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This article in the Economist magazine points out that official data do not accurately show the health of the banking sector, with large number of bad loans at smaller banks. Bank shares it points out are priced in a way that reflects bad loans at 5-10% of loans.

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Deposit insurance at the top of the priorities for economic and banking changes in China in 2014.

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Central Huijin, part of China's sovereign wealth fund, China Investment Corporation, bought shares of China's four major banks in October 2011 to prevent steep price declines. China's bank stocks have lost about a third of their value in 2011. The four major banks- China Construction Bank, Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China- control two-thirds of the banking industry in China. In China's interlocking system of relationships between the state, the banks and the state controlled industrial companies, Central Huijin owns 35.4% of Industrial and Commercial Bank, 67.6% of Bank of China, and similiar stakes in the other 2 banks. It was created in 2003 to bail out China's banks after bad loan losses, and was transferred to China Investment Corporation in 2007. As part of the 2007 move bonds were issued by CIC to compensate the central bank. This means the banks pay dividends to CIC so that it can make payments on the bonds. Today the 4 major banks pay half of their earnings in dividends to CIC. CIC chief Lou Jiwei, says Central Huijin needs 300 million renminbi a day, or $47 million to pay interest on the bonds to the central bank. The 4 major banks are also under pressure from China's regulators to increase their capital reserves, because of large bad loans to local governments after the global financial crisis of 2008....

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Chinese banks have 20% of total loans as receivable in 2016, up from 6% at the end of 2011, according to WSJ analysis. Many banks disguise loans as receivables. The government regulators have warned about this, but are hesitant to take strong action so that there is no shock to the system. This has created a parallel buildup of debt next to official debt of over 250% of GDP. These are seen as "hidden credit risks" by Shang Fulin, top banking regulator. As a result about $2 trillion is missing from broad measures of credit reported by the central bank, according to economists at UBS, using shadow lenders to mask loans as investments.

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Liu He, the author of the 2013 DRC report on recommended changes to China's banking and financial system, is now the director of the Communist party's top financial policy committee and senior advisor to president Jinping. Changes he is pushing for relate to increasing focus on credit risk for China's banks, promoting competiion between banks, a mechanism for letting banks fail, and a deposit insurance program to protect the public against failing banks. To open up the sector dominated by state owned banks, opening private banks would be encouraged. Local governments would be allowed to issue bonds in an effort to reduce their dependence on land sales and opaque off-market borrowing. The urgency of this agenda comes from the realization in top Chinese policy circles and the Jinping-Keqiang administration of the risks to the banking sysem from the lack of attention to credit risks in bank lending.

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China's shadow banking system of trust companies and insurance companies with trust company units and other informal lenders are the fastest growing part of its banking system. Between 2010 and 2012 trust companies and other shadow banks doubled outstanding loans to 36 trillon yuan ($5.8 trillion) or about 69% of China's GDP, according to J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. Hidden debt that is likely to default in this poorly regulated sector is seen as a large risk in the banking system by the central bank and China's government planners. Tightening of credit by the central bank, the People's Bank of China, sent interbank lending rates from 3% to as high as 25% in late June 2013, finally settling on June 24 at 6.64%. China's state owned banks lend to trust companies in this market. Trust companies get additional financing by selling wealth management products promising investors returns of 8-10%. Even with China's high savings rate and large government reserves, the hidden debt and large unknowns about the loans in default, are seen by the central bank as posing risks to the target rate of economic growth of 7.5% if the government has to bailout a significant number of troubled banks. Much of the money funnelled through the trust companies since 2008 has been poorly invested. The trust companies such as Citic and Ping An Trust channel lending to borrowers for projects ranging from steel mills to infrastructure projects, such as highways and property developments that cannot obtain the financing through the large state owned banks. Fitch Ratings estimate is that since the financial crisis of 2009 these loans generated only one third of the economic growth per yuan as they did before 2009. ...

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Is Trichet's approach at the ECB more like that of an engineer who is good at fixing things when its clear that something is broken, but not so good at seeing things further ahead, which is what the next phase of the mortgage and credit crisis will present.

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The comparison of China with Japan as stress builds up from overexpansion of credit in the banking system. The sharp increase in credit following the 2008 financial crisis has built up stress in China's banking system. Japan went through a period of low growth and insufficient lending by banks. Banks refinanced bad debts to zombie companies in Japan leading to a long period of low growth. China faces a similiar period of low growth after a credit expansion binge.

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This Journal editorial looks at the reason why Trusts and shadow banking became systemic risks, with trust products growing 7- fold in 2007-2012. It says money tends to find its way where its needed, and without junk bonds as in the U.S. the additional capital needs were being met by Trusts. The lid on interest rates meant individuals turned to the Trusts for higher rates. And the regulators failed to control the systemic risks posed by Trusts with their low transparency and regulatory control.

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The approach of the new Jinping-Keqiang administration to tackle the problem of surging credit growth, with poor quality lending in China's shadow banking system leading to problems of hidden debt and unknown quantity of loans in default. The central bank tightens credit in June 2013 sending a signal to lenders including small and medium sized banks and Trust companies in the shadow banking system that the government will let them default- that they are essentally on their own if they do not follow prudent financial practices.