LyrArc Article Gist
The terms of the debt restructuring deal with the bond swap in Greece become clear on March 9, 2012. In the deal with private bondholders -using collective action clauses to force remaining bondholders into the deal- about 96% of the 206 billion euros of Greece's bonds will be exchanged. Private bondholders held out throughout most of 2011, delaying the inevitable as Greece's economic situation became increasingly hopeless. This created a logjam with the German government, which insisted on serious private sector participation and bondholder haircut as the cost of poor lending decisions of the French, German and other European banks that made loans to Greece out of proportion of the ability of Greece to payback loans. Charles Dallara of the Institute of International Finance, negotiating for European banks, offered a 10% average loss on the bonds in July 2009. It was not until German Chancellor Merkel told Dallara at a late night meeting on October 27, 2011: "this is my last offer," for a 50% loss on the face value of the bonds, was agreement reached. The Greek debt swap that now takes place will give private bondholders a loss of 53.5% from the face value of 200 billion euros of bonds that they hold. The new Greek bonds issued in place of the old bonds include short-term bonds issued by the eurozone rescue fund at 15% of the face value of the old bonds, and a series of Greek bonds with maturity ranging from 11-30 years valued at 31.5% of the face value of old bonds. That even this 53.5% bondholder loss will not be adequate, as Greece's economy looks irretrievably damaged as it spirals downwards, is shown by the value of these bonds already trading in a hypothetical "gray market." The new 30 year bond is quoted at 17 cents and the 11 year bond at 22 cents.
The questions remain about the stalling by the banks in taking the losses earlier- was this the wisest move considering the losses beyond Greece as the eurozone economy as a whole has suffered from the prolonged negotiations stretching through 2011, lurching from one crisis to the next? Even if the stalling was designed to give time for banks to repair their balance sheets, was this the best strategy, considering the damage inflicted on European economic growth. John Taylor of Stanford points out that the European banks delayed the unavoidable serious debt restructuring for too long, when insolvency was the real issue not illiquidity, and exaggerated the effect of contagion from the beginning- in John Taylor, WSJ, 2/22/2012, A Better Grecian Bailout. And John Cochrane of the University of Chicago, points out that French and German governments if they bailout French and German banks should do so openly and frankly rather than cover this up as bailouts of countries, because this would lead to serious questions about the poor lending decisions of the European banks and government supervision of the banks- in Cochrane, WSJ, 12/2/2010, 'Contagion' and other Euro Myths. As early as Feb. 2010, Cochrane was suggesting the forced exchange of new bonds with long debt maturities for exisiting bonds with short debt maturities, as short term debt was the major issue here. ...
