elections. So Karzai is protecting these officials and because of this opposes aerial eradication and does not support using Afghan Army for land eradication. The military in the U.S. and the UK does not want to take more casualties by turning against them the officials and farmers who support the government, but this is a short sighted policy because this helps make the Taliban insurgency stronger with access to cash and weapons because they also are actively setting up farms in their areas of southern Afghanistan. Aerial eradication takes care of poppy farms in all areas and has been effective in other countries. In the long run the military takes many more casulaties because of the bigger insurgency and Taliban they have to deal with. The military's policy is called "Sequencing," and its basically we'll deal with drugs later which is based on a complete misperception and understanding of the situation facing them. Schweich is in the thick of these battles and has fought them wit courage it appears from this account. He has the support of Secretary of State Rice but has not been able to get the Administration to get Karzai to change the way he is operating. It risks making the situation and insurgency in Afghanistan a lot worse if not corrected. Its a call for action and for educating the public and clearing all the misunderstanding and myths and fog about whats happening in Afghanistan....

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Scott Shane says no one including Mr Obama talked about Pashtun-land or Pastunistan which comprises 12 million people in Afghnaistan and 27 million on the Pakistan side of the border. This is basically where the war is being fought and the bases are on the Pakistani side. He points to the risks for an exit strategy, as this means shifting the balance in America's favor, which depends mainly on getting the popular nationalistic sentiment support for the Pastun Taliban to erode. With aweak partner alienating the Afghan people the chances for eroding that popular support are not good. Just compare Maliki and the Shiite majority support for the government and Karzai's corrupt and unpopular government, and you see the difference between one surge and the other. Compare the localized fight in Iraq's Anbar desert type flat open areas with a vast mountainous area and popular sentiment of supporting fellow Muslims of the Taliban in Pakistan, and one can see that the two are vastly different. ...