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Spain and Italy's 10 year government bonds yield declined to 3.2% in April 2014, compared to 2.68% on U.S. 10 year government bonds and 1.56% for German 10 year bonds. This is a far cry from the dark days of 2012 when these yields for Italy and Spain hovered at 7-8%. Italian bonds reached a peak in Nov. 2011 of 7.408% and yields declined to 3.221% on April 8, 2014, according to Tradeweb. Spain's bonds reached a peak of 7.637% in July 2012 and declined to 3.204% on April 8, 2014.

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Richard Portes of the London Business School provides two good reasons why the EU's decision to adopt the French Banking Federation's proposal for rollovers with 10% interest costs is a serious mistake. It doubles the interest costs from 4-6% to 10% with 2% Greek GDP growth and makes debt servicing untenable. Portes says the real Brady Plan from the 1980's included a 35-40% bondholders haircut. Deals of this type have a precedent- in Mexico in 1988 and in Argentina in 2001 such bond exchanges were soon followed by deals that placed bondholder haricuts on creditors. The lesson from Latin America in the 1980's, says Portes, is that the burdens of servicing a debt of such proportions under onerous conditions only extinguishes the enterprise, investment and productive capabilities of the particular country trying to service that debt, making the debt even less serviceable. See the Wall Street Journal's editorial on this deal which it calls "The French Deception." The terms sound like Greek to the editors leaving a sense that French banks are only saying "gimme." The only benefit achieved may be putting off the problem and avoiding contagion to Portugal and Spain. Yet this is not that much of a benefit when one realizes that the problem has not gone away, and is likely to look much worse six or nine months from now....

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ECB study put out in April 2013 shows household wealth and income in eurozone countries based on 2009-2010 data for 60,000 households throughout the eurozone. The household wealth in southern European countries is higher than that in Germany. The study shows why ordinary Germans oppose bailouts for banks, Greece, and eurozone countries that experienced a boom in the 2000-2010 period, a period in which German workers took small pay raises to improve German competitiveness. Germans also see Portugal and Ireland in a different light compared to Greece, Cyprus, Italy and Spain where real estate speculation, lax accounting, tax evasion and favored treatment of certain groups, has created or aggravated the debt problems. Wealth is defined as total assets, including real estate, vehicles, bank deposits, investments and pensions, minus liabilities for mortgages, credit card debt and loans. By this measure German households had an average of 200,000 euros in wealth, and lower than this in Finland and Netherlands. At the median or midpoint German households had 50,000 euros, the lowest in the eurozone, for Greece the median was 102,000 euros. The impact of home ownership is significant in the report, as home ownership is lower in Germany than in Southern European countries, and mortgage interest is not considered favorably in German tax laws. The decline in value of homes after 2010 is also not reflected. Another indicator for comparitive wellbeing is income, and this is shown in figures released in March 2013 from the European Statistics Agency for GDP per capita. For Germany per capita GDP was 29,000 euros in 2010. The average GDP per capita for the eurozone is about 24,000 euros. By this measure Greece is at 21,000 euros, 24,000 euros for Italy and for Spain. Germany being 18-19% above Spain and Italy. If Germans, Dutch, Finns and Austrians are less well off then the argument favors having the banks, creditors, and including depositors, in a burdensharing arrangement for bailout of troubled eurozone economies. ...

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Krugman points to the connection between the failure to achieve debt reduction through debt forgiveness and the sluggish economic growth in the eurozone and U.S., five years after the global banking and financial crisis of 2009 and four years after the beginning of the eurozone debt crisis in 2010. In the U.S. debt reduction for homeowners was delayed with a wave of foreclosures, and in Europe austerity budgets were the norm as Germany pushed hard for austerity policies. In 2014 small relaxation of austerity to give relief to voters took place in Greece, France, Italy and Spain, with austerity budgets still in place. Growth also slowed in Germany to slight contraction in the third quarter and no growth in the fourth quarter of 2014. This is leading to the formulation of new policy to address growth challenges in the eurozone. Debt to GDP is growing in eurozone countries and Britain because of lack of growth, even though spending cuts have been made, showing the need for rethinking policy. ...

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Landon Thomas Jr. looks at the situation in Spain and finds it hard not to conclude that austerity policies are not working in the absence of economic growth, and increasing unemployment. Unemployment in Spain is at 24% and growing. Deficit reduction is likely to take longer with the deteriorating economic outlook. Spain's economy minister, Luis de Guindos has announced Spain plans to increase consumer taxes in 2013, including the VAT, which is currently at 18%. This would further depress consumer spending. Bondholders sense dangers from lack of economic growth and competitiveness, as much as they sense dangers from uncontrolled regional spending. As a result investors are leaving Spain. According to analysts at Credit Agricole Cheuvreux in Madrid, 100 billion euros (132 billion) have left Spain, including distress sales- coming from insurance companies, pension and sovereign wealth funds reducing holdings of Spanish bonds.

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Sheila Bair, former head of the U.S. FDIC, points out flaws in the rules for capital adequacy ratios and risk weighted assets which allow banks to increase their capital adequacy ratios. The ratios show the financial strength of the banks and their ability to absorb losses, which makes their accurate calculation very important for the safety of the U.S. banking system, especially with large "too big to fail" banks. Bair says the 2013 U.S. Fed stress tests showed Bank of America as having a capital adequacy ratio of 11.4%, when it should actually be 7.8% without the risk weighted adjustment. The mortgage banking crisis showed how the risk wieighting can be flawed and give a distorted representation of the acutal risks facing the banks in its assets. For Morgan Stanley the 2013 stress tess by the U.S. Fed showed the capital adequacy ratio at 14%, taking out the risk weighting adjustment this drops to 7%. Bair says its not the idea of risk weighting that is the problem, but the way it is applied- for example considering sovereign government bonds in the eurozone as zero risk, or that only 20% of the accounting value of debt one banks buys from another bank is to be taken into account in setting the ratio. Go back to the drawing board she says, it makes no sense that Citibank debt be shown as having one fifth risk of IBM's. ...

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Applebaum talks to two researchers at the University of Chicago and Princeton, Prof. Sufi and Prof. Mian, on the record of U.S. president Obama and Fed chairman Bernanke in helping homeowners facing foreclosure and underwater borrowers, comparing that record with their record in helping the banks. The issue is relevant as the policy and handling of homeowners had to be part of an overall effective plan for recovery in the U.S. economy, because ultimately without the U.S. consumer any recovery would be weak in the long run- a situation the U.S. faces in early 2014. The response to the issue of irresponsible homeowners borrowing beyond the limit without an equally robust response to irresponsible bank management that allowed wildly excessive leveraging of assets, and successful aggressive lobbying by banks in a shortsighted policy of going through with a wave of foreclosures; besides creating questions of fairness and equitable handling of the problem, also had major ramifications for the future of the U.S. and global economic growth. Here Christina Romer and other administration advisors say Bernanke was right in tackling the problem from the perspective of the banks needing to be recapitalized. Thoughtful advisors looking at the entire problem, Martin Feldstein and Sheila Bair strongly pushed for providing the same help to homeowners without getting caught up in the issue of who was responsible home buyers or the banks, and looking at the interests of the U.S. economy and the U.S. people. Proposals by Feldstein and Bair were equally robust in helping banks as they were in helping homeowners, only the banks understood their interests narrowly and had more access to policymakers in the Bush, as well as the Obama administration, Paulson as well as Geithner. This leaves us with the ultimate irony of the Obama administration pushing for the minimum wage, even to the point of electoral posture, when lasting damage had been inflicted on homeowners from the weaker portions of America's middle class by a policy that went against what two respected financial and economic experts from the Reagan period, Sheila and Bair had strongly advocated. See links and groups on Feldstein and Bair. Applebaum has followed most aspects of this problem closely and continues to provide exceptional reporting including the piece on the thinking of new Fed chairman, Janet Yellen. Private enterprise rules that require management at banks just as for other companies to take responsibility for failures, and be replaced with new management, was largely avoided leading to a fundamental failure in how a free market economy such as the U.S. and western European economies are supposed to function. Rules aggressively pushed by Geithner's mentor Treasury Secretary Rubin for a vigorous cleanup at banks in South Korea during a similiar situation in 1997, were not followed in any way here, also setting wrong precedents for the long run. ...