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Kadish says interest on the national debt is 383 billion dollars or over 40% of the national individual income tax revenues of $904 billion. This according to Treasury's Bureau of the Public Debt. THe COngressional Budget Offfice estimates the 2009 budget deficit to be about $1.4 trillion or about 10% of GDP. OMB estimates total government revenues at $2 trillion. As of 2009 the national debt waas $12 trillion according to Treasury. and OMB forecasts $9 trillion of projected deficits over the nexxt 10 years. This means the natioanl debt could reach $21 trillion by 2019. OMB projects $13.5 trillion of revenue increases over the next 10 years but this says Kadish is optimistic and minimizes the rise in interest rates from larger debt burden. In the light of this adding more social programs he says could lead to asituation of high interest rates double or triple the 2.9% now, on refinanced or new debt.

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All sides had to make concessions to reach a new agreement on a restructuring of Greece's debt, and new terms for loans to Ireland and Portugal. The agreement was reached after negotiations between France, Germany, the ECB, and eurozone countries with a declaration issued on July 21, 2011. The powers and financing of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) were expanded to be the main mechanism for channeling EU funding to reduce the burden of Greece's debt. Germany will provide new funding and be open to additional commitments, something German chancellor Angela Merkel had resisted since the beginning of the crisis in 2010. Earlier funding had come with high interest rates and only when the situation had reached a crisis, with Germany insisting on the punitive rates and conditions as a way to discourage countries from taking advantage of cheap borrowing. In exchange for commitment of German funds Ms Merkel had insisted that banks and private creditors share in the losses. Private bondholders resisted but finally agreed to take a loss of 20% of principal on a small portion of the bonds. Their larger concession was to take lower interest rates and extend the maturities to 15 years and 30 years on new bonds which are guaranteed by the EU. The specific terms of the agreement are as follows: The EFSF and the IMF will lend Greece 109 billion euros over 3 years at 3.5%. Private creditors including German and French banks will "voluntarily" turn in their old bonds for new ones that mature over 15-30 year periods. These new bonds include 15 and 30 year Greek bonds with varying coupons. Some of the bonds would have a 20% discount on principal. EU leaders say the private sector contribution amounts to 37 billion euros through 2014 and 106 billion euros through 2019. Another part of the program is for the EFSF to buy back some of the Greek bonds on the secondary markets, which would mean Greece would now owe a smaller amount to the EFSF on these bonds. The EFSF will now have additional financial support from Germany and other EU countries and be authorized to provide aid to countries before a crisis situation arises. It would also have power to buy Greek bonds at prices on secondary markets to reduce the Greek debt burden. Ireland and Portugal are also assisted in the agreement. The interest rate for EU aid to Ireland and Portugal is taken down to 3.5%. Ireland is paying about 6% on the EU portion of its 67.5 billon euros bailout and efforts to reduce the rate were resisted earlier. The main theme behind these concessions and provisions is to give Greece, (and Ireland and Portugal) a chance to grow. High interest rates came under strong criticism because it only increased the size of the debt burden of these countries with a shrinking economy and high unemployment. The failure to come together behind a broad and sensible agreement with all parties making serious concessions, the EU, the ECB and the political leadership in these countries especially Greece, was undermining confidence in the euro and the eurozone itself. By mid-July Italy and Spain were feeling the effects of contagion in the financial markets, U.S. debt ceiling negotiations were unsettling global financial markets, the pressure was intense to come up with the workable agreement achieved on July 21, 2011. ...

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Spain's banking officals at the central bank and at the IMF, Jaime Caruana, Rodrigo Rato, and Jose Vinals, failed to exercize proper oversight over the Spanish banking system and did not draw early attention to the problems that were building up. Each time this came up they insisted that everything was under control and Spain's banks were adequately capitalized. In July 2008 when the issue was raised to Mr Caruana at an IMF news confernece he said: " The financial system in Spain is able to cope with that and is properly capitalized."

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The New York Times reports from the comments of current and former members of the Chase Chief Investment Office (CIO), that risk officers at Chase were ignored when they raised issues about the complex trades made by trader Iksil. Iksil's trades had the support of his manager Mr. Macris, and Ms. Drew who was in charge of CIO. The comments also indicate that at one point Mr. Macris brought in a Risk Officer with whom he had worked closely for many years. Risk Officers are supposed to be independent and their concerns seriously heard, with the authority to halt trades that pose excessive risks. Which made this kind of cozy behaviour in the CIO trading offices in London cause for alarm. These reports also say Mr. Braunstein, the new CFO at JP Morgan Chase, did not strengthen controls after he assumed office in 2010. Bank officials disputed this. The New York offices did not fully grasp the complex trades being made in the CIO London offices, and upper management let the CIO operate pretty much on its own, especially with CEO Jamie Dimon's confidence in Ms. Drew's management of the CIO. This led to another gap in the process of risk management. Dimon had other priorities and distractions, from problem mortgages coming with the acquisition of Washington Mutual, pushing back aginst financial regulation after the 2008 crisis, stress tests and others. At the same time the U.S. Federal Reserve, regulators, and Treasury's coordinated effort to merge failing banks with other larger banks- because of the lack of the process of unwinding failed banks provided later under Dodd-Frank legislation- created mega financial banks. Unlike what the U.S. under Treasury Secretary Rubin pushed for in the case of S. Korea during a banking crisis in 1997, Treasury under Geithner and Fed officials did not push for unwinding of failed financial institutions such as Countrywide and Washington Mutual in 2008-2009 Chase's own portfolio of assets under the CIO, increased by an astounding amount from $76 billion in 2007 to $356 billion in 2011. Even if Ms Drew had managed CIO well before, managing a portfolio of this size is most likely to have presented a whole set of new challenges and problems for which the CIO office was not prepared. Similiar concerns were raised by other Fed officials such as Fed governors, Hoenig and Fisher, who raised the issue that such mega-banks posed unacceptable risks and were too big to manage. Pressures to increase investing profits, growing complacency, relaxing risk management controls, led to the situation where a single trader Mr. Iksil, who had only joined the bank in 2007 according to other reports, could create large losses. This follows a situation at UBSin 2011, where a novice trader made bets that resulted in large losses....

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The government is focussing on tangible common equity ratio which for Citigroup is at a low of 1.5%. A 3% TCE is considered safe. The tier 1 capital ratio for Citigroup is 11.8% above the level that shows capital adequacy. To boost the Citigroup TCE ratio the government is expected to convert its preferred stock into common stock that would give it about 40% of Citigroup's common stock.

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An account by Journal reporters based on over 25 interviews with eurozone policymakers shows how the central players in the eurozone drama acted to defend their national interests during the period April to July 2011. On one side France's president Sarkozy, Frenchman Claude Trichet at the European Central Bank, arguing in favor of the banks not to take bondholder losses or haircuts on loans made to Greece. On the other side the Bundesbanks Axel Weber, and Jens Weidman, Jurgen Stark and German Finance Minister Schauble. The Germans argued strongly for bondholder losses to take responsibility for bad loan decisions by French and German banks. French banks had committed more loans to Greece than German banks and had more at stake. German public opinion was strongly against German taxpayers paying for the losses, making German politicians insistent that European banks take losses on their bad loan decisions, or Germany would not support additional loans to Greece. Throughout April to July the two sides were locked in an impasse. The French feared losses for their banks and a Lehman Brothers bankruptcy style situation. The Germans at the Bundesbank and the Finance Ministry were equally insistent. A July 2011 summit meeting did not settle the issue. The events not covered here from the July to the December summit of eurozone leaders resulted in bondholders taking 50% haircut on loans to Greece, reducing the debt burden in Greece after austerity measures led to popular protests. The French pushed hard for the ECB or the EFSF to be allowed to make large purchases of bonds of troubled eurozone countries in an effort to protect Spain and Italy from contagion through higher bond yields. The Netherlands and Finland supported Germany's position. German bankers Weber, Weidman at the Bundesbank and Finance Minister Schauble opposed large scale buying by the ECB of Italy's and Spain's bonds and Chancellor Merkel said about a common eurobond that "this is not going to happen." Governments changed in Greece, Italy, and Spain by Dec. 2011, which committed to austerity programs and spending cuts. Italian Mario Draghi was appointed with German support as new head of the ECB. In late December 2011 Draghi launched the Long Term Financing Operation for lending unlimited amounts at 1% for three year loans to European banks and relaxing the terms to accept government bonds and other debt as collateral for loans. The effect of this was to provide a large infusion of liquidity into the banking system in Europe and drastically bring down the yields on bonds issued by Italy and Spain....

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Cochrane says the best option today is for Europe to accept a sovereign default for Greece. He says the European Central Bank which stands behind the euro, should not be used for buying bonds of troubled countries with shaky "collateral." This would only lead to a situation where EU countries would have to recapitalize the ECB. He emphasizes the fact that Greece will not pay back this debt. And the only way out is to have a situation similiar to Argentina where it needs to start over, and it would at some point be able to borrow again. Austerity is deeply unpopular in Greece and with higher unemployment Greece's financial situation is rapidly deteriorating. Making austerity something that was tried to buy time but will not work. Cochrane also makes the point that the euro itself acts like the euro bonds that EU countries are reluctant to support, it means the ECB backs the currency and supports it- which makes it vital to keep the ECB whole and prevent the dilution of its financial strength. Axel Weber, former head of the Bundesbank, resigned to express his opposition to the ECB buying the bonds of troubled eurozone countries, which he said was outside the ECB's mandate to conduct monetary policy....

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This editorial in the Economist says Spain's economy has recovered to pre crisis levels by 2018 with growth at 3 percent. It says Spain had a bigger crisis than Italy and took stronger measures under prime minister Rajoy to fix problems in its banking system, address the housing crisis, and unemployment. Italy's steps by comparison were timid and faltering. Mr. Rajoy had his problems including corruption scandals in his party and a poor handling of the Catalan drive for independence. Yet Spain owes muchas gracias to Rajoy for his leadership in bringing Spain out of the housing and economic crisis, and for running the country for two and a half years after losing his majority in parliament.  Another difference with Italy is the generally favorable attitude to immigration for all parties. Of the newer parties Ciudadanos remains at the centre and the Podemos party remains to the left in politics, as part of the populist changes in Spain during the economic crisis. The new government of Pedro Sanchez has a positive attitude to immigrants and to women, with the largest number of women in the cabinet of any European country. ...

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The Vickers commission, has been appointed by the Cameron government to look into the British banking system and the largest banks. Ringfencing to protect retail deposits from the bank's other investment activities has been suggested. The focus is on increasing capital requirements as critical to protecting British taxpayers and the banking system. This means going beyond the Basel 3 requirements to build an extra safety buffer for the types of situations the British government was faced with in HBOS, where losses were even greater than average. Determining this should be coordinated with EU and Basel regulators.

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Bank of Scotland stands to lose close to 90% of the value for a 1500 acre luxury golf-course property and homes it financed in Hawaii called Hokuli'a. From its peak price of $600-800 million it is now going for $50-100 million after the developer based in Phoenix defaulted on the $1 billion loan from Bank of Scotland, which is now part of Lloyd's Banking Group.

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Sir Fred Goodwin left RBS with a 693,000 British pounds annual that was arranged in the contract. At the end of 2007 Sir Fred was owed 597,000 British pounds, but when he was forced out in October 2008, Sir Fred 50 years old, was given credit for 10 years more work, increasing the payout to 693,000 British pounds a year. With the highest annual loss in British history of 24 billion pounds reported by RBS for 2008, the government is asking Sir Fred to take areduced pension. This has resulted in a nasty exchange with Sir Fred who has refused, and the British public and the people of Edinburgh especially are furious. "There is asense of fury that the government seems impotent, unable to act when the man chiefly responsible for the bank's collapse is able to walk away with apension that others can only dream of- and at the ripe olfd age of 50!" said David Pickering, aspokesman for the Edinburgh Association of Community Councils. "And what is worse that we, the British taxpayers are actually paying for it."...

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As the UK's biggest banks are hit hard in the markets, RBS shares down 39%, HBOS down 42%, and Lloyd's down 13%, Barclays down 9%, on Tuesday October 7, 2008, Brown takes a bold step to recapitalize British banks. In recent years as the boom years progressed British banks handled global capital equal or greater than Britain's entire economic output for a year, and making London the global financial hub rivalling New York. Brown offered to buy stakes in British banks for as much as 50 billion pounds or $88 billion.

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At the G7 meeting in Washington of finance ministers efforts to pitch Gordon Brown's plan to other G7 members. The British idea to expand its proposal to other countries has a lot of support on Wall Street and is being studied by officials at Treasury and US government officials. Under the British plan the government would guarantee upto 250 million pounds ($432 billion) in bank debt maturing in 36 months. It is also injecting capital into British banks in exchange for equity stakes. The government is also considering removing a ceiling on deposit insurance giving essentially unlimited protection to bank deposits to protect investors and banks seeing withdrawals from scared investors.