World News Insights
1-3 Minute Gist

Browse Articles or use Lyrarc's US patented "Groups" and "Links" for new insights. A Lyrarc Group of Articles on a topic gives insights into particular angles shown in the Group Title. A Lyrarc Link shows more specific insights for 2 articles.

All Topics Articles

LyrArc brings in selected articles from many of the world's top publications.

Articles are selected by experts and you can see the gist of the important articles.


Wall Street Journal Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
In an interview with the Wall Street Journal Deutschland, Hans Werner Sinn, head of the Ifo Institute in Germany, says Greece's bondholders are overly exaggerating the effects on the eurozone of an exit by Greece. He sees it in the best interests of Greece to improve its competitiveness and return to growth by going back to the drachma. Just to get to the level of Turkey Greece would need to reduce prices by 31%, which is impossible to do within the eurozone without risking a complete breakdown in civil order. The best way to use the 130 billion euro second bailout package is to use it to recapitalize its banking system, says Sinn. Sinn says Portugal's faces the risk of a debt crisis following the crisis in Greece.
Washington Post Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
A review of the aid program for Greece done for European leaders meeting in Brussels on October 23, 2011, shows that most of the money sent to Greece has gone to pay off bondholders (mostly European banks that lent to Greece). For the initial bailout program of the European Union and the IMF in May 2010, international loans amount to $91 billion. Of this $52 billion has gone to repay bonds that came due between May 2010 and September 2011, according to this review. The report was prepared by the European Commission in coordination with the IMF and the ECB. Greece owes over $300 billion dollars and Greece's borrowing extends far beyond the country's size and ability to repay, creating extraordinary risks to the financial system in Europe. The initial bailout program based its lending on little or no haircuts for the bondholders, who are mainly the European banks (mostly French and German banks) that loaned the money, which creates another set of risks, and a logjam, because taxpayers in the stronger financial countries such as Germany are equally adamant on not paying for the excess lending of the French and German banks. The financial leaders in Germany, Finance Minister Schauble, Axel Weber, the former head of the Bundesbank, and other prominent financial experts have also adamantly insisted on following prudent financial practices, and are opposed to using the European Central Bank to buy the sovereign bonds of France, Italy and Spain....

The Tragic Greek Sideshow

Wall Street Journal Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
This Journal editorial does not shy away from the task of evaluating the Greece bailout in March 2012, for what it really means; its longer term consequences for the EU experiment, the consequences for Greece, and what it does for democracy in Athens. Its clear it points out the last 2 years were spent insulating the rest of the EU from the fallout of the debt crisis in Greece. Even though it would have been better to have acted at the outset two years ago- to let Greece go into a planned default, reduce debt to manageable levels, and to have acted on reforms earlier. This would have setup a better outcome than the one today. It would have meant a bigger haircut for the banks and greater debt reduction which would have hurt European banks. The current outcome is bad for Greece's economy which leaves it with debt at over 120% of GDP in 2020, and no hope to return to growth. And its bad for democracy as the two main political parties in Greece were required to pledge support to the austerity measures against overwhelming public opposition....
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
ECB study put out in April 2013 shows household wealth and income in eurozone countries based on 2009-2010 data for 60,000 households throughout the eurozone. The household wealth in southern European countries is higher than that in Germany. The study shows why ordinary Germans oppose bailouts for banks, Greece, and eurozone countries that experienced a boom in the 2000-2010 period, a period in which German workers took small pay raises to improve German competitiveness. Germans also see Portugal and Ireland in a different light compared to Greece, Cyprus, Italy and Spain where real estate speculation, lax accounting, tax evasion and favored treatment of certain groups, has created or aggravated the debt problems. Wealth is defined as total assets, including real estate, vehicles, bank deposits, investments and pensions, minus liabilities for mortgages, credit card debt and loans. By this measure German households had an average of 200,000 euros in wealth, and lower than this in Finland and Netherlands. At the median or midpoint German households had 50,000 euros, the lowest in the eurozone, for Greece the median was 102,000 euros. The impact of home ownership is significant in the report, as home ownership is lower in Germany than in Southern European countries, and mortgage interest is not considered favorably in German tax laws. The decline in value of homes after 2010 is also not reflected. Another indicator for comparitive wellbeing is income, and this is shown in figures released in March 2013 from the European Statistics Agency for GDP per capita. For Germany per capita GDP was 29,000 euros in 2010. The average GDP per capita for the eurozone is about 24,000 euros. By this measure Greece is at 21,000 euros, 24,000 euros for Italy and for Spain. Germany being 18-19% above Spain and Italy. If Germans, Dutch, Finns and Austrians are less well off then the argument favors having the banks, creditors, and including depositors, in a burdensharing arrangement for bailout of troubled eurozone economies. ...
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
Stamouli and Walker of WSJ describe the last days of negotiations in June before Greece pulled out its negotiating team, and German chancellor Merkel decided to call off the bailout of Greece. The impasse was over pension cuts and vaue added taxes, yet the negotiations were still going over details when Tsipras pulled out Greece's negotiating team with the surprise announcement of a referendum on July 5, 2015. By saying the Syriza party would call for a "no" vote Tsipras alienated public opinion in Germany. Chancellor Merkel seeing the shift in domestic opinion favoring Greece's exit from the euro during the tense months of negotiations with the Syriza government and acrimonious charges, moved to call off a continued EU bailout of Greece.
The Guardian Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
This view from the Guardian by David Adler from July 8 2019, gives a third perspective on Greece as it goes into elections. It looks at the turbulent period of 2015-2019 when a new leader Alexis Tsipras promised to lead Greece out of the eurozone crisis by standing up to the ECB and Germany, instead of looking at Greece's own responsibility in letting debt buildup till it overwhelmed Greece. Adler says Syriza was too much on one end blaming Germany for strict conditions on a loan bailout, and after this did not work embracing the loan program in a complete reversal causing much anguish to his own support base when this led to callous implementation.  Mitsotakis is careful to say in his interview with Reuters that the vulnerable have to be protected while also committing to a path of economic growth for Greece. It says 50 billion euros was provided to help people with the cost of living crisis, pensions were increased, minimum wage increased by 20%. It also shows the need to judge by looking at the situation not by labels of centre left or center right, are people better off, will people be better off in the future, are all the bases education, healthcare, public services, infrastructure covered? Is the government honest with the people and doing everything it can after listening to the people? ...
New York Times Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
About $229 billion, three fourth of Greece's debt, is now held by the European Central Bank, the IMF and the European Commission. This is taxpayer money and the governments are making sure that they get back bailout loans in the form of interest payments. About two thirds of the $177 billion given to Greece as bailout loans since May 2010 actually came back to the ECB, IMF, and the EC, in the form of interest. The ECB is keen on recovering taxpayer money. The money route has been setup with an escrow account in Greece for bailout loans so that interest payments get paid, and this money cannot be used for any other purpose. Banking experts say this is a practice in risk management, and with Greece's poor record in finances the controls have been put in place to recover money the ECB invested in Greek bonds in an effort to calm nervous financial markets and now gets about 10% in annual interest payment. Under earlier debt restructuring for private creditors to Greece a haircut of over 50% on Greek bonds was taken, with the ECB insisting on receiving full payment. If Greece were to repudiate the loans under a new elected government losses would have to be taken by the ECB, IMF, and EC, and by private creditors. The ECB has Greek bonds in the range of $44 billion to $69 billion, and the European Financial Stability Facility $88 billion, by some estimates. Greece's exit from the euro would result in losses on these bonds .for the ECB and the EFSF, ultimately European taxpayers. It would also make the new bonds to private creditors under the restructuring of little value which is why European banks would not favor that outcome. Greece's tax receipts at some point, possibly 2013, would exceed basic operating expenses of the government, at which point a future Greek government might decide to exit the euro and stop interest payments on debt in its best interest....
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
Prospects of a continuation of the eurozone crisis into 2012 with a deterioration of conditions in Greece, friction over funding of the EFSF bailout financing mechanism, economic contractions in some countries, a lowering of credit ratings of France and Italy, and a change of government after April elections in France adding to the uncertainty.
New York Times Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
Greece passed what prime minister Samaras called the last of the austerity cuts in November 2012 and called for action by lenders in the EU. The EU's Rehn says it is time to dispel the notion that Greece has not made progress in making the economic changes needed. Finance ministers of the eurozone meeting in Brussels agreed to give Greece two more years to reach deficit reduction targets. The cost of this to the eurozone will be 32.6 billion euros. A $40 billion payment to Greece is still on hold till Nov. 20, 2012. The cuts passed in parliament in November 2012 by the Samaras government will raise 17 billion euros over 4 years. The 2013 budget passed in parliament has cuts of 9.4 billion euros to salaries pensions and benefits, and raises the retirement age from 65 to 67. As of Nov. 2012 the bailout packages to Greece from the eurozone countries are at $240 billion.
New York Times Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
Syriza party's young leader Alexis Tsipras retains popularity even as Greece accepts the third bailout program from the EU with conditions for pension reform and tax changes. He now says some of the pension reforms were necessary even in the absence of the bailout conditions, saying it is not normal for someone to retire at age 45 or 50. He also says that he is fighting tax evasion so that the rich pay their share of taxes. The mainstream parties have lost confidence because the programs did not ensure a equitable sharing of tax and other measures, and more of the burden falling on the poor. In contrast to Portugal where the tax burden is shared more equitably, more of the burden in Greece has fallen on the poor and less affluent.
The Economist Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
Peter Altmaier is director of the chancellery in Berlin, and is the person closest to Angela Merkel. This report in the Economist points out that Altmaier has played a critical role in steps taken by Merkel- as chief whip in parliament for the CDU during the Greece financial crisis and bailouts, as environment minister implementing the program away from coal based electricity, and in negotiating deals such as the deal with Turkey on refugees, and now with Brexit negotiations. Merkel has asked Altmaier to write her manifesto for the September 2017 election. A member of the CDU's liberal wing, Altmaier is known for being a scholar on German history, especially Bismarck, and a workaholic. Here he is mentioned as a bridge maker for the CDU to the Greens Party and was part of a group of CDU and Green Party politicians who met at an Italian restaurant in Bonn. As the moderates are now dominant in the Greens Party, a CDU coalition with the Greens could be shaped by Altmaier if the election results move in that direction. ...
New York Times Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
Dart Management, a vulture fund based in the Cayman Islands, received 90% of the 436 million euros bond payment by Greece on May 15, 2012. Dart is one of the holdout investors who did not participate in the Greek debt restructuring deal. It planned to sue the Greek government. This has implications for the other holdout investors with about 6-7 billion euros of Greek bonds. The reason given by the Greek government was that this caught Greece at a bad time- suing Greece could have tied up European bailout funds that Greece needs to make interest payments on its debt. The timing is bad from another standpoint, as it will further exacerbate voter discontent with the parties associated with the government just before the second Greek elections in June 2012.
New York Times Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
Jim Yardley points out the controversial nature of the referendum in Greece on July 5, 2015. It is flawed in 3 respects- it makes no mention of Europe, the details of the agreement are not clear to voters, and the "No" vote is framed in terms of the "Oxi" or "No" vote of 1940 in Greece to Mussolini for annexation of Greece. No sane minded person can confirm that this has anything to do with the annexation of Greece by foreign powers. It had one additional flaw- the government and Tsipras simply went ahead and campaigned for a "No" without talking to its European partners. Landon Thomas Jr shows how the difficult dynamic and confrontation between the eurozone negotiator Dijsselbloem and the Greece negotiator led to the collapse of talks on June 25, 2015, playing right into the paranoia of an inexperienced Greece administration about the EU's intentions. Only over a week later July 7, 2015 the new Britain trained Greece negotiator Tsakalotos from St Pauls School and Oxford was able to change the very tone of negotiations leading to the Third Bailout Program. ...
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
The domestic German public opinion has shifted against further bailouts to the point where a poll conducted July 1-5 before the referendum shows only 10% of German supporting further concessions in negotiations with Greece. This reduces even further the room domestic public opinion gives German chancellor Merkel for flexibility in talks following the Greece referendum "no" vote to earlier proposals from Germany and France. The multi year program planned for Greece following the referendum involves reforms such as making firing workers easier, changes to product markets and privatization of state assets, which were left out in the June 2 proposal from Merkel and Hollande, which was rejected at the time by Greece.
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
The terms of the debt restructuring deal with the bond swap in Greece become clear on March 9, 2012. In the deal with private bondholders -using collective action clauses to force remaining bondholders into the deal- about 96% of the 206 billion euros of Greece's bonds will be exchanged. Private bondholders held out throughout most of 2011, delaying the inevitable as Greece's economic situation became increasingly hopeless. This created a logjam with the German government, which insisted on serious private sector participation and bondholder haircut as the cost of poor lending decisions of the French, German and other European banks that made loans to Greece out of proportion of the ability of Greece to payback loans. Charles Dallara of the Institute of International Finance, negotiating for European banks, offered a 10% average loss on the bonds in July 2009. It was not until German Chancellor Merkel told Dallara at a late night meeting on October 27, 2011: "this is my last offer," for a 50% loss on the face value of the bonds, was agreement reached. The Greek debt swap that now takes place will give private bondholders a loss of 53.5% from the face value of 200 billion euros of bonds that they hold. The new Greek bonds issued in place of the old bonds include short-term bonds issued by the eurozone rescue fund at 15% of the face value of the old bonds, and a series of Greek bonds with maturity ranging from 11-30 years valued at 31.5% of the face value of old bonds. That even this 53.5% bondholder loss will not be adequate, as Greece's economy looks irretrievably damaged as it spirals downwards, is shown by the value of these bonds already trading in a hypothetical "gray market." The new 30 year bond is quoted at 17 cents and the 11 year bond at 22 cents. The questions remain about the stalling by the banks in taking the losses earlier- was this the wisest move considering the losses beyond Greece as the eurozone economy as a whole has suffered from the prolonged negotiations stretching through 2011, lurching from one crisis to the next? Even if the stalling was designed to give time for banks to repair their balance sheets, was this the best strategy, considering the damage inflicted on European economic growth. John Taylor of Stanford points out that the European banks delayed the unavoidable serious debt restructuring for too long, when insolvency was the real issue not illiquidity, and exaggerated the effect of contagion from the beginning- in John Taylor, WSJ, 2/22/2012, A Better Grecian Bailout. And John Cochrane of the University of Chicago, points out that French and German governments if they bailout French and German banks should do so openly and frankly rather than cover this up as bailouts of countries, because this would lead to serious questions about the poor lending decisions of the European banks and government supervision of the banks- in Cochrane, WSJ, 12/2/2010, 'Contagion' and other Euro Myths. As early as Feb. 2010, Cochrane was suggesting the forced exchange of new bonds with long debt maturities for exisiting bonds with short debt maturities, as short term debt was the major issue here. ...
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
A bailout of Ireland with $136 billion bailout planned by the European Union. Fear of contagion effects on Greece, Portugal and Spain. Pressure on Ireland to accept the bailout for its banks.
New York Times Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
The steps taken at a meeting of Europe's leaders in March 2011. The European Financial Stability Facility will be allowed to disburse its entire 440 billion euros if needed, and it will be allowed to buy bonds in government auctions but not on the secondary market. Interest rates were reduced on loans to Greece and repayment terms were extended. But this fund can only buy bonds of countries receiving bailout money, which means Portugal will not see a decline in its interest rates for benchmark government bonds. Interest rates on Portuguese 10 year bonds remained high at 7.4%. Greek bonds saw a lowering of interest rates, but Ireland saw no change. What is needed now is a plan that will bring interest rates down for these countries, say analysts. And they say the plan agreed on by EU leaders fall short. If interest rates do not go down for these countries the debt keeps piling up, especially when austerity measures lower the economic growth rates of Greece and Portugal. Both Greece and Portugal do not have a competitive export industry, which places the burden entirely on austerity measures and revenue raising steps. The perverse scenario analysts fear is that debt continues to grow because of high interest rates at low or declining growth rates. While some relief was offered to Greece the situation is still precarious, and analysts estimate Greece's debt increasing to 160% of GDP from 127 % of GDP by 2013....
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
Antonis Samaras continues his efforts to get the EU to agree to a two year extension for deficit targets agreed to in the March 202 bailout. He meets Merkel in Berlin, Aug. 24 and Hollande in Paris, Aug. 25. Merkel's coalition partners the Free Democrats oppose an extension. The opposition Social Democrats leader Steinmeier tells the Frankfurter Rundschau newspaper "its not very smart to abandon all conditions for aid over an extension of 12 months." Samaras tells the Sueddeutsche Zeitung newspaper: "our economy shrank 27%. Greece is bleeding, It is really bleeding." And German finance minister Schauble tells Germany's SWR2 radio that its too early for Greece to come back and say the agreed aid is insufficient considering that its ony 6 months since the March 2012 agreement. Merkel and other leaders in the Christian Democrats say they will wait till a report from the troika (the EU, ECB and the IMF) in October 2012 before responding.
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
The German parliament votes 439 to 119 on July 16, 2015, approving a 86 billion euro aid and loan package to Greece under an aid for reforms plan. 60 members of chancellor Merkel's CDU group voted against compared to 29 voting against the bailout extension of Feb. 2015. This included approval of 7.16 billion euros in short term funding for July 20, to meet a 4.2 billion euro payment to the ECB. This was conducted as a special session of parliament. Chancellor Merkel said: "we would be acting with crude intelligence and irresponsibility if we didn't at least try this path." Finance Minister Schauble told parliament- "We believe that there is a chance that we can bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion," yet he cautioned that after the negotiations of coming weeks "we will have to discuss whether the negotiations have shown a way that works."
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
The Bank of Cyprus and the Cyprus Popular Bank (Laiki Bank), passed stress tests given by the EU in 2010 and 2011. By the end of 2010- even as other banks such as Barclays were cutting their Greece government bonds by over 50%- the two banks held 5.8 billion euros of Greece bonds, over $1 billion euros larger exposure to Greece than nine months earlier, according to European regulators. Regulatory supervision failed to alert the banks and the banks risk management failed to see the warning signs in Greece. The Laiki Bank Risk Officer went in the opposite direction actually increasing exposure to Greece, saying in a conference call in August 2010, that he had used the bank's capital position "to deepen selectively some highly profitable client relationships." What went wrong with the stress tests by the EU regulators in July 2010 of these two banks, was that the tests looked at what would happen if economic conditions deteriorated, but did not consider the possibility that government bonds could produce losses. The two banks suffered total booked losses of 4.3 billion euros in 2013 from holdings of Greece bonds. The EU stress tests of July 2010 showed the two banks having total of 572 million in surplus capital. The two banks then went on to issue dividends in 2010-2011 totalling 141 million euros. By March 2013 the Laiki Bank was "on respirator" for a few months, according to the Central Bank of Cyprus, until the 10 billion euro EU bailout in March 2013 with the closing of Laiki Bank and the sharp downsizing of Bank of Cyprus....
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
Washington Post Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
Alexis Tsipras of the Syriza Party stresses in his election campaign in September 2015 that even though he has accepted the Third Bailout Program from the EU, only Syriza will act so that the most vulnerable in society are protected. Tsipras openly accepts his mistakes and says he has learnt from his mistake of underestimating the resolve of the EU about its plans for the Greek economy. Syriza has also taken a sympathetic view of refugees and migrants coming to Greece. The Popular Unity Party and finance minister Varoufakis, a breakaway group from Syriza that advocates going back to the drachma, are not expected to do well in the election. New Democracy Party led by Meimarakis stresses in its campaign that Syriza is turning the recovery into an experiment and lacks the experience to implement the Third Bailout Program neogtiated withe the EU. Syriza and New Democracy are the leading parties in the election. It shows how much has changed in 2015, that the only two parties with some credibility are Syriza under Tsipras and New Democracy under Meimarakis, both having made errors but having the candour and courage to tell Greek voters that they have learned from their mistakes....
Wall Street Journal Original article ›
LyrArc Article Gist
The European Stabilization Mechanism, setup this week will bailout member states but also enforce strict conditionality. This conditionality means coming in and telling a country what it must do in taxes, spending and economic policy as a price for being rescued. This is amajor adjustment to the system setup originally for the euro, which had the European central bank for price stability and the individual states handling their own finances with no bailout provision. With bailouts made part of the system, each country gurantees the others debts in the eurozone. And this comes with strict conditionality. The agreement last week makes a big change to the original Lisbon Treaty, which had no provision for a bailout. Lagarde says it was wishful thinking to think that the euro would work without something more coercive and stronger discipline. Jolis and Carney quote a former German central bank chief Tietmeyer in describing the challenge facing the euro:"it requires the degree of solidarity characteristic of a nation." They cite the violence and protests in countries from Greece to France when austerity policies are implemented on the basis of such discipline....

Support LyrArc

We took a different way to help millions around the world build educated informed mindsets that affects and shapes their lives. For a future that is open, global and digital, with everyone having access to high quality information. We believe in the renewal of America, renewal of Europe, the renewal of India, the rest of Asia, Latin America and Africa. The renewal of our supply chains, health, education, infrastructure, as we rebuild our countries after the pandemic. Literacy and knowledge we believe cannot thrive and grow in a world of web bots, web crawlers, or AI. This requires human curiosity, human learning, and human imagination. We take as inspiration the saying- “One has to be free, and as broad as sky. One has to have a mind that is crystal clear, only then can truth shine in it.” Every contribution whether big or small is precious- in this crisis and ahead.

Support Lyrarc from as small as $1


Copyright © 2006 - 2026 Intelilinks LLC
Terms and Conditions | Copyright Policy | Privacy Policy | Contact Us