LyrArc Article Gist
Mark Landler of the NYT intervews Ben Bernanke at his office overlooking the Washington Mall, and Secretary Paulson in his Treasury office. Both men look back at events that led to Chinese savings financing excessive American consumption, and currency and other policies on both sides perpetuating the dependence of America on lowpriced Chinese products, and of China on the American export market. Now that this export market is collapsing it presents China with serious problems with unemployment in the export sector, and pesents America with the hangover from a consumption binge that now must be paid for with years of low or negative growth. Could this have been foreseen and if foreseen could things either have been mitigated or prevented. In March 2005, Prof. Bernanke at Princeton was not at the Fed (his Fed job started in 2006), and cautioned about the imbalances presented by Chinese savings finacing American consumption. But Bernanke saw this as a market phenomenon that would take years, even a decade to work itself out in a global economy. He said "for now, we have little choice except to be patient." The prevailing opinion among Greenspan, Bernanke and others was that the global economy worked in ways that were ultimately benign and regulation was not a good thing. After all the situation benefitted American consumers and kept inflation low while also providing China as an additional engine for global economic growth. The American economy it was believed was large and resilient, and it would not be adversely affected in the long run by such a large dependence on foreign savings. Only the positive effects were visible and the adverse effects were simply talked away as not serious for now. Zoellick, who was deputy secretary of state says that successful models are very hard to change, and Paulson says that without some kind of crisis its hard to get changes made once asituation gets entrenched. For China efforts to strengthen the currency that would slow exports and improve internal consumption were stymied by a reluctance to disturb the status quo, and Americans were lulled into complacency as years of low priced imports provided the best of both worlds, high growth and low inflation.